Rank and File
A Clerk’s War
20th January to 31st January 1940
The next day I was back in the office, and determined to clear the backlog of information.
The first few things I looked at were not particularly interesting, but then I saw a collection of papers from General von Rundstedt, commander of the Nordsee Army. He is not an alarmist, so for him to write to Berlin something important must have happened. Quickly glancing through the documents, I saw what prompted his unusual action. At 1PM on 20th January, an estimated 60,000 Scandinavians attacked our forward positions in Slagelse. The operation was led by and mainly consisted of Norwegians, but there were also a large number of Swedes. Von Rundstedt reports that after some initial confusion, our troops realised that there was no real chance that the Scandinavians would break through, and started to return fire in an organised way. After just a few hours it started to get dark and the enemy pulled back, leaving 29 men behind. Tallying our losses was difficult as there were so many nationalities involved, but the final total was 36 dead. The conclusion by the Nordsee Army was that the Scandinavians were testing our defences. Perhaps they were unaware that we now have more than 170,000 men in the province.
First Battle of Slagelse
Most of the documents I skimmed through, but one caught my eye. It was a hand-written report from General Wilhelm Keitel, commander of 22.Infanterie Division. (Keitel was a promising officer, and was temporarily Military Governor of the Sudentenland. He was known to be very close to the traitor Himmler, however, and his career took a sharp turn for the worse). The General was actually carrying out an inspection of his men on the front line at the time of the attack, and jotted down some comments as soon as he had a moment free. Some of his comments give an idea of what it was like during the assault.
“At 1300 hours on 10th January 1940 I was carrying out a routine review of the forward positions of the 16th Infantry Regiment. Conditions were cold (-5.0 degrees C) with a light wind. The sky was overcast and there was occasional rain and sleet. The terrain in front of our positions was fairly flat, but covered in light vegetation. Recent snow had covered the entire landscape.
I heard sounds of gunfire to the north, where two Italian divisions had been deployed. Even at that distance it was apparent that the shots were not Italian: the sound of the Norwegian Krag-Jorgensen rifle is easily distinguishable from that of the Facile Modele 98. At that moment I was told that movement had been detected in front of our position. Through binoculars I saw one or two camouflaged soldiers some distance away, but before I could prepare a response we were hit with a wave of small arms fire. Obviously the Norwegians and Swedes had taken advantage of the snow cover to move close to our lines and mount an assault. Now that the forward troops had been detected, more of the enemy opened fire, and we were being raked by a couple of Colt M/29 heavy machine guns hidden in some nearby woods. The damn Norwegians must have brought them up during the night in preparation for the attack.
These Norwegians are armed with Krag-Jorgensen rifles and wearing the snow camouflage suits that were so effective. This photograph was recovered from a Norwegian soldier after the battle – no matter how often they are told about security, soldiers in every army always carry personal items.
Within minutes our machine guns were busy, but we were taking casualties. The regiment’s mortars were already in action, and I could see the enemy fleeing from several small areas of woodland that were being torn apart by the shells. A slight rise a kilometre away gave the attackers a protected area from which to infiltrate forward, but I heard Oberst Schimmel personally direct the divisional artillery to blanket the area with high-explosive. The Oberst had the situation under control, so I left him to manage the defence and headed north. Behind the lines there was chaos. For the past few weeks tens of thousands of Italians, Hungarians and Slovakians have been arriving here in Slagelse, and there seemed to be little organisation. With the sound of gunfire to the east, artillery shells passing overhead and reinforcements moving, the soldiers, lacking any reliable information, started to listen to rumours and began to panic. Not being fluent in any of these languages, it was only by judicious use of force that I could restore a modicum of order. I understand that none of the injuries will be permanent.
A Norwegian Colt M/29 heavy machine gun: I hope these men are fooling around as there is no way these would be effective as an anti-air weapon.
The Italian divisions who had first detected the advance were handling the attack well. General Messe, commander of 1a Divisione Alpina “Taurinese” is fluent in German, and assured me that his compatriot further north, General Cambroni, was a fine officer whose men could be relied upon. I had no doubt of this, as 4a Divisione Alpina “Cuneense” had earned a reputation in Switzerland for being an elite unit desperate to prove itself. Up here there seemed to be Swedish units involved, as I distinctly heard a Ksp M/36 firing, the 6.6mm cartridges giving them a completely different sound to the Colt, although they are the same basic weapon.
