This is a fantastic AAR! How do you find such great images? I can barely find any good images for my AAR with google.
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Thanks. I use only Google as well, you just have to know where and what to look.
I recently read war memories of a soviet infantry commander, and he writes that Finns were masters of machine gun combat. Far more skilled than the Germans (marksmanship for one).
Now this is GREAT aar!! 
Nice to see what I don't know about Finland's history even though Im a Finn
Nice to see what I don't know about Finland's history even though Im a Finn
I wonder what will the gameplay portion look like? It seems to me that the only way to not get one's behind handed to the player, is to hold the fortified line near Leningrad, and logistic-bomb Karelia, so that northern thrust can be held off.
Meanwhile, many thanks for the history lesson.
Meanwhile, many thanks for the history lesson.
I´ve edited the infrastructure of the region to historical levels - there were four (4!) dirt roads crossing the border during the war era, and thus the amusing 40-60% infrastructure levels that Paradox placed to Eastern Karelia are gone for good:
http://images.military.com/Resources/pics/worldwarii_europe_map16_largerview.jpg
The gameplay part will start from 1939-scenario, but I still have ton of tinkering to do to before the virtual Winter War will begin, so expect the previously promised naval update next.
http://images.military.com/Resources/pics/worldwarii_europe_map16_largerview.jpg
The gameplay part will start from 1939-scenario, but I still have ton of tinkering to do to before the virtual Winter War will begin, so expect the previously promised naval update next.
I´ve edited the infrastructure of the region to historical levels - there were four (4!) dirt roads crossing the border during the war era, and thus the amusing 40-60% infrastructure levels that Paradox placed to Eastern Karelia are gone for good:
http://images.military.com/Resources/pics/worldwarii_europe_map16_largerview.jpg
The gameplay part will start from 1939-scenario, but I still have ton of tinkering to do to before the virtual Winter War will begin, so expect the previously promised naval update next.
Looking forward to it ^_
I wonder if Paradox added good infra to those provinces so that USSR AI actually wins the winter war fairly quickly instead of getting bogged down until 1942.
The early test games I´ve played seem to indicate that such ahistorical and unrealistic shortcuts are luckily unnecessary. I plan to ensure this by adding plains-terrain to southern Isthmus and using Krazy19Karls Magrathea map mod. I´m under the impression that he plans to change the provincial borders in the region so that Koivisto and not Käkisalmi will have two-province border. This way Käkisalmi will remain a sideshow front behind the Vuoksi-river and these changes should encourage the AI to fully focus its efforts to the vicinity of Leningrad.
The fact that the AI also tends to send single divisions to wander along the narrow "roads" of higher infra in northern part of the country without any consideration to flank security is also quite promising
The early test games I´ve played seem to indicate that such ahistorical and unrealistic shortcuts are luckily unnecessary. I plan to ensure this by adding plains-terrain to southern Isthmus and using Krazy19Karls Magrathea map mod. I´m under the impression that he plans to change the provincial borders in the region so that Koivisto and not Käkisalmi will have two-province border. This way Käkisalmi will remain a sideshow front behind the Vuoksi-river and these changes should encourage the AI to fully focus its efforts to the vicinity of Leningrad.
The fact that the AI also tends to send single divisions to wander along the narrow "roads" of higher infra in northern part of the country without any consideration to flank security is also quite promising
Well, I hope it doesn't look like this at the beginning of the Winter War:
Can't really wait for the next update, keep up the excellent work
Well, I hope it doesn't look like this at the beginning of the Winter War:
Can't really wait for the next update, keep up the excellent work
Ouch. Thats how it was for me when I played as the Russians except that was seen throughout the entire border...hehe I wanted a swift victory with zero mistakes and thats what I got.
The war versus the Germans...so far not so much.
Big fan of Finland... Man, if you survive the USSR HOI mass attacks, well played... straight up infantry+land fort all the way is usually the only way to survive...
From Barents to Baltic - Finnish Navy
Coastal defense ship Ilmarinen in a summer training exercise in late 1930s. The picture outlines the intented wartime role of Ilmarinen and Väinämöinen - the ships were intented to act first and foremost as floating coastal artillery batteries armed with 254mm Bofors main guns, specifically build to fight in the conditions of rugged Baltic coast filled with small islands and shallow waterways of Archipelago Sea.
From Coast Guard to Navy - the first postwar years
The first military ships independent Finland had were smaller vessels that the rebellious Russian Baltic Fleet could not move out in time when it sailed out from Helsinki in the closing stage of the Finnish Civil War when the Germans led by von der Goltz were already invading the country. During the two following years the fledling Finnish Navy was further reinforced by captured Russian gunboats Golub and Pingvin, handed over by the Germans in November 1918. The first task of the small Finnish Navy (Suomen Laivasto) was demining the extensive naval minefields Russian Navy had used to defend the approaches to the coasts of the Grand Duchy.
Meanwhile the actual coastal defense was still primarily the duty of the extensive coastal artillery that the Russians had steadily reinforced through the war era to defend St. Petersburg. During the following years the organization of Finnish coastal defense was slowly taking shape after a specific military committee had been set up to review the issue. Before the year 1927 the duties of coastal defense were still split up between three different commands: Navy, Coastal Artillery and War Harbour Command that was responsible for maintaining the harbours and naval bases. Meanwhile the Navy continued to demine the coast, opening shipping lines back for export traffic. The task was rather demanding and time-consuming for inexperienced crews operating with old, obsolete ships, and this fatal combination caused a disaster in 1925.
