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One of the most intriguing AARs I have read.
A must read for all HoI3-tacticians.
So much commies-bashing, so delicious.

Thank you for your great work.
 
really fascinating piece ... so much to agree with, so much to pick apart (or at least query). Maybe because I come at this from a different perspective, I still suspect any formal definition of the goal of strategy tends to underplay the practicalities, with the latter being much messier, much more informed by what looks like luck (but is in fact usually a carefully constructed in built advantage) and of course pure opportunism.

one other question ... it would make sense for a nineteenth century theoretician to see the individual battle as the point of (temporary) resolution, armies didn't tend to fight continuously or across wide fronts, both sides tended to move to a point of concentration etc. Even if battle tended to be inconclusive (such as often in the American Civil War?) it was still a recognisable point. Is the leap to seeing an operational campaign in the twentieth century in much the same way little other than a recognition that a combination of mobility and civilian armies (so much larger), meant that active combat spread out much wider. If so:

Carl von Clausewitz as the use of engagements for the purpose of policy. ... In its strictest sense, in fact, Clausewitz’s definition of strategy was out of date.

is perhaps a little harsh (even with your carefully worded phrase in there).

Great stuff again ...
 
With apologies to the title of this fascinating and enjoyable AAR; and with all due respect to your academic precis of the definition of "strategy", I must beg to differ as to your conclusion. There was no Italian "strategy", rather there was operational aptitude. Please, I don't mean to insult your work in this AAR in any way. I think you played far better than I am able under similar circumstances. It's just that there was no grand design to implement Italian goals across the map of the world (nothwithstanding the writings of the author). Frankly, if I want that approach I read Kanitatlan's AARs. I read Myth AAR because they are more fluid and strike me as more "real" and attainable. But that's just my .02c. ;)
 
With apologies to the title of this fascinating and enjoyable AAR; and with all due respect to your academic precis of the definition of "strategy", I must beg to differ as to your conclusion. There was no Italian "strategy", rather there was operational aptitude.

I have to disagree, there. At least initially, the strategy was "Contest with the British Empire for widespread Imperial hegemony," and the tech focus on early aircraft carriers (which, IMO, cost Mussolini his conquest of Russia) was entirely devoted to supporting that strategy, and it was prosecuted in theatres which bore upon British interests. Only with the insane German decision to bring Russia into the war was that strategy replaced by "Neutralise Russia in order to survive as a nation."
 
Even then the CAG groups could have been used to greater effect. The Italian Navy sat idle ever since the Black Sea Fleet had been beaten and the Russian land formations being beaten further inland. The logical step would have been to rebase them inland an use them from there. They're not particularily good in that environment but certainly better than nothing. If anything, they could contest the airspace, thereby alleviating the lack of other means to protect the Italian formations.

Then we have the troops stationed in secondary theatres. It might be against the narrative but since the AI never tried to land in any of these locations, they could have been called upon, too. Every single Italian unit could have made a difference, as we can see from the very close run for Moskow.

Thirdly, there are the shortcomings of the German AI. The front had been a stalemate for years and when Italy ran out of viable targets in the Med, thanks to the looming threat in the north, it might have been useful to support the German front and try to punch a hole in the Russian lines, so the German AI finally wakes up and tries to exploit it.

The initial aim to pacify the Med was valid and actually achieved, but then the Italians were caught unprepared for the war with Russia and the German inability to persue it's chosen course.
 
Stuyvesant: Mostly protecting Suez. Africa has the misfortune of being a sort of strategic bottomless pit with a heart of darkness. Not the best place to try to wage a war. :p

Khanwulf: Nah, I said nothing here that was overly interesting. :D

reis91: I didn't say much on grand strategy either. ;)

Enewald: It was fun! :D

Jemisi: Nahhh. :p

reis91: Maybe so, maybe so. :p

loki100: I agree that definitions of strategy tend to be on the rationalist side of things, thus downplaying the other two sides of the trinity that Clausewitz posited: irrationality, and nonrationality. Concerning your latter Clausewitzian point, it may have possibly been a bit harsh. But I believe I allow for the opportunity to conceptualize operations as engagements later. I know others have worked to try to fit operations into the Clausewitizian mould, and some accuse Clausewitz of having conceived of the operational level of war! The latter particularly is bizarre. :p