The Italians fought steadily, driving back the Swedes. These two used their Breda 30mm effectively, but we heard that many of these weapons broke down during the battle. It seems to be a design problem: the many slots and the necessity to oil the cartridges make them susceptible to seizing up in snow (and presumably in any dirty or dusty environment).
Moving to the rear, I could see that the local commanders had regained control. Several Italian divisions were lining up to use the “roads” and moving forward in an orderly fashion. The Hungarian officers were also marshalling their troops, but there seemed no need to send any more men to the front, as I could already hear the gunfire decreasing.
It was lucky for us that the Scandinavians chose to attack at just the time that our best units were rotated to the front line. The only two German divisions in the province and the two best Italian mountain divisions just happened to be in the front. If one of the Slovakian militia divisions had been attacked, things may have been different. I am sure the individual soldiers are brave, but without training it is difficult to hold your position when under fire from an invisible enemy. It needs steadiness to stay in your entrenchment or machinegun position and either wait for the mortars and guns to break the attack or for the enemy to give up concealment and try to storm your position.
I believe that although the Scandinavians attacked in force, that this was more in the nature of a probing attack, designed to identify our defensive positions and lines of fire, as well as to test our response times. Had it been more successful the enemy commander was in a position to quickly reinforce a breakthrough, but in my opinion this was not a serious attempt to drive us from Slagesle. The attackers came only from one direction (Helsingor) and attacked at 1PM, when there were only a few hours of daylight left at this time of year. There were no aircraft involved, and as far as I could determine, most of the units used were recently mobilised divisions, not regular army.
My recommendation is that some of our fortified positions be moved, and that new areas be designated for marshalling reinforcements in case the Norwegians use information gained to pre-plot artillery barrages. I predict more probing attacks over the next few weeks as the days start to get longer and there is more opportunity for a major assault. I also recommend that our allies be instructed to organise their troops. The Italians are from four different corps, and two different armies. Both the Army HQ units are still in Italy! (Too cold for them up here?). The Hungarians are not much better. Unless there is an improvement, I fear that these troops will only impair our ability to hold the province, as the demand for food and other supplies is placing an enormous strain on our commissariat. Finally, despite the demands from OKH that we release more divisions for the Balkans and “other operations”, it is essential that the Wehrmacht retain at least two divisions in this area, to ensure that a sudden surprise attack does not see us thrown completely off the island of Zealand.
Wilhelm Keitel
22.Infanterie Division
Slagelse”
It seems clear that despite his demotion, the General has not lost his edge. An attached note states that his adjutant was killed during the initial attack, and that Oberst Schimmel, commander of the 16th Infantry Regiment, personally implored the General to take cover. I hope he is not looking for a bullet: I have seen how some officers (particularly of decorated veterans of the last war) handle disgrace.
Speaking of decorations, it cannot be long before Käpitan-zur-See von Nordeck receives some sort of award: he is mentioned almost daily on the Wehrmachtbericht. On the 21st his U-boats sank another three transports in a single attack on a convoy from Nauru. He claims the British freighters were so heavily laden that they were easy to hit, but his success is not so easily shrugged off. The loss of thousands of tonnes of fertiliser will hit the English farmers hard, at a time when they are being called upon to feed more of the population.
Back in the more mundane world of factories and production, three new radar bases were completed. One was installed at Brest, perfectly placed to detect British naval operations. Another was deployed far to the south, at Bayonne, where it will hopefully provide information on Spanish activities (and keep an eye on the Bay of Biscay). The third was placed in Frederikshafen, to detect both naval activity in the North Sea, and incoming aircraft intending to hit the port facilities. In response to the demands of the Heer for second line troops to free up the experienced combat divisions, two more security divisions (2 garrison regiments and a police brigade) were called up, as well as another cavalry division. The two regiments of cavalry are intended to hunt down rebels while the infantry hold the cities and mining areas safe from insurrection: that is the plan anyway.
