The Year of Development
Part 1: Shaking up the Generals, January 1937
With the end of the old year and the onset of the new, Mussolini knew that it was time to shake up his generals in Abyssinia. He had to inject some fresh blood into the struggle as he felt that certain commanders were not doing their duty. Furthermore, a particular small handful of men had to be made examples of, as Voltaire would say,
pour encourager les autres. The Regio Esercito of the early 1930s may have been primarily a show army with all the incumbent weaknesses, but Mussolini was not about to allow it to become a showcase of persistent incompetence in the face of a minor African country! Things certainly had to change at the headquarters of the Armata del’AOI.
Two corps commanders, Lieutenant Generals Moizo and Bennati, were unceremoniously demoted to major generals and sent back to Italy in disgrace, stripped of any command. With complete justification, Mussolini was wary of employing them again for any reason. Such rough treatment was sure to be an encouragement to others not to share their miserable fate. With his two most incompetent subordinates gone, Grazioli may have been expected to try again and to perform better this time, but Mussolini had different plans for him. Instead, Grazioli was promoted from general to field marshal and relieved of direct command of the Armata dell’AOI. He was sent to Libya to take over the Tarabulus theater headquarters, under which the Armata dell’AOI fell, and which had been leaderless this entire time. Along with his old army, under his direct command was a single, but strong, infantry division at Tobruk. At Tarabulus, Grazioli would be able to focus on his strengths, particularly logistics, without distraction—a focus which could only aid his old command in Eritrea.
Grazioli was promoted up to the Tarabulus theater headquarters.
However, Mussolini went further than this still. In a direct effort to reduce the logistical needs of the Armata dell’AOI he reduced it in size by more than half. Every single remaining militia regiment was sent back to Ed for transport to Italy. This amounted to 22 regiments in all, comprising some sixty-six thousand men. Furthermore, of the regular infantry, twelve regiments would remain: four would be sent back to Italy. Finally, of the six corps headquarters, four would be dissolved. The two mountain brigades under Tellera stayed. All together some thirty regiment or regiment-sized units were dissolved or removed from Abyssinia. Ninety thousand mostly useless men were removed from its payroll and ceased to dilute its flow of supplies. The Armata dell’AOI was left with one army headquarters, two corps headquarters and seven divisions, six of infantry and one of mountaineer. In total, it numbered thirty thousand men.
The withdrawal of two thirds of the Armata dell’AOI to Ed and further to Italy.
The command of this truncated force went to General Grossi, a friend of Grazioli’s and with the same logistical talents. This harmony between theater and army level, and in particular its concentration of logistical acumen, was sure to work in the Italians’ favor. The decrease in manpower was certain to help as well, for only trained and competent soldiers were left in Africa Orientale Italien. Whatever disappointment Grossi may have felt at being handed a much reduced command was offset by the situation he was in: it was his chance to march into Adis Abeba. The glory of conquest was his for the taking, regardless of how small his command has shrunk.
Grossi at the headquarters of the Armata dell’AOI.
Directly subordinate to Grossi were two corps commanders who were veterans of the Abyssinian campaign, being the fortunate two who were not demoted or had their commands dissolved. The first of these was Lieutenant General Gonzaga del Vodice. He was of the army old guard, much like Grazioli and Grossi and indeed many other of the older generals, but he had some skill. Furthermore, he had talent in the fields of defensive fighting as well as fortification assault. Under his command were the three stars of the Abyssinian campaign thus far: Tellera and his mountaineers and Nicolosi and Calcagno with their infantry divisions. Gonzago’s corps was spread thin, one division each at Kara K’ore, Fiche, and Dese.
Gonzaga del Vodice and his corps.
The other corps commander was Lieutenant General Pirzio Biroli. Also of the old guard, his main talents were in his tactical unpredictability, which could at times catch his opponents by surprise. The remaining four divisions of the Armata dell’AOI were under his command: one division each under Major Generals Castellano, Gandin, Silvestri and Barbasetti di Prun. These men, unlike the three divisional commanders of Gonzago’s corps, had barely seem combat in Abyssinia. The hope was that they were competent enough for their posts and would act as necessary to ensure victory. All four divisions of this corps were concentrated at Bahir Dar.
Pirzio Biroli and his corps.
The operational dispositions Grossi inherited from Grazioli and his incompetent corps commanders. However, he entered his new command with a ‘can-do’ attitude and immediately began planning how to best take advantage of the resources he was left. This would mean taking full advantage of the incredible concentration of troops at Bahir Dar. It would become Grossi’s main offensive force.