The Year of Strategic Crisis
Part 4: Operation Valeria Victrix III, February 20 – March 22, 1941
It was during this period that Operation Valeria Victrix revealed its true strength, and the very real virtuosity of the Italian commanders. Heavy Spanish mistakes were greatly punished, and by the last week of March there was no longer any shade of doubt as to the result of the campaign.
With Roatta’s encirclement of a lone Spanish division against the southern Spanish coast completed and the division destroyed, there was a vacuum in front of him as there were no Spanish units left. Everything, even nature, abhors a vacuum. Roatta did what was natural for any right-thinking soldier: he began moving his corps into that vacuum, in what would become a flanking maneuver against the entire Spanish line, from the south. Thus while Aymonnino’s corps was wreaking havoc on the Spanish line on a direct line to Madrid, Roatta’s forces were driving in an ever diverging series of marches toward the west and northwest. The Spaniards were stripping troops from everywhere to counter events in the center and far north, where the Germans were finally appearing in numbers, and the frontline was growing shorter and shorter by the day. The Spanish were going to sacrifice their foot to try to save a hand. The result of all this was that by midday on the 20th Gibraltar was guarded by a single Spanish infantry brigade. It was time for Tellera and Gandin to break out.
Tellera and Gandin on the move.
The Spanish only belatedly realized the stupidity of their redeployments and reversed a handful, though these units, fed piecemeal against Roatta’s thrusts, were defeated easily. Aymonnino’s actions had led to the encirclement of one Spanish division, and an independent brigade, and had badly damaged the Spanish position in the center of the line, leaving their units greatly battered and disorganized. By the 27th, the Rock had been relieved. The Italian port at Estepona had been liberated from the Spanish and Tellera had linked up with Bittosi, of Roatta’s corps. Thus the situation in the center and south was that, while the Spanish had two divisions and a brigade to safeguard the entire south of the peninsula against six highly mobile Italian infantry divisions, a dozen and a half or even more Spanish divisions were suffering from the throes of rout in front of Madrid. The Spanish position had fallen apart by the 1st of March.
The situation on the south and center fronts on March 1st.
In the south, Roatta’s corps was dedicated to simply pushing forward into the vast undefended regions of the Spanish interior, as Tellera and Gandin pushed along the Spanish littoral, in the face of determined Spanish resistance in the form of a marine division. The Spanish in the north were more slippery than elsewhere, however. Though not more competent, they excelled at marching into towns surrendered to the Italians and taking them over. Thus, two elusive Spanish divisions and the remnants of the front in the north would occupy Gambara’s corps for the next three weeks. However, the Germans were making their presence felt at last, having dedicated apparently at least a whole army to the fight. Their intervention by this point resulted in a number of small pockets of Spanish divisions between the German frontline and the Italian frontline, ready for liquidation.
The strategic situation in the whole of Iberia, March 5th.
In the center, Aymonnino was single-mindedly pursuing his goal: Madrid. Using his four divisions, he levered the Spanish arrayed against him, who outnumbered his forces, through dispersed maneuver and battlefield concentration. On the 5th he was less than two hundred kilometers from Spain’s premier city. On his left flank, Pirzio Biroli’s corps was safeguarding his dash toward Madrid, also through superior operational-level tactics. By the 11th, with Pirzio Biroli eviscerating Spanish forces along the Guadiana River and trapping several Spanish formations against the half of Gonzaga del Vodice’s corps that was in the area, Aymonnino began his final push toward Madrid. He had routed the remaining Spanish forces in his way, and the road was now open. There was no Spanish position any more, save against the Germans.
The situation on March 14th.
The Spanish were incoherent in operations and strategy, but they were trying to make up for this with sheer fervor in the few battles left to them. At Alcalá, which by the 15th was an Italian victory, nearly thirteen hundred Italians lost their lives, as against only twelve hundred thirty Spanish, in the bloodiest battle of the entire war. Perhaps unsurprisingly, this is where the Spanish marines had made their stand. By the 18th, meanwhile, Aymonnino had placed two divisions up against Madrid’s perimeter and was maneuvering a third into place. He aimed to give each division its own axis of attack, for ease of assault both logistically and vis-à-vis the Spanish defense. Finally, on the 22nd, Aymonnino launched the assault. Two Italian divisions, with another nearly ready to participate, moved into the city and grappled with the Spanish defenders, which amounted to the guard of the Spanish general staff and an infantry brigade.
The battle for Madrid had begun.
This was the decisive period of the war. Spanish mistakes and Italian intrepidity combined to doom the Spanish war effort and allowed Aymonnino to tear a hole in the center of the Spanish line and reach Madrid. In the south, the Spanish foolishly denuded their line of virtually all troops, allowing Roatta to burst across half of southern Spain in four weeks. It was only a matter of time before the Spanish state crumbled.