The next bundle of papers bore a massive Kriegsmarine stamp and were marked “Naval Tactical Report: Restricted” which immediately attracted my interest. It contained all relevant documentation of a series of engagements involving von Nordeck’s II Unterseebootsflotte, commencing at 11AM on 22nd January and concluding late on 24th January. Von Nordeck’s submarines, the scourge of the Channel approaches, had pushed their luck just a little too far that day, and were caught on the surface by a Royal Navy detachment that seems to have been escorting some out-of-supply Dutch submarines to port. Von Nordeck had hoped the bad weather would allow him to clear the Channel at surface speed, but a sudden wind change led to his discovery. The flagship of the British group was the “Royal Sovereign”, the battleship that on 22nd October 1939 had led the British fleet in the Battle of the Bälts, the ship that had probably sunk the “Admiral Scheer”. But this ancient battleship was no threat even to von Nordeck’s three flotillas of Type II submarines. The danger came from two destroyer flotillas, which immediately sprang into action.
Battle of the Channel Approach: 11AM 22nd January
Luck, which led von Nordeck to blunder into the way of the Royal Navy, then went his way. He had ordered his submarines to each fire all three bow torpedoes prior to diving, hoping to cause confusion and allow his submarines to reach their maximum depth of 150 metres before the destroyers could reach him. This was a risky operation, as the Type II boats only carry 5 torpedoes each and some of the submarines were left defenceless. The gamble paid off however, as several destroyers of 8th Destroyer Flotilla were damaged, and the ensuing fires tied up the crews for the duration of the battle.
A British ship firing depth charges during the Battle of the Channel Approach
An hour later, the destroyers were circling the submerged submarines, while von Nordeck’s commanders struggled to keep a balance between protecting their ships and being ready to take an opportunity to finish the damaged destroyers. The British were using their ASDIC detection system, which made it difficult for von Nordeck to extricate his flotillas. Luckily ASDIC is not effective when very close to the target, so the destroyers lost contact when they made their depth charge runs, but a couple of the ships had depth charge launchers which allowed them to “throw” the depth charge ahead. The cat and mouse battle continued for several hours, but by 2PM the Royal Navy had sunk every U-boat of 4th Unterseebootsflottille. It had not been without cost: with 8th Destroyer Flottila crippled, 10th Destroyer had taken the key offensive role, and von Nordeck’s commanders had easier shots as those ships. Von Nordeck also commented that with only one or two torpedoes left, his commanders were being very careful with their shots. Many of the destroyers were badly damaged by 2PM, and at 4PM a perfectly placed torpedo from U-13, commanded by Hans-Gerrit von Stockhausen, sank the last ship of 10th Destroyer Flotilla.
Battle of the Channel Approach: 2PM 22nd January
During the night the U-boats managed to resurface and recharge their batteries, but none of them considered it worthwhile to attempt a full speed (13knots) escape. It was dark, but the cloud cover that had existed at 2PM had nearly all gone, and though there was intermittent snow, nobody wanted to leave a long fluorescent wake for any patrolling British aircraft. That is not to say that progress towards escape was not being made: even submerged the U-boats were using their pitiful 7 knots to head west, trying to get beyond the confines of the Channel.
Korvetten-Käpitan Hans-Gerrit von Stockhausen, commander of U-13, wearing the Iron Cross he was awarded for his actions on 22nd January 1940.
At 6AM, bad news. Two new destroyer flotillas arrived, the 40th and 38th. Things were looking grim for II Unterseebootsflotte, as they were almost defenceless, having used nearly all their torpedoes. But again luck went their way. For the whole of the 23rd, the British hunted von Nordeck’s boats, but despite repeated searches they met with no success. By 11AM on the 24th January, the Royal Navy had flooded the area with ships. Admiral Chatfield had arrived to take direct command, and had brought another three destroyer flotillas, the 37th, 41st and 42nd. But by then it was too late: the ASDIC probes revealed nothing and the depth charges were wasted. II Unterseebootsflotte had quietly slipped out into open seas, having lost a third of its boats, but thankful it was not worse.
Battle of the Channel Approach: 6AM 23rd January
While it is clear from von Nordeck’s report that he is partly to blame for the loss of 4th Unterseebootsflottille, the official Kriegsmarine review of the naval action found that his orders led not only to the escape of the balance of his force, but also the sinking of several British destroyers. He will not be censured by Admiral Dönitz, who probably wishes he had more such leaders (von Nordeck is the most successful commander in terms of ships sunk). The official review also notes that although none of the “Town” class destroyers were sighted during the battle, it seems more than likely that news of their arrival allowed the British Admiralty to release destroyers from convoy duty to patrol the English Channel, so we have suffered already from the perfidious American decision.
