The First Year of Renaissance
Part 1: Abyssinia, The Generals’ War, January 1 – January 24, 1936
From the beginning, Abyssinia was the generals’ war in its entirety. In exchange for the high command of the Italian East Africa (Africa Orientale Italiana, or AOI) headquarters, General Grazioli had pleaded for a complete abstinence from Mussolini on any interference from on high. Mussolini resisted at first but eventually gave in, on the condition that if he asked then Grazioli would have to release to him AOI air and sea assets. Grazioli easily agreed to that, and suggested that the Abyssinians were such a small threat that an air force was completely unnecessary. Mussolini would by and large hold him to that promise, for he was already beginning to conceive of his new strategic ideas and had already determined to revise the organization of the Italian armed forces on the mainland to that purpose.
Grazioli commanded considerable forces in East Africa, though they were divided between Eritrea and Somalia, with the majority in the former region. The fourteen infantry regiments in Eritrea and the two in Somalia were envisioned as the Armata dell’AOI’s main offensive force, along with the two mountaineer regiments in Eritrea. Secondary forces consisted of nineteen Blackshirt and Eritrean militia regiments in this area, and another ten Blackshirt and Somali militia regiments in Somalia. In total the Armata dell’AOI totaled some 162,000 soldiers, including the 87,000 militiamen and some 21,000 in various headquarters. The core of the force was obviously the 48,000 trained infantrymen and the 6,000 crack mountaineers. Abyssinian forces were unknown but not anticipated to be particularly troublesome by anyone involved in the theater. Grazioli’s objective with this force was the Abyssinian capital of Adis Abeba. However, in a remarkable turn of events, he began pleading for reinforcements even before his offensive
began, asking for two armored brigades and a medium bomber squadron.
Italian deployments in Eritrea and Grazioli’s requests for reinforcements.
Italian deployments in Somalia, and the first known deployment of Abyssinian troops.
Grazioli had evidently forgotten his boastful suggestions of late the previous year, of which Mussolini was quick to remind him—in an effort to goad him on. Late on the 1st of January, Grazioli began ponderously shifting his forces forward. Most units were far away from the border and had to march to reach it, many soldiers’ first real experience with marching in the desert. Attrition was already becoming something of a problem. Nevertheless, Grazioli was sufficiently confident to march the 5a Divisione Alpina ‘Pusteria’, the elite mountaineers under Major General Tellera, toward Afrera Terar, within the Abyssinian borders. Though reduced to an observer of this colonial war and despite Grazioli’s initial wavering and pleading for reinforcements, Mussolini was confident in the abilities of his generals.
Grazioli’s first movements toward and into Abyssinia.
By midday on the 5th of January, the area around Afrera Terar had fallen to Tellera’s mountaineers and the 26a Divisione ‘Assietta’ under the command of Major General Nicolosi had come up to join them. These two divisions then began broadening the front. Tellera was sent toward Serdo, Nicolosi toward Maych’ew. Confident reports radiated from Grazioli’s headquarters outward toward the higher Tarabulus headquarters at Tobruk and further to Rome. No Abyssinian opposition had yet been met and it was anticipated that the Abyssinians would not put any significant resistance either. Given the humiliating defeat in 1897 at Adwa was still a living memory, it is astonishing that the Italians could have been so overconfident.
Grazioli pushing deeper into Abyssinia.
On the 14th, the Abyssinians gave battle around Serdo, which Tellera had reached with his mountaineers. His six thousand well-trained men were put upon by nine thousand Abyssinian militiamen. Though poorly trained and equipped, they knew the desert and the mountains well and fought enthusiastically.
Set upon by the Abyssinians!
The Abyssinians fought, but without any real success. Italian victory at Serdo was inevitable, though their good progress was not. It is generally accepted by historians that Tellera was delayed for a considerable time at Serdo due to the battle. Due to Grazioli’s penchant for issuing short marching orders, perhaps a side effect of the desert attrition, Tellera’s final assigned destination was Serdo and he was not to receive another marching until until he reached it, much as at Afrera Terar. The battle delayed his march by a considerable amount of time.
The Abyssinians never came close to victory.
The battle at Serdo was still raging five days later, on the 19th, when Nicolosi occupied Maych’ew and began marching toward Dese. By this point, the majority of the Eritrean portion of the Armata dell’AOI was marching across the already violated Abyssinian border and toward Maych’ew. Some seventy or eighty thousand men were marching thin dustry roads across the desert and through mountains to reach that obscure settlement, even as the vanguard division was leaving it.
Grazioli’s offensive building momentum, despite the delay around Serdo.
Despite the success of the northern thrust from Eritrea, the Corpo d’Armata Libico, under the command of Lieutenant General Bennati, was still in Somalia. There seems to be a dearth of evidence on the reason why. Either orders had not gone out from Grazioli to Bennati, or Bennati had become insubordinate and refused to pass the orders on to his division commanders. Some of what little evidence exists points toward this latter conclusion, as Bennati was on record multiple times for requesting from Grazioli up to
four regiments of armor! Given the Italian binary divisional system, this amounted to an entire
two armored divisions. This at a time when Italy barely had two motorized infantry regiments and an armored car regiment, all in different divisions! It is impossible to avoid the conclusion that if Bennati had merely concentrated his forces—and, indeed,
not keep his division of trained infantry behind at Muqdisho—he could clearly have broken through the thin lines of Abyssinian militia that confronted him and would have been on the southern road to Adis Abeba.
Inactivity in Somalia and Bennati’s demands for reinforcements.
By the 24th Nicolosi had also met resistance on the road to Dese, in the form of another division of Abyssinian militia. Despite the mountainous terrain and a lack of training, Nicolosi caught them in an unfavorable situation and was pushing his advantage; the militia was being steadily pushed back. Tellera was still embroiled in low intensity combat around Serdo, hunting down militiamen employing hit and run attacks against his columns and supply lines. He had already lost ten days to a force stronger in manpower, though inferior in every other way. Despite this ongoing setback and the fighting in front of Dese, Grazioli’s reports still seeped confidence and infected all who read them. He had cause; only two divisions of twelve thousand men total had engaged the enemy, they were winning, and Grazioli had another 120,000 or so men marching up to the front as reinforcements. It was inevitable that the Abyssinians would crack and then shatter under such pressure.
The battle of Dese, the fighting around Serdo being sidelined and reinforcements coming up.
On the 24th, confident of continuing success in Abyssinia, Grazioli flew back to Rome for a personal report to Mussolini. Landing at the airport outside Rome, his entire journey into the center of the Eternal City and Mussolini’s palace and offices was hindered by a rapturous reception by the Italian people, who had heard of the great exploits and many successes of Italian soldiers in Abyssinia for the past month. Mussolini must have taken note of the elated hero worship his one active general was receiving and must certainly have disapproved of it. What passed between the two men upon Grazioli’s late arrival at Mussolini’s offices is still unclear, but there does not seem to have been a falling out and both men appeared to have left the meeting quite satisfied.