Old Russian gunboats Hämeenmaa and Uusimaa formed the heaviest units of Finnish Navy for over a decade.
During the same year when a political process for buying new ships to replace the aging vessels of the existing fleet had finally started, the old torpedo boats of the Coastal Squadron were caught in a sudden autumn storm in open sea at the Gulf of Bothnia in a middle of a training exercise for new naval conscripts. One of the ships, an old Russian torpedo boat named S 2 quickly capsized and sunk, taking almost her whole crew with her. This was so far the worst military accident in the short history of the new republic, and the deaths of the young crew shocked the whole nation. As a result of the public outrage towards the dismal state of the naval forces, a new public assosiation called Finnish Naval Union was organized in 1926 to promote the agenda of Finnish naval program. A year later the lobbying of Naval Union met success, as the new Naval Law of 1927 granted formidable funds for naval expansion program.
Schemes and submarines - Crichton-Vulcan and secret German U-boat research
When the Committee of Coastal Defense had publicly stated that Finnish Navy should obviously field submarines in the future, Allan Staffans, the leader of the Finnish shipyard Crichton-Vulcan had quickly started to use his extensive commercial contacts to secure the future order of these warships for his company. Well before the accident of torpedo boat S 2 Staffans had made early contacts with the representatives of Ingenieurskantoor voor Scheepsbouw, a Dutch company that acted as a cover firm for secret German U-boat research program. Since the Versailles Treaty forbade Germany to construct U-boats, the Germans had sought to bypass the clauses of the treaty by licence-building their new submarines abroad. According to the secret deal between IvS and Staffans, the Germans would provide the specs and the know-how for Crichton-Vulcan so that the company could offer the Finnish government the politically good option of building the new submarines for the Navy in Finland.
In 1927 the government did indeed order three submarines from Crichton-Vulcan, and the first of the three submarines, Vetehinen, became the first warship constructed in independent Finland in 1930. By 1931 the two others, Vesihiisi and Iku-Turso were also ready for service. The new, modern submarines were proudly sailed through the harbours towns of Finland, and the membership rates of Naval Union soared. Meanwhile Crichton-Vulcan now had plenty of recent practical experience from U-boat construction, and IvS and Staffans signed a new secret treaty in 1930 to build a new prototype model ordered and paid directly by the IvS, with Finland gaining the right to buy the desing after testing. A team of German specialists monitored the whole construction process, and the boat was constructed and finished without any public announcements in 1933 with the codename 707. After the German team had tested the new vessel extensively, it was ultimately sold to Finnish Navy and renamed Vesikko. Later on it became clear that Finnish Navy had bought themselves the final prototype of IIA-class U-boat.
The secret prototype of first German mass-produced U-boat model served the Finnish Navy well.
As the new submarines gained new public support for Finnish naval program, newspapers were soon drawing direct comparisons to Sweden where public initiative had earlier started a fundraising campaign that had led to the purchase of HMS Sverige, the first Pansarskepp-class coastal defense ship. By now the government had the option to expand the navy either with new smaller ships or by ordering more expensive heavier units in a similar way than Sweden. Ultimately the lobbying of Naval Union made the government to choose the approach of coastal defense ships, and Crichton-Vulcan was once again able to secure the order - Allan Staffans had once again contacted his business partners in Germany and gained necessary licences and technical advisors to secure the order for his company. After investing to new drydock and special equipment the company was able to deliver the ships in time, and the coastal defense ships (in Finnish this ship type was known as Panssarilaiva "armored ship", a literal translation from Swedish Pansarskepp) Väinämöinen and Ilmarinen were ready in 1930 and 1931.
Armored ships and Åland Question
The Finnish coastal defense ships were highly specialized vessels designed to operate and fight in the conditions of Archipelago and Åland Seas. They were heavily armored and powered by Germania-type diesel engines that provided a meager top speed of 15.5 knots, making the ships little more than mobile coastal forts. The class carried a complement of 343 and was armed with four 10-inch guns in a 2x2 configuration with a modern fire control system that provided the 225kg shells an accurate max range of 30 kilometers. For anti-aircraft purposes the ship type had primary armament of eight 105mm/50cal Dual-Purpose Bofors guns and four 40mm/40cal. Vickers AA-guns supplemented by six additional 20 mm Madsens. Ilmarinen and Väinämöinen, named after the mythical god-hero brothers of Kalevala were first and foremost designed and constructed to fulfill two tasks: their primary role was to act as "fleet in being" in Baltic, thus deterring possible amphibious invasion to Finland by their mere presence. Their secondary role and the very fact that these expensive ships were ordered in the first place mirrored a fundamental change of thinking in Finnish naval strategy. The Naval Law 1927 had provided funds for two coastal defense ships, four submarines and four MTPs, and this naval expansion was based on the newfound need to deter amphibious landings and especially to cover the vitally important shipping lines, the virtually only foreign trade routes of Finland. The need to secure the shipping lines to West was based on a simple assumption. Finnish economy was export-oriented, and virtually all exports were shipped abroad from major harbors of Viipuri, Helsinki, Turku and similar places. The new navy was therefore tasked first and foremost to secure the most important trade route to the West - the shipping route between Stockholm and Turku.