The U-13 heads for the open sea after the tense days of the Battle of the Channel Approach
While the Royal Navy hunted our beleaguered submarines, the Royal Air Force was again trying to hit our economic centres. Felmy intercepted Newall over Erfurt and followed him to Leipzig. Once again Newall’s bombing was ineffective, and occe again he was chased back to the Channel where Bogatsch’s 5th Fliegerkorps took over, as 2nd Fliegerkorps returned to base to refuel and re-arm. As we have now come to expect, as soon as our planes were over the Channel, Steele’s fighters appeared, and Bogatsch had to abandon any attempt to further punish the bombers. Our estimate is that Strategic Bomber Command lost more than 40 aircraft in this one raid, and while we lost a few fighters, it was nowhere near that figure. Our intelligence operative have come the conclusion that the British Fighter Command has forbidden its commanders to venture past the Channel: good for our fighter defence, but dangerous should we ever decide to send bombing mission to the United Kingdom’s production facilities.
Air Battle of the Mouth of the Thames
The 24th saw another completed project from a Heer research group. (Since war began there has been a wave of tactical and strategic work groups set up by General von Blomberg. We are receiving vast amounts of data from combat units, and the General is convinced that we can learn a lot from our experience. Some of the best minds in the Reich are at work devising new procedures and techniques to take advantage of this knowledge, all aiming at reducing casualties and increasing the speed and effectiveness of our attacks). This project related to the coordination of large scale offensives, and promises to both raise the shock value of our lead units and cut supply usage by the headquarters involved. General von Blomberg argued extremely persuasively that the researchers be allowed to continue their work (I have in front of me copies of several long and strongly worded letters) but Minister Schacht again prevailed: the research funds will be used to develop advanced methods of steel production. Our production of steel cannot keep up with the demands of the shipbuilding, construction and armaments industries, and in the absence of trade deals the only way to avoid a crisis is to improve our efficiency in mining the ore and manufacturing the steel.
Minister Schacht won his battle just in time. The very next day a jubilant Foreign Minister advised his fellow Cabinet Ministers of a massive deal with the Soviet Union. They will provide us with 20,700 tonnes of steel and 17,000 tonnes of mixed rare materials (mainly other metal ores I think) per day, for a cost of 3.66 million RM. The cost to us is immaterial: most of it comes from captured banks and anyway, we expect to retake it in a year or so. The main thing is that trainloads of desperately needed raw materials will be heading for our factories, and our future enemy will be providing the means with which we will defeat him! Life can be sweet in its ironies! Coincidentally, the day the trains started heading west, we were told that road and rail links across Poland and Memel had been improved, part of our long-term preparations for the drive to the East. This had been an absolutely enormous program, with hundreds of thousands of labourers working in Bydgoszcz, Gniezno, Gostyn, Konin, Kutno, Leszno, Lódz, Poznan, Prusków, Sieradz, Slupca, Turek and Wloclawek. According to Minister Bayerlein it is essential that we have a reliable network across Poland to the border before we can contemplate any push to the East.
General Guderian, newly appointed commander of the Balkans Army, has been complaining loudly for some time that he has insufficient troops to carry out an invasion of Yugoslavia (should he be asked to do so). He has only three korps: a total of 11 divisions. He has pointed out that he has no armour units at all, and that while the border areas are unsuitable for armour operations, once through the mountain passes and the hilly areas behind them the plains extend most of the way to Beograd. He has convinced OKH of the merits of his argument, and an upset General Rommel has grudgingly agreed to release 1st leichte Panzerkorps. (I can understand his annoyance: back on 21st January he saw 2nd, 4th, 5th and 6th Kampffliegerkorps leave their French airbases, transferred to the Balkan Army). The sudden adjustment has created turmoil in the Interior Ministry which has had to reroute hundreds of trains and give priority to the tank transporters carrying the Panzers from the Atlantic coast to the Adriatic. They will need to hurry – there is a rumour that 1st February is the day marked in Guderian’s calendar.
General Kleist’s predictions of more probes in the Slagelse region were remarkably accurate. On the 27th brief fire fights were reported by all four divisions on the front line, and there were several sightings of Swedish bombers, though no bombs landed on our positions. These probes differed from the first in that they took place at 4AM, in pitch darkness, and while a snow storm was raging. Our troops performed well, and only 13 men were lost, compared to 8 Scandinavians. Considering that we believe 70,000 Norwegians and Swedes took part in the attack, casualties were very low. Perhaps the conditions had something to do with it: I can’t imagine how either side could see anything worth firing at.
