I've been lurking in the shadows, waiting to get my copy of HoI 3 up and running, so it's time to join the bandwagon. Looking forward to your next update.
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thank you for the time you take to note your reasoning. makes it all the more interesting! a chance to learn from the Duce!
"Together, these three books changed his outlook on strategy. It can even be said that perhaps these works transformed Mussolini into a competent strategist. It was a very clear break with the past."
I love it! I can barely wait for the outbreak of war with the UK and France. Keep up the excellent work!
I love it! I can barely wait for the outbreak of war with the UK and France. Keep up the excellent work!
Beakmiester: Thank you, and welcome aboard!
Soulitaire: You'll only learn from him if what he's doing is actually going to work. There's no guarantees yet.
cthulhu: Thank you! War with the UK and France is certainly going to be one of the main events, and should certainly be interesting. Welcome aboard, sir!
Update coming up!
Soulitaire: You'll only learn from him if what he's doing is actually going to work. There's no guarantees yet.
cthulhu: Thank you! War with the UK and France is certainly going to be one of the main events, and should certainly be interesting. Welcome aboard, sir!
Update coming up!
The First Year of Renaissance
Part 5: The Generals’ War II, February 4 - March 29, 1936
Having completed all the aforementioned activities by the end of January, from laws and technological contracts to redeployments and army restructuring, Mussolini was left with little to do for the next two months other than wait. In part this was because he was not yet willing to go through with his second stage of redeployments yet, but in large part simply because he had run out of matters to take care of. Thus his activities were reduced in large part to reading reports of events occurring in far away Abyssinia, but not intervening in them. His other activities will be described in the next section; this will be dedicated to the war in Abyssinia between February 4 and March 29, 1936.
When he returned to a regular reading of reports from Abyssinia on February 4, everything seemed to be going well at first glance. Tellera had finally rid himself of the Abyssinian annoyance around Serdo and was at last himself attacking toward Bati against those same erstwhile attackers. Nicolosi was still advancing toward Dese, but the long road over the mountains was nearly finished. The Abyssinians were on the way to being beaten, though given the poor infrastructure and the timidity of Grazioli’s corps commanders, pursuit and ruthless exploitation of victory was somewhat lacking. However, a closer look at the situation reveals a disquieting trend in the Armata dell’AOI. Though twelve divisions had reached Nicolosi’s old positions around Maych’ew, none were moving. Not the division commanders on the spot, nor the corps commanders hundreds of miles behind them and slowly moving up, not Grazioli himself, who was actually closer to the front than the corps commanders were, took the initiative to order these divisions onward. They simply remained in place and consumed supplies for no good use.
Tellera and Nicolosi pushing onward as the rest of the army looks on and does nothing.
In part, this overwhelming timidity may have been due to the corps commanders. In short, their competence was very much in question. Firstly, they were further away from the front than Grazioli was. Orders had to go backwards toward the sea before they could go forwards to the troops! Secondly, Mussolini attained samples of intelligence estimates at the corps level and the resulting requests for troops. Lieutenant General Moizo, commander of the II Corpo d’Armata dell’AOI, alone requested seven armored regiments, four mountain regiments and twelve infantry regiments as reinforcements! Typically for corps commanders, he did not specify how logistics could possible support such an infusion of troops, leaving it to Grazioli. At the same time, he was not using the troops he had under his command; he was letting them sit at Maych’ew rather than having march at the undefended area of Bahir Dar. Mussolini did not fulfill these requests; the Italian army did not even have so much armor and even if it did, Moizo was certainly not competent enough to employ them properly.
Moizo’s ridiculous requests for reinforcements.
It was in the second half of February that Mussolini received a very direct shock that decidedly shook his already slowly waning confidence in the competence of the upper echelons of the Armata dell’AOI to achieve anything of use in Abyssinia. It was at this time that Grazioli sent a report to Rome that the Abyssinians had put together a successful offensive into Somalia beyond the purview of the one corps stationed there. Gaalkacyo had fallen to Abyssinian militia. Apparently Abyssinian militia had offensive capabilities that Italian, Eritrean and Somali militia did not.
Somalia invaded by the Abyssinians!
Soon after the onset of the Abyssinian offensive into Somalia, both Bati and Bese fell to Tellera and Nicolosi, respectively. At the same time, many Italian and Eritrean units finally began moving toward Bahir Dar, which remained as yet undefended. This sudden burst of progress lightened Mussolini’s heart; the Abyssinian War was not going to be a disaster after all. Indeed, Abyssinia’s capital, Adis Abeba, was nearly within reach by the end of February. Mussolini decided to continue with his promise of non-intervention.
Good new from the front!
