The Year of Ruin
Part 8: Withdrawal II, March 26 – April 16, 1945
Retreating in the face of the enemy is invariably a messy activity even when supreme coordination is attempted. Even at the best of times, strategy is a business conducted in an ambiguous situation where the other strategic actor is attempting to impose his will upon oneself just as one is trying to impose one’s will upon him. The situation is even worse during a withdrawal because a withdrawal precisely means that the enemy’s imposition of will has been, at least to a certain extent, rather successful and the only way to combat this imposition is to withdraw and sacrificing either gains made in previous offensives or one’s own territory, depending on the exact circumstances. Thus the enemy has the initiative, he has the confidence to advance and he has the forces to continue, at least within the invisible binds of his own culminating point of victory.
The Italians were deep into Soviet territory, very deep indeed. The closest defensible line undoubtedly lay at the River Prut, in northern Dacia. The whole of Ukraine would have to be crossed along a north-south axis even for nearby armies such as those commanded by Guzzoni and Pintor. For those further away, they would also have to move along the infinitely more imposing east-west axis as well. Yet even before such an exodus could be considered, battles had to be broken off, many of them offensive battles. Thousands more would die in the last days of these battles: over two thousand two hundred Italians and over five thousand three hundred Soviets. It was only by March 30th that the Italian armies could actually begin lumbering southward and westward toward Dacia. The armies in the Kazan and Caucasus would also have to withdraw, else the weight of the Soviet juggernaut would roll up and then over them. Over half a million Italian men began streaming toward Dacia and Anatolia, never mind the legions of Germans who were already moving.
Another total withdrawal out of the Soviet Union and toward the Balkans.
This is, of course, the moment when everything begins falling apart. The withdrawal could only run smoothly if the Soviets did not interfere by delaying units or forcing them to deviate from their paths. This reprieve the Soviets were not willing to grant for obvious and good strategic reasons. Instead, Soviet pressure redoubled after an immediate and short period of surprise at the Italian, and they began hounding the rearguard formations mercilessly. Southwest of Moscow, large numbers of Soviet formations tore into a straggling corps of three divisions, and forced a corps of five formations to deviate to try to save it. In this they were fortunately successful, but it was a very close encounter as the Soviets had finally begun learning how to properly pursue a withdrawing enemy.
A hair-raising withdrawal.
From western Ukraine and southeastern Poland, too, the Italians were receiving a significant amount of trouble from the pursuing Soviets. One corps, which had nearly broken through to the German lines with the support of a loaned German infantry formation under a certain Major General von Manstein, began stuck for some time, under assault at the end of a long and very vulnerable salient. While one Italian corps was sent forward to rescue it, as elsewhere before, it was very far away and might not make it in time. Von Manstein bravely forged ahead with his division and held the vulnerable neck of the salient open long enough for the Italians to escape, sacrificing the cohesion of his own division to do so. While the German high command did not appreciate the Italian ability to achieve and exploit success, at least some of their lower level generals did.
Another nerve-wracking withdrawal.
By April 16th, however, all formations were safely back in Dacia, nearly exactly on the old defensive line that had been held back in 1941 and 1942 for some time. This time, however, the Italians would have three medium or large armies holding it rather than two small ones, leaving Vercellino’s and Pintor’s armies in the rear to use as a reserve as necessary. The Italians planned to hunker down and simply defend for the foreseeable future. They had decided to let the Germans take the greater weight of the war on their own; the Italians had already suffered enough dead for a war that was neither of their making nor in their real interest.
Italian armies filling out the renewed Dacian Line.
The withdrawal had been costly, but nowhere near as costly as the previous advances had been. Just over four thousand eight hundred Italians had lost their lives during this time, the Soviets nearly six thousand eight hundred. Given the high losses of previous weeks, such a drop attests to the overall success the Italians had in breaking much of the contact between themselves and their Soviet pursuers. The Italians would become passive in the war, defending only their own territory and confident in the German ability to do the same. Stalemate would exist, but neither side would be able to overthrow the other.