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My point is, if none of them are ever admit that their concepts and theories and predictions were ever wrong, which is impossible. I tend to think most are BS artists. But that is getting away from your aar. Are you getting SF. You should find the AI a bit more challenging from what I have seen.
 
Brilliant AAR, I join those who claim that this was the greatest AAR in the history of paradox. Such a great narrative stile and the final was just magnificent. I would have never come to such an unawaited turning point of the war.
 
On Strategy

Myth's AAR seems to invite three approaches to Strategy:
From a Rationalist perspective Myth's strategy was focused at a Grand Strategic level on the consistent goal of securing Italy's status and ambitions as a great power, both in the generation of Italy as a great power, then as the defence of Italy as a great power.

More clearly this emerges as the idea that positive offensives were chosen as limited operations with discrete end points.

From an irrationalist perspective, Myth's strategy was driven by responsiveness, to Great Britain's failure to defend its African periphery, to the ready access to states that did not secure themselves, and by responsiveness to the Russian offensives. The Italians became pulled progressively into the quagmire of the Soviet Union. Perhaps the only moment of resisted irrationality was the maintenance of the Neutral status of Hungary.

From a non-rationalist perspective, Italy as an organisational political unit was entirely responsive, to past organisational practice, to their maritime position, and to other state's presence or absence. Italy's actions can be seen as fully formed by past bureaucracy and states craft, and Italy stripped of its strategic agentic nature (while admittedly operationally brilliant, or rather "grand tactically", Italy was not a positive agent).

To be honest, my perception of Myth's AAR is primarily non-rational in a strategic sense. Perhaps the one choice made was the organisational one to focus on Italy's status as a maritime power with aircraft carriers. In all other senses, rational or irrational behaviour can merely be seen as emergent properties of the static organisation position of the Italian state. To borrow from structuralist Marxism, Italy's position was overdetermined by its maritime status. Whatever actions Myth chose, a choice lay behind them, over determining them, the maritime route to great power status required all subsequent actions, even if moment to moment they were produced by a variety of factors, in the last instance the maritime status of Italy demanded adventurism in the med and defencism against the Soviet Union.
 
Whoo, finally back from England! Took five days longer than necessary because the British don't know how to handle a bit of snow. :p

Forster: I have indeed gotten SF, yes. Am waiting for the new patch now before I begin thinking about a new AAR. :p

foriavik: I think you're the only one claiming that. It's a big claim, after all. :D

li2co3: Interesting post, but I posit that you don't understand what nonrationality is. :D It is impossible for human agency to be nonrational. It can be rational, or it can be irrational. But nonrationality belongs to geography, to weather, to luck and chance, friction, etc. Not to human reactions to it, but specifically to those sorts of agencies, which are simply facts of the world or of events. What you describe as nonrational in your post can really be ether rational or irrational, depending on how conceived. The drive toward embracing maritime power, for instance, would be irrational if done instinctively and without reflection and rational if reflection and study drove its upkeep (broadly speaking). Nonrationality is indeed a large part of strategy, but its role is that of factors that, for the most part, man cannot directly change as noted above. Reaction to these factors must necessarily fall into rationality or irrationality. :p

I hope to have the first bibliographical post this weekend, probably Sunday. In other news, I've graduated with distinction from university! Not only with distinction, but the highest in the entire department. Not bad. I was also chosen as the winner of this year's annual prestigious RUSI Trench-Gascoigne Essay Competition, netting me 500£, and my essay will be published in the June/July issue of RUSI Journal. It's entitled "A Collective Failure of Grand Strategy - The West's Unintended Wars of Choice." Very exciting. At some point in January too, I'll be starting an internship (unfortunately unpaid, as internships are) in DC at the British-American Security Information Council, which should be interesting. Hopefully other good stuff will come my way soon.

Anyway, bibliographical update on Sunday hopefully!
 
Well done (on escaping the UK) and very many congrats on your academic successes and papers .... now all you need to do is to convince someone to pay you

re non-rationality, think you're spot on. It captures those inputs to any human system that are outside human agency as opposed to how human agency imposes order and makes plans.

