The Year of the Masters of War
Part 6: The Great Gamble of the War II, July 7 – July 10, 1944
The Regio Esercito, in partnership with the Regia Marina, had made three landings in the past half a month: at Athens, at Istanbul and at Eregli. Baistrocchi’s 11a Armata was stretched out over an enormous area, his army’s corps components connected only by the Italian navy. Five Italian armies sat on the Illyrian line: Graziani’s 1a Armata, Bastico’s 2a Armata, Pintor’s 7a Armata, Guzzoni’s 8a Armata and Amadeo duca degli Abruzzi’s 9a Armata. Grossi’s army in Hispania had been reduced to the very bones to marshal the men for this Balkan enterprise. Italians, too, still fought in Central Africa—or perhaps better to say, safeguarded Eastern Africa without fighting. On the Illyrian line stood over three hundred and forty thousand men, twenty-seven thousand in Hispania, and thirty-eight thousand in Africa. Baistrocchi’s army consisted of ninety thousand spread across the perimeter of a quarter of a continent. And yet, despite such a prodigal display of Italian manpower, one army remained yet unused.
Forgotten by many commentators in the excitement of the landings, Vercellino’s 5a Armata of eighty-two thousand men remained at Taranto. His movements were dictated by two considerations: opportunity and shipping. He had not been forgotten by Mussolini by any means. Instead, his planned landing vied with that at Istanbul in importance. Italian intelligence kept a close eye on Soviet deployments, and on July 6th sent a note to Mussolini that the moment was auspicious for a landing. By that same time, the three previous landings were completed and, while there would be future redeployments, the entirety of Italian shipping could be dedicated to transporting Vercellino’s forces to where they needed to be. Owing to transport losses in previous years, by some accident or fluke to British destroyers deep in the north end of the Red Sea, a number of Italian transports had been destroyed. This meant that, despite the efforts of the Italian shipbuilding industry to recoup the losses incurred, Vercellino’s entire army could not be moved in a single convoy. This was unfortunate, but not fatal. Two corps could be moved, and they were. On July 7th, Vercellino made his landing with one corps of infantry and his mobile corps. The landing was at Vylkove.
Vercellino’s landing at Vylkove.
With seven divisions fully ashore by the early morning of the 8th, and the rest of his army ready for transport at the docks of Taranto, Vercellino put into effect his ambitious plan. It was dangerous, particularly given that there was a Soviet armored division directly to the southwest of Vylkove. However, da Zara’s aviators still dominated the skies, and the crossroads and the bridges and the supply depots, north of Vercellino’s planned march, which would reduce any potential pressure on Vercellino from the north. Already by the 8th Soviet formations that were moving southward from Dacia toward Istanbul were being diverted back northward in an attempt to stem this new surprise. Vercellino’s plan was a simple one, and was almost a complete copy of one that had occurred over two years previously. His forces would push directly westward until they made contact with the Hungarian border, and from then on simply maintain their land-blockade of the entirety of the southeast of Europe. This was why his mobile corps was on the wave to hit the beaches, because it was an integral part of the plan and its speed would be appreciated, given Italy’s previous experience with this risky maneuver. Vercellino’s infantry would, for the first days, remain in Vylkove to protect the headquarters and supply base from any counterattacks. The second major piece of Mussolini’s gamble was now in place, and an entire army of eighty-two thousand dangled at the end of a long maritime line of communication, incredibly fragile.
Vercellino’s planned advance.
By July 9th, the Soviet army in the Balkans was in absolute chaos as its headquarters could not fathom where the Italian center of gravity was. Where was the main effort? More importantly, where was the most important effort? Which of the Italian landings proved the most threatening to the Soviets? Of the threatening landings, which were the most vulnerable? These were all important questions the Soviets had to pose to themselves and then answer, but over which the generals had little traction. Soviet divisions were being diverted from one landing to another almost at random, and it could all be detected by Italian intelligence. The first wave had reached southern Illyria and many were on the way to Greece, but some were going toward Dacia and others still going back northward, for whatever odd reason. Another wave was also in the offing, mostly going east-northeastward to counter Vercellino’s landing. Even the Soviets could sense the danger here, and were likely determined to try to do something about it. There were a bizarre handful of British and Persian divisions in Illyria, cut out from Soviet operational planning and intelligence of any kind, and merely watched in consternation at the confusion of Soviet arms. Meanwhile in the confusion, there were only two Soviet formations actually in a position from which they could gain direct contact with Italian forces: one was the headquarters that Visconti Prasca’s divisions were forcing into retreat time and again away from Istanbul. The other was the armored division Vercellino had landed right next to. As yet, and two weeks into the campaign, no Soviet division had yet reached any of the new fronts, not even the formations that were close by in Thrace or Dacia.
The complete situation in southeastern Europe.
Into this breach of chaos caused by the multiple Italian landings in the Soviet deep rear stepped Army Group East, under Badaglio. Its five armies and three hundred and forty thousand men were finally to be unleashed. Badaglio had judged, in concordance with Mussolini and the army and corps commanders, that the Soviet defense were finally think enough to be worth attacking. The balance of five armies, rather than four as the previous year, was a boon for the Italians. It allowed them to dedicate two armies to pushing southward, two to pushing eastward and one to hold the front between these two thrusts. Guzzoni’s and Amadeo duca degli Abruzzi’s armies were on the southern flank, and in that direction they began their assaults. Like Pintor the year previously, they aimed first to cut off Soviet divisions in Zadar before sweeping down the coast. In the north, Pintor and Bastico began aiming for a joint encirclement of their own. Graziani’s army for the moment stood and did nothing, for it was judged better this way, to make a possibility for encirclement in the middle of the front opposite him as well.
The Illyrian front, it finally moves! Note the Persian headquarters and British formations.
And so the third and final piece of Mussolini’s gamble began. The hammer blow from Illyria, whose job was to destroy the scattered formations of the Soviet Balkan theater, was started. The lessons of the previous year had been learned, and Mussolini believed they had been learned well. Furthermore, Italy now had more men in arms than at any time previously in the war. And yet, despite this, the combined Italian forces still counted for only half a million or thereabouts—the same as the foes they faced. It would be a bloody struggle no matter what happened.