This narrow route went straight past the strategically most important island group in the Baltic - Åland Islands. Situated ideally between Stockholm and Finnish mainland the Island group with its ethnically Swedish inhabitants had caused much early tension between Sweden and Finland when the League of Nations had ultimately degreed that the islands should stay as a part of Finland under a special agreement that gave the locals wide autonomy and priviledges. Even more importantly the Islands had a curious international position. During the peace negotiations that ended the Krimean War, the great powers had forced Russia to demilitarize the islands in 1856. As a part of the League of Nations settlement the demilitarization agreement had been reinforced by a new agreement between Finland, Sweden, Germany, Britain, France, Italy, Poland, Denmark and Latvia. in 1922. According to this more recent treaty Finland had the right to keep only police forces present in the islands in peacetime. Additionally only two light Finnish ships had the right to visit the region in a temporary bases. Finnish Air Forces had the right to fly over the region, but landing to the islands was allowed only in emergency situations. All construction efforts of military installations and fortifications were forbidden, but in a case of war Finland had the right to mine the coastal waters of Åland and send in troops to defend the neutrality of the region. The basis of the treaty was that all signatory powers should aim to keep Åland outside of any conflict in the Baltic region.
The two armored ships were an sizeable investment for a country of four million inhabitants, and they were a proof of the fact how seriously Finland took the question of the safety of her vitally important foreign trade.
The treaty was, in short, a primarily diplomatical gesture that had successfully defused the volatile diplomatical feuding between Sweden and the former "eastern half the kingdom." As the Soviet Baltic Fleet kept growing and Hitler rose to power in Germany and renounced the Versailles Treaty, everyone realized that Åland Islands would play a pivotal role in any naval conflict in northern Baltic. Control of Åland would enable the owner of the islands to effectively shut down all naval traffic between Gulf of Bothnia and rest of the world, blocking the Stockholm-Turku route in the process as well. It was therefore unsurprising that Soviet Union, Germany and even UK (before the Anglo-German Naval Agreement) had secret plans to secure bases in Åland at a time of crisis. The development of Finnish Navy mirrored the knowledge of the changes in the strategic situation in the Baltic. The safety of shipping routes and southern coast of Finland in general became central, and the question of Åland was seen as the key for both issues. Meanwhile the Army leadership was increasingly concerned of the threat of amphibious landings to the flanks and rear. When the possibilities of "Yellow" (the traditional colour of OPFOR in Finnish military map exercises even today) naval invasion to Hanko region were studied, the demands for increased naval presence in Eastern Gulf of Finland were quickly made. During the 1930s the Finnish HQ envisioned that the most likely war scenario was a Soviet invasion focusing to Karelian Isthmus, supported by attempts to invade Åland Islands and/or Hanko, Hamina or Kotka harbours and coastline. Finnish HQ estimated that such an offensive would be part of a wider European war where the Soviet Union would simultaneously invade the Baltic States to gain control of their harbours and airfields.
During the critical interwar period the Finnish Navy had the priviledge of being commanded by a single officer for most of the time, whereas Army and Air Force suffered from constant rotation of commanders and the resulting shifts in priourities. When 29-years old Väinö Valve was chosen to the task, many doubted his chances to succeed. The early organizational shuffling could be seen from his title: while he commanded practically the same force for the whole time, his title changed from Commander of Coastal Artillery to Commander of Coastal Defense, Commander of Sea Defense and then finally to Commander of Finnish Navy. As a commander of the third independent service branch of the armed forces Valve was tasked to supervise the organization and technical changes of Navy as well as coordinate his efforts with rest of the Armed Forces. The first reform he implement was a massive reorganization of Finnish coastal artillery. New batteries were organized along the coast with emphasis being on Lake Laatokka, northern Isthmus and outskirts of Helsinki. This work alone required a lot of resources since the forts were located on islands and far away from major cities and railroad lines.
Old Obuhov-batteries being repositioned to islands of Laatokka in 1920s. The Finnish coastal artillery underwent a major reform postwar decades - modern equipment was concentrated to most vulnerable sectors in Gulf of Finland while obsolete pieces were repositioned to guard the flank of the most likely battlefields in Isthmus and eastern Karelia.
By latter half of 1930s Finnish Navy was firmly aware of its mission and purpose. It was a force tasked to defend sealines to Sweden, with emphasis being on operations around the western openings of the Gulf of Finland. In coastal defense the artillery was reorganized to defend Hanko, Porkkala, Helsinki, Kotka and support the Army by securing the northern coast of Lake Laatokka and western coast of Isthmus. The Navy was also keenly planning to win the "race to Åland" in a possible crisis situation, and initiatives in this field created interesting possibilities for Finnish defense policy in general. In the difficult economical situation and in the face of growing power of Soviet Union and resurgent Germany, the Finnish military leadership was seeking security guarantees from the West. During the 1920s the so-called Erich Comittee had presented the idea of regional defense treaties and mutual cooperation between neighbouring states within the League of Nations, a kind of a Nordic defense treaty within the League concept. By 1933 Japan and Germany had left the organization, and the invasion of Manchuria had fatally weakened the international credibility of the League. As a reaction to these changes Finnish military leadership sought to improve relations and cooperation with friendly neighbouring countries, Estonia and Sweden.