In a very different context it was why Marx in his Critique of the Gotha Programme was so scathing of the claim that all wealth was the product of human labour, & in doing so ignoring all the non-human inputs to our social organisations.
 
Congratulations! In all sincerity, I wish you good luck in finding a place that will handsomely reimburse you for your talents.

Speaking of not knowing how to handle a bit of snow, Delta decided to cancel our flight from Wilmington to Atlanta tomorrow - seemingly because there might be snow in Atlanta the next day. So guess to what day they rebooked us?

Anyway... It's nice to hear some more postings are forthcoming. I shall enjoy reading them, whenever I have the chance. :)
 
I echo the congratulations and kudos of the others! Very well done and you should be quite proud! Good luck with all your future endeavors and I look forward to the bibliography and next AAR.
 
loki100: Cheers! :D

Nikolai II: Thanks! :D

Stuyvesant: Thanks, and that sounds a bit silly! :p

WhisperingDeath: Thanks! :D

I totally forgot to post yesterday. I blame being sick. I was asleep in the afternoon, I was asleep before dinner, I was asleep after dinner and then I went to bed for the night. :p I do have something to post. While writing it, I was running out of steam by the end but it's alright. I'll post it now.
 
Reflections and Sugested Reading I: Strategic Theory
Bibliography: Strategic Theory

How the Weak Win Wars, Ivan Arreguin-Toft
A modern work on why weaker actors may win wars, published in the mid-2000s. Refreshingly competent on the subject, although the author does unfortunately use a direct/indirect approach dichotomy to strategy, which I feel is, although the most prevalent, also the weakest. It does, however, emphasize that the character of each actor’s strategy is of central importance to the character of the end result, which I can only applaud.

Introduction to Strategy, Andre Beaufre
One of the few significant French works on strategy to survive the Cold War, in many ways it is a typically French work, particularly in its embrace of the totality of strategy. Beaufre argues a concept of total strategy, which is roughly equivalent to grand strategy or national security strategy, which thus takes all tools of power into account. As a method of illustration, Beaufre’s concept of indirect approach is effectively slow and cautious diplomacy, rather than Liddell Hart’s ambiguous concept.

Strategy and Ethnocentrism, Ken Booth
A Cold War British take on strategic culture, and one of the very first treatises on strategic culture full stop, its importance as a pathfinding work is clear. It is also lucid on the contemporary differences in thought processes of Western and Soviet strategic concepts. It clearly shows that the potential differences between strategic cultures can be vast enough that not only do most strategists not even try, but they can’t even conceive of the idea that there actually are different cultures.

Small Wars, C.E. Callwell
This hefty tome is one of the late Victorian and early Edwardian classics on the types of colonial conflict that largely predated what today is known as insurgency. The latter half of the book is chockfull of tactical advice which, while interesting, isn’t worth particularly much. The first half deals with strategy, however, and touches on topics such as the varying cultures and the effects of geography and terrain upon them, different strategic aims within colonial wars and so on. Some have called it a somewhat racist book—in keeping with the spirit of the times during which it was written—but others would argue that it merely does not lose sight of the fact of violence in war.

On War, Carl von Clausewitz (Peter Paret & Michael Howard)
The single most important book on war, to the extent that even those few (fools) who disagree with Clausewitz on his major points cannot ignore him. The Peter Paret and Michael Howard translation is the best translation currently available, although it is steeped in the academic concepts and formulations of the mid-Cold War. Yet until a new and better translation is available, it remains the best.

Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, Julian S. Corbett
The classic British work on seapower, written at the height of empire, it reflects the spirit of its times. Phrases such as that describing the quest for concentration and decisive naval battle as a shibboleth adorn this work, which emphasizes the ability of seapower to localize and otherwise limit conflict, as well as a realistic appreciation of the limits of its utility.

Pure Strategy, Everett C. Dolman
Another modern book, published in the past few years, it is perhaps one of a meager handful of books that builds upon the thought that has come before and offers ideas that are truly new and interesting. Quite a thought provoking book, although it sometimes gives the feel of being two separate monographs pasted together into one.

