The Year of the Masters of War
Part 10: The Strength of Italian Arms I, August 7 – August 28, 1944
So far, the Italian gamble had been holding up to Mussolini’s expectations, even if not necessarily the expectations of some contemporary commentators. By early August, seven Italian armies and a myriad of miscellaneous German formations probably totaling approximately six hundred thousand men were firmly attached to the periphery and pushing inward from the northwest and, to a far lesser extent, the east and northeast. Italian strategic mobility had already been shown to be unmatched by any other country in the world, at least amongst the belligerent powers. Italian strategic imagination was also a tier above that of both its allies and its foes. From early August onward, Mussolini judged that it was time to finally show the world the true strength of Italian arms.
The Soviets were contracting their frontlines. Perhaps the theater commander understood the Italian advantage due to their ability to concentrate in time, across many fronts. Perhaps he hoped to restore a coherent front from which he could mount a more competent defense and hope for reinforcements to break into southeastern Europe from the northeast. Perhaps he understood that Soviet divisions were now vanishing with alarming rapidity. By the 8th of August, at least one division had been encircled in the Dacian neck, and another two on the south-central Illyrian front. Belgrade was also under attack, though the Soviet defenders had vowed to fight for every street. That battle would rage for five grueling days, costing nearly three thousand lives in aggregate by both sides, yet even as Budapest burned other Italian formations were maneuvering around it, pushing past it. In the south-center area of the Illyrian front, Guzzoni’s and the southern wing of Graziani’s armies were rushing forward, having crushed a pocket, and were in the process of overrunning their foes. From Dacia, meanwhile, Cei’s mobile corps had finally broken free of Soviet formations and was beginning a race westward and southwestward around the tip of Hungary, overrunning one retreating Soviet division in the process. The Soviet forces in the east were beginning to stream southward, abandoning their attempts to punch through the Dacian neck. It was time for Vercellino’s army to move south, in pursuit. The Italian armies were beginning to squeeze their enemies.
Italian armies moving in on central southeastern Europe, on the 15th of August.
The Italian armies continued to squeeze the Soviet forces mercilessly. In all except a few locations, the operation had changed from one of breaking through Soviet lines to moving in headlong pursuit of withdrawing Soviet forces, and aiming to encircle them. Seven Soviet formations by this point faced Pintor’s army, which was so used to empty space before it. These formations were but the detritus of battle, however. Furthermore, while Pintor’s army was pressuring their northwestern front, Cei’s cavalry was cutting through their supply lines southward. Another pocket was forming, and it the link up between western forces and eastern forces was on the cusp of occurring. Further east, the rest of Vercellino’s army was hard in pursuit of withdrawing Soviet elements. At this point the greatest Soviet resistance was probably in front of Guzzoni’s, Graziani’s and Baistrocchi’s armies. It was between these armies that the Soviet lifeline to Athens lay, for Mussolini had suspicions that Soviet blockade runners were reaching Athens sufficiently to provide some limited supplies. The resistance Baistrocchi faced was indeed the greatest resistance yet for his army during this operation, as for most of the past month the Soviet defenses on his front had been weak and scattered. Meanwhile, on the southern and central Illyrian fronts, a number of minor pockets had been achieved and were in the process of being cleared. The Italians were not letting up on the pressure.
The Italians squeezing the Soviets evermore, by August 21.
The Italians were temporarily held back by the need to clear up the many pockets being formed, and thus stayed their executioner’s blade for a short while. The northern pocket was on the verge of destruction, and the pockets being formed on the south-central Illyrian front were all wiped out. Vercellino and Baistrocchi were, however, aiming for an encirclement of numerous Soviet elements around Bucharest, though it was unknown whether Italian infantry would be faster than Soviet armor. Amadeo duca degli Abruzzi’s army, after having waited for a week and more while his elongated flanks became shorter and better protected by Guzzoni’s advance, finally launched his forces forward again, southward into Albania. The Soviet formations opposing his advance were meager and he quickly broke through them. Shortly after this, and with the northern pocket entirely liquidated, Pintor’s army removed from the operational order of battle and instead sent northward into the Dacian neck to begin making preparations for its defense against a Soviet counterattack that had not yet materialized but which Mussolini continued to expect. His aid was not required any more in any case: the majority of the remaining Soviet forces were being herded into an enormous pocket comprising eastern Illyria, southwestern Dacia and northwestern Thrace. South of this forming pocket, probably only about a half-dozen Soviet divisions remained.
The situation on the 28th of August, the Soviets were being herded into an ever tightening space.
Mussolini may have been the only person with complete confidence in the strength of Italian arms even against the largest army in the world, that of the Soviet Union. The Germans certainly had no confidence in the Italian armed forces. They saw only the retreats of the past two years and most likely expected it to occur again. They failed to see the great successes of 1943, or the fact that neither retreat proved fatal to Italy, as both were incredibly well controlled. The Germans saw supposed Italian failures while being unable to perceive their own. With the Soviets being confined to an ever smaller space, the Germans merely saw a greater density of Soviet formations, not the devastating process that had led them to that point. The Germans saw false strength rather than the weakness that really afflicted the Soviet Balkan theater. Thus it was that Mussolini reacted with shock and fury at reports streaming from Germany, that incredible portions of the Eastern front was being denuded of troops. And for what reason? To reinforce the success they could not see in the Balkans, unaware of the terrible mistake they were making. There were already probably forty German divisions in the Balkans, and according to reports it seemed like another forty would be joining them. The Germans were finally moving, but in the wrong direction.
Goddamnit those worthless Germans.
While a handful of significant battles raged during this period, most notably at Belgrade, the actual bloodletting in the operation had been steadily reducing. With the Soviets in no shape to offer the heavy resistance that had marked the previous month of combat, and indeed withdrawing precipitously to the south, the casualty rate both for the Italian and German forces had dropped considerably. Their casualties for these three weeks of August amounted to not even ten thousand four hundred, dropping by over five thousand despite the time period being longer by eight days. The Soviet casualty rate had also dropped, to not quite twenty thousand five hundred, from a number four thousand higher for the preceding period. Combat had obviously become less intensive. Nevertheless, the Soviet losses remained even greater than noted, as a fair number of formations had been destroyed. The total was unknown, but likely to be over one dozen and possibly approaching, and even exceeding, one eighteen. Most significantly of all, the Soviets were rapidly approaching a completely untenable position. If only the Germans could see it that way, and do something intelligent for once.