Explorations in Strategy - Italy at War

Sentinal 6: Indeed, that naval battle was pretty successful. Must've eliminated half or more of the Republican navy.

Karelian: Unfortunately there's no chance for the Balearic Islands, but Cartagena will do nearly as well as a naval base. Plus, once I get Gibraltar that'll be a good window into the Atlantic..

Judas Maccabeus: And especially not with such a successful battle!

dogfish8: It's my pleasure. I enjoy writing, and I think my games tend to be on the more interesting side, especially when it comes to deviations from history.

Cacahuananche: Good insight there. Even if I don't link up, my plan was to improve Cartagena anyway. It's only level four or five now, which probably can't support much beyond Pintor's full army (if even that). Plus, the general staff will have to devise a defensive plan in case Franco decides not to accept an Italian presence in Iberia. But before that, Pintor must push northward and take what he can!

Jorath13: To be honest, I don't really know what impact the CAGs made--whether they softened targets up or not. I just know that they didn't sink any ships. And yeah, the beachheads are the major question right now...

Valentinan: I think I broadly agree with you concerning the AI control, though for role-playing (for AAR purposes primarily) it's certainly quite good. Also, you have some good ideas there concerning difficulty. I'm just playing at normal/normal as far as I'm aware but for future games and AARs, some tweaking may be in order.

I'll write an update for tomorrow evening, guys! Also, I gotta admit a mistake! I misinterpreted the images. The ARE España and the ARE Jaime I (the former sunk, the latter escaped) aren't heavy cruisers but battleships! Oh damn.

truth is life: I've actually not heard of that bug before, but that sounds pretty serious.

VILenin: Maybe, but that would run counter to Mussolini's strategic ideas.

Maj. von Mauser: I did notice myself that those were battleships yesterday, but I didn't realize they they still had a heavy cruiser there too. Obviously Italian intelligence needs to train up when it comes to photo reconnaissance. As for Gibraltar, I hope things will be okay with just a one province front, and hopefully the beachheads will link up!

NilsS: Very good story. I'll use that one.

AreoHotah: Thanks! And yeah, building and upgrading ports are a slow business. As for airfields, I don't have any in Spain at the moment as Cartagena doesn't have any. The closest are Gibraltar, in British hands, and Valencia, in Nationalist hands.

I'll write an update for tonight!

Enewald: I definitely have to consider a war with the Nationalists, but I don't think I can afford to attack. Another DOW would push my threat level through the roof and the hammer will fall. Don't want that yet.

Stuyvesant: Neither. It'll be covered in the relevant update.

Update coming up!

The Year of Preparation
Part 3: Operation Scipio II, February 1 – February 11, 1938

The ten day period of February 1 – 11 shaped the course that the Italian intervention in Spain took from then on, for two fundamental reasons. Firstly, the race for Alcalá la Real was decided, an event whose general implications are obvious. Secondly, the nearly completely empty front to the north of the western beachhead was simply far too inviting to pass unexploited, and Pintor and Gambara mustered every ounce of aggression to advance in that direction.

February began with another naval victory. The remnants of the Republican navy, with Cartagana conquered by Messe and Caracciolo di Feroleto and the warships’ berths under fire from artillery, had no choice but to flee the port. They sailed right into the waiting guns of the Italian fleet. Within a few hours it was over, the slaughter profound. The Republican battleship ARE Jaime I was sunk first, the final shots being fired by the light cruiser RM Luigi Cadorna. After that, there was practically no resistance as the Italian warships plunged into a sea full of empty transport vessels. The entirety of the 5a and 6a Flotilla de Transporte Navale were wiped out, primarily by the battleship RM Caio Duilio and the light cruiser RM Alberico da Barbiano. Only two ships, the light cruisers ARE Républica and ARE Méndez Núñez, escaped the scene of disaster. A net was, however, drawn around them and later in the day they too slipped beneath the waves of the Mediterranean, their end hastened by the shells of the heavy cruiser RM Trieste and the RM Caio Duilio, respectively. Campioni’s carrier-based airplanes again played little part in the victory, besides aerial reconnaissance. These were the last naval clashes of the intervention that the Regia Marina took part in: the Republican navy had been definitively shattered.