WhisperingDeath: Most of the people I referred to were actual practitioners of strategy, with hands-on experience. Jomini and Clausewitz of course were highly experienced by the Napoleonic Wars. Beaufre retired as a French General with experience in WW2, Indochina and Algeria. Wylie retired as a rear admiral, having had experience in the Pacific during WW2 and having been posted to all sorts of other naval tasks. Gray worked for the Reagan administration in arms control and matters of nuclear strategy, in a position that required senate confirmation. So their words carry a good amount of weight. :p

It'd actually be interesting to try to figure out where this strange idea that strategy has to be a great design first originated. I'd bet it's from some discipline which isn't particularly related to strategic studies but bastardized some of its concepts, like economics. I had the misfortune of reading a book on economic strategy once, mostly 'cause it seemed interesting at the time. It had the most rationalist definition of strategy I had ever seen, quite along the lines of the one you provide, of strategy being an overall plan etc. But that good had exactly one good idea, and the rest of it was mumbo jumbo and had some of the sloppiest thinking I've ever seen. Anyway, the point is that a plan does not a strategy make, nor does strategy require an explicit plan. Strategy serves policy. Policy does tend to have some sort of overarching vision. What was mine? To make Italy great, lead it into a position from which it could dominate Europe (and possibly the world). In this vein, should I conquer Switzerland? What about Greece or Turkey? In the end, I conquered the latter two but not the former. But really, those were just details. Minor details. Important details when it comes to the conduct of operations mind you, but still minor.

So strategy is not merely a plan, nor is a mere plan anything related to strategy. One of the common threads in virtually all strategic works and even within definitions of strategy is the ends/means dichotomy. You have a certain set of ends, of objectives, you want to achieve, and you have another set of means you can try to achieve them with. You have to match means to ends, and ends to means--no fighting to achieve ends beyond your means and all that. You thus may have set ends and set means, but the way is largely unknown. After all, the enemy is also intelligent and is also using strategy and is actively trying to thwart you and advance himself. Thus you cannot really define the way you apply means to ends with any great precision, although doing so is a favorite activity of peacetime militaries. The purpose of exercises that develop the ways of waging war are less for the plans, but more to develop strategic sense and insight. What sort of actions might bring the greatest strategic effect? If thwarted this way or that way, how might one adapt to continue achieving the desired strategic effect? Etc. Of the definitions I provided, Wylie's is in fact the closest to your conception of strategy, but he too would agree that a plan is not enough to be called a strategy. His exact words were "[a] plan of action designed in order to achieve some end; a purpose together with a system of measures for its accomplishment." The means-ends relationship is more important to strategy than plans. Virtually no definition of strategy ignores the means-ends relationship, while many ignore the plans aspect. It's just that plans are good tools to help illuminate the means-ways-ends trichotomy. :p

Tribal: Don't watch too hard, it'll be a little while yet. The new patch will apparently be released in the new year, and I would no doubt wait on that. :p

womble: Indeed, the insertion of another enemy did upset my ideas of who my main enemy would be to a significant extent. Well, strategy has to adapt. ;)

Baltasar: Yeah the CAGs sat idle to a lage extent. This is primarily because using air units is a goddamn pain in the ass. :D As for secondary theaters, I stripped them as much as I could. I left only enough formations in Spain to hold the ports, and enough divisions in Africa to deter the Belgians, British and South Africans from advancing. A total of ten or so divisions, the other 70-80 being in the East. And I think the shortcomings of the German AI were a central theme of the latter half of the AAR. ;)
 
Good to see someone shares my view on most works in economics :). Too bad I still have to read them, for study, though...