"And since we are now in Finland I refuse to speak Swedish with you gentlemen" - Cooperation with Estonia and Sweden
The cooperation with Estonia dates back to 1930, when the HQs of both countries made a joint plan to block the Gulf of Finland between Porkkala and Naissaari by reconstructing the heavy Russian-era coastal batteries and reinforcing the blockade with minefields and submarines - Finns persuaded Estonia to buy submarines of her own for this very purpose in mind. On 26th of December 1933 Finnish and Estonian HQs held a joint map exercise in Tallinn, studying the case of blockading Gulf of Finland in a wartime situation even further. As a result of the exercise it was acknowledged that to effectively maintain the blockade by coastal artillery, a joint fire control system was required. When an old Tsarist-era sea cable between Finland and Estonia was renewed in 1930s, the new cable was to be set between Mäkiluoto and Naissaari, creating a direct contact between the two coastal batteries controlling the entrance to Gulf of Finland. The development in Estonia during the fall of 1939 stopped the plan that was due to be ready in summer 1940. For Finns the question of blockading Gulf of Finland was vitally important due the vulnerable position of Åland. By setting up the blockade as early as possible in a case of war, the Finnish Navy would win more time to transfer troops to the demilitarized area. The Finnish Operational HQ reviewed the situation in pessimistic terms in 1934: Soviet Union had the resources to occupy Åland Islands and possibly the whole Archipelago Sea, and the appearance of Soviet naval and air bases to this region would seal the fate of Finland. As long as the demilitarization treaty was in force, Finland would be unable to stop such an operation alone.
But because Åland was also strategically pivotally important for Stockholm, Swedish HQ had also been making plans for crisis situations. During the 1930s plans to send several divisions to northern Finland to support Finnish defenses in a case of a Soviet invasion based on the founding charter of League of Nations had been in development ever since the year 1923. Swedish military leadership had also devised another, less ambitious but strategically even more important plan for joint defense of Åland Islands. Ironically military leadership in both countries firmly supported the idea of Swedish expedition to northern Finland, but much smaller-scale operation in Åland caused much more friction. There were several reasons for disagreements in this question. A defense revision was just finishing its final report in Sweden in 1930, when the matter was first brought up in negotiations. This parliamentary committee was setting up a wide and comprehensive memorandum to fully reorganize the Swedish defense policy, and its members fully believed that when the question of "sanction aid" to Finland had been solved in positive manner, the questions regarding Åland would now solve automatically.
Italian-made MTB on the move. Finnish interest towards motor torpedo boats dates back to chaotic times of Russian Civil War, when A flotilla of British Coastal Motor Boats operating from bases in Finland under the command of captain Augustus Agar raided Kronstadt Harbour twice, sinking the cruiser Oleg and the depot ship Pamiat Azova on June as well as damaging the battleships Petropavlovsk and Andrei Pervozvanny on August, at the cost of three CMBs.
For the Finnish General HQ and Operational HQ the Åland Question was still the final blockade between a wider agreement between the two countries. Finnish Chief of Staff Airo wrote to Swedish HQ that "the demilitarization treaty was the single remaining obstacle in creatind deeper military cooperation between Sweden and Finland. It was decisively important to review the treaty and remove the parts that limited Finland´s rights to organize the defense of the region." Finnish strategists feared that if the Soviets would seize Åland by surprise in opening phase of a wider conflict in the Baltic region, they could keep Sweden out of the war by making Stockholm and rest of Sweden much more vulnerable for Soviet counterattacks in case of a posssible Swedish intervention. As the negotiations now revolved around the Åland issue, the language question in Finland gained new publicity. University students in Helsinki begun to put pressure on Finnish government and Eduskunta to "Finnicize" the University of Helsinki by a new language legislation. While the students aim was quite understandable (the top university of the country refused to educate persons in several sciences with a language that was spoken by +90% of the total population of the country), these events caused a clear conflict of interest to Finnish foreign policy in a situation where President Svinhufvud, Mannerheim and the government in general sought support from Sweden and other Scandinavian countries. Many Swedish officers like Carl August Ehrensvärd were deeply disturbed by the rising nationalism in Finnish politics. Ehrensvärd fully supported the idea of military cooperation with Finland - he and Axel Rappe had both fought in Finnish Civil War on the White side - but he knew that the public opinion in Sweden would never accept such agreements in a situation where Finland seemed to oppress the priviledges and rights of her Swedish-speaking citizens.
Despite the fact that Mannerheim soon send angry letters to major newspapers and ordered them to calm down the vivid public discussion about the matter, the language strife soon poisoned the atmosphere of the negotiations. As amazing as it may sound, the Head of the Operational Office of Finnish HQ was part of this problem. Akseli Airo refused to speak Swedish during the negotiations, and bitter Ehrensvärd wrote to Mannerheim that while he was gone "and your nationalists have been let loose" the negotiators have to continue their discussions either in German or French since the Finnish delegation refuses to speak Swedish while the negotiations were underway in Helsinki. While these setbacks were rather embarassing for two states with a long common past and a troubled near history, by 1938 Finnish Ambassador J.K. Paasivi in Stockholm stated that the matter was going along "splendidly." Yet the key issue, the demilitarization treaty, was still unsolved. Swedish HQ begun to questionize the premise of negotiations and asked whether Finns were truly interested of militarily securing Åland - or whether they were just aiming to alter the existing treaty to their favour as much as possible.
By 1939 Finnish coastal artillery was one of the few branches of the armed forces fully up to date. The batteries of Laatokka effectively closed the wide freshwater lake from possible invasion attempts.
