The Year of Returned Hope
Part 9: The Indirect Approach VIII, June 28 – August 2, 1943
In the paradoxical logic of war, everything eventually becomes its opposite, albeit at the risk of simplifying relationships between phenomena. Among these relationships is that between offense and defense. The former is the weaker but with the positive objective, the latter is the stronger but negative form. Clausewitz was keen to stress that they were not opposites: rather, they were complimentary. Offense almost always required defense at some level, and defense was not passively waiting for the attack but rather a shield made out of well-placed blows. The paradoxical logic of war distorts this relationship into that of simple and unambiguous opposites, all to make the point that Clausewitz had also made: that eventually the attacker reaches the ends of his means and no longer has the strength to push forward, for whatever reason.
High summer began with an Italian attempt to pinch off a Soviet salient in the north of the front. It was not an ambitious operation, and as planned would only result in the encirclement of two divisions, but it would significantly shorten the front in the north. It failed as an encirclement in the end, but the Soviets were pushed out the salient in the end, and the front shortened nevertheless. There was another attempt at encircling Soviet forces in the south-center of the front, at Vlasotince, which ended successfully with a Soviet division destroyed. However, the Soviets on the whole were wising up to Italian tactics and able to forestall more significant Italian successes. Italian arms continued to accrue victories, but at an ever greater cost. In the first ten days of July, Italy won yet another string of victories across the front: at Jimbolia, Arad, Kastoria, Mesolongi, Timisoara, Vlasotince, Beius and Vlore. Casualties in aggregate amounted to over six thousand one hundred Italian and over eight thousand seven hundred Soviet soldiers. Trying to push onward was becoming ever bloodier for the Italians.
The attempt to pinch off the salient, in its early stages.
Germany meanwhile had been pushing into Finland, and so by the 10th of July was in a state of utter confusion as it attempted to deal with the previously unknown strategic state of actually invading a country, something it hadn’t done for over two years. It indeed opened up a second front with the Soviet Union on the Kola Peninsula and on Finland’s eastern border, which some optimistic Italian strategists hoped would mean a diffusion of Soviet strength and possibly even a couple fights between German and Soviet soldiers. It was this, as much as anything else, that threw the German high command into its panic. Thus the deep rear areas of East Prussia and western Latvia were awash with German divisions moving to and fro to no reasonable purpose whatsoever. This Teutonic confusion, and Italian persistence in the Balkans, led to the Soviets siphoning off yet more formations to deal with the Italian menace.
Teutonic confusion, probably over a missing kitten in East Prussia. Everybody can guess where the Soviet divisions are going.
Back in the Balkans, the situation was evolving, albeit slowly and unsurely. In the far north, Bastico accomplished yet another encirclement, trapping three Soviet divisions against the Hungarian border and crushing them. Of these three formations, two were armored divisions, the loss of which must have galled the Soviet commanders. The Italians won victories at Bosilgrad, Jasa Tomic, Curtici, Kresna, Vrsac, Yakoruda, Faget, and Kostinbrod. A loss was registered at Arad. Casualties totaled nearly five thousand eight hundred Italians and nearly ten thousand two hundred Soviets for the remainder of July and into the first two days of August. In addition, Greece had been cleaned up of Soviet divisions, which together with other successful Italian encirclements resulted in another ten or eleven Soviet divisions fully destroyed. Losses remained in favor of the Italians, but the overall strategic situation was not. The Soviets were pressing hard against Italian positions in and around both Kostinbrod and Netanya. The Soviets also accomplished a penetration of the Italian line and were exploiting it, there was even danger of the Italians losing a division. The Italians were striving to close it and turn it into another Italian victory, but the jury remained out.
The situation on August 2.
Regardless whether one followed Clausewitz closely, or preferred the paradoxical logic of war, time seemed to be running out for the Italians. The Soviets had formed a coherent front after five straight months of continuous defeat and seemed to be going onto the offensive. It remained to be seen whether the Italians could still muster the strength to close off Soviet salients, if not go full out onto the offensive. What was obvious, however, was that geography was now conspiring against the Italians. Their four armies were stretched across a terrible distance from the Hungarian border to the Aegean Sea, a set up which of course favored the more numerous Soviet formations. Worse yet, additional Soviet divisions were still streaming south from the German front.