The Command of the Air, Giulio Douhet
This remains the most important book on airpower, due as much to historical accident and the (clumsy) force with which Douhet argued his ideas (clumsy, because its readability has been compared unfavorably with that of Mein Kampf). Almost the basic concepts of airpower theory are touched upon here. Those that are not are those which are rarely seen as a part of airpower theory, such as air transport, air supply, and the like, which are simply not as glamorous.

The Strategy Bridge¸ Colin S. Gray
I admit to not actually reading this one yet. That’s partially because it was published in the past couple months, that I bought it in the past couple weeks and have not had time to read. However, Colin Gray is one of the greatest contemporary writers on strategy and so it should be more than well worth the cost of purchase.

Every War Must End, Fred Charles Iklé
Although a tiny little Cold War-era book, it gives a good impression that, although every war must indeed end, the process of ending is inevitably very messy and rather varied between instances. An important book for this reason alone, as most people tend to underrate the difficulties of war termination.

The Art of War, Baron de Jomini
The work of Clausewitz’s rival, and usually slagged off when compared to On War, this book actually has some interesting discussion that On War lacks. Among other things, it discusses different types of wars, the existence of which Clausewitz refers to but never delves in to. Also, it is very important for historical value, due to the great influence it had during the 1800s.

Strategy, Basil Liddell-Hart
The quintessential work of British strategic theory, written by the quintessential British strategic theorist. At once a sweep of history and a near polemic arguing Liddell Hart’s indirect approach, it contains some good ideas, a lot of bad history and so forth. The general thrust of Liddell Hart’s argument is utterly right, but he begins to fall down a bit when arguing how to achieve the specified goals.

Strategy, Edward N. Luttwak
This book has two major ideas contained within. First, that war is divisible into levels (strategic, operational, etc). Second, that war is governed by a paradoxical nature. Both ideas are stretched rather too far (it is impossible to divide war into levels, although as an aid to discussion it can be helpful, but this subtly has been lost since the idea was first put forward) (also, much of the paradoxical logic identified is merely ironic). However, it remains a thought provoking book.

Victory in War, William C. Martel
This is a very interesting discussion on what victory actually is, and the author helpfully offers a number of measures by which any success can and perhaps should be measured. It sets itself a relatively modest goal, “pretheory,” and while it probably offers a bit more than that, its ideas must still be developed further.

How Wars End, Dan Reiter
In some ways, this book is a good companion to the immediately above. Whereas the above discusses concepts of success, this work discusses certain processes by which war termination can be achieved, albeit within an unabashedly rationalist framework. Despite this particular leaning, it remains quite a thought provoking work on the topic.

Arms and Influence, Thomas C. Schelling
One of the most hardheaded books on nuclear strategy to emerge from the Cold War, it can easily infuriate those who do not share its basic assumptions. It will also exasperate those who are too easily riled up by the assumption of a strategic man—akin to the economic man—but its explicit emphasis on effect makes it well worth reading, as ultimately strategy is about effect.

Military Strategy, J.C. Wylie
Possibly the second best book on strategy, it is full of many interesting ideas, one of my favorite being a unique dichotomy of strategy—sequential and cumulative, which I think can be tweaked into being a very insightful bit of work. It has been hailed as possibly the only book after On War to provide some original theory, although now it may possible share that title with Pure Strategy (albeit of the two it remains in first place).
 
Sun Tzu?
And there be some other gems from the east too...

Actually, I'm curious Myth whether your studies have included these. There are several accessable texts out there that, while I doubt they cover "new" ground compared to your rather exhaustive list, should provide interesting points of consideration regarding "strategic culture" as you've referenced.