As the negotiations of Åland and naval security in the Baltic were going nowhere in summer 1938, bitter Ehrensvärd took directly contact to Mannerheim and once again complained about the unconstructive attitude of General Airo. Since Mannerheim had personally named Airo to lead the negotiation delecation the whole issue becomes even more puzzling - the old Marshall knew well that Airo was fervert nationalist in the language issue and that he would cause trouble in this regard when dealing with the Swedish delegation. Most likely Mannerheim calculated that a deal could be reached nevertheless - and using Airo as a major participant in the negotiations would be a way to "tame" the domestic opposition to such moves. It is good to remember that was after all the time when the Lapua Movement was still a strong force in Finnish domestic politics and thus the tense atmosphere of Finnish society was easily reflected to military negotiations that looked like a foregone conclusion and mutually beneficial trade from modern point of view. On later phases of diplomatic contacts between Stockholm and Helsinki General Airo was left out, since he continued to doubt that Sweden would really abandon her long-lasting neutrality in a case of war and instead promoted the idea that Finland would have to prepare to defend Åland Islands alone. In January 1939 his pessimism was seemingly proven wrong, when Foreign Ministers Sandler and Erkko signed the historical Stocklholm Treaty where Sweden agreed to defend Åland in time of crisis. Yet the Swedish Parliament never ratified this treaty after Soviet Union (a state that was not among the signatory powers of the 1922 demilitarization treaty and was therefore not in a formal position to object in any way) publicly stated that it would oppose any attempts of Finno-Swedish cooperation to defend Åland Islands. Despite nearly a decade of negotiations Finnish Navy and its limited force of two armored ships, five submarines, 7 MTB:s four obsolete gunboats was alone with its task to defend the 1500km coastline in the face of mounting international crisis. During these final months of a long and grim year many quoted bitterly the words of Augustin Ehrensvärd, inscripted to the bastion of Sveaborg:
"Eftervärd, stå här på egen botn, och lita icke på främmande hielp*"
*"Progeny, stand here on your own foundation, and do not rely on foreign help."
Coastal defense ship Ilmarinen in a summer training exercise in late 1930s. The picture outlines the intented wartime role of Ilmarinen and Väinämöinen - the ships were intented to act first and foremost as floating coastal artillery batteries armed with 254mm Bofors main guns, specifically build to fight in the conditions of rugged Baltic coast filled with small islands and shallow waterways of Archipelago Sea.
From Coast Guard to Navy - the first postwar years
The first military ships independent Finland had were smaller vessels that the rebellious Russian Baltic Fleet could not move out in time when it sailed out from Helsinki in the closing stage of the Finnish Civil War when the Germans led by von der Goltz were already invading the country. During the two following years the fledling Finnish Navy was further reinforced by captured Russian gunboats Golub and Pingvin, handed over by the Germans in November 1918. The first task of the small Finnish Navy (Suomen Laivasto) was demining the extensive naval minefields Russian Navy had used to defend the approaches to the coasts of the Grand Duchy.
Meanwhile the actual coastal defense was still primarily the duty of the extensive coastal artillery that the Russians had steadily reinforced through the war era to defend St. Petersburg. During the following years the organization of Finnish coastal defense was slowly taking shape after a specific military committee had been set up to review the issue. Before the year 1927 the duties of coastal defense were still split up between three different commands: Navy, Coastal Artillery and War Harbour Command that was responsible for maintaining the harbours and naval bases. Meanwhile the Navy continued to demine the coast, opening shipping lines back for export traffic. The task was rather demanding and time-consuming for inexperienced crews operating with old, obsolete ships, and this fatal combination caused a disaster in 1925.
Old Russian gunboats Hämeenmaa and Uusimaa formed the heaviest units of Finnish Navy for over a decade.
During the same year when a political process for buying new ships to replace the aging vessels of the existing fleet had finally started, the old torpedo boats of the Coastal Squadron were caught in a sudden autumn storm in open sea at the Gulf of Bothnia in a middle of a training exercise for new naval conscripts. One of the ships, an old Russian torpedo boat named S 2 quickly capsized and sunk, taking almost her whole crew with her. This was so far the worst military accident in the short history of the new republic, and the deaths of the young crew shocked the whole nation. As a result of the public outrage towards the dismal state of the naval forces, a new public assosiation called Finnish Naval Union was organized in 1926 to promote the agenda of Finnish naval program. A year later the lobbying of Naval Union met success, as the new Naval Law of 1927 granted formidable funds for naval expansion program.
Schemes and submarines - Crichton-Vulcan and secret German U-boat research
When the Committee of Coastal Defense had publicly stated that Finnish Navy should obviously field submarines in the future, Allan Staffans, the leader of the Finnish shipyard Crichton-Vulcan had quickly started to use his extensive commercial contacts to secure the future order of these warships for his company. Well before the accident of torpedo boat S 2 Staffans had made early contacts with the representatives of Ingenieurskantoor voor Scheepsbouw, a Dutch company that acted as a cover firm for secret German U-boat research program. Since the Versailles Treaty forbade Germany to construct U-boats, the Germans had sought to bypass the clauses of the treaty by licence-building their new submarines abroad. According to the secret deal between IvS and Staffans, the Germans would provide the specs and the know-how for Crichton-Vulcan so that the company could offer the Finnish government the politically good option of building the new submarines for the Navy in Finland.
In 1927 the government did indeed order three submarines from Crichton-Vulcan, and the first of the three submarines, Vetehinen, became the first warship constructed in independent Finland in 1930. By 1931 the two others, Vesihiisi and Iku-Turso were also ready for service. The new, modern submarines were proudly sailed through the harbours towns of Finland, and the membership rates of Naval Union soared. Meanwhile Crichton-Vulcan now had plenty of recent practical experience from U-boat construction, and IvS and Staffans signed a new secret treaty in 1930 to build a new prototype model ordered and paid directly by the IvS, with Finland gaining the right to buy the desing after testing. A team of German specialists monitored the whole construction process, and the boat was constructed and finished without any public announcements in 1933 with the codename 707. After the German team had tested the new vessel extensively, it was ultimately sold to Finnish Navy and renamed Vesikko. Later on it became clear that Finnish Navy had bought themselves the final prototype of IIA-class U-boat.