Part 9: The Indirect Approach VIII, June 28 – August 2, 1943
In the paradoxical logic of war, everything eventually becomes its opposite, albeit at the risk of simplifying relationships between phenomena. Among these relationships is that between offense and defense. The former is the weaker but with the positive objective, the latter is the stronger but negative form. Clausewitz was keen to stress that they were not opposites: rather, they were complimentary. Offense almost always required defense at some level, and defense was not passively waiting for the attack but rather a shield made out of well-placed blows. The paradoxical logic of war distorts this relationship into that of simple and unambiguous opposites, all to make the point that Clausewitz had also made: that eventually the attacker reaches the ends of his means and no longer has the strength to push forward, for whatever reason.
High summer began with an Italian attempt to pinch off a Soviet salient in the north of the front. It was not an ambitious operation, and as planned would only result in the encirclement of two divisions, but it would significantly shorten the front in the north. It failed as an encirclement in the end, but the Soviets were pushed out the salient in the end, and the front shortened nevertheless. There was another attempt at encircling Soviet forces in the south-center of the front, at Vlasotince, which ended successfully with a Soviet division destroyed. However, the Soviets on the whole were wising up to Italian tactics and able to forestall more significant Italian successes. Italian arms continued to accrue victories, but at an ever greater cost. In the first ten days of July, Italy won yet another string of victories across the front: at Jimbolia, Arad, Kastoria, Mesolongi, Timisoara, Vlasotince, Beius and Vlore. Casualties in aggregate amounted to over six thousand one hundred Italian and over eight thousand seven hundred Soviet soldiers. Trying to push onward was becoming ever bloodier for the Italians.
The attempt to pinch off the salient, in its early stages.
Germany meanwhile had been pushing into Finland, and so by the 10th of July was in a state of utter confusion as it attempted to deal with the previously unknown strategic state of actually invading a country, something it hadn’t done for over two years. It indeed opened up a second front with the Soviet Union on the Kola Peninsula and on Finland’s eastern border, which some optimistic Italian strategists hoped would mean a diffusion of Soviet strength and possibly even a couple fights between German and Soviet soldiers. It was this, as much as anything else, that threw the German high command into its panic. Thus the deep rear areas of East Prussia and western Latvia were awash with German divisions moving to and fro to no reasonable purpose whatsoever. This Teutonic confusion, and Italian persistence in the Balkans, led to the Soviets siphoning off yet more formations to deal with the Italian menace.
Teutonic confusion, probably over a missing kitten in East Prussia. Everybody can guess where the Soviet divisions are going.
Back in the Balkans, the situation was evolving, albeit slowly and unsurely. In the far north, Bastico accomplished yet another encirclement, trapping three Soviet divisions against the Hungarian border and crushing them. Of these three formations, two were armored divisions, the loss of which must have galled the Soviet commanders. The Italians won victories at Bosilgrad, Jasa Tomic, Curtici, Kresna, Vrsac, Yakoruda, Faget, and Kostinbrod. A loss was registered at Arad. Casualties totaled nearly five thousand eight hundred Italians and nearly ten thousand two hundred Soviets for the remainder of July and into the first two days of August. In addition, Greece had been cleaned up of Soviet divisions, which together with other successful Italian encirclements resulted in another ten or eleven Soviet divisions fully destroyed. Losses remained in favor of the Italians, but the overall strategic situation was not. The Soviets were pressing hard against Italian positions in and around both Kostinbrod and Netanya. The Soviets also accomplished a penetration of the Italian line and were exploiting it, there was even danger of the Italians losing a division. The Italians were striving to close it and turn it into another Italian victory, but the jury remained out.
The situation on August 2.
Regardless whether one followed Clausewitz closely, or preferred the paradoxical logic of war, time seemed to be running out for the Italians. The Soviets had formed a coherent front after five straight months of continuous defeat and seemed to be going onto the offensive. It remained to be seen whether the Italians could still muster the strength to close off Soviet salients, if not go full out onto the offensive. What was obvious, however, was that geography was now conspiring against the Italians. Their four armies were stretched across a terrible distance from the Hungarian border to the Aegean Sea, a set up which of course favored the more numerous Soviet formations. Worse yet, additional Soviet divisions were still streaming south from the German front.