|Alison Turnbull (Strathclyde) ‘Glasgow’s War and Masculine Identities in the Reserved Occupations 1939-1945: Recovering Regional Experience in Oral Narratives and Public History’
|Christopher Miller (Balliol, Oxford) ‘The Clydeside Naval Arms Industry and Local Political Attitudes Towards Rearmament, 1931-1939’
Obviously from me picking out these papers you can observe that my broad interest is social history rather than strategic studies. Good papers, good coverage. Nice conference then, I think it is reasonable to say that the states system supporting war was unmodified from Waterloo onwards, though the totality of war variety depending on geography, politics, production output, perceived risk by states to their continued function.
Hope you enjoyed it and your paper received the attention it deserves, which if it shares a quality with this AAR compared genre to genre, must be rich, high and well written.
Looking forward to your simulation of Mussolini's next strategic conceit. Mussolini has had relatively limited rather than grandiose strategic ambitions so far. Given how much "gaming" could occur, I suspect his ambitions will be in line with his capacity to exert strategic force comprised of "historically" viable operations, rather than gamey plays. As such, from the unique strategic position in this AAR I wonder what such a strategic operation this would be. Given the over commitment to the greater Balkan theatre, he is locked into an emphasis on war with Russia. Redirecting attention towards Britain or the Colonial Periphery would not achieve strategic effect within the year planning cycle Mussolini is running. Thus Mussolini is locked into making strategic decisions in relation to the Soviet Union.
So far Mussolini's grand strategy has been a combination of adventurism towards small states, and a defensive perimeter geopolitically towards great powers. There are no small states to adventure with (Hungary would be insanity, its role as a neutral was decisive in protecting the Balkans and Italy itself). The defensive perimeter in relation to Great Britain is secure. The defensive arrangements in relation to Germany are moderately secure (at risk only due to a failure of the German state to conduct a strategic defence). Thus Mussolini seems locked into expanding a defensive perimeter in relation to the Soviet Union.
I propose that Mussolini will be compelled to use predominance at sea to use outside lines to attack sites in the Black Sea, thus distracting the Soviet Union from the German front. An advance into Central and Eastern Europe by land will not achieve strategic effect unless the capacity of the Soviet state to defend itself has been utterly shattered. Such a condition would allow for even the German state to conduct the construction of a perimeter on Italy's behalf, regaining strategic choice for Italy. This condition will not come to pass due to the weak willed defensive nature of the German grand strategy.
Italy will be forced into peripheral, and in a grand strategic sense distracting, attacks on the Southern borders of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. This alone will be insufficient to cement a defensive perimeter against the Soviet Union. Thus, unable to direct attention to smashing the British State apparatus, Mussolini will _still_ be losing the war.