The Year of Strategic Crisis
Part 2: Operation Valeria Victrix I, January 15 – January 26, 1941
It was time for the Regio Esercito to unearth its old plans. In 1938, after its intervention in Spain during the Civil War, Field Marshal Nasi had drawn up with Generals Pintor and Grossi an operational plan called Valeria Victrix, after one of the Roman legions that participated in the final conquest of Iberia and the establishment of the provinces of Hispania under Roman suzerainty. The plan as conceived was comprised of two components: a defensive component in which Grossi’s army south of Cartagena and Pintor’s army north of it would wage an elastic defense to wear down and perchance destroy Spanish formations. Once the Spanish were weak enough, the plan was then to go onto the offensive and fundamentally destroy the Spanish army. Valeria Victrix as it was originally conceived did not anticipate taking any more territory, save for a strip along the Iberian east coast, to take Valencia and Tarragona and ease Italian logistics.
The strategic situation was different three years previously, however. Nasi’s army group was comprised of two armies rather than the one it fielded in January 1941. The small southern bridgehead was undefended at that time, whereas by this second war Gibraltar had been taken and had to be held to protect the Mediterranean from an even greater Allied presence than that already in Tel Aviv. The defense was thus in a very difficult situation. Rather than one army dedicated to defending Cartagena from the south and the other from the north, there was one corps in the north and half a corps in the south, with the other half of this latter corps holed up in Gibraltar. Indeed, by the 21st of January the southern bridgehead had fallen, save for the Rock. Two Italian divisions were surrounded by at least four Spanish divisions, each on its own probably a regiment larger than either of the Italian divisions, and amongst these four besieging divisions there was an armored division to boot. The situation seemed grim.
Gibraltar, isolated.
Fortunately, one strategic asset that Italy had in abundance was a flexibility born of uncommitted armies, interior lines of communication and, above all, sea power. Also by the morning of the 21st, Campioni’s carrier fleet was steaming off the coast, just over the horizon from Valencia. It was keeping in port the last Spanish light cruiser, the ARE Baleares, as well as a flotilla of destroyers. The first relay of Italian transports had also arrived in theater, depositing half of Pintor’s army, Roatta’s corps, at Cartagena. These new forces were moving southward to replace the half-corps in that area, which itself would be budged closer to the center, which was simply a gaping hole leading straight to a cluster of headquarters in and around Cartagena (and there were indeed a great many headquarters here: Nasi’s army group headquarters, Grossi’s and Pintor’s army headquarters and also Roatta’s corps headquarters, though this last was in transit to the south as well).
Hispania shrinking, but reinforcements marching to their area of operations.
By the afternoon on that same day, Da Zara’s carrier fleet had also reached the theater. Positioning his ships to the south of the Balearic Islands, his warplanes were soon launching strikes on the port of Eivissa. Da Zara was eager to blood his new command in real combat operations. Unfortunately, while gaining experience, his pilots failed to sink either the light cruiser or any of the destroyers. This may have been because, so eager to participate in the planned hammer blow against the Mediterranean Fleet as Da Zara was, he forgot to find a commander for his carrier wings. Nevertheless, despite this small oversight and subsequent incapacity, the defense of Hispania was well in hand. Valeria Victrix was being quickly updated and, indeed, somewhat improvised by Nasi, Grossi, Pintor and Bastico.
Da Zara’s leaderless carrier planes striking Spanish ships at Eivissa.
Of the three armies in the east, two went west. These were Pintor’s 7a Armata, which was still Italy’s elite and, further, had experience in Spain already, and Bastico’s 2a Armata, which by this point was Italy’s second army in terms of experience and prestige. Graziani’s 1a Armata was destined to remain in Romania during this crisis. While half of Pintor’s army was redeploying itself to the southern sector of front, Bastico’s army went north. Indeed, it was not actually going to Cartagena. Instead, it was to make a landing at Valencia in the face of Spanish resistance. This resistance was comprised of only one division—three regiments—but this was potentially enough to stymie a difficult landing. Bastico’s entire army was going ashore here, and its only support came from the diversionary activities of a single division of Grossi’s army, the only in the vicinity that was within range to help, from the south.
Bastico’s landing at Valencia.
By the 25th, Gambara’s corps was finished with its duties in Cyprus and was redeployed and ready for action in Spain. Gambara was not, however, destined to wage war alongside Roatta. Gambara achieved semi-detached status here, still being part of Pintor’s army but taking his orders directly from Nasi for the time being. This was the result of sheer distance, and the independence of Gambara’s mission vis-à-vis Pintor. Gambara was inserted into Tarragona, the final of the three Spanish ports on their Mediterranean coast. It was a landing made against no resistance. Indeed, there was not a Spanish unit within two hundred miles of the city. Gambara had the opportunity of exploding across the entire north of Spain.
Gambara’s corps, having landed at Tarragona.
Operation Valeria Victrix was now in play; all its constituent pieces were in action. Italy held command of the sea, with the minuscule Spanish fleet declining to make an appearance, due to the inevitability of its destruction. Grossi’s army was shielding Cartagena until Bastico’s army came ashore. Pintor’s army was already in action around Vicar in the south, and Gambara’s corps was firmly ashore at Tarragona. In a crisis, the forces for Valeria Victrix had grown immensely, and with these forces grew Mussolini’s intention to use them to solve the problem of Spain.