Another naval victory for the Regia Marina.

On land, operations were becoming equally successful. Though by the 2nd Gambara had yet to reach Alcalá la Real, orders had gone out from his headquarters to subordinate units. Frattini was to advance on Ubeda and secure Gambara’s flank, before turning northeastward. Nicolosi was sent on a long march through Tobarra, Albacete and Casas Ibáñez to Ayore. Messe’s march route was to take him through San Javier, Hellin and Almansa before he too reached Ayore. Caracciolo di Feroleto also transited through San Javier before pushing directly along the coast past Alicante to reach Alzira. These three thrusts would meet up to present a coherent front right at the gates of Nationalist-held Valencia. Here it was anticipated that Gambara’s corps would halt and rest, unless Valencia fall in the meantime, presenting the Italians with another port to capture, or the opportunities at that time still outweighed the dictates of caution. The operational plan until then was to encircle and isolate, but not occupy, the Republican capital, which was situated at Murcia after having been forcefully driven out of both Madrid and Guadalajara.


Italian forces rushing northward at utmost speed.

On the 4th, Nicolosi became embroiled in the second battle on Spanish soil between Italian and Republican forces. His six thousand man division ran into a Spanish corps headquarters, though what it was actually commanding Italian intelligence could not pinpoint. Despite its lack of heavy weapons, it put up a relatively difficult fight, delaying Nicolosi’s advance by two days. The defense was ferocious but lacked skill; only two Italians were killed, at the cost of eighty-six Spaniards. Nicolosi used simple tactics to push the headquarters’ guard units back: he pinned the defense with one regiment and swept around its flank with the other.


The battle of Tobarra.

By the 6th, the race for Alcalá la Real was over. Gambara had lost. The Nationalists kept the Italian beachheads split and had liberated Granada. Roatta’s corps was effectively out of the war. Gambara acted quickly to realign his advance, and decided to send his own headquarters northeastward toward Elone de la Sierra. Frattini was sent careering through Beas de Segura, Santiago Pontones and to Munera, northwest of Tobarra. Messe’s, Nicolosi’s and Caracciolo di Feroleto’s objectives remained the same at this point as before. Pintor and Gambara were eager to overrun as much territory as possible, with subtle backing from Mussolini. It was late on the 6th that Messe met resistance as well, from the same brigade that defended Cartagena, outside Hellin. What transpired was a stubborn battle that only ended on the 12th. The Spanish took 452 casualties to 59 Italian and were forced to withdraw but their defense stymied Messe’s advance for nearly a week.


The battle of Hellin.

By the morning of the 11th Frattini and Nicolosi had linked up. Frattini had yet to receive new objectives, but Nicolosi was still marching toward Ayore. Though Messe was embroiled in combat at Hellin, Caracciolo di Feroleto had occupied Alzira and made contact with the Nationalist forces. His new orders had also come through: he was to maneuver all the way around the Nationalist positions at Valencia. His objective was to occupy Requena, passing through Ayore on the way. Requena was already being envisaged as a jump off point from which the Italians could keep marching northeastward. In a slightly spiteful mood following the failure at Alcalá la Real, Pintor hoped to isolate Valencia from the rest of Spain, following the now inevitable Nationalist victory. That lay in the future, however: Messe was still fighting at Hellin, and of Gambara’s corps only Caracciolo di Feroleto was even near Valencia. It was about this time too, noting that the Nationalists were beginning to move forces through Italian occupied territory, that Pintor decided to send his headquarters to occupy Murcia.


Gambara’s corps, pushing ever northward.

Republican resistance remained incredibly spotty in the first one and a half weeks of February, with only two stands being made: against Frattini at Tobarra and against Messe at Hellin. Though both resulted in light Italian and heavy Republican casualties, Messe noted that the Republican logistical system was wondrous: the casualties of Cartagena had already been replaced. The Republican fronts everywhere seemed to be collapsing or on the verge of breaking, and particularly near where the Italians were operating, but their supplies were still holding strong. The Italian general staff drew an important lesson from this realization, though it was more of a confirmation than anything new: logistics was the basis of strategy, but not its guarantor.