Even more good news came by the end of February, reinforcing Mussolini’s non-intervention, as not only was the enormous host assembled at Maych’ew marching toward Bahir Dar but Nicolosi began pushing toward Debre Markos. Mussolini interpreted this as the beginning of a maneuver to extent the front to such lengths that the Abyssinians could not adequately cover it all. Though he did wonder how they could adequately cover it anyway, as a single division could not defend what was really a good hundred or so kilometers of front, especially not a militia division. Not minding such musings, he was glad of the burst of progress the Armata dell’AOI was making.
Grazioli pushing his left flank outward in a sweeping motion.
Furthermore, in the first week of March Grazioli released another report to Rome with his own intelligence estimates and requests for reinforcements. Though he had evidently forgotten his boast, Mussolini did not bother reminding him other than not indulging in his requests. Grazioli did not elucidate on the logistics situation either. Nevertheless, his report was a good deal more sanguine than Muizo’s was. Instead of Muizo’s legions, Grazioli requested eight armored regiments and a squadron of medium bombers. His estimate of Abyssinian capabilities was, however, at variance with his requests, given how low he rated them. Nevertheless, as opposed to Muizo’s heart-stopping requests, Grazioli’s were a breath of fresh air.
Grazioli’s sanguine view of the situation and requests for reinforcements.
The situation had further improved by the end of March. Bahir Dar had fallen, though Debre Markos was successfully defended by the Abyssinians. Fiche and Kara K’ore both fell, the former to Tellera and the latter to another rising star major general, Calcagno, who commanded an infantry division. Adis Abeba was under threat from two different axes. The future looked bright for the Armata dell’AOI.
The frontlines in Abyssinia on March 29, 1936.
As can be seen, during this period of nearly two months from the beginning of February to the end of March, Italian fortunes in Abyssinia continued to improve as Grazioli’s army pushed forward to just within reach of Adis Abeba. However, despite this progress, below the surface there were intimations of unsteadiness and of weakness in the Armata dell’AOI. Only three divisional commanders seemed to be active: Tellera, Nicolosi and Calcagno. At the corps level, generals appeared to be weak and incompetent all around, unable to use their full assets, weak as they may be, effectively. At the army level, Grazioli displayed greater competence and verve for victory than his direct subordinates by being closer to the frontline than they were. On top of this, the corps-sized force in Somalia seemed entirely inert and allowed the Abyssinians to begin an invasion of that area.
Part 5: The Generals’ War II, February 4 - March 29, 1936
Having completed all the aforementioned activities by the end of January, from laws and technological contracts to redeployments and army restructuring, Mussolini was left with little to do for the next two months other than wait. In part this was because he was not yet willing to go through with his second stage of redeployments yet, but in large part simply because he had run out of matters to take care of. Thus his activities were reduced in large part to reading reports of events occurring in far away Abyssinia, but not intervening in them. His other activities will be described in the next section; this will be dedicated to the war in Abyssinia between February 4 and March 29, 1936.
When he returned to a regular reading of reports from Abyssinia on February 4, everything seemed to be going well at first glance. Tellera had finally rid himself of the Abyssinian annoyance around Serdo and was at last himself attacking toward Bati against those same erstwhile attackers. Nicolosi was still advancing toward Dese, but the long road over the mountains was nearly finished. The Abyssinians were on the way to being beaten, though given the poor infrastructure and the timidity of Grazioli’s corps commanders, pursuit and ruthless exploitation of victory was somewhat lacking. However, a closer look at the situation reveals a disquieting trend in the Armata dell’AOI. Though twelve divisions had reached Nicolosi’s old positions around Maych’ew, none were moving. Not the division commanders on the spot, nor the corps commanders hundreds of miles behind them and slowly moving up, not Grazioli himself, who was actually closer to the front than the corps commanders were, took the initiative to order these divisions onward. They simply remained in place and consumed supplies for no good use.
Tellera and Nicolosi pushing onward as the rest of the army looks on and does nothing.
In part, this overwhelming timidity may have been due to the corps commanders. In short, their competence was very much in question. Firstly, they were further away from the front than Grazioli was. Orders had to go backwards toward the sea before they could go forwards to the troops! Secondly, Mussolini attained samples of intelligence estimates at the corps level and the resulting requests for troops. Lieutenant General Moizo, commander of the II Corpo d’Armata dell’AOI, alone requested seven armored regiments, four mountain regiments and twelve infantry regiments as reinforcements! Typically for corps commanders, he did not specify how logistics could possible support such an infusion of troops, leaving it to Grazioli. At the same time, he was not using the troops he had under his command; he was letting them sit at Maych’ew rather than having march at the undefended area of Bahir Dar. Mussolini did not fulfill these requests; the Italian army did not even have so much armor and even if it did, Moizo was certainly not competent enough to employ them properly.
Moizo’s ridiculous requests for reinforcements.
