The United States: 'Prophets of a New Order'

Just a quick response to posts here. I should have another update written up by late tomorrow.

Kurt_Steiner: Quite odd, but that's the price one pays for Russia supporting both the treaty and an independent Poland. I imagine giving them Brest-Litovsk would certainly help aesthetics.

quaazi: Russia always does a good job of looming, wouldn't you say? They remain, as always, a rather uncertain element on the world stage.

Zhuge Liang: Ultimately, I'm leaving it up to the AI to decide for itself, much in the same way in-narrative the U.S. is letting the European powers decide.

Of course, there are a few rather silly outcomes that I have to tinker with, like Juan III and Franco leading a social liberal Spain... :wacko:

Nathan Madien: To go into some more detail on that matter, the two union votes (Netherlands-Belgium and Germany-Austria) were left up to events I modded in. There was a 50-50 chance the Anschluss went through, and a 40-60 chance the Dutch and Belgians unite.

Enewald/Parokki: FYoR? The lesser of evils, I suppose. The Bulgarians 'conquered' them after the Great War, the Romanians conquered them during the Third Balkan War, Albania didn't exist, and on it's own it's not a viable state.

Virtually all your other points of contention were not subject to plebiscites. Transylvania was handed over to Romania in order to expedite the 'liberation' of the Balkans peaceably, Tyrol had already been given to Italy prior to the American invasion, Danzig was given to Poland as a matter of course in order for it to survive economically in the future, Sudetenland was kept away from Germany so Czechoslovakia could exist as a functional state, and the Slovaks just did it because I say so.

As for France, it is not being 'rewarded.' Giving France back Alsace-Lorraine is simply a way to get the French and Germans to stop clawing at each other's throats constantly. As for the Alpine provinces, Italy handed those over of their own accord in 1943. France is still taking a territorial hit, losing Romandy and Luxembourg. Hungary's reduced state is mostly a consequence of Romania's relative strength as ruler of the Balkans. I toyed with the idea of Hungary keeping Arad and Mate-Saru but decided it looked stupid on the map. I'm sure from an American perspective, a large Yugoslav-esque state would be desirable, but decided it wasn't worth the effort to mod in.

That, of course, doesn't mean the borders are permanent. In fact, while I was double-checking events in-game, Serbia eventually caved in and gave Bulgaria its cores, and Romania declared war on Greece.

Arcvalons: As Van5 rightly points out, it's an American bias, not authorial. Part of the set-up for the Kaiserreich scenario is what amounts to a German declaration of economic warfare against the United States in the 20's which causes the Depression. For the past three decades, Americans have grown up seeing Germany basically try to conquer first Europe, then the world, then sitting around letting it fall apart on them. That they were ruled over by a monarch didn't help, either. Unlike with the French Syndicalists, there is simply no basis of support for a militarist, monarchical German Empire.

And yes, the United States basically has won. Its homeland is impregnable to invasion, it has the largest navy, most advanced air force and army, largest industrial capacity, and leads any and all rivals in the field of nuclear weapons by almost a decade. But this isn't, it should be noted, a gameplay AAR. It was not meant to test the player with a difficult challenge to overcome, nor is it designed to entertain readers in that respect. We are fast approaching another point in this AAR, much like during the civil war, where the narrative becomes completely divorced from the reality of in-game events.

Prophets of a New Order - Part IX

With the borders of the nations of Europe firmly established, at least of the immediate future, the citizens of these countries could go about the task of selecting their respective governments. From across the Atlantic, President Truman wished the people of Europe the best of luck and remained confident in spite of concerns raised by many skeptics within both the government and press that Europe would choose wisely. Behind the scenes, the President directed all commanders assigned to occupation duties to keep American interference with the ongoing political campaigns to an absolute minimum; law and order were to still be maintained, of course, but the President appeared to be willing to tolerate more than a small amount of chaos in the occupied territories if it meant the United States could not be accused of tampering with the local political processes.

Truman's relatively hands-off policy belied a deeper concern tied closely with political prospects much closer to home. Though its effects were only just beginning to manifest themselves, the end of the war had raised the threat of economic slowdown and recession. With the sudden drop in military contracts, requisition orders, and the steady influx of demobilized soldiers, unemployment was on the rise. Commerce Secretary Averell Harriman, newly appointed following Ickes' retirement, warned that the situation would only deteriorate if left by itself; with no war to sell goods to, the United States economy simply lacked the markets to sustain itself at current levels. The much-vaunted FCA would be of little use to rectify the problem. Some new solution, then, had to be devised if the President were to keep the country from sinking back into the Depression. Truman, therefore, intended to derive maximum benefit from the swift and peaceful transition of the countries of Europe from military occupation to civilian government while simultaneously paving the way for the inevitable cost-cutting measures in reducing the size of America's standing military force.

Though most people's attentions were focused on the dramas unfolding in France, Germany, Italy, or even Spain, it was Poland that made the first move toward a return to civilian government. Practically untouched over the course of the World War, Poland had been the benefactor of French aggression, achieving independence from Germany and expanding territorially as a matter of course, a trend the United States saw no reason to curtail and in fact