The Year of Upheaval
Part 4: The Gamble in the East IV, January 20 – January 28, 1942
Late January was the decisive period of time for the Italian gamble in the east. The two Italian armies involved in the operation, Bastico’s 2a Armata and Graziani’s 1a Armata, went through to nearly superhuman lengths to accomplish their mission of closing the pocket, particularly as Soviet resistance truly began stiffening a formidable amount during this time.
Badaglio, the commander in chief of the Eastern theater, with Mussolini’s connivance released Guzzoni’s nascent 8a Armata for operations in northern Thrace and southern Dacia. As may be recalled, this army was to defend Istanbul’s northern approaches. This had three justifications: firstly, a successful forward defense in these regions would protect Istanbul just as much as the closer defense originally envisaged. Secondly, it would halt Soviet advances into Thrace. Finally, it would it would begin the process of liquidating what had by this point become an enormous pocket covering nearly the entirety of Dacia. Unfortunately while Guzzoni’s army had by this point grown from one to three combat divisions, only one of them was in any state to actually undergo operations of any sort, including even those as mundane as marching into ostensibly hostile territory. Guzzoni’s basic plan, inasmuch as he had one at this early stage, revolved around relying upon deception and Liddell Hart’s indirect approach on a tactical and operational scale to force the Soviets northward. To the north, meanwhile, the combat continued at its unrelenting pace. The gap between Bastico’s and Graziani’s armies was closing, slowly.
The gap closing, slowly.
By the 23rd of January, the gap had closed further. The battle of Brasov had ended, with just over two hundred and fifty Italian casualties and nearly nine hundred Soviet casualties. Other ongoing battles were just as intense. Ionesti was nearly over by this point. Other battles were not going so well, however. The Soviets had funneled numerous formations into the area of operations, mostly north of the twin Italian pushes. Italian intelligence picked up at least two armored formations north of the encirclement attempt, as well as at least three infantry divisions and other assorted units. The Soviets could foretell disaster and were striving hard themselves to preclude it. In the south, Guzzoni’s 8a Armata had split. The two unready divisions placed themselves between the Soviets and the north Aegean coastline, hoping that their presence would be noticed but their incapacity not. Meanwhile, Guzzoni’s one ready division had begun its own march into the Soviet pocket from the south. The naval air forces still retained their complete air superiority; there were no Soviet air units in the sky anywhere over Dacia.
The situation of the entire pocket.
The actual closing of the pocket, however, was not going as planned or as hoped. Numerous Soviet formations had by this point become trapped in between the two Italian armies, and were resisting the closing of the encirclement desperately. At Onesti, there were four heavy Soviet motorized divisions. The Italians, by this point somewhat stretched, attacked with a single division initially though soon reinforced by the other side. Nevertheless, the battle ended in defeat as the Italians broke off the fight: over eight hundred Italians lost their lives assaulting those positions, as opposed to only two hundred and twenty Soviet deaths defending them. Directly to the south, however, Valenii de Munte, the Soviets were less ready to deal with heavy Italian assaults. Nevertheless, they still defended desperately. Ionesti finally fell, and the defending Soviet armored division wiped out, thus releasing Bastico’s third corps to join in the attempt to close the pocket, by yet another alternative route.
The alternative closing route of Bastico’s third corps.
Other battles during this time were also raging, and nearly all resulted in heavy casualties on both sides. A battle at Sarata resulted in six Italian and two hundred and twenty-four Soviet deaths; defeat at Gheorgheni saw nearly seven hundred Italian and two hundred and twenty Soviet casualties. However, all of a sudden the alternative route was no longer required. The Soviets at Valenii de Munte broke, taking over eight hundred and fifty losses while inflicting nearly nine hundred. The Italians, weary but victorious, immediately entered the town and cut the road. The encirclement was closed at last. The cost, however, had been heavy and it had taken longer than anticipated. Furthermore, the Soviets had by the 28th massed truly significant forces north of the thin Italian bulwark. Italian intelligence counted at least five armored divisions, three infantry formations and numerous unidentified units as well.
The encirclement, finally closed but already under threat.
The encirclement was thus finally closed off. However, the hardest part still remained: it had to be liquidated. Furthermore, until its destruction, its integrity had to be protected against the predations of the formidable Soviet build-up to the north.