The secret prototype of first German mass-produced U-boat model served the Finnish Navy well.
As the new submarines gained new public support for Finnish naval program, newspapers were soon drawing direct comparisons to Sweden where public initiative had earlier started a fundraising campaign that had led to the purchase of HMS Sverige, the first Pansarskepp-class coastal defense ship. By now the government had the option to expand the navy either with new smaller ships or by ordering more expensive heavier units in a similar way than Sweden. Ultimately the lobbying of Naval Union made the government to choose the approach of coastal defense ships, and Crichton-Vulcan was once again able to secure the order - Allan Staffans had once again contacted his business partners in Germany and gained necessary licences and technical advisors to secure the order for his company. After investing to new drydock and special equipment the company was able to deliver the ships in time, and the coastal defense ships (in Finnish this ship type was known as Panssarilaiva "armored ship", a literal translation from Swedish Pansarskepp) Väinämöinen and Ilmarinen were ready in 1930 and 1931.
Armored ships and Åland Question
The Finnish coastal defense ships were highly specialized vessels designed to operate and fight in the conditions of Archipelago and Åland Seas. They were heavily armored and powered by Germania-type diesel engines that provided a meager top speed of 15.5 knots, making the ships little more than mobile coastal forts. The class carried a complement of 343 and was armed with four 10-inch guns in a 2x2 configuration with a modern fire control system that provided the 225kg shells an accurate max range of 30 kilometers. For anti-aircraft purposes the ship type had primary armament of eight 105mm/50cal Dual-Purpose Bofors guns and four 40mm/40cal. Vickers AA-guns supplemented by six additional 20 mm Madsens. Ilmarinen and Väinämöinen, named after the mythical god-hero brothers of Kalevala were first and foremost designed and constructed to fulfill two tasks: their primary role was to act as "fleet in being" in Baltic, thus deterring possible amphibious invasion to Finland by their mere presence. Their secondary role and the very fact that these expensive ships were ordered in the first place mirrored a fundamental change of thinking in Finnish naval strategy. The Naval Law 1927 had provided funds for two coastal defense ships, four submarines and four MTPs, and this naval expansion was based on the newfound need to deter amphibious landings and especially to cover the vitally important shipping lines, the virtually only foreign trade routes of Finland. The need to secure the shipping lines to West was based on a simple assumption. Finnish economy was export-oriented, and virtually all exports were shipped abroad from major harbors of Viipuri, Helsinki, Turku and similar places. The new navy was therefore tasked first and foremost to secure the most important trade route to the West - the shipping route between Stockholm and Turku.
This narrow route went straight past the strategically most important island group in the Baltic - Åland Islands. Situated ideally between Stockholm and Finnish mainland the Island group with its ethnically Swedish inhabitants had caused much early tension between Sweden and Finland when the League of Nations had ultimately degreed that the islands should stay as a part of Finland under a special agreement that gave the locals wide autonomy and priviledges. Even more importantly the Islands had a curious international position. During the peace negotiations that ended the Krimean War, the great powers had forced Russia to demilitarize the islands in 1856. As a part of the League of Nations settlement the demilitarization agreement had been reinforced by a new agreement between Finland, Sweden, Germany, Britain, France, Italy, Poland, Denmark and Latvia. in 1922. According to this more recent treaty Finland had the right to keep only police forces present in the islands in peacetime. Additionally only two light Finnish ships had the right to visit the region in a temporary bases. Finnish Air Forces had the right to fly over the region, but landing to the islands was allowed only in emergency situations. All construction efforts of military installations and fortifications were forbidden, but in a case of war Finland had the right to mine the coastal waters of Åland and send in troops to defend the neutrality of the region. The basis of the treaty was that all signatory powers should aim to keep Åland outside of any conflict in the Baltic region.
The two armored ships were an sizeable investment for a country of four million inhabitants, and they were a proof of the fact how seriously Finland took the question of the safety of her vitally important foreign trade.
The treaty was, in short, a primarily diplomatical gesture that had successfully defused the volatile diplomatical feuding between Sweden and the former "eastern half the kingdom." As the Soviet Baltic Fleet kept growing and Hitler rose to power in Germany and renounced the Versailles Treaty, everyone realized that Åland Islands would play a pivotal role in any naval conflict in northern Baltic. Control of Åland would enable the owner of the islands to effectively shut down all naval traffic between Gulf of Bothnia and rest of the world, blocking the Stockholm-Turku route in the process as well. It was therefore unsurprising that Soviet Union, Germany and even UK (before the Anglo-German Naval Agreement) had secret plans to secure bases in Åland at a time of crisis. The development of Finnish Navy mirrored the knowledge of the changes in the strategic situation in the Baltic. The safety of shipping routes and southern coast of Finland in general became central, and the question of Åland was seen as the key for both issues. Meanwhile the Army leadership was increasingly concerned of the threat of amphibious landings to the flanks and rear. When the possibilities of "Yellow" (the traditional colour of OPFOR in Finnish military map exercises even today) naval invasion to Hanko region were studied, the demands for increased naval presence in Eastern Gulf of Finland were quickly made. During the 1930s the Finnish HQ envisioned that the most likely war scenario was a Soviet invasion focusing to Karelian Isthmus, supported by attempts to invade Åland Islands and/or Hanko, Hamina or Kotka harbours and coastline. Finnish HQ estimated that such an offensive would be part of a wider European war where the Soviet Union would simultaneously invade the Baltic States to gain control of their harbours and airfields.
