The Year of Returned Hope
Part 4: The Indirect Approach III, April 12 – April 21, 1943
In war, the most important moments are typically its first and its last. The first is important for it gives an indication of the character of the war to be fought. The last is important because it determines the victor. Those moments in the middle, while of course important, remain but the bridge between the first and the last. One possible complaint on the nature of strategic studies as a discipline, both professional and academic, is that it tends to forget the last moments in favor of those middle moments, with the assumption that getting those right will get the last moment right by default. Unfortunately war is not so linear that this works in all but the most exceptional instances. Mussolini, should he even with to try to think of the last moments of the war with the Soviet Union, would be utterly unable to. It was simply impossible to envisage. Was it the Red Army entering Rome? Was it the Regio Esercito holding a defensive line against the Soviets in perpetual vigilance? On an operational level, the focus on first and last moments is just as important, and indeed the last moments of this Italian operation in Illyria were just as shrouded by the fog of war. Thus, to best understand the Italian attack, we can do naught but focus on the first moments and those after them.
The offensive began with four battles: Banja Luka, Knin, Valpovo and Slavonski Brod. A fifth battle was taking place in northern Greece, at Korce, where the Soviets were forcing Bergonzoli’s division back. That battle would end with heavy casualties on both sides: nearly sixteen hundred Italian and eight hundred and fifty Soviet dead. Korce would mark the apogee of Vercellino’s unaided advance into southeastern Europe. Fortunately for the Italian armed forces, the battles in Illyria were much more in their favor. The Soviet defenders of Slavonski Brod and Valpovo both broke and fled within the first thirty hours, leaving behind a cumulative twenty-two hundred dead. The Italians had lost less than six hundred. Banja Luka saw the next breakthrough some hours later, as less then two hundred and fifty Italians traded their lives for those of nearly eleven hundred Soviet soldiers. Valpovo was only stripped of its defenses on the 14th, costing just over one hundred and fifty Italian dead and over seven hundred Soviet dead. Further fighting around Slavonski Brod led to another two hundred and thirty Italian dead and eleven hundred Soviet deaths. As far as first moments go, the first four days of the Italian offensive had proved wildly successful. For the cost of about twelve hundred Italian dead, the Regio Esercito had inflicted over five thousand Soviet casualties and had broken the Soviet frontline in four different locations. It was in the very north of the front that the Italians gained their new positions the quickest, and could thus begin planning their next moves. These new thrusts were planned to secure the Italians’ rear and also encircle another two Soviet divisions to their front though it should be noted that even at this early stage the Soviets were attempting counterattacks, at least to try to rescue encircled comrades.
The Italian offensive rolling forward in the north.
At Sinj, Italian troops got in amongst a Soviet corps headquarters, and for the loss of three soldiers they ravaged the headquarters, killing three hundred and forty Soviet soldiers. Nevertheless, despite such successes, the Soviets were not giving up. In the north, the encircled Soviets had been temporarily relieved by a Soviet armor column that had linked up with them. Italian spearheads had passed the flanks of the two new target divisions and were closing in on their rear but their own lines of supply were completely undefended and thus vulnerable to potential Soviet countermoves. In the center, the Italians were bulling ahead at Travnik, ripping the frayed Soviet defenses to shreds. In the south, however, Pintor’s army had gotten itself encircled. Gambara and Roatta had let their rear go undefended, and some quick-witted Soviet commander saw the opportunity and snatched it, marching his troops across that line of supply. Neither corps commander appeared too worried continued on with their forward thrusts, trusting to comrades behind them to restore the situation.
Encirclements north and south, Soviet and Italian.
Favorable battles continued in Illyria: Travnik resulted in less than three hundred Italian casualties and nearly eleven hundred Soviet deaths. The battle for Udbina, the fight to restore the flow of supplies to Gambara and Roatta, resulted in nearly three hundred and twenty Italian dead and eleven hundred Soviet dead. In Greece, however, Vercellino was being pushed back by the greater weight of Soviet numbers. Nearly eight hundred and fifty Italians died there during the same time span, and opposed to not even three hundred and fifty Soviets. Vercellino was beginning what would be a skilful withdrawal back to Amfissa. Back in Illyria, the front had been broken. The Italians had achieved a deep penetration in the north, where despite some threat to their lines of supply, they were on their way to a second encirclement even though the first had been broken. At the same time, the central Italian thrust had been judged to have reached the end of its useful life and was split in twain. One half moved north, to close the broken encirclement by a bigger encirclement and perhaps ensnare some rescuers as well as the original targets. The other half shifted southward, to close a potential pocket there as well, and link up with Gambara and Roatta. Meanwhile, those two were still encircled, but had reached the Illyrian coastline, allowing Gambara to immediately organize a sealift to bring necessary supplies into Split until logistics could resume by land, which was anticipated to be soon. A handful of Soviet divisions, and a Mongolian division, would be trapped in Zadar.
Despite Soviet resistance, the Italians continued their forward march.
By the evening of the 21st, the Soviets had been encircled again in the north of the Illyrian line. In the center, Italian forces were pushing both north and south in an attempt to close multiple pockets. In the south, the Italians had managed to reopen a line of supply to Gambara and Roatta, and allowed Gambara to begin his assault on the Soviet forces in and around Zadar. Altogether, including encircled divisions, there were perhaps only fifteen Soviet divisions, including headquarters, on the Illyrian front. Discounting encircled divisions drops this number to about ten. There was no doubt that the Soviets were facing a crisis in Illyria. The Soviets recognized this, and significant forces were returning from Greece to attempt to halt the Italian offensive. Due to simple geography, they would be hitting the southern thrust first.
The complete situation in southeastern Europe.
Nevertheless, the Soviets still felt there was a possibility for a meaningful victory in Greece, and thus declined to strip that front of the majority of its troops. For the half-dozen or so Soviet divisions moving northward by the end of this period, there were still perhaps a dozen and a half to two dozen Soviet divisions pressing southward into the unfavorable terrain and geography of Greece. They did not trust Vercellino to keep quiet with only a light force guarding him, probably with good reason.