The Year of Ruin
Part 12: Operation Save-Ze-Germans III, June 28 – July 3, 1945
The endgame of any campaign is always difficult to foretell with any great accuracy by those involved in its planning and execution. In part, this because of the uncertainty and danger that permeate the strategic world; one can rarely know with certainty what was over the next hill, to take a minor tactical example. Of course, in war the enemy always has a vote too. They always have a significant input into the conduct of any operation, as well as the processes of war termination and the ultimate end state of any war. After oneself, the enemy is the most important factor in any war and that is to view war through an ethnocentric lens, for really the enemy is exactly as important as oneself. The lesson is necessarily that both proclamations of victory and of defeat are always premature and that either end result will arrive when it arrives and not before.
Yet Mussolini was hoping to push the war against the Soviet Union into endgame. He could not be sure where the majority of Soviet formations were, but he hoped to smash those in Poland at the very least. Simultaneously, he hoped to dominate the eastern front territorially, thus forcing the Germans to fight behind his Italians. This would have the salutary result of the Germans probably advancing to hold the territory that the Italians took, thus getting at least some use out of them. Of course, to achieve this, the Italians would need to accomplish stunning success in Poland. Mussolini planned to do so by sending Bastico striking toward Warsaw. In fact, Bastico’s push toward Warsaw would have many parallels with his push on Moscow. Both were undertaken without his full force and, indeed, his advance to Warsaw was even weaker than toward Moscow! He could only deploy a single full corps against Warsaw, as distractions behind him required the deployment of other forces in that direction. Pintor was fortunately to his south and could lend support, but this support was academic as long as he had not broken through the concentration of Soviet and Polish formations before him. All the while, the Germans were being punished.
Bastico, marching on Warsaw with a single corps.
The result of this confluence of factors meant that Bastico had to resort to maneuver to achieve his goal. Fortunately, past experience showed him to be a master of maneuver, as the Illyrian campaigns indicated. Even with one corps, he could be dangerous. Thus, while Pintor forged through Soviet formations to try to protect Bastico’s southern flank, Bastico’s solitary corps threw itself in three different directions to try to take Warsaw. Here was yet another parallel with Moscow, where his vanguard corps undertook exactly the same sort of operation. Even the details of approaches were parallel, for Bastico’s forces approached both cities from the south, east and northeast—or tried to. Further like at Moscow, Bastico’s vanguard corps was very exposed, with extremely long and unprotected flanks on both sides. And, finally, the Soviets were beginning to react as stubborn defense bought them time. If Bastico had been a lesser man, he would have been cowed by such an alignment of factors for the second time in half a year. Yet he was not, instead he completely threw himself into the conduct of this important push.
Bastico’s lone corps closing on Warsaw, slowly.
Meanwhile, on the Dnepr, Soviet pressure also intensified. The Soviets were much more numerous than the formations of the two Italian armies deployed to distract and hold them, those of Graziani and Guzzoni. The Germans too were worthless, either unwilling to actively engage unless under direct Italian operational control or were deploying back and forth like entire formations of thousands of men were headless chickens. As before Warsaw, frequently the Italians were dedicating single corps to operations which required armies. So it was around Kharkov, where three divisions aimed to occupy the city, save their corps headquarters from the assault of Soviet marines and generally push the Soviets back across the Dnepr River. This sort of scene was replaying itself across the front as superior Soviet numbers began to make their presence felt, particularly as German units abandoned the front and left gaps vulnerable to exploitation.
Desperate measures in the east.
By the beginning of July, the state of the Polish theater had improved recognizably. Although there was a significant mass of Soviet formations in southwestern Poland, they thinned out in the north. They had achieved a sort of frontline against the Italians in the east, but it was a weak one. Bastico’s solitary vanguard corps retained some momentum and was pushing forward toward Warsaw. It had linked up with Pintor’s army, so that the Italians nearly formed a coherent frontline of their own in Poland against the Soviets. The Germans, however, were of course being beaten although even this process was slowing down as the Soviets directed more and more attention and assets eastwards.
The Polish theater on July 3.
And so the question had to be posed. Endgame? Warsaw was being threatened with conquest, the Soviet forces in Poland were increasingly finding themselves between a rock and a place that should have been hard but was not quite so. If success were achieved in Poland, what then would be the next course of action? How much longer could the Soviet Union cope with the losses it was sustaining? During this period of time it had lost another fifteen thousand two hundred and fifty men, as opposed to eight thousand two hundred Italians. The next few weeks were sure to be decisive.
