The Year of Upheaval
Part 3: The Gamble in the East III, January 13 – January 19, 1942
The British officer Colonel Charles E. Callwell wrote on small wars at the turn of the century, and utilized his encyclopedic knowledge of small wars across the globe during the 1800s to compile a significant milestone in the theory of such wars. He wrote that strategy was not the final arbiter in war, for in the end the battlefield decides the issue. Whoever is left controlling the battlefield, or in modern high-intensity warfare the area of operations, is the victor. Given the obvious importance of Mussolini’s gamble in the east on the entire Italian strategic situation, it is worth continuing examining it in some detail.
By the 14th of January, it had become clear to Bastico that Graziani’s army would find it difficult to close the entire gap between the Black Sea and the Hungarian eastern border. With only eight divisions, of which four were assigned to guarding only the eastern half of the northern flank, his army simply was not large enough to succeed in its mission. Thus, Bastico secured permission from Mussolini to launch his own offensive eastward. He and Graziani would meet in the center and provide a united front to the Soviet reinforcements likely to be on the way to Dacia at that very moment. Bastico’s plan was a simple one. One corps would push along the Hungarian border, trying to fend Soviet formations away from the space in between the two armies by shoving them northward. Another corps would push directly eastward, it was this corps which would actually link up with Graziani’s vanguard forces. Finally, Bastico’s final corps would find itself with a limited mission, at least at first: it would encircle the vulnerable Soviet armored division at Ionesti. It was also anticipated that it would be Bastico’s southern flank’s safeguard and begin the actual process of liquidating the pocket.
Bastico’s push toward Graziani.
Little news came from the operation until the 17th, when Graziani could report that his forces had finally broken Soviet resistance at Tulcea at the cost of nearly six hundred casualties, albeit inflicting nearly eight hundred and fifty on the Soviets. More importantly, the Soviets withdrew southwestward, leaving the direct path of Graziani’s formations open. At the same time, Bastico’s army scored its first victory of the operation as his middle corps ejected the Soviets from their positions with less than one hundred and fifty casualties, though inflicting over seven hundred and fifty on the enemy. the Soviets withdrew northward. The way was open on both sides. Finally, Bastico’s southernmost corps was by this point nearly halfway accomplished with its minor encirclement of the Soviet armored division.
The minor encirclement going according to plan thus far.
By the evening of the 18th Graziani’s position seemed quite favorable. There was no intelligence of significant Soviet formations between Graziani’s and Bastico’s armies, none that were not retreating out of their way at the very least, and while Soviet reinforcements did seem to be drawing closer to the area of operations their numbers were as yet quite small. Furthermore, after some days of extensive air battles, the Soviets seemed to have largely given up its challenge to the Italian carrier-borne air forces, leaving them with air superiority, if not actual, though local, air supremacy. Some few Soviet units were persisting in their southern advance, drawing them ever further away from the more decisive areas of battle to the north. Everything was going well for the operation.
The complete situation at 2000 on the 18th.
By the evening of the 19th, Bastico’s northernmost corps had defeated the Soviets around Sibiu. There they inflicted over one thousand casualties, albeit while suffering over seven hundred of their own. Nevertheless, the Soviets were withdrawing northeastward, broadly as the Italians had hoped. Thus, two of Bastico’s corps were doing their work correctly. The third was as well, for by that point it had completely encircled the Soviet armor at Ionesti and had begun the assault. Six brigades of Italian infantry faced a formation that was estimated to have two armored brigades and two infantry brigades, though it was also possible for it to simply have three armored brigades. Regardless, it was bound to be a long and difficult battle, though this fact did not seem to percolate upward to Italian high command effectively. Bastico and Mussolini were already planning to swing La Ferla’s mountain division eastward into Bucharest, hopefully to destroy Soviet planes on the ground at the airport. As the Soviets themselves said in a very true adage: air superiority is our tank on their runway.
Soviet armor under attack; note the used airfield in Bucharest, and the fact that it was undefended.
By the end of the 19th, it seemed that both Bastico’s and Graziani’s armies were either breaking through Soviet lines, or about to. The first, albeit minor, battle of annihilation was already being fought by Bastico’s southernmost corps. Italian intelligence could gain no information on how many divisions were still in the closing pocket by this point, nor of how many were rushing toward the onward pushing Italian armies to try to keep the pocket open, but was optimistic on both points. Perhaps about half of all Soviet divisions that had been on the Dacian front a month previously were within the closing noose, and few Soviet divisions were being sent toward the area of operations. A great success was in the making.