On the 28th more evidence that steps were already being taken to prepare for the long-awaited attack on the Communists. Construction gangs have been set up in Memel, Suwalki, Warszawa, Przwmysl and Kraków, with orders to expand the local airbases. Another gang has been sent to Innsbruck to work on the airbase there, but I suspect it will be too late to be useful for General Guderian’s aircraft. (A few files down, I found similar orders setting up road and rail gangs in the provinces of Jaroslaw, Niemirów, Krasnobród, Tomaszów Lubelski, Chelm, Wlodawa, Biala Podlaska, Bielsk-Podalski, Sokolów and Memel. All are close to our current border with Russian, and work will be completed by September next year. Things are warming up in the East).
On the same day, Minister Fricke (in his role as Head of Intelligence) sent the secret coded messages that put our agents in Norway, Sweden and Republican Spain on active alert. All have been instructed to seek out military details, regardless of the risk.
At the end of the month, we received an update from the Italians regarding progress in their attack on Greece. (One military aide muttered to me: “Things must be going very well if they are going to volunteer information”). After a slight problem at the beginning of the campaign, the Regia Esercito has broken through the Greek front lines and is pursuing the Greeks southwards into the mountains. Apparently all is going well. Several of the accompanying photographs seem to indicate perhaps not every problem has been overcome.
Il Duce and Victor Emmanuel III review troops heading to Albania to join the war on Greece
Greek soldiers: the Italian briefing paper contrasts these “brigands” to the crack soldiers in the photograph above, but I know who I would prefer to have beside me in the mountains of the Dinaric Alps! Those bayonets look as though they have been carefully sharpened! The defence made of discarded ammunition boxes, however, will not last long against heavy weapons.
Weather conditions are not conducive to a rapid advance: whatever influenced Mussolini to attack before spring?
So as January closes, we have a new armies sitting on the borders of Spain and Yugoslavia, a vast force built up in Denmark, and a surge of (long term) preparation in Poland. You don’t need to be psychic to predict that February will see the Wehrmacht in action again.
Unterseebootsflotte Activity Report
Horseshoe Mount:
1 escort (UK): Bombay – Plymouth: Dönitz
Coast of Porto:
1 transport (UK): Singapore – Plymouth: Wolf
Western Channel Approaches:
3 transports (UK): Nauru – Plymouth: von Nordeck
Setubal Bay:
2 transports (UK) Plymouth – Kuching: Dönitz
Cape St Vincent:
2 transports (UK): Dubai – Plymouth: Dönitz
Channel Approach:
2 transports (UK): Plymouth – Tel Aviv-Yato: von Nordeck
Channel Approach:
1 transport (UK): Plymouth – Socotra: von Nordeck
Cape St Vincent:
1 transport (UK): Plymouth – Rangoon: Dönitz
Galician Bank:
1 transport (UK): Plymouth – Diego Garcia: Wolf
Cape St Vincent:
1 transport (UK): Plymouth – Barbados: Dönitz
Coast of Galica:
1 transport (UK): Plymouth – Accra: Wolf
Cape St Vincent:
2 transports (UK): Plymouth – Madras: Dönitz
Western Channel Approaches:
2 transports (Norwegian): Bergen – Boston: von Nordeck
Cape Finisterre:
1 transport (UK): Plymouth – Socotra: Wolf
Channel Approach:
1 transport (UK): Plymouth – Singapore: Wolf
At the end of the month, in the absence of an official Cabinet meeting, a series of confidential position maps were circulated. Copies had to be filed of course.
The Yugoslav border: Guderian’s men are still trying to reach their start positions
Albania and Greece: the Italians have sent thousands of troops and the outnumbered Greeks are being forced back.
China: have the Japanese overreached themselves? Rebellions in Muang Xon and Huizhou could be a concern.
Siam: large Japanese forces are reported heading south. What has the Japanese High Command got in mind? And what are those British troops doing in Siam?
North Africa - the forgotten war. After marching across the desert, Iraqi forces are ready to attack the last Italains stronghold in Libya: Tarabulus. With only three infantry regiments, two headquarters units and few squadrons of transport planes, General Pricolo has problems. But his back is to the sea, and that may stiffen his resolve.