The Year of Returned Hope
Part 8: The Indirect Approach VII, June 13 – June 27, 1943
Operational art, as a discrete concept were born during the 1920s in the Soviet Union, crafted initially by the trio of military theorists Alexander Andreyevich Svechin, Mikhail Frunze and Mikhail Tukhachevsky. It did not exist before, and those who have argued that it was basically present in the concept of grand tactics, which was usually defined along the lines of being the art of deploying troops most advantageously to the battlefield, are incorrect. Operations came into being because of the growth of armies and of the space they occupied. Operations are campaigns, artistic sequences of individual battles, unified by a single idea. Operational art is a dangerous newcomer to military-strategic planning and execution, however. It is seductive: it becomes tempting to abjure responsibility for campaign planning from the politicians to the military; it allows the military the illusion that what it does is divorced from politics; and finally it allows the casual, misinformed or delusional observer to mistake operational success with strategic success. All three of these are very dangerous fantasies. Operations can be valuable tools of strategy, but only in firm and guiding hands. It seems entirely plausible that, with Mussolini’s own connivance, all of these delusions that operations can induce were present in Italy’s Balkan escapade.
Operationally, Italian actions continued to be highly successful. The first major battle of the campaign was lost at a location confusingly named Montana, with nearly one thousand eight hundred and fifty Italian and nearly fourteen hundred Soviet casualties, though in that battle three Italian brigades were set up by three times their number of Soviets. Italian operational art was, however, strong enough that such a defeat, bloody as it was, could not halt their progress. Senta and Zajecar were Italian victories aggregating seven hundred Italian and eighteen hundred Soviet dead. In the north of Greece, Pintor’s army, with some lost divisions belonging to Graziani’s army, began their push westward into Thrace. In front of them stood a bare five Soviet divisions, one of which was in a vulnerable salient and the other four of which were scattered across a front too wide for them. This westward push by virtue of its direction also finally sealed off Greece, trapping a number of Soviet divisions there. It seemed like the Soviet line was going to be unhinged yet again, though by this time a number of Italian divisions were in terrible shape organizationally, thus limiting Italian capabilities.
The Italians of Pintor’s army, and some other bits and bobs, swinging westward toward Thrace.
In the north, meanwhile, Bastico was continuing his string of improbable successes, albeit at a slower pace. Truly a master of operational art and maneuver, Bastico finagled his forces—for there is no other word that can describe his accomplishments as accurately—to reach the Hungarian border at Orhei. This resulted in another three Soviet infantry divisions being encircled by Italian forces, one of them motorized. This was admittedly a small drop in the bucket compared to the hordes facing him, for Italian intelligence estimated the Soviet strength in the north as at least twenty-one divisions, including two armored divisions, but not including the three encircled formations. The accomplishment is palpable, however, when one considers that these Soviet formations were faced by perhaps only three-quarters as many Italian divisions—and in terms of manpower this disparity becomes even more striking. Additionally, by pushing on Petrovac, Graziani and Bastico were planning yet another encirclement, one that would plausibly result in another four Soviet divisions cut off, albeit at heavy cost. Over fifteen hundred Italians and fourteen hundred Italians died in and around Petrovac.
Bastico and Graziani, but particularly Bastico, displaying their operational virtuosity.
In Greece, the success of Pintor’s army in the north finally allowed Vercellino to achieve the definitive breakthrough. With Italian troops who had marched all the way from northern Illyria splashing in the warm waters of the northern Aegean and the Soviet line in utter disarray, Vercellino burst out at long last. His main aim was two-fold: to link up with Pintor, and also to slice the Soviet forces into multiple small pockets and wipe them out. By the 20th of June the former was very nearly accomplished, with only minor distances left to travel and no Soviets in between the two armies. The second objective the Soviets themselves had virtually accomplished for Vercellino. Of the apparent six Soviet divisions still in Greece, two infantry formations were in the far north by the provincial border with Albania. One Soviet mountain division was on the cusp of being trapped against the Corinthian Gulf, one infantry division was being swept westward toward the Ionian Sea, and the last mountain division as well as the armored formation were to be trapped against the Aegean. It was only a matter of time until all six of these divisions would be destroyed.
Vercellino’s army and assets of Pintor’s eviscerating the Soviet position in Greece.
In the far north, the trapped motorized division proved too slippery and managed to conduct a ragged long march back to Soviet lines, albeit in poor shape. Bastico’s and Graziani’s other encirclement plan came only partially to fruition, but one or two Soviet divisions were still trapped and destroyed by Italian forces. What followed during this time was another sequence of battles, spread across the entire front, and all invariably won by the Italians: Kucevo, Arad, Arandelovac, Kyustendil, Pernik, Lamia, Larisa. In the seven days these battles all took place during, nearly thirty-five hundred Italians and fifty-nine hundred Soviets lost their lives. In the north and center, Bastico and Graziani had pushed into Dacia. In the south, Pintor was swinging into Thrace and had trapped another Soviet division on the Chalcidice peninsulas. In the far south, finally part of the action, Vercellino was mopping up Greece.
The operational situation on the 27th of June.
Operationally, the Italians remained stunningly successful, and indeed this period was perhaps the single most successful since the very beginning of the operation three months ago. Not only had possibly four divisions been destroyed and many others battered in combat, but the Italians had set up the conditions for the destruction of another seven, including one armored and two mountain divisions! On the deficit side, Italian casualties had also never been higher, and losing nearly three thousand five hundred men in a single week was perhaps more than the Italians could afford over the long run. Soviet resistance finally seemed to be filling out, as significant reinforcements from the Soviet strategic reserve—that is, the German front—finally began arriving in strength. The Italians, too, were still far from the defensive borders of the Prut River and the Bosporus. Indeed, they nearly had to cover as much distance again as they already had.