But Myth, while most of your AAR approaches operational strategy, you cannot fail to acknowledge that some of your decisions imply great strategy. For instance, while controlling Turkey was part of your operational strategy to control your "Mare Clausum", it was chosen also due to it's strategic location for future operations, like the ones you conducted around Azerbaijan. Other examples were your approach to power projection, that, I, layman as I am, still regard that as grand strategy, noting also that it really has no ends implied by itself, those ends come, like you said, from policy.
 
The only thing I am still wondering about, is why you didn't walk over that english fleet in the med? As far as I know, it shouldn't be able to get out of the med after you have both sides of suez, and Gibraltar ..and of course Bosporus...would have been embarrasing to see it fueled by Soviet oil, in the black sea :D.
Once upon a time there was a slight chance of capturing a ship by taking the port it was in..Could have been funny to get some new italian ships that way..

I am quite certain that the use of the CAG's on dry land might have been useful..Its just not certain that it would have won the war. And they DO use some supplies, just waiting in an airfield re-orging after a transfer. And that usage might also have had an impact...

About reserves in spain etc. : Just because the Allies didn't land there, doesn't mean they wouldn't have done so, if no defense had been present!
 
Yeah, cause D-Day didn't face concentrations of german divs on the beaches... anyway, SF should improve that

..maybe, just maybe, the allies in the real world would have PREFERRED to face nobody on the beaches of normandy! -like in operation Torch, where resistence on the beaches was slightly less than in Normandy....:" end sarkasm"
 
But they still sacrificed thousands of lives to land there... point being, that a daring AI is good, even if it sometimes butchers their forces in less-than-perfect operations. Right now, just the odds from stacking penalty are enough to dissuade their landings with minimal force.

..well.. the original point (of Baltasar, this page) was, that Myth should have removed more/all troops from spain (secondary theatres), to support the thrust on Moscow. My point was, that even though the AI didn't attack the guarded beaches in Spain, that does not prove it wouldn't have landed there, if those beaches had NOT been guarded...Hope I got all my double negatives correct in that sentence :D
 
I think that SF, and 2.03c in particular, is much better for allied landings.... I'm not quite there in the postings for my own AAR, which could be seen as "inspired by Myth" if played on SF, with better German AI, but the Allies attempt landings several times at several places. I've also been playing a Germany campaign on Hard with SF 2.03c and the allies are trying to land behind my lines, even while the fight still rages for France!

So I think this shows the improvement in Allied AI between HOI3 1.4 and SF!
 
..well.. the original point (of Baltasar, this page) was, that Myth should have removed more/all troops from spain (secondary theatres), to support the thrust on Moscow. My point was, that even though the AI didn't attack the guarded beaches in Spain, that does not prove it wouldn't have landed there, if those beaches had NOT been guarded...Hope I got all my double negatives correct in that sentence :D

Yeah, I was kinda justifying (or condemning) AI behavior based on historical evidence, since this AAR tries to achieve somewhat realistic operations. But yes, got your point.
 
reis91: Sure, the way I played I was following a sort of grand strategy. I was merely saying I didn't discuss it much. :p

BlitzMartinDK: Because it wouldn't have been a walk over. Virtually every capital ship the British had was there (at least from pre-war capitals, notwithstanding those sunk). That's scary. There was also absolutely no reason to destroy it, since when cooped up in Tel Aviv was almost totally out of my hair. And concerning Spain, the Allies did try landing there at least once. I'm quite sure I noted it when it happened. It simply didn't develop into anything because the port garrison cut the attacking division to pieces. :p

mankle30: The AI sounds a bit more promising. :p

Forster: I'm not entirely sure what point your trying to make here. :p

Anyway, there may or may not be an update later, as I'm going to be pretty busy today! I've only got three more to go, and they're all suggested reading lists for those who are interested in reading more on strategic theory and history etc. I've got the first two lists, but have yet to annotate them. Also, I'm leaving tomorrow to go to England for two weeks, where I will most likely be without any internet access besides that which I can periodically bum from friends or my university library. So this AAR's final (but relatively inconsequential) updates will come in a couple weeks!