It was in the second half of February that Mussolini received a very direct shock that decidedly shook his already slowly waning confidence in the competence of the upper echelons of the Armata dell’AOI to achieve anything of use in Abyssinia. It was at this time that Grazioli sent a report to Rome that the Abyssinians had put together a successful offensive into Somalia beyond the purview of the one corps stationed there. Gaalkacyo had fallen to Abyssinian militia. Apparently Abyssinian militia had offensive capabilities that Italian, Eritrean and Somali militia did not.
Somalia invaded by the Abyssinians!
Soon after the onset of the Abyssinian offensive into Somalia, both Bati and Bese fell to Tellera and Nicolosi, respectively. At the same time, many Italian and Eritrean units finally began moving toward Bahir Dar, which remained as yet undefended. This sudden burst of progress lightened Mussolini’s heart; the Abyssinian War was not going to be a disaster after all. Indeed, Abyssinia’s capital, Adis Abeba, was nearly within reach by the end of February. Mussolini decided to continue with his promise of non-intervention.
Good new from the front!
Even more good news came by the end of February, reinforcing Mussolini’s non-intervention, as not only was the enormous host assembled at Maych’ew marching toward Bahir Dar but Nicolosi began pushing toward Debre Markos. Mussolini interpreted this as the beginning of a maneuver to extent the front to such lengths that the Abyssinians could not adequately cover it all. Though he did wonder how they could adequately cover it anyway, as a single division could not defend what was really a good hundred or so kilometers of front, especially not a militia division. Not minding such musings, he was glad of the burst of progress the Armata dell’AOI was making.
Grazioli pushing his left flank outward in a sweeping motion.
Furthermore, in the first week of March Grazioli released another report to Rome with his own intelligence estimates and requests for reinforcements. Though he had evidently forgotten his boast, Mussolini did not bother reminding him other than not indulging in his requests. Grazioli did not elucidate on the logistics situation either. Nevertheless, his report was a good deal more sanguine than Muizo’s was. Instead of Muizo’s legions, Grazioli requested eight armored regiments and a squadron of medium bombers. His estimate of Abyssinian capabilities was, however, at variance with his requests, given how low he rated them. Nevertheless, as opposed to Muizo’s heart-stopping requests, Grazioli’s were a breath of fresh air.
Grazioli’s sanguine view of the situation and requests for reinforcements.
The situation had further improved by the end of March. Bahir Dar had fallen, though Debre Markos was successfully defended by the Abyssinians. Fiche and Kara K’ore both fell, the former to Tellera and the latter to another rising star major general, Calcagno, who commanded an infantry division. Adis Abeba was under threat from two different axes. The future looked bright for the Armata dell’AOI.
The frontlines in Abyssinia on March 29, 1936.
As can be seen, during this period of nearly two months from the beginning of February to the end of March, Italian fortunes in Abyssinia continued to improve as Grazioli’s army pushed forward to just within reach of Adis Abeba. However, despite this progress, below the surface there were intimations of unsteadiness and of weakness in the Armata dell’AOI. Only three divisional commanders seemed to be active: Tellera, Nicolosi and Calcagno. At the corps level, generals appeared to be weak and incompetent all around, unable to use their full assets, weak as they may be, effectively. At the army level, Grazioli displayed greater competence and verve for victory than his direct subordinates by being closer to the frontline than they were. On top of this, the corps-sized force in Somalia seemed entirely inert and allowed the Abyssinians to begin an invasion of that area.
Histories of the first Italo-Abyssinian war seem to be coming back to haunt Grazioli's subordinates. Moizo, in particular, seems to have been shook to the brink of insanity - the man requested for no less than 21 brigades in God-knows-how-many divisions to be attached at corps level - has he been terrified into insane fantasy, or does he want his own army to lead into shame and dishonor?
The Abyssinian foray into Italian-held territory is even more shameful. The generals in charge of this sector of the front could have either fully manned the lines or exploited the opportunity to threaten the Abyssinian rear. They did neither.
When a detailed analysis is made of the second Italo-Abyssinian war, some generals will have to answer embarrassing questions.
The Abyssinian foray into Italian-held territory is even more shameful. The generals in charge of this sector of the front could have either fully manned the lines or exploited the opportunity to threaten the Abyssinian rear. They did neither.
When a detailed analysis is made of the second Italo-Abyssinian war, some generals will have to answer embarrassing questions.
Soulitaire: You'll only learn from him if what he's doing is actually going to work. There's no guarantees yet.
ooh but I can learn from HIS mistakes and then avoid them (if I'm lucky)
Well, still more progress.
You have to feel bad for Grazioli. He is obviously a competent General, trying his best, but forced to ask for those ridicoulous reinforcements by his Corps Commanders.