Part 8: The Indirect Approach VII, June 13 – June 27, 1943
Operational art, as a discrete concept were born during the 1920s in the Soviet Union, crafted initially by the trio of military theorists Alexander Andreyevich Svechin, Mikhail Frunze and Mikhail Tukhachevsky. It did not exist before, and those who have argued that it was basically present in the concept of grand tactics, which was usually defined along the lines of being the art of deploying troops most advantageously to the battlefield, are incorrect. Operations came into being because of the growth of armies and of the space they occupied. Operations are campaigns, artistic sequences of individual battles, unified by a single idea. Operational art is a dangerous newcomer to military-strategic planning and execution, however. It is seductive: it becomes tempting to abjure responsibility for campaign planning from the politicians to the military; it allows the military the illusion that what it does is divorced from politics; and finally it allows the casual, misinformed or delusional observer to mistake operational success with strategic success. All three of these are very dangerous fantasies. Operations can be valuable tools of strategy, but only in firm and guiding hands. It seems entirely plausible that, with Mussolini’s own connivance, all of these delusions that operations can induce were present in Italy’s Balkan escapade.
Operationally, Italian actions continued to be highly successful. The first major battle of the campaign was lost at a location confusingly named Montana, with nearly one thousand eight hundred and fifty Italian and nearly fourteen hundred Soviet casualties, though in that battle three Italian brigades were set up by three times their number of Soviets. Italian operational art was, however, strong enough that such a defeat, bloody as it was, could not halt their progress. Senta and Zajecar were Italian victories aggregating seven hundred Italian and eighteen hundred Soviet dead. In the north of Greece, Pintor’s army, with some lost divisions belonging to Graziani’s army, began their push westward into Thrace. In front of them stood a bare five Soviet divisions, one of which was in a vulnerable salient and the other four of which were scattered across a front too wide for them. This westward push by virtue of its direction also finally sealed off Greece, trapping a number of Soviet divisions there. It seemed like the Soviet line was going to be unhinged yet again, though by this time a number of Italian divisions were in terrible shape organizationally, thus limiting Italian capabilities.
The Italians of Pintor’s army, and some other bits and bobs, swinging westward toward Thrace.
In the north, meanwhile, Bastico was continuing his string of improbable successes, albeit at a slower pace. Truly a master of operational art and maneuver, Bastico finagled his forces—for there is no other word that can describe his accomplishments as accurately—to reach the Hungarian border at Orhei. This resulted in another three Soviet infantry divisions being encircled by Italian forces, one of them motorized. This was admittedly a small drop in the bucket compared to the hordes facing him, for Italian intelligence estimated the Soviet strength in the north as at least twenty-one divisions, including two armored divisions, but not including the three encircled formations. The accomplishment is palpable, however, when one considers that these Soviet formations were faced by perhaps only three-quarters as many Italian divisions—and in terms of manpower this disparity becomes even more striking. Additionally, by pushing on Petrovac, Graziani and Bastico were planning yet another encirclement, one that would plausibly result in another four Soviet divisions cut off, albeit at heavy cost. Over fifteen hundred Italians and fourteen hundred Italians died in and around Petrovac.
Bastico and Graziani, but particularly Bastico, displaying their operational virtuosity.
In Greece, the success of Pintor’s army in the north finally allowed Vercellino to achieve the definitive breakthrough. With Italian troops who had marched all the way from northern Illyria splashing in the warm waters of the northern Aegean and the Soviet line in utter disarray, Vercellino burst out at long last. His main aim was two-fold: to link up with Pintor, and also to slice the Soviet forces into multiple small pockets and wipe them out. By the 20th of June the former was very nearly accomplished, with only minor distances left to travel and no Soviets in between the two armies. The second objective the Soviets themselves had virtually accomplished for Vercellino. Of the apparent six Soviet divisions still in Greece, two infantry formations were in the far north by the provincial border with Albania. One Soviet mountain division was on the cusp of being trapped against the Corinthian Gulf, one infantry division was being swept westward toward the Ionian Sea, and the last mountain division as well as the armored formation were to be trapped against the Aegean. It was only a matter of time until all six of these divisions would be destroyed.
Vercellino’s army and assets of Pintor’s eviscerating the Soviet position in Greece.
In the far north, the trapped motorized division proved too slippery and managed to conduct a ragged long march back to Soviet lines, albeit in poor shape. Bastico’s and Graziani’s other encirclement plan came only partially to fruition, but one or two Soviet divisions were still trapped and destroyed by Italian forces. What followed during this time was another sequence of battles, spread across the entire front, and all invariably won by the Italians: Kucevo, Arad, Arandelovac, Kyustendil, Pernik, Lamia, Larisa. In the seven days these battles all took place during, nearly thirty-five hundred Italians and fifty-nine hundred Soviets lost their lives. In the north and center, Bastico and Graziani had pushed into Dacia. In the south, Pintor was swinging into Thrace and had trapped another Soviet division on the Chalcidice peninsulas. In the far south, finally part of the action, Vercellino was mopping up Greece.
The operational situation on the 27th of June.
Operationally, the Italians remained stunningly successful, and indeed this period was perhaps the single most successful since the very beginning of the operation three months ago. Not only had possibly four divisions been destroyed and many others battered in combat, but the Italians had set up the conditions for the destruction of another seven, including one armored and two mountain divisions! On the deficit side, Italian casualties had also never been higher, and losing nearly three thousand five hundred men in a single week was perhaps more than the Italians could afford over the long run. Soviet resistance finally seemed to be filling out, as significant reinforcements from the Soviet strategic reserve—that is, the German front—finally began arriving in strength. The Italians, too, were still far from the defensive borders of the Prut River and the Bosporus. Indeed, they nearly had to cover as much distance again as they already had.
