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Wow, there's a lot of comments here! I typically wait until the next morning before replying but given how many there are and with the possibility of getting more over night, I figure I should get the first batch now while it's still manageable! 
Exterous: What timing, right in-between my posts! Maybe great minds think alike. As for the French, rest assured that I'll keep an eye on them...
Enewald: I'm not sure how much Mussolini would get out of Sun Tzu. And yeah, wasted opportunities. Hopefully they won't be too wasted in this game.
ColossusCrusher: I sure hope so!
takishan: Nah, not yet. It's not exciting until the first bombs start to fall!
Maj. von Mauser: Thanks!
Lordban, Deamon: Now, while I may have some affinity with the Italians and their very exploitable strategic situation, it's nothing compared to my relationship with Guangxi Clique...
Nikolai II: Naval in part, yes. Truth is life and Coz got it right, maritime rather than naval. There's a specific difference between the two, as maritime is broader. It takes into account more than just the warships but also, for instance, the littoral.
truth is life: As I mentioned to Nikolai II, it'll indeed be a predominantly maritime game. There'll be more detail on this in my third update, which'll basically be Mussolini's synthesis of his readings.
coz1: Don't worry, I haven't forgotten the importance of having an army.
The_Phoenix: As Stuyvesant noted, I don't have access to the game yet. I will on Friday, Gamersgate servers willing, and that's when I'll start playing this game. Until then I'll be basically outlining the strategic concepts I'll be following.
Jorath13: Yes, the naval and aerial aspects will certainly be interesting...
Stuyvesant: Indeed. In fact, note the title of the AAR - Explorations in Strategy. This will be an exploration as much for me as for Mussolini.
stnylan: We can hope! Welcome, stnylan!
I may end up writing another update tonight, which means that I may post it up tomorrow if I feel like it. Or I may keep it for Friday. We'll see. I anticipate at least another two introductory posts before we get to the actual gameplay. I don't anticipate any gameplay updates until Saturday at the very earliest, but probably Sunday or later.
Exterous: What timing, right in-between my posts! Maybe great minds think alike.
As for the French, rest assured that I'll keep an eye on them...Enewald: I'm not sure how much Mussolini would get out of Sun Tzu. And yeah, wasted opportunities. Hopefully they won't be too wasted in this game.
ColossusCrusher: I sure hope so!
takishan: Nah, not yet. It's not exciting until the first bombs start to fall!
Maj. von Mauser: Thanks!
Lordban, Deamon: Now, while I may have some affinity with the Italians and their very exploitable strategic situation, it's nothing compared to my relationship with Guangxi Clique...
Nikolai II: Naval in part, yes. Truth is life and Coz got it right, maritime rather than naval. There's a specific difference between the two, as maritime is broader. It takes into account more than just the warships but also, for instance, the littoral.
truth is life: As I mentioned to Nikolai II, it'll indeed be a predominantly maritime game. There'll be more detail on this in my third update, which'll basically be Mussolini's synthesis of his readings.
coz1: Don't worry, I haven't forgotten the importance of having an army.
The_Phoenix: As Stuyvesant noted, I don't have access to the game yet. I will on Friday, Gamersgate servers willing, and that's when I'll start playing this game. Until then I'll be basically outlining the strategic concepts I'll be following.
Jorath13: Yes, the naval and aerial aspects will certainly be interesting...
Stuyvesant: Indeed. In fact, note the title of the AAR - Explorations in Strategy. This will be an exploration as much for me as for Mussolini.
stnylan: We can hope! Welcome, stnylan!
I may end up writing another update tonight, which means that I may post it up tomorrow if I feel like it. Or I may keep it for Friday. We'll see.
I anticipate at least another two introductory posts before we get to the actual gameplay. I don't anticipate any gameplay updates until Saturday at the very earliest, but probably Sunday or later.