Part 12: Operation Save-Ze-Germans III, June 28 – July 3, 1945
The endgame of any campaign is always difficult to foretell with any great accuracy by those involved in its planning and execution. In part, this because of the uncertainty and danger that permeate the strategic world; one can rarely know with certainty what was over the next hill, to take a minor tactical example. Of course, in war the enemy always has a vote too. They always have a significant input into the conduct of any operation, as well as the processes of war termination and the ultimate end state of any war. After oneself, the enemy is the most important factor in any war and that is to view war through an ethnocentric lens, for really the enemy is exactly as important as oneself. The lesson is necessarily that both proclamations of victory and of defeat are always premature and that either end result will arrive when it arrives and not before.
Yet Mussolini was hoping to push the war against the Soviet Union into endgame. He could not be sure where the majority of Soviet formations were, but he hoped to smash those in Poland at the very least. Simultaneously, he hoped to dominate the eastern front territorially, thus forcing the Germans to fight behind his Italians. This would have the salutary result of the Germans probably advancing to hold the territory that the Italians took, thus getting at least some use out of them. Of course, to achieve this, the Italians would need to accomplish stunning success in Poland. Mussolini planned to do so by sending Bastico striking toward Warsaw. In fact, Bastico’s push toward Warsaw would have many parallels with his push on Moscow. Both were undertaken without his full force and, indeed, his advance to Warsaw was even weaker than toward Moscow! He could only deploy a single full corps against Warsaw, as distractions behind him required the deployment of other forces in that direction. Pintor was fortunately to his south and could lend support, but this support was academic as long as he had not broken through the concentration of Soviet and Polish formations before him. All the while, the Germans were being punished.
Bastico, marching on Warsaw with a single corps.
The result of this confluence of factors meant that Bastico had to resort to maneuver to achieve his goal. Fortunately, past experience showed him to be a master of maneuver, as the Illyrian campaigns indicated. Even with one corps, he could be dangerous. Thus, while Pintor forged through Soviet formations to try to protect Bastico’s southern flank, Bastico’s solitary corps threw itself in three different directions to try to take Warsaw. Here was yet another parallel with Moscow, where his vanguard corps undertook exactly the same sort of operation. Even the details of approaches were parallel, for Bastico’s forces approached both cities from the south, east and northeast—or tried to. Further like at Moscow, Bastico’s vanguard corps was very exposed, with extremely long and unprotected flanks on both sides. And, finally, the Soviets were beginning to react as stubborn defense bought them time. If Bastico had been a lesser man, he would have been cowed by such an alignment of factors for the second time in half a year. Yet he was not, instead he completely threw himself into the conduct of this important push.
Bastico’s lone corps closing on Warsaw, slowly.
Meanwhile, on the Dnepr, Soviet pressure also intensified. The Soviets were much more numerous than the formations of the two Italian armies deployed to distract and hold them, those of Graziani and Guzzoni. The Germans too were worthless, either unwilling to actively engage unless under direct Italian operational control or were deploying back and forth like entire formations of thousands of men were headless chickens. As before Warsaw, frequently the Italians were dedicating single corps to operations which required armies. So it was around Kharkov, where three divisions aimed to occupy the city, save their corps headquarters from the assault of Soviet marines and generally push the Soviets back across the Dnepr River. This sort of scene was replaying itself across the front as superior Soviet numbers began to make their presence felt, particularly as German units abandoned the front and left gaps vulnerable to exploitation.
Desperate measures in the east.
By the beginning of July, the state of the Polish theater had improved recognizably. Although there was a significant mass of Soviet formations in southwestern Poland, they thinned out in the north. They had achieved a sort of frontline against the Italians in the east, but it was a weak one. Bastico’s solitary vanguard corps retained some momentum and was pushing forward toward Warsaw. It had linked up with Pintor’s army, so that the Italians nearly formed a coherent frontline of their own in Poland against the Soviets. The Germans, however, were of course being beaten although even this process was slowing down as the Soviets directed more and more attention and assets eastwards.
The Polish theater on July 3.
And so the question had to be posed. Endgame? Warsaw was being threatened with conquest, the Soviet forces in Poland were increasingly finding themselves between a rock and a place that should have been hard but was not quite so. If success were achieved in Poland, what then would be the next course of action? How much longer could the Soviet Union cope with the losses it was sustaining? During this period of time it had lost another fifteen thousand two hundred and fifty men, as opposed to eight thousand two hundred Italians. The next few weeks were sure to be decisive.