You have to feel bad for Grazioli. He is obviously a competent General, trying his best, but forced to ask for those ridicoulous reinforcements by his Corps Commanders.
Well, when everything fails, you just have do your best and hope for better.
Good to have this as a learning wAAR.
So Ethiopian militia has managed to beat Italian militia in Somalia?
Good to have this as a learning wAAR.
So Ethiopian militia has managed to beat Italian militia in Somalia?
Just a thought, I think maybe a lot of the poor progress in abyssinia may have to do with the horrible supply lines? If so, your transport plane could be put to good use airlifting supplies to the front so they can advance more quickly.
The .. now, what's the word? .. the optimism of the Italian general staff is really quite overwhelming.
Lordban: Very embarrassing questions. "Are you aware that Italy doesn't even have eight armored regiments and, in fact, doesn't have a single armored regiment at all?" or "Are you aware that Eritrea's port consists of a single wooden plank sticking out into the Red Sea and a single banana would cause it to tip over into the sea, much less eight regiments of tanks?"
Soulitaire: True, true. As Bismarck said, after all...
Maj. von Mauser: To some extent that's certainly true. We'll see just how true in a later update.
Enewald: Technically they haven't. The Abyssinians decided upon a shockingly clever strategy along the lines of marching into the bits of desert where I don't have any soldiers.
cwg9: That's probably it, but my entire first year of play was in my very first session of play so I'm still thinking about it in rather HoI2 terms and logistics barely came to mind.
stnylan: Very true.
Soulitaire: True, true. As Bismarck said, after all...
Maj. von Mauser: To some extent that's certainly true. We'll see just how true in a later update.
Enewald: Technically they haven't. The Abyssinians decided upon a shockingly clever strategy along the lines of marching into the bits of desert where I don't have any soldiers.
cwg9: That's probably it, but my entire first year of play was in my very first session of play so I'm still thinking about it in rather HoI2 terms and logistics barely came to mind.
stnylan: Very true.
Hehe...I had no idea this AAR would take a humorous turn! :rofl: Loving the update!
:rofl: Loving the update!
Wow, Graz is going for some fancy moves and sweeps when all he has to do is march in a striaght line to Adis Abeba.
cwg9: That's probably it, but my entire first year of play was in my very first session of play so I'm still thinking about it in rather HoI2 terms and logistics barely came to mind.
Note that logistics can play a very large role in HOI3. I have found that sole transport plane to be extremely useful in supplying units that are getting insufficient supplies. Without supplies units can't attack, and in defence get a -50% penalty. Also beware that enemy occupation of aden seems to block convoys to somalia when you own the suez.
HAHA those Italian generals are so... Italians:rofl:
I suggest you start to lincense those tanks from germany, or else Ethiopia will kick their asses
Great update.
I suggest you start to lincense those tanks from germany, or else Ethiopia will kick their asses
Great update.
The frustration with AI control just oozes out
Quite entertaining, actually. I haven't yet played a game where I've actually gone to war The troubles you're having with Ethiopian infrastructure are certainly going to inform my future US game.
Quite entertaining, actually. I haven't yet played a game where I've actually gone to war
The troubles you're having with Ethiopian infrastructure are certainly going to inform my future US game.
are they requesting the armor because of the blitzing stance perhaps?
- so what would they demand if they had a 'normal' offensive?
- so what would they demand if they had a 'normal' offensive?
Jorath13: If there is an amusing situation, it will be commented upon.
burning_phoneix: Pretty much.
davion76: Yeah, I know logistics are important, though at the time of play I didn't know that one level of naval base can apparently support only two brigade-sized units, which is a bit of a problem. That's pretty cool about Aden, though!
Zaku: I hope I don't have to license tanks from Germany! Soon enough my IC will be full of procurements as it is!
truth is life: Yeah, the infrastructure slows things down. As does my level 2 naval base in Eritrea.
Mostyn: Thanks! What countries are your four friends playing? GER/UK/JAP/SOV or something along those lines?
Juan_de_Marco: That's an interesting theory, I'll have to check it out.
I think I'll try to have an update for either tonight or tomorrow morning!
burning_phoneix: Pretty much.
davion76: Yeah, I know logistics are important, though at the time of play I didn't know that one level of naval base can apparently support only two brigade-sized units, which is a bit of a problem. That's pretty cool about Aden, though!
Zaku: I hope I don't have to license tanks from Germany! Soon enough my IC will be full of procurements as it is!
truth is life: Yeah, the infrastructure slows things down. As does my level 2 naval base in Eritrea.
Mostyn: Thanks! What countries are your four friends playing? GER/UK/JAP/SOV or something along those lines?
Juan_de_Marco: That's an interesting theory, I'll have to check it out.
I think I'll try to have an update for either tonight or tomorrow morning!