Subscribed. May you lead Italy to better ends than the real Il Duce. When you say "maritime" as opposed to "naval" it gives me hope that we'll see crazy things like the Italian Navy and Air Force working in conjunction, a feat they could never quite seem to manage.
When you say "maritime" as opposed to "naval" it gives me hope that we'll see crazy things like the Italian Navy and Air Force working in conjunction, a feat they could never quite seem to manage.
I'd rather see all three together...Army taking Egypt, Navy interdicting British convoys and Air Force destroying their logistical support for the supplies that get through...
After all, they can't fight if they can't eat, can they?
After all, they can't fight if they can't eat, can they?
Are bayonets made of milk acceptable strategic weapons for a maritime power? They were what I was actually thinking of
i sense a distinct lack of italian presence in this AAR. let me rectify that.
the balbinater will be watching you closely!
mussolini was a schoolteacher, not a military strategist. NOBODY can read three books on war and then call himself a strategist ))) he once said that he wished he could "give back" libya. that by itself shows the noobness of his strategic thinking. the fourth shore is absolutely integral to the defense of the homeland. i expect you to defend it to the bitter end!!!
the balbinater will be watching you closely!
mussolini was a schoolteacher, not a military strategist. NOBODY can read three books on war and then call himself a strategist ))) he once said that he wished he could "give back" libya. that by itself shows the noobness of his strategic thinking. the fourth shore is absolutely integral to the defense of the homeland. i expect you to defend it to the bitter end!!!
VILenin: I certainly hope I'll do better. I've been recorded as claiming that Mussolini's become competent, definitely. We'll just see how it goes, eh? Glad to have you along!
ColossusCrusher: They can't fight if the British Isles are taken, can then?
Lordban: I certainly hope they're acceptable strategic weapons, given how many of them Italy has! (Reputedly eight million)
Rensslaer: Thanks! Glad to have you reading along!
The Balbinater: Well, a strategist is someone who thinks and does strategy. That includes heads of state and government, regardless of what their occupation had been previously. And hopefully I won't have to defend the fourth shore.
Well, the update's written! Depending on how I feel later today I may post it. The AAR mood is upon me again and I want to get this thing going, y'know.
ColossusCrusher: They can't fight if the British Isles are taken, can then?
Lordban: I certainly hope they're acceptable strategic weapons, given how many of them Italy has! (Reputedly eight million)
Rensslaer: Thanks! Glad to have you reading along!
The Balbinater: Well, a strategist is someone who thinks and does strategy. That includes heads of state and government, regardless of what their occupation had been previously. And hopefully I won't have to defend the fourth shore.
Well, the update's written! Depending on how I feel later today I may post it. The AAR mood is upon me again and I want to get this thing going, y'know.
Whats with the small thinking??!! Navys are for sea invasions! I expect to see a very green England before this AAR is done!
Exterous: We can hope!
All right, I've given in to my AAR mood and will be posting the update shortly!
All right, I've given in to my AAR mood and will be posting the update shortly!
Introduction
Part 2: Italian Strategic Thought and Practice to 1936
Italy’s strategic thought and practice until late into the interwar period was predicated on the assumptions of Fascist Modernism. Modernism, particularly the Fascistic acceptance of such, utterly glorified the rise of the machine, and idealized action, vigor, and speed. It was essentially a celebration of modernity. If something was new, it was good by default and was certainly better than something that was old. This applied to both technology and to the human race. Human birth was celebrated as a triumph but once man attained age he was, ideally, stripped of his individualism and inserted as merely another cog in the autarkical corporate state that Mussolini had proclaimed. Women existed primarily to propagate the national race. And machines were predominant.
