The First Year of Renaissance
Part 2: Drastic Measures I, January 1, 1936
When Mussolini set to his task of turning the ponderous state bureaucracy of the Kingdom of Italy he was nearly overwhelmed by it all, seeing all the avenues he would have to go down and all the leads he would have to pursue to make sure his strategic vision take root and succeed. He, indeed, nearly balked at the task. It was fortunate for him that political intrigue was kept to a minimum: none of his primary ministers were threatened by his plans and one, his chief of staff, was far too busy already. The chief of staff was Francesco Grazioli, and he was far too concerned with supply throughput to Eritrea and Somalia and the Abyssinian War generally to care much about what Mussolini was doing in Italy. It is possible that he anticipated the great prestige he would gain from victory in that colonial war would render him relatively immune to Mussolini’s more bothersome dictates.
The first task he set himself was to grapple with comprehending the state of the Italian armed forces in early January 1936 and planning the structure of the Royal Italian forces from there. All three staffs turned out reams of documents at his request, complete with informed, and biased, advisors to answer any questions Mussolini had regarding anything remotely relevant to that branch. Arguments broke out often but Mussolini nevertheless made remarkable progress wading through the dense archival materials. The broad overview was thus: the army disposed of 145 brigades whose theoretical manpower should have totaled just over 400,000 by his rough calculations. However, at the same time the army reported that considerable resources were required to bring reserve units up to full strength. The navy consisted of 59 ships of varying types and classes, and the air force of 12 units. The navy and air force claimed most of the fuel spent, though the army required two thirds of all the supplies that were directed to the support of the armed forces.
Four pie charts detailing the general status of the Italian armed forces.
Looking into the make-up of the army in further detail, Mussolini found that nearly an entire fifth of the army, unit-wise, consisted of headquarters alone totaling 99,000 men and requiring over a fourth of all the supplies the army consumed! Nearly half the army consisted of infantry brigades, with an upper limit of 189,000 men. Most importantly for Mussolini’s future plans were the mobile forces of the Regio Esercito: six cavalry, three motorized infantry and one armored car brigades. These were the units that would for the moment be the cadre of his armored corps. This revelation had noticeably shaken Mussolini: he had never before realized just how much of his bombast was an utter lie. And yet the international community had fallen for it wholesale. It is difficult to discern which is more staggering.
Four pie charts detailing in further detail the status of the Regio Esercito.
The air force was arguably in better shape as a whole than the army. Nearly half of the Regia Aeronautica was comprised of interceptor squadrons. Given his budding maritime emphasis, Mussolini’s desire was for a primarily defensive army aviation doctrine. The role of interceptors was to clear the skies above Italian armies and perhaps escort medium bombers on tactical missions. Of these medium bombers there were three squadrons. Despite Douhet’s influence on Mussolini, he did not believe that bombers—certainly not such bombers—could inflict decisive defeat on the enemy on their own. As mentioned, he determined to reign them in to just tactical missions, not only against armies but if necessary against navies as well. This dual role was forced upon them as the Italian air force had only three squadrons of naval bombers. These specialized bombers would be of great importance in helping to define and control sea zones to impose lop-sided battle conditions onto any enemy. The squadron of transport planes was simply inexplicable, though Mussolini is on record for deciding to keep them.
Three pie charts detailing the status and needs of the Regia Aeronautica.
The Regia Marina in 1936 was possibly the most effective service of the Italian armed forces. Four of its 59 ships were battleships and another eight were heavy cruisers; these were capital ships of the fleet. The navy also had eighteen destroyer flotillas and twelve light cruisers. These lighter ships were the workhorses of the fleet and they were myriad enough to put Mussolini at ease concerning certain portions of his strategic vision. Another light cruiser was also near to being operational and would join the fleet by mid January. The remaining naval units were six transport flotillas and a fairly strong submarine arm of eleven flotillas. Given the importance of controlling the littoral in maritime strategy, despite Mahan’s pronouncements to the contrary, Mussolini knew that the transport fleet would have to be expanded. He did not anticipate too much use of the submarines; he did not believe that commerce warfare would be particularly useful unless many submarines were built, and their anti-warship capabilities were likely to be limited too. Mussolini did not anticipate building more submarines; the one submarine production on-going at that time was cancelled.
Three pie charts detailing the status and needs of the Regia Marina.
After bringing himself up to speed on his armed forces, Mussolini overviewed the laws currently in place in Italy. Of the seven groups of laws in force, Mussolini believed he could modify five for the benefit of Italy. Italy went from a one year draft system to service by requirement; from basic to total economic mobilization; from a medium-large to a big educational investment; from a mixed to a heavy industry emphasis; and he implemented specialist training.
Italy’s laws before and after—note however that at this point Mussolini had not enacted specialist training yet.
The recently changed laws went into effect immediately, and indeed had immediate effect. They used to say that the trains ran on time in Fascist Italy even though this was not actually the case; afterwards they other wonders of administration to marvel about. From these laws the armed forces were slated to received half again more manpower and mid-ranking leaders than the year earlier. Industry increased by fifty per cent over night, and the populace suddenly demanded less luxury items. Supply throughput increased as well, to Grazioli’s approval. New recruits were getting more training, though this would take longer. Mussolini was finally taking advantage of the war with Abyssinia to push through a number of reforms that would help make his strategic visions a reality.
The precise effects of the five laws enacted by Mussolini.
This concludes the first portion of the overview of the drastic measures and changes Mussolini implements to begin turning the ship of state toward his strategic vision. These overviews and initial law reforms were an important step in Mussolini’s task. Next, we shall examine what necessarily followed from this, his apportioning of contracts for technological development and their strategic purposes, and the beginning of his army reforms.