During the critical interwar period the Finnish Navy had the priviledge of being commanded by a single officer for most of the time, whereas Army and Air Force suffered from constant rotation of commanders and the resulting shifts in priourities. When 29-years old Väinö Valve was chosen to the task, many doubted his chances to succeed. The early organizational shuffling could be seen from his title: while he commanded practically the same force for the whole time, his title changed from Commander of Coastal Artillery to Commander of Coastal Defense, Commander of Sea Defense and then finally to Commander of Finnish Navy. As a commander of the third independent service branch of the armed forces Valve was tasked to supervise the organization and technical changes of Navy as well as coordinate his efforts with rest of the Armed Forces. The first reform he implement was a massive reorganization of Finnish coastal artillery. New batteries were organized along the coast with emphasis being on Lake Laatokka, northern Isthmus and outskirts of Helsinki. This work alone required a lot of resources since the forts were located on islands and far away from major cities and railroad lines.
Old Obuhov-batteries being repositioned to islands of Laatokka in 1920s. The Finnish coastal artillery underwent a major reform postwar decades - modern equipment was concentrated to most vulnerable sectors in Gulf of Finland while obsolete pieces were repositioned to guard the flank of the most likely battlefields in Isthmus and eastern Karelia.
By latter half of 1930s Finnish Navy was firmly aware of its mission and purpose. It was a force tasked to defend sealines to Sweden, with emphasis being on operations around the western openings of the Gulf of Finland. In coastal defense the artillery was reorganized to defend Hanko, Porkkala, Helsinki, Kotka and support the Army by securing the northern coast of Lake Laatokka and western coast of Isthmus. The Navy was also keenly planning to win the "race to Åland" in a possible crisis situation, and initiatives in this field created interesting possibilities for Finnish defense policy in general. In the difficult economical situation and in the face of growing power of Soviet Union and resurgent Germany, the Finnish military leadership was seeking security guarantees from the West. During the 1920s the so-called Erich Comittee had presented the idea of regional defense treaties and mutual cooperation between neighbouring states within the League of Nations, a kind of a Nordic defense treaty within the League concept. By 1933 Japan and Germany had left the organization, and the invasion of Manchuria had fatally weakened the international credibility of the League. As a reaction to these changes Finnish military leadership sought to improve relations and cooperation with friendly neighbouring countries, Estonia and Sweden.
"And since we are now in Finland I refuse to speak Swedish with you gentlemen" - Cooperation with Estonia and Sweden
The cooperation with Estonia dates back to 1930, when the HQs of both countries made a joint plan to block the Gulf of Finland between Porkkala and Naissaari by reconstructing the heavy Russian-era coastal batteries and reinforcing the blockade with minefields and submarines - Finns persuaded Estonia to buy submarines of her own for this very purpose in mind. On 26th of December 1933 Finnish and Estonian HQs held a joint map exercise in Tallinn, studying the case of blockading Gulf of Finland in a wartime situation even further. As a result of the exercise it was acknowledged that to effectively maintain the blockade by coastal artillery, a joint fire control system was required. When an old Tsarist-era sea cable between Finland and Estonia was renewed in 1930s, the new cable was to be set between Mäkiluoto and Naissaari, creating a direct contact between the two coastal batteries controlling the entrance to Gulf of Finland. The development in Estonia during the fall of 1939 stopped the plan that was due to be ready in summer 1940. For Finns the question of blockading Gulf of Finland was vitally important due the vulnerable position of Åland. By setting up the blockade as early as possible in a case of war, the Finnish Navy would win more time to transfer troops to the demilitarized area. The Finnish Operational HQ reviewed the situation in pessimistic terms in 1934: Soviet Union had the resources to occupy Åland Islands and possibly the whole Archipelago Sea, and the appearance of Soviet naval and air bases to this region would seal the fate of Finland. As long as the demilitarization treaty was in force, Finland would be unable to stop such an operation alone.
But because Åland was also strategically pivotally important for Stockholm, Swedish HQ had also been making plans for crisis situations. During the 1930s plans to send several divisions to northern Finland to support Finnish defenses in a case of a Soviet invasion based on the founding charter of League of Nations had been in development ever since the year 1923. Swedish military leadership had also devised another, less ambitious but strategically even more important plan for joint defense of Åland Islands. Ironically military leadership in both countries firmly supported the idea of Swedish expedition to northern Finland, but much smaller-scale operation in Åland caused much more friction. There were several reasons for disagreements in this question. A defense revision was just finishing its final report in Sweden in 1930, when the matter was first brought up in negotiations. This parliamentary committee was setting up a wide and comprehensive memorandum to fully reorganize the Swedish defense policy, and its members fully believed that when the question of "sanction aid" to Finland had been solved in positive manner, the questions regarding Åland would now solve automatically.
Italian-made MTB on the move. Finnish interest towards motor torpedo boats dates back to chaotic times of Russian Civil War, when A flotilla of British Coastal Motor Boats operating from bases in Finland under the command of captain Augustus Agar raided Kronstadt Harbour twice, sinking the cruiser Oleg and the depot ship Pamiat Azova on June as well as damaging the battleships Petropavlovsk and Andrei Pervozvanny on August, at the cost of three CMBs.