The Fascist vision of war reflected this love affair with machine over man in every respect. Man was not the bringer of victory: machine was. Man, if he was necessary at all, was present only to operate and direct the deadly work of the machines and to witness the revelry of the machines’ inevitable victory over men. There was no doubt in the Fascist vision of warfare. There was only a scientific precision that could not be gainsaid. This Fascistic vision of warfare lay heavily indebted to the work of men such as Giulio Douhet and J.F.C. Fuller, both of whom celebrated the past accomplishments and future potential of machine of war. They postulated that man was weak and unsuited for modern warfare, as proven by the repeated failures on the Western Front during the Great War. Further, they argued that it was the advent of machines—of tanks and aircraft—which, in suitable roles, restored hope that victory could be attained from military action. This vision of warfare had an enormous impact on the organization of the Italian armed forces during the period in question.
Suitably for an army whose central tenets were wholly Fullerian in nature, the Italian Royal Army, the Regio Esercito, showered its love, honor and budget on its armored division concept. Yet even by 1936, over a decade after the Fascists had come to power in Italy, the vaunted armored core of the Italian army was no closer to existing than it had been when the Blackshirts marched on Rome. At best, the Italians had a handful of brigades of armored cars and tankettes but nothing that would stand the test of combat. During this period Mussolini was primarily a showman, attempting to achieve with bombast what he could not any other way, as he had an aversion to hard work. His armored cars and tankettes were sufficient to impress the Italians and convey an image of strength to the rest of Europe. However, the vaunted Italian armored division did not exist as an effective force. Furthermore, the emphasis of machine over man had not only demoralized the soldiers of the army but had led to a lack of budgetary consideration for them, resulting in a lack of training, of modern small arms and artillery and the like. By 1936, despite the bombast, the Regio Esercito had atrophied.
The Italian Royal Navy, the Regia Marina, floundered in a similar plight by 1936. The drive for technology, for machines, and the lure of bombast had brought the navy a core of battleships which in many particulars outclassed their British counterparts of the day. Like in the army, the budget was consumed by the machines and the men to man them received only pittances for their own equipment and training. The ships were good, but their crews were not. Strangely and somewhat ironically given the hold Modernism enjoyed in Italy, there were two technological marvels which had been largely ignored during the Fascists’ decade in power. These two inventions were asdic, now known as sonar, and radar. Both of these technological breakthroughs were to be vitally important to the future of naval warfare, yet the Regia Marina lagged behind. In these two fields, the British severely outclassed the Italians.
The Italian Vittorio Veneto-class battleship Littorio, a prime example of Fascist Modernism.
Of the three services, the Italian Royal Air Force, the Regia Aeronautica, was in the most enviable shape. Though the same philosophy that had so effectively punished the army and the navy was still brought to bear within the air force, its impact was somewhat counterbalanced by the greater exclusivity of this aerial service. As the new and glamorous service, the air force tended to attract the most enthusiastic recruits, who were more willing to look past the, admittedly less major, budgetary indignities they suffered, as compared to the conscripts of the army and the navy. Additionally, they reveled in their machines. Fascist rule had turned the Regia Aeronautica into a modern air force. By the late 1920s and early 1930s its planes were the most modern and most capable not only of all the Mediterranean countries but even within Europe generally. Soon, however, this domination would be erased by the introduction of the all-metal monoplane. Particularly after 1933, as Germany began rearming and officially announced its own air force and the other powers of Europe began gradually and myopically reacting to this growing threat, the Regia Aeronautica quickly began to lose what relative power it had.
Italian strategic thought during this time was predicated upon modernity and all the warlike advantages this would bring them. However, due to Italy’s weak industry and flamboyant rather than practical leadership it was never able to carry through with all its plans, plausibly leaving its armed forces weaker than they would otherwise have been with an equivalent amount of money poured into them. By late 1935 these weaknesses were to some extent being revealed as the Italians went to war with Abyssinia, the one remaining independent African state. Perhaps Mussolini had an intuitive grasp of the weaknesses that were partially revealed by the beginnings of the conflict, as it was during this turmoil that he read the three works of strategic theory that were to change his strategic thought forever.
