The Year of Aggression
Part 5: Operation Anicius Gallus I, June 26 – July 23, 1939
During the month between the end of June and the end of July, Mussolini sat down with five other men in Rome to plan a new operation, Anicius Gallus. These three other men were Pintor, commanding general of the 7a Armata; Bastico, commanding general of the 2a Armata; Badaglio, commanding general of Army Group East; Campioni, admiral of Italy’s carrier-centric fleet; and finally Ghé, admiral of Italy’s battleship-centric fleet. They were planning another limited war, under the cover of international events so that no one state pick them out and declare war on them in response, as the Allies had done over Poland.
As they were planning this operation, Quilicci was already implementing a preliminary, and indeed requisite, part of the operation. He was tasked to take the 7a Armata, recently detached from Army Group Iberia, under Nasi, back to Italy. Their path would take them past the French coast, causing the French Navy to shadow the transport convoy for a while, before the transports sailed into Italian territorial waters, where the French did not follow. The Italians were not hostile to the French, certainly not in the immediate sense which the French were worried about, given events in Eastern Europe. As Italy moved its most infamous army—the 7a, the interveners in Spain—the final throes of the Polish campaign were underway.
Quilicci, removing the 7a Armata from Spain.
By the 30th of June, the convoy had reached its destination: Trieste. From there, Pintor’s army deployed southward, toward Kozina and Rovigno. It was immediately apparent from these new surroundings what their future task would be: the invasion and conquest of Yugoslavia. From its positioning, it was immediately apparent that the 7a Armata was to be the main hammer blow, the army that would be pushing deep into Yugoslavia. The rumor-mongers who suggested this were more right than they could have possibly imagined.
Deploying the 7a Armata along the Yugoslavian border.
The 7a Armata consisted of eight divisions in two corps, four divisions apiece. In terms of numbers it was a modest force, though it was a potent one, particularly against an unassuming opponent. Yugoslavia was envisaged as being such an opponent, its army was relatively small and it was unmobilized. The frontier guards were expected to shatter and the speed of the Italian advance would prevent any new line of resistance from being formed. In this spirit, Pintor’s operational plan was a bold one. To risk anachronism, it is worth mentioning that its concept was more in line with the future Soviet concept of Deep Operations than with the German blitzkrieg. The eight divisions of the 7a Armata would push deep, very deep, into Yugoslavia: past Sarajevo and toward the outskirts of Belgrade, along a wide front. In part this was because of the nature of the front; it was narrow initially but would quickly blow out into quite wide frontages. Further, it represented Pintor’s—and, indeed, everyone’s—confidence. Finally, it represented the first major general staff operational plan: Spain was too small to stress the operational planners much, whereas Yugoslavia was much, much bigger.
Pintor’s plan for the 7a Armata.
As opposed to the confident and ambitious plans Pintor laid for the 7a Armata, Bastico’s plans for his 2a Armata were much more modest. In part this was because Pintor’s plan envisaged pinching the 2a Armata out of the front as the 7a Armata would take over the whole length. Also, the 2a Armata was much weaker than the 7a Armata. It consisted of only four divisions in one corps. The entire edifice was green: Bastico had no recent experience, neither did his corps commanders, their divisional commanders, nor the frontline soldiers themselves. Compared to the awe-inspiring 7a Armata, with its highly skilled leaders and blooded soldiers, the 2a Armata was a force rather unsure of itself. Bastico therefore set it limited goals. His goal was the conquest of Ljubljana, no more and no less. He deemed this task firmly within the capabilities of his army, and he shared Pintor’s confidence that Yugoslavian resistance would be short and there would be no need for his army to partake further.
Bastico’s plan for the 2a Armata.
Altogether, thus, the operational plan was a somewhat schizophrenic mess. Twelve divisions, three corps headquarters and two army headquarters were expected to overrun Yugoslavia. Bastico’s plan was conservative but, admittedly, there was little space for maneuver in northern Yugoslavia. Pintor’s plan was ambitious to the point of foolhardiness, but his confidence and experience led him to believe that his army could handle the task set to it. Yugoslavia, after all, would not be ready for war. It would be a quick campaign. The only anticipated difficulties would be, of all things, Turkey and Poland. Yugoslavia, Turkey and Poland were allied and no one was sure whether or not Turkey would heed the predictable call to arms of its ally in distress. Poland was an even shadier situation, for it existed only as a government in exile in London and was part of the Allies. Invasion of Yugoslavia could, in the very worst case, result in the war Italy was not yet ready for. Mussolini decided to keep his options open and hope for the very best: no plans were made for any possible situation and no war was anticipated with the Allies.
The entire operational plan in a single picture.
Thus, on July 23rd, as the Germans were stalling in Belgium, Italy took advantage of the world’s attention to the situation in the Low Countries to declare a limited war on Yugoslavia. Turkey heeded the call to arms. Poland did not. In Italy, everyone breathed a sigh of relief to this news. Italy had the limited war it wanted, though slightly larger in scope. It was not yet, however, involved in the general war and for this Mussolini was profoundly grateful.
The Italian declaration of war on Yugoslavia.
The diplomatic side of things was ended. The planning was made. Campioni and Ghé were steaming to blockade Yugoslavian ports. The 2a Armata and the 7a Armata were ready to go. Mussolini immediately gave the word. Operation Anicius Gallus had begun.