For the Finnish General HQ and Operational HQ the Åland Question was still the final blockade between a wider agreement between the two countries. Finnish Chief of Staff Airo wrote to Swedish HQ that "the demilitarization treaty was the single remaining obstacle in creatind deeper military cooperation between Sweden and Finland. It was decisively important to review the treaty and remove the parts that limited Finland´s rights to organize the defense of the region." Finnish strategists feared that if the Soviets would seize Åland by surprise in opening phase of a wider conflict in the Baltic region, they could keep Sweden out of the war by making Stockholm and rest of Sweden much more vulnerable for Soviet counterattacks in case of a posssible Swedish intervention. As the negotiations now revolved around the Åland issue, the language question in Finland gained new publicity. University students in Helsinki begun to put pressure on Finnish government and Eduskunta to "Finnicize" the University of Helsinki by a new language legislation. While the students aim was quite understandable (the top university of the country refused to educate persons in several sciences with a language that was spoken by +90% of the total population of the country), these events caused a clear conflict of interest to Finnish foreign policy in a situation where President Svinhufvud, Mannerheim and the government in general sought support from Sweden and other Scandinavian countries. Many Swedish officers like Carl August Ehrensvärd were deeply disturbed by the rising nationalism in Finnish politics. Ehrensvärd fully supported the idea of military cooperation with Finland - he and Axel Rappe had both fought in Finnish Civil War on the White side - but he knew that the public opinion in Sweden would never accept such agreements in a situation where Finland seemed to oppress the priviledges and rights of her Swedish-speaking citizens.
Despite the fact that Mannerheim soon send angry letters to major newspapers and ordered them to calm down the vivid public discussion about the matter, the language strife soon poisoned the atmosphere of the negotiations. As amazing as it may sound, the Head of the Operational Office of Finnish HQ was part of this problem. Akseli Airo refused to speak Swedish during the negotiations, and bitter Ehrensvärd wrote to Mannerheim that while he was gone "and your nationalists have been let loose" the negotiators have to continue their discussions either in German or French since the Finnish delegation refuses to speak Swedish while the negotiations were underway in Helsinki. While these setbacks were rather embarassing for two states with a long common past and a troubled near history, by 1938 Finnish Ambassador J.K. Paasivi in Stockholm stated that the matter was going along "splendidly." Yet the key issue, the demilitarization treaty, was still unsolved. Swedish HQ begun to questionize the premise of negotiations and asked whether Finns were truly interested of militarily securing Åland - or whether they were just aiming to alter the existing treaty to their favour as much as possible.
By 1939 Finnish coastal artillery was one of the few branches of the armed forces fully up to date. The batteries of Laatokka effectively closed the wide freshwater lake from possible invasion attempts.
As the negotiations of Åland and naval security in the Baltic were going nowhere in summer 1938, bitter Ehrensvärd took directly contact to Mannerheim and once again complained about the unconstructive attitude of General Airo. Since Mannerheim had personally named Airo to lead the negotiation delecation the whole issue becomes even more puzzling - the old Marshall knew well that Airo was fervert nationalist in the language issue and that he would cause trouble in this regard when dealing with the Swedish delegation. Most likely Mannerheim calculated that a deal could be reached nevertheless - and using Airo as a major participant in the negotiations would be a way to "tame" the domestic opposition to such moves. It is good to remember that was after all the time when the Lapua Movement was still a strong force in Finnish domestic politics and thus the tense atmosphere of Finnish society was easily reflected to military negotiations that looked like a foregone conclusion and mutually beneficial trade from modern point of view. On later phases of diplomatic contacts between Stockholm and Helsinki General Airo was left out, since he continued to doubt that Sweden would really abandon her long-lasting neutrality in a case of war and instead promoted the idea that Finland would have to prepare to defend Åland Islands alone. In January 1939 his pessimism was seemingly proven wrong, when Foreign Ministers Sandler and Erkko signed the historical Stocklholm Treaty where Sweden agreed to defend Åland in time of crisis. Yet the Swedish Parliament never ratified this treaty after Soviet Union (a state that was not among the signatory powers of the 1922 demilitarization treaty and was therefore not in a formal position to object in any way) publicly stated that it would oppose any attempts of Finno-Swedish cooperation to defend Åland Islands. Despite nearly a decade of negotiations Finnish Navy and its limited force of two armored ships, five submarines, 7 MTB:s four obsolete gunboats was alone with its task to defend the 1500km coastline in the face of mounting international crisis. During these final months of a long and grim year many quoted bitterly the words of Augustin Ehrensvärd, inscripted to the bastion of Sveaborg:
"Eftervärd, stå här på egen botn, och lita icke på främmande hielp*"
*"Progeny, stand here on your own foundation, and do not rely on foreign help."
därför att främmande hjälp ska inte komma i tid.
Oh well.
How do they plan to defend the seas during winter?
Oh well.
How do they plan to defend the seas during winter?
därför att främmande hjälp ska inte komma i tid.
Oh well.
How do they plan to defend the seas during winter?
Considering the fact that systematic icebreaking in Baltic sailing routes was largely a post-WWII phenomena, the Navy considered the winter period as operationally impossible time.
In a similar way than the Army held the strategic view that amphibious invasions during fully frozen period were outright impossible due the fact that no force could clear routes through the ice for invasion fleet and following supply transportation.
Thanks, I try to find suitable pictures for each update since I personally like them as well.
I must say, the coastal defense ship in camo just became my favorite image of the AAR so far. Silly question but since this is the first time I've seen such effort to keep a ship hidden, was this sort of method common?