Part 2: Italian Strategic Thought and Practice to 1936
Italy’s strategic thought and practice until late into the interwar period was predicated on the assumptions of Fascist Modernism. Modernism, particularly the Fascistic acceptance of such, utterly glorified the rise of the machine, and idealized action, vigor, and speed. It was essentially a celebration of modernity. If something was new, it was good by default and was certainly better than something that was old. This applied to both technology and to the human race. Human birth was celebrated as a triumph but once man attained age he was, ideally, stripped of his individualism and inserted as merely another cog in the autarkical corporate state that Mussolini had proclaimed. Women existed primarily to propagate the national race. And machines were predominant.
The Fascist vision of war reflected this love affair with machine over man in every respect. Man was not the bringer of victory: machine was. Man, if he was necessary at all, was present only to operate and direct the deadly work of the machines and to witness the revelry of the machines’ inevitable victory over men. There was no doubt in the Fascist vision of warfare. There was only a scientific precision that could not be gainsaid. This Fascistic vision of warfare lay heavily indebted to the work of men such as Giulio Douhet and J.F.C. Fuller, both of whom celebrated the past accomplishments and future potential of machine of war. They postulated that man was weak and unsuited for modern warfare, as proven by the repeated failures on the Western Front during the Great War. Further, they argued that it was the advent of machines—of tanks and aircraft—which, in suitable roles, restored hope that victory could be attained from military action. This vision of warfare had an enormous impact on the organization of the Italian armed forces during the period in question.
Suitably for an army whose central tenets were wholly Fullerian in nature, the Italian Royal Army, the Regio Esercito, showered its love, honor and budget on its armored division concept. Yet even by 1936, over a decade after the Fascists had come to power in Italy, the vaunted armored core of the Italian army was no closer to existing than it had been when the Blackshirts marched on Rome. At best, the Italians had a handful of brigades of armored cars and tankettes but nothing that would stand the test of combat. During this period Mussolini was primarily a showman, attempting to achieve with bombast what he could not any other way, as he had an aversion to hard work. His armored cars and tankettes were sufficient to impress the Italians and convey an image of strength to the rest of Europe. However, the vaunted Italian armored division did not exist as an effective force. Furthermore, the emphasis of machine over man had not only demoralized the soldiers of the army but had led to a lack of budgetary consideration for them, resulting in a lack of training, of modern small arms and artillery and the like. By 1936, despite the bombast, the Regio Esercito had atrophied.
The Italian Royal Navy, the Regia Marina, floundered in a similar plight by 1936. The drive for technology, for machines, and the lure of bombast had brought the navy a core of battleships which in many particulars outclassed their British counterparts of the day. Like in the army, the budget was consumed by the machines and the men to man them received only pittances for their own equipment and training. The ships were good, but their crews were not. Strangely and somewhat ironically given the hold Modernism enjoyed in Italy, there were two technological marvels which had been largely ignored during the Fascists’ decade in power. These two inventions were asdic, now known as sonar, and radar. Both of these technological breakthroughs were to be vitally important to the future of naval warfare, yet the Regia Marina lagged behind. In these two fields, the British severely outclassed the Italians.
The Italian Vittorio Veneto-class battleship Littorio, a prime example of Fascist Modernism.
Of the three services, the Italian Royal Air Force, the Regia Aeronautica, was in the most enviable shape. Though the same philosophy that had so effectively punished the army and the navy was still brought to bear within the air force, its impact was somewhat counterbalanced by the greater exclusivity of this aerial service. As the new and glamorous service, the air force tended to attract the most enthusiastic recruits, who were more willing to look past the, admittedly less major, budgetary indignities they suffered, as compared to the conscripts of the army and the navy. Additionally, they reveled in their machines. Fascist rule had turned the Regia Aeronautica into a modern air force. By the late 1920s and early 1930s its planes were the most modern and most capable not only of all the Mediterranean countries but even within Europe generally. Soon, however, this domination would be erased by the introduction of the all-metal monoplane. Particularly after 1933, as Germany began rearming and officially announced its own air force and the other powers of Europe began gradually and myopically reacting to this growing threat, the Regia Aeronautica quickly began to lose what relative power it had.
