The Year of Strategic Crisis
Part 9: Graziani’s Crusade II, May 2 – June 16, 1941
As Bastico wrestled to come to grips with and destroy a lone Soviet armored division running amok in central Dacia, significant events were taking shape to the north. Zingales’ corps began its push to close up the considerable inroads made by the Soviet armor. Graziani was, meanwhile, overseeing his other corps under Ambrosio in its conquest of the Crimea.
Zingales’ campaign began on the 2nd when his corps engaged a Soviet division of three brigades at Soroca. It was a sharp battle, but a relatively short one: after four days and over seven hundred casualties on each side, the Soviets broke and fled their positions. Stung by this reverse, the Soviets withdrew from the front for the moment and allowed Zingales a free hand in acting to achieve his objectives. He proceeded to throw one division directly westward; it was to reach the Hungarian border before turning northward and taking some further positions that were a part of Italian Dacia. The other three divisions were to drive southward and close up the entire Soviet inroad north of Bastico’s army, which had by this point encircled the Soviet armored division and was assaulting it.
Zingales’ operational concept was that of a cleaning up operation.
However, as always in warfare, complications arose with Zingales’ operation. Logistics failed at this critical point and only one division received the necessary supplies to drive forward—in this case, southward. By the 20th it had achieved its mission but none of its compatriot divisions had even been able to begun their advances and the Soviets had returned to the front. Their reappearance was, unfortunately, in some force. Zingales had to act quickly. He ordered his one division that had achieved anything northward again, though by a different route than it had taken to go south. The other three divisions were to redeploy, at least as much as logistics allowed, eastward. Bastico by this point was mopping up the remnants of the Soviet armor southward, and Graziani had captured Sevastopol and ejected the Soviet Black Sea fleet from its valuable moorings there, exiling it to the port at Batum. Zingales with three divisions immediately at hand would have to fend off an estimated eight divisions at least, in the first echelon of Soviet forces.
Zingales in his hurried redeployment to defend the vital supply lines required to maintain Ambrosio’s corps.
Zingales attempted to pursue an offensive defense, with local attacks against weak points on the Soviet front, but a lack of supplies and the escalating numbers of Soviet formations prevented this from being an effective strategy and he quickly abandoned it. Indeed, by the 2nd of June, a lot more than simply a local strategy of defense had to be abandoned. With Soviet divisions numbering at sixteen infantry divisions, if not more, and at least four separate tank brigades, Graziani’s position was becoming untenable. Bastico was struggling northward, but one of his corps was becoming engaged heavily at Toplita, a previously mentioned battle which would cost him twenty-five hundred casualties. Bastico’s capability to rescue Graziani’s situation was fast approaching a negligible value. There was only one course left to Graziani: retreat. His eight divisions were stretched over at least twelve hundred kilometers of front. As determined to salvage what he could in retreat as he could gain in offense, Graziani hit upon a two-stage withdrawal. Zingales’ corps would have to hold the line for some time while Ambrosio’s corps was entrained from all over western Ukraine and sent west of the Dnepr.
The first stage of Graziani’s withdrawal, with Ambrosio’s corps rushing to escape the crushing weight of Soviet arms.
Graziani’s handling of the retreat was a testament to his skill. Within four days, only a single formation was still east of the Dnepr. With Ambrosio’s escape nearly accomplished, Graziani gave the order for Zingales’ corps to take to the trains as well and rush southward. The timing was almost as last minute as it could get: Zingales’ corps by this point formed a salient in the Soviet frontline, bordered by six infantry divisions and two tank brigades. The carnage was still piling up at Toplita, but Zingales and Ambrosio would escape without being engaged by pursuing Soviet divisions in any major battle. Carboni’s mountain division had its rearguard assaulted by Soviet troops, but Zingales ordered a unilateral disengagement and despite the delay involved this formation too managed to escape. Graziani’s crusade had come to an end when the real might of the Soviet army was fielded against it. He had, however, escaped with the entirety of his army and his reputation intact.
The second stage of Graziani’s withdrawal from the Ukraine and his crusade.
The only thing left for Graziani to do once he had accomplished his impressive withdrawal was to attain a defensive position alongside Bastico’s 2a Armata, which had finally occupied Toplita. The fortunes of geography placed him on the River Prut, behind which he would have an easier time defending Dacia than would Bastico to his west, even though both had attained the same density of formations per any length of front. There was to be no elastic defense in the depths of Dacia; that strategy would merely play into the game the Soviets preferred. With their tank brigades and their superior numbers, any such Italian defense would result in the evisceration of the two Italian armies safeguarding the Italian Empire’s northeastern border. Instead, everything was being staked on a single belt of sturdy defenses right on the front, with the hope that it would provide enough deterrent value to preclude any determined Soviet assault as being too risky and bloody, while they waited for reinforcements to make their positions less tenuous.
The complete defensive line: Bastico’s 2a Armata to the left and Graziani’s 1a Armata to the right. Also note Da Zara’s powerful fleet poised off the coast.
Thus ended Graziani’s crusade. It had little effect on the Soviets save to disrupt their war economy in southern Ukraine and to eject their Black Sea fleet from Sevastopol. It also called a possible two dozen major Soviet formations to the area, resulting in the defeat of Graziani’s crusade—though not of Graziani. Instead, with Bastico and Graziani now side-by-side at last, they were in a strong defensive position and hoped that this was enough to halt the Soviets by decreasing the impact of their superior numbers due to the narrowness of the front. There was only one other front on which Soviet and Italian forces were to clash: Anatolia.
