The Year of Upheaval
Part 2: The Gamble in the East II, January 7 – January 12, 1942
With the frontline between Hungary and the Black Sea successfully evacuated, and the forces in Anatolia withdrawing safely, those in the know in Italy waited with baited breath, simultaneously eager to and fearful of seeing whether or not the Soviets would take the bait.
The hours ticked onward and the days slipped by the waiting Italians. The Soviets had indeed taken the bait. Their forces, caught off guard by the sudden vacating of the Italian trenches in northern Dacia, began reacting only slowly and cautiously. They were undoubtedly expecting a trap, and rightly so. Nevertheless, they thought in terms of tactical and conventional operational maneuvers. After poking a few vanguards forward, only to find that the space in front of them truly was open and empty, the Soviet war machine ponderously leapt forward. From then events moved quickly. Enterprising Soviet infantry formations marched forward, competing with each other for the honor of conquering noteworthy prizes—particularly Ploesti and Bucharest—while most armored formations were redeployed to other, more important fronts, though some followed up on the tracks of the infantry. In Anatolia, knowing the fragility of the Italian frontline that had stretched across its waist and having near future offensive combat operations already planned, the Soviets were more willing to believe in the likelihood of a complete withdrawal. They began their pursuit quicker than in Dacia, albeit more slowly due to the strains of terrain and logistics.
The big picture in the east.
By the 11th, Mussolini, in communication with commanders on the spot—particularly Graziani—deemed that it was time for the counterstroke to begin. Intelligence held that at least seven infantry divisions had poured into central and southern Dacia, as had one mountaineer division and an armored division. Other formations were considered likely to be hiding in the fog of war. It will be remembered that Graziani had withdrawn directly southward to Varna. Quillicci’s transports had, since its original transporting missions of spring 1941 shifting two armies from Spain to the eastern provinces of the empire, remained in Istanbul. Graziani’s entire army boarded those transports, moved up to the Thracian port of Varna, and protected from any plausible and implausible attacks by Campioni’s carrier task force, sailed northward along the coast. Under Mussolini’s supervision, Graziani had waited and timed it exactly right. The Dacian port of Vylkove was undefended.
Graziani’s landing in the Soviet rear.
By 0800 on the morning of the 12th the entire army was ashore. The Italians immediately uncovered the presence of another Soviet infantry division, lending credence to the hypothesis that there were likely more Soviet formations behind the frontline units driving forward into the great vacuum of central and southern Dacia. Meanwhile, Da Zara’s fleet was steaming up the Aegean and toward the Black Sea. Italy was concentrating its entire carrier strength off the coast of Dacia. They were an integral part of the Italian gamble. Even given operational surprise and the fact that they were deep in the Soviet rear, it was likely that Graziani did not have sufficient punch to drive straight across to Hungary—one reason why Mussolini had originally preferred Bastico’s army for the job, a hope quashed by the vagaries of geostrategy. Thus, the Italians had planned to make up for this relative lack of offensive power by dominating the skies. The five fleet and two escort carriers of Campioni’s and Da Zara’s fleets would put up twelve wings of carrier-borne aircraft. The Italians were banking on not just local air superiority, but local air
supremacy. Any Soviet air formation would be savaged, and the carrier aviators would also fly in support of the troops on the ground.
Graziani’s enclave at Vylkove, having landed without opposition deep behind Soviet lines.
Graziani had eight divisions under his command. With these eight divisions, he planned to throw up a basic bulwark facing northward to prevent Soviets reinforcements from rushing into Dacia, while at the same time dividing the foreseen Soviet pocket into two—and potentially three—separate encirclements. It was an ambitious plan, but it would leave the Soviets in a bad position from which to react against their entrapment. Their only chance seemed to come from relief from outside the pocket, but Graziani had already taken that into account. Four divisions would hold the Prut River, back in exactly the same positions the army had occupied only two weeks previously, while the other four would be the actual formations closing the pocket.
Graziani’s plan for closing the pocket.
The second stage of Italy’s gamble in Dacia had begun promisingly. Graziani had landed without trouble, and his units had received their orders. Campioni’s warplanes were ready to take off, and Da Zara was nearing the area of operations with every hour. The chances of success seemed, if not high, to be favorable to the Italians.