Italian strategic thought during this time was predicated upon modernity and all the warlike advantages this would bring them. However, due to Italy’s weak industry and flamboyant rather than practical leadership it was never able to carry through with all its plans, plausibly leaving its armed forces weaker than they would otherwise have been with an equivalent amount of money poured into them. By late 1935 these weaknesses were to some extent being revealed as the Italians went to war with Abyssinia, the one remaining independent African state. Perhaps Mussolini had an intuitive grasp of the weaknesses that were partially revealed by the beginnings of the conflict, as it was during this turmoil that he read the three works of strategic theory that were to change his strategic thought forever.
But little did the Italian boys predict that the age of battleships was to be over and the age of CAG was about to begin...
Machines are only as good as the men manning them.
Too bad Mussolini is the Italian Barnum & Bailey instead of an effective leader or organizer. Then the Italians might have a halfway decent military.
Too bad Mussolini is the Italian Barnum & Bailey instead of an effective leader or organizer. Then the Italians might have a halfway decent military.
Mussolini learning important strategic lessons from the Abyssinian boondoggle? The AAR's barely started and already my mind has been blown.
Very interesting introspective into the social ideology that drove Italy's militarization. Truly an irony that, for all it's obsession with modernism, the Italian armed forces ended up backwards and out of step with the times. But this Italy, I'm sure, will be different.
(one little nit-pick, if I may: Ethiopia wasn't the only independent African state. Even excluding South Africa, which can fairly be left out, there's still Liberia. Unless of course by African you were making a sociocultural classification and not a geographic one, in which case I suppose I could let you by.)
Very interesting introspective into the social ideology that drove Italy's militarization. Truly an irony that, for all it's obsession with modernism, the Italian armed forces ended up backwards and out of step with the times. But this Italy, I'm sure, will be different.
(one little nit-pick, if I may: Ethiopia wasn't the only independent African state. Even excluding South Africa, which can fairly be left out, there's still Liberia. Unless of course by African you were making a sociocultural classification and not a geographic one, in which case I suppose I could let you by.
)
While optimistic in tone, your preamble can be interpreted as being a little ominous... machine over man?...... that hearkens to Evil Galactic Empire/The Terminator.
I just re-read 'Castles of Steel' so I'm all fired up re: big-gun ships. Maybe your game will bear out the theory that the Med is small enough to be dominated by land based aircraft. Malta/Corsica/Sicily/Crete make great aircraft carriers!
Subscribed!
I just re-read 'Castles of Steel' so I'm all fired up re: big-gun ships. Maybe your game will bear out the theory that the Med is small enough to be dominated by land based aircraft. Malta/Corsica/Sicily/Crete make great aircraft carriers!
Subscribed!
Sounds like the Italians might learn some hard lessons that, at the end of the day, it is the poor bloody infantry that win the wars.
excellent update! gives the reader something to think of that does not include allied propaganda when it comes to the italian war machine.
giulio douhet was big in his day. it suprises me his name is largely forgotten.
further, armored warfare was, as you say, recognized early in italy as the wave of the future. italy had the worlds FIRST operational armored unit in the world active in albania...what would become the centauro armored division.
because of italy's IC limitations, i find it necessary to concentrate only on certain aspects of italy's war machine. do you concentrate on AIR, NAVAL, or LAND? you cant do all three and still remain competetive in a modern way.
i look forward to see what you have planned for your build scheme...
giulio douhet was big in his day. it suprises me his name is largely forgotten.
further, armored warfare was, as you say, recognized early in italy as the wave of the future. italy had the worlds FIRST operational armored unit in the world active in albania...what would become the centauro armored division.
because of italy's IC limitations, i find it necessary to concentrate only on certain aspects of italy's war machine. do you concentrate on AIR, NAVAL, or LAND? you cant do all three and still remain competetive in a modern way.
i look forward to see what you have planned for your build scheme...
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