The Year of Development
Part 5: Politics, Domestic and Foreign, January – October, 1937
Concurrently with the war in Abyssinia, until it ended, and with all the technological progression taking place under Mussolini’s direction was a burgeoning political scene that affected Italy domestically and Europe internationally. It was during this year that Europe began splitting itself into its various blocs, and occasionally drawing in extra-European states as well into the entangling webs of alliance and promise.
Early on in January, in an announcement that surprised Mussolini in Rome, both London and Warsaw announced that Poland had joined in alliance. This was surprising because there did not seem to be any cause for such a diplomatic move from the isolationist and appeasing British government, except for a sudden paranoia that Germany was up to no good. Such paranoia thus resulted in an attempt to encircle Germany with an alliance, an approach the French had already been following for years with its own overtures to Czechoslovakia and Poland, though these were not nearly as successful as London’s sudden and unexplained diplomatic coup. Poland was joined in early May by South Africa, the first instance of a non-European country joining a European alliance. Given South Africa’s dominating isolation from Europe, Mussolini could only interpret this alliance in one way: Britain was anticipating war with Italy as well. War with Italy would, of course, close down the Mediterranean Sea as a safe route for British shipping, but alliance with South Africa would alleviate this to some extent by allowing shipping to put in at South African ports on their way around the Cape of Good Hope. This was worrisome to some degree for Mussolini; the British were obviously thinking ahead. And quite presciently, too.
Poland joins the Allies!
Also in early January, Mussolini begins putting forward feelers in Berlin as he wished to establish a Rome-Berlin Axis. Mussolini could not propose an alliance, but he could instead get the diplomatic cogs in Berlin going so that Hitler looked favorably on such a relationship. He anticipated a number of benefits from such a relationship with Germany. Firstly, it would help convince the public that war was a viable option in service to political ends. Mussolini’s thinking on this point was actually remarkably murky given his strategic clarity concerning other matters, but though it is clear that he thought it, it is unsure
why he thought that joining the Axis would have such an effect on the pro-neutrality segment of the Italian population. Perhaps he anticipated, as was the case, that the pro-Axis and pro-war factions would be bolstered by such actions and would way others to their views. Secondly, alliance with Germany did not necessarily mean that Germany would gain any spoils in an Italian war, for Mussolini could decide to exclude Hitler from any wars he may fight. He also hoped that Hitler would show him the same courtesy. Musolini’s only fear was that he would not.
Italy aligning to the Axis.
Little occurred on the political front until early May when a resistance leader attempted to flee Italy by crossing over the Alps and into France but he was apprehended before reaching the impossible crags of the border due to a betrayal by one of his own men. While it was anticipated that his resistance movement would attempt an attack once he was safe, despite its relatively small size, and would not dare to act now, with its leader imprisoned, Mussolini decided that there was no sense in taking risks and ordered precautions just in case. The band was a fanatical one and might have attempted to spring their leader out of prison. Nevertheless, no untoward actions occurred. Italian intelligence services later reported that, upon the capture of the leader, the band disintegrated. He was their sole commander.
A resistance leader was captured and imprisoned.
By late June Mussolini was becoming very worried about Italy’s stocks of strategic resources. While Italy boasted nearly twenty thousand tons of fuel, she only had just over five thousand tons of coal, four thousand tons of steel, and less than three thousand tons of rare materials as well as less than three thousand tons of crude oil. Steel and rare materials stocks were dropping quickly, far too quickly for Mussolini’s comfort. He could not initiate trade deals to acquire more; other action had to be taken. On the 27th, he relieved the industrialist Guido Jung of his post as minister of industry and armament and placed himself in that position instead. Jung’s focus was on the expansion of Italian industry and was widely credited for expanding it by approximately ten percent. Useful at one point, this emphasis was doing Italy’s resource stockpiles no good; Mussolini himself focused on the stockpiles, and was later broadly credited with a five percent daily increase in resource intake. Additionally, the loss of Jung’s ten percent also reduced strain on those stockpiles.
Mussolini as armament minister.
Politics was again bereft of crises until late September, when a rebellion broke out in Abyssinia, which was not garrisoned. They claimed to be nationalists, eager to put an Abyssinian ruler back on the throne of Abyssinia. Mussolini had a momentary panic before calm and calculation reasserted themselves. He had three options. Firstly, he could send the army back in and crush the rebellion with one swift stroke. Grossi and his Armata dell’AOI were on the Egyptian-Libyan border, merely watching what went on, on the other side. Another Abyssinian campaign might have been a welcome distraction. The second option was to ignore it. This option has fallen into disrepute today but has always been perfectly legitimate policy choice. The Abyssinians would liberate Abyssinia and then Mussolini would not have to care about it any more. The third option was the one Mussolini actually went with, and it was the most Machiavellian of the three.
Rebellion in Abyssinia!
Mussolini immediately counter-proclaimed the existence an Abyssinian kingdom under an Abyssinian ruler, beholden to Rome only by ties of client-ship. The Abyssinian rebels’ nationalistic propaganda about Abyssinia for the Abyssinians immediately withered away amongst all but the educated elite, who had fled the country with Haile Selassie I after the conquest anyway. The rebellion quickly lost support and ended up disbanding as it dwindled to such an extent in the space of a week or two that even a single Italian Blackshirt patrol would have been able to arrest the remnants without much struggle. In addition, it meant that Italy would not have to supply the few Abyssinian factories. There were disadvantages too, of course. Italy could not tap Abyssinian civic leadership or resources at will, and a particularly nonsensical ruling disallowed trade as Abyssinia did not have a port even though two Italian-held ports were directly adjacent to the country.
Abyssinia as a puppet state. Minus Bahir Dar.
1937 was the year that diplomacy began working its insidious way through Europe and the continents on its periphery. Though the events thus far were few and far between, Mussolini took them as a promise of the future. Primarily, it was a promise of future danger, as the Allies looked to be increasing in friends and in strength. It was fortunate for Mussolini and Italy that neither of Britain’s new friends thus far were well-placed to intervene against Italy.