The Year of Upheaval
Part 1: The Gamble in the East I, January 1 – January 6, 1942
The new year began with dire intelligence. There were rampant indications that the Soviet Union was planning to go onto the offensive. In Anatolia it would continue its slow push westward, but the great change came in Dacia. There, the Soviets had amassed forces that were likely in excess of twice what the Italians had on the front, and probably with further formations in the theater reserve. By selecting their opening battles, the Soviets could undoubtedly concentrate sufficient forces to penetrate the fragile Italian frontline in a handful of places. Such defeats would be enough to cause the entire line to withdraw to inferior defensive positions, or collapse entirely. With the prospect of defeat in Dacia, the Italian position in Anatolia was quickly seen to be untenable.
Mussolini, in talks with the general staffs and commanders at the front, hit upon a single way to save the situation. It was to be a gamble unlike any that Italy had embarked upon before. If it succeeded, the frontline could be stabilized for another year. If it failed, at best Italy might succeed in abandoning much of its eastern empire and forming another front somewhere much closer to the Italy itself. The first step was the easiest, least controversial and had indeed been advised by some of the Italian general staff for some time. Pintor’s 7a Armata and the nascent 8a Armata under Guzzoni would withdraw to Istanbul. Pintor would deploy his two corps on Asia Minor, safeguarding Istanbul from the Soviets moving over Anatolia. Guzzoni would deploy his paltry force of one—later three—divisions on the European side to protect Istanbul from any Soviet thrusts southward through Dacia. Istanbul was, for the foreseeable future, to become a fortress.
Simultaneously in Dacia, Bastico and Graziani made preparations for their own strategy. It was here, in Dacia, that the gamble would take place. They would not, and indeed could not, sit and await the Soviet assault. It would come and it would likely break them. Instead, they would attempt a daring maneuver. They would retreat. It was the unfortunate result of events that Bastico held the western half of the front, and Graziani the eastern half. Ideally, Mussolini would have preferred Bastico to play the decisive role. It was not a personal question; Bastico merely had the bigger army of the two, and the more experienced generals. Nevertheless, Graziani would have to play the hammer. It was to be a long withdrawal. Bastico would be shifting his headquarters back to Belgrade and his army would withdraw several hundred kilometers and simultaneously wheel to create a front running northwest-southeast rather than west-east. Graziani would withdraw his entire army to Varna. Between the two armies would be a gap of several hundred kilometers. This was why Istanbul needed to be defended from the European side as well. Otherwise any enterprising Soviet armored officer could rush the city, ruin Italian logistics in that part of the empire and throw one army group headquarters and two army headquarters into chaos.
Bastico and Graziani withdrawing into the depths of the Balkans.
The withdrawal in Dacia caught the Soviets completely by surprise. They made no attempt to attack withdrawing Italian forces as they abandoned their positions and left. However, once the front was completely denuded of Italian troops, they were not slow to begin shoving their armies into the gap that opened up between Hungary and the Black Sea. They were initially moving slowly, however, and this gave the Italians time. Bastico managed his positions, finally setting on a shorter line than even had been planned before, but which would offer greater security along the Hungarian border and concentrate it more should he need to make use of mass. Graziani too was withdrawing with all speed to Varna. Thus far, insofar as it had only just begun, the gamble seemed to be paying off. The Soviets were in confusion and the Italians were preparing themselves.
Bastico readying his army for operations.
The withdrawal to Istanbul was merely a defensive redeployment: some of the general staff advocated leading the Soviets into the western depths of Anatolia before landing in their rear and cutting them off. Such a plan of action, while well recommended simply by looking at the map, ignored in the first instance the vagaries of Anatolian terrain. The mountain valleys lead east-west rather than north-south. This would make any thrust northward from the southern coast, or southward from the northern coast, more difficult than it would be for the Soviets to rush formations from the west back eastward to counter such Italian moves. Furthermore, such a strategy ignored the realities of logistics. There was no Anatolian port in the south to supply an offensive from that area; any Italian forces would quickly run out of supplies and be completely reliant upon forces pushing down from the north. However, the only Anatolian port in the north—other than Istanbul—was Eregli, and quite close to Istanbul. Thus by logistical necessity, the proposed northern prong would have to land there, but that would be quite close to the hypothetical Soviet rear and only exacerbate the first problem mentioned, of terrain. Finally, it was all academic anyway as the Italians did not have sufficient forces available for such a strategic maneuver, and particularly not with the Soviet threat in Dacia. Pintor’s and Guzzoni’s armies, fortunately, escaped the reach of Soviet formations in Anatolia with little loss or difficulty and, by the 6th of January, were well on their way to Istanbul.
Pintor and Guzzoni escaping with their armies to Istanbul.
Thus the scene was set for the greatest strategic gamble the Italians had ever attempted.