Though it's been sitting, half-read, for literally 2 decades on my shelf, I recommend the "Seven Military Classics of Ancient China" (http://www.amazon.com/Seven-Military-Classics-Ancient-including/dp/0813312280). This is an accessible translation (if you're not steeped in Chinese history) of the following texts, all in one place:

1) T'ai Kung's Six Secret Teachings
2) The Methods of Ssu-ma
3) Sun-tzu's Art of War
4) Wu-tzu
5) Wei Liao-tzu
6) Three Strategies of Huang Shih-kung
7) Questions and Replies between T'ang T'ai-tsung and Li Wei-kung

At the very least, this list provides a more exhaustive starting point for raising the question of eastern writings.

--Khanwulf
 
Enewald: Yeah Sun Tzu's alright, but I couldn't be bothered putting him in. :p

Khanwulf: Yep, I've read that book. Ralph Sawyer's pretty good. Have also read his Tao of Spycraft. Interesting books. :p

I'll try to have the next installment up sometime today or tomorrow. Y'know, before the new year sort of thing. :p
 
Apologies for being late with this but congratulations for many things.

Firstly, for an entertaining AAR, brought to the best conclusion that circumstances allowed. Some writers take a quick exit when things fall apart. You perservered and we appreciate it.

Secondly, for an interesting AAR. I was intrigued in your early attempt to use the AI but AI weaknesses are not easily managed with a nation as brittle as Italy. Your subsequent operations could not easily have been sustained without manual control and many strategic questions could not have been addressed. Your AAR title made it clear that your focus was strategy, not game mechanics. You stayed true to your mission.

Lastly, well done on your personal achievements (getting published and doing well in your studies). Good things happen to those who work hard and have a plan!

Thanks for the reading list. I'll look forward to your next AAR.
 
shepherd352: Thank you for the kind words! :D

Next bibliographical update coming up!
 
Reflections and Sugested Reading II: The Strategists
Clausewitz in English, Christopher Bassford
As can be inferred from the title, this work deals with the evolution of the reception of Clausewitz and his opus magnum in the English-speaking world since On War was first published in the 1830s. An interesting book since naturally, to fully examine Clausewitz’s reception, it must necessarily also trace strategic thought in the English-speaking world more generally so that the why and wherefore etc can be fully explained.

Liddell Hart, Brian Bond
The first work on Liddell Hart, written not long after his death (seven years IIRC), it deals with his military thought. The author being one of Liddell Hart’s disciples as they were, he tends to be kind to his old mentor, but even so does not whitewash him and points out some of the strange beliefs and bizarre ideas that Liddell Hart clung to over the course of his career.

Alchemist of War, Alex Danchev
Another work on Liddell Hart, this is mostly a straight up biography but, given the centrality that Liddell Hart’s strategic writings took in his life, it is obviously impossible not to examine them, and the author explains how and why Liddell Hart came to hold the views that he did.

Clausewitz and Modern Strategy, Michael I. Handel (ed)
Either the best or the second best collection of (English-language) essays ever combined in a single volume on Clausewitz, the authors within range widely in their discussion on Clausewitz from his take on uncertainty, on intelligence and space and time through to how Clausewitz was regarded, disregarded, perceived or misperceived by the British, Germans, Italians and French.

Masters of War, Michael I. Handel
This work is an exercise in comparing and contrasting three major strategists—Clausewitz, Jomini and Sun Tzu—across multiple themes, with occasional deviations to compare/contrast them with others as well—including Corbett and Mao. Among other things, the book explodes the idea that Clausewitz and Jomini are polar opposites, since they certainly are not.

Reading Clausewitz¸ Beatrice Heuser
This work on Clausewitz deals less with him and more with his work, how to read it, and what to keep in mind while reading it, such as where certain ideas came from, the major shift in his thinking and when and why it came about and so forth.

Liddell Hart and the Weight of History, John J. Mearsheimer
This book is quite explicitly out for Liddell Hart’s blood, and does a rather trenchant job of extracting it. It attacks Liddell Hart left, right and center, almost as if it has to compensate for the previous decade of scholarship which was kind to Liddell Hart. It has numerous valid points, although it certainly exaggerates them at times. A much needed counterpoint to the Liddell Hart myth, but don’t take everything at face value.

