The Year of Upheaval
Part 5: The Gamble in the East V, January 29 – February 10, 1942
With the close of the pocket on January 28, the decisive part of the operations in Dacia began. It would be during this period of twelve days that would decide the fate of Dacia. The two Italian armies that had closed the pocket were struggling to master the situation both in front of and behind them. Behind them stood an estimated half dozen divisions, including an armored division, and a headquarters. Before them pressed Soviet reinforcements whose numbers were swelling daily, if not hourly.
Guzzoni in the south had yet again redeployed his forces, perceiving that the events in the north in the last days of January had presaged the closing of the pocket and that his task had become, rather than fending off adventurous Soviet formations, shrinking the encirclement from the south. With his three divisions, of which only one was combat ready, he did not have much chance in combat but the events in the north had begun pulling Soviet divisions northward to break the ring that surrounded them. Thus he was moving simply into empty space. In the north, meanwhile, the battle of Onesti still raged. By the 2nd of February it was consuming six Soviet divisions, and a further one in reserve, as well as eight Italian divisions, with two in reserve. The Soviets formations were battered were suffering major casualties, but so too were the Italians. Onesti would become the pivotal point on the Italian ring separating central and southern Dacia from its northern regions. In the end, within another four days, the Italians would finally triumph and take the town from the Soviets. The cost, however, was high: over five thousand two hundred Italians and five thousand six hundred Soviets died in that one battle alone. Hundreds more were to die in later Soviet attacks on those same positions.
The battle of Onesti, and the overall situation on February 2nd.
By the 4th of February the Soviets were pressing the Italian ring at various points on the front, despite the battle for Onesti which was still raging and sucking nearby units into the maelstrom. At Comrat, Major General Ferrari Orsi with two infantry brigades was forced to defend against a Soviet attack comprising three armored and three infantry brigades. Comrat was to become a crisis in the Italian defense, and the far eastern end of the Italian front would be sucked into the defense of Comrat. The Soviets had played their hand well. West of Comrat, all Italian formations were either involved in Onesti or holding the from by the Hungarian border, too far away to be of any possible aid. Behind Comrat, Bastico’s third corps, involved in the eastward sweep inside the pocket toward the Black Sea, had become bogged down against desperate Soviet defensive fights. At Ostrov, a half-strength Soviet division of three infantry brigades would hold the Italians for three days and inflict five hundred and fifty casualties while only taking three hundred and thirty themselves. In the south, meanwhile, Guzzoni’s three divisions were advancing against no resistance.
The full situation in the evening of February 6.
Late in the evening on the 6th, the Soviets threw another attack against the Italian ring, at Sarata on the Black Sea coast. Six Soviet brigades, albeit two thousand men short, assaulted two Italian brigades. A Soviet attempt to retake Onesti was repulsed with a few hundred casualties, cumulatively, including on the Soviet flank at Gheorgheni. It was at this point, late on the 10th, that Mussolini, conferring with Badaglio and his army commanders, decided that the game was up. The Italian ring was cracking. Dacia could not be saved. Istanbul would have to be abandoned, and the entirety of the eastern half of the empire would be left to the Soviets. A massive withdrawal was to begin, to a new frontline. It would be a line shorter even than the old Dacian front, and one where four armies would make a stand rather than two. It would be in northern Illyria.
Pintor beginning the withdrawal from Istanbul and the Straits.
Mussolini’s decision was quickly vindicated. The Italians were bloodily thrown out of Sarata, suffering nearly twelve hundred casualties whereas the Soviets lost only seven hundred. Simultaneously, Comrat fell. Twelve hundred and fifty Italians fell for that town, as opposed to only five hundred Soviets. Their armored superiority and their strength of numbers were telling. The eastern half of the ring had completely and absolutely collapsed. Graziani ordered an evacuation to begin. The gamble had failed. Now the only task that remained was to salvage the battered 1a and 2a Armatas from the jaws of destruction. Onesti was under attack again, and the Soviets had already begun limited offensive operations northwestward out from the pocket.
The withdrawal from Dacia had begun.
It had been a gamble. Mussolini and all his commanders knew that the chances of success were far from guaranteed. Their hopes had reached their apex on January 29th, when the ring had closed and the pocket created. Their hopes had been destroyed by February 10th, when the eastern third of the Italian ring was shattered. All of a sudden, the Italians were in a terrible operational situation. It would take consummate skill to withdraw without loss.