The Year of Strategic Crisis
Part 10: The Defense of Anatolia I, May 2 – June 16, 1941
As compared to the trials and tribulations that Graziani, and to a lesser extent Bastico, went through during the one and a half months of late spring and early summer, the events that unfolded in Anatolia were nearly perfectly serene. During this time, Pintor realized that the logistical support he was receiving was inadequate for an offensive out of eastern Anatolia and through the Caucasus into the region between the Black and Caspian Seas. With this realization, he decided instead to pursue a defensive strategy in the middle of Anatolia.
Such a defensive strategy would be abdicating control over the entire eastern half of Anatolia to the Soviet Union. Feeling that this could upset political leaders in Rome, Pintor marshaled strong arguments in defense of his strategy. Firstly, due to logistical reasons, he was unable to launch an offensive himself. Secondly, due to geographical reasons, even if he could, it would merely result in his army being dispersed over hundreds and hundreds of kilometers of frontage between the Black and Caspian Seas, resulting in a very weak defense and the likelihood that any Soviet counteroffensive would easily push the 7a Armata back into Anatolia, if Soviet operational skill did not manage to isolate and destroy it despite Pintor’s hypothetical best efforts. Thirdly, a defense so deep into Anatolia would ease Pintor’s supply problems by putting his army close to the supply depots at Ankara and Istanbul, while at the same time greatly exacerbating Soviet logistical difficulties, which themselves would have to deal with the rugged and sparse nature of the logistical network in eastern Anatolia. These difficulties would prevent the Soviets from massing overly large forces against Pintor’s army. Pintor spent the first three weeks of May redeploying his forces westward. His headquarters went to Ankara, with corps headquarters forward of that city. In the north, the defense would be made among the mountains and rivers.
Gambara deploying his corps toward the envisioned defensive positions.
In the south, Roatta would have a harder task, as Pintor well knew. The river was to his rear, not to his front and among his positions as it was for Gambara. The terrain was also, to some extent, less mountainous than to the north. This was the sector Pintor was most worried about. There was some slight prospect for a defense in depth at least to behind the river in some parts of the front if absolutely necessary, but a full withdrawal to the river would create a gap between the front and the sea and would bend the entire front out of shape. Pintor would have to rely on a static defense and aggressive support actions to keep his defensive line secured.
Pintor recognized that there were dangers to his plan. His forces would be stretched thin to cover the entirety of Anatolia from its Black Sea coast to its border with Syria. He would have no reserves. If he miscalculated and the Soviets were indeed able to bring up sufficient forces to the front to penetrate his lines and throw in sufficient and sufficiently mobile forces to exploit into the depths of western Anatolia, it was unlikely that the 7a Armata would survive the defeat. Beyond the local rear, there was no chain of advantageous positions further westward that would allow his eight divisions to cover the entire front. Furthermore, in a true war of maneuver against armies to whom Tukhachevskij’s doctrine of deep battle was still a fresh memory, even if under Stalin’s regime after 1938 an undesired one, his infantry divisions would be hard pressed to match the capabilities of their attackers. By the 16th of June, his defensive line, such as it was, was ready. The Soviets, meanwhile, began their long crawl forward across the rugged terrain and poor roads of eastern Anatolia.
Pintor’s full defensive line across the Anatolian peninsula.
Pintor could only remind his military and political superiors that every action in war was a gamble to some degree. He believed that his strategy offered the best chance of short-term integrity to the province of Anatolia. In the long-term, he reported to Badaglio and Mussolini, he would need reinforcements.
If not we will just have to be very happy with the update tonight. 