Clausewitz and the State, Peter Paret
Hailed as the single greatest biography of Clausewitz in the English or any other language, this work takes as its centerpiece Clausewitz’s relationship with the state both in theory and in practice. Paret focuses on this aspect as the glue that holds the biography together through his argument that Clausewitz’s relationship with Prussia through the tumultuous years of the Napoleonic Wars defined to a significant extent how he thought about war.

Makers of Modern Strategy, Peter Paret (ed)
An epic volume of essays on thinkers in strategy from Machiavelli into the nuclear age. It touches not just on the major thinkers such as Jomini, Clausewitz, Mahan and the air theorists of the 1920s but also on lesser known figures such as the major military figures of the 17th century, Vauban, Delbruck, Russian military thought between Napoleon and the First World War, French colonial strategic thought, as well as more unexpected entries such as an essay on a handful of economists and the economic foundation of military power, and Marx and Engels. Surprisingly, there is no essay on Corbett.

Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century, Hew Strachan & Andreas Herberg-Rothe (eds)
Either the best or the second best English language collection of essay on Clausewitz. This collection includes essays on what Clausewitz thought of non-linearity in war, problems of text and translation, his ideas on strategy and victory and his relationship to information warfare, among others. It not only forms a fantastic complement to Clausewitz and Modern Strategy but is an essential book in its own right.

Theorist of Maritime Strategy, J.J. Widen
Possibly the only biographical work on Julian Corbett (although there are indications that Andrew Lambert is also writing a biography of the man at the moment), as far as I’m aware this actually hasn’t been published yet. It is the PhD thesis of a Swede who is currently a lecturer in the Swedish National Defense College. I happened to be able to read a draft copy of this book about this time last year and thought it was quite good, had a number of excellent ideas and had the potential to become the standard work on Corbett.
 
Delurking to say I really enjoyed the AAR after reading it over the past few days. So close to Moscow, yet so far. . .oddly familiar.

Also I found the switching of the historical roles between the Italians and Germans amusing.

Great job!
 
I'm intrigued by (some of) your reading suggestions. Guess I'll have to see if my local university has anything in the library - I'm not too hopeful.

Briefly, if you wouldn't mind, humor me and give me the gist of the 'Liddell Hart Myth'. I know his name, know a little bit about him, but clearly not nearly enough to understand that comment. :)
 
dlain: Cheers, glad you enjoyed it! :D

Stuyvesant: Liddell Hart was a very vain man. He was the sort of man who kept all his personal correspondence and all his random notes and ideas, just to leave it all to posterity (and indeed, there is a Liddell Hart library affiliated with King's College London I believe, where all this stuff now resides). Among his vanities, he had to leave the impression that he was right about everything, all the time. As an example, he was very pessimistic about the role of tanks in warfare in the late 30s, convinced that AT weaponry had evolved sufficiently to sound their death knell. Well, then came France 1940 and he was immediately arguing that he was merely trying to protect the West by arguing along those lines to try to deter Germany from implementing his ideas on armored warfare etc etc. :p He also had a need to show that others appreciated, understood and utilized his writings--after the war, when he had nearly exclusive access to a slew of German generals, he had Guderian put in his memoirs that he got his ideas on armored warfare from Liddell Hart (in return for favors that LH could supply him). Of course, that attribution only appears in the English language edition of Guderian's memoirs...:p Basically, that sort of stuff. Which is why it's significant that the first book dedicated to the topic of Liddell Hart was written by one of his former students. :p

I'll try to have the next (and finally last :eek:) update, bibliographical or otherwise, in the next couple days!
 
Myth, congratulations on 500,000 views! :D

Good Heavens, man! I'm still back at 125,000.

I've been reading this in spots, mostly looking at pictures, so far (it IS kind of large! :D). I intend to come back and read in more detail when I have time -- I find your approach fascinating, but the depth is, at times, fit for deep contemplation, which I don't have time for yet.

I've never really gotten into the philosophers of warfare very deeply, except where necessary for the Strategy Guide. But yes -- I agree their thoughts are fascinating!

Great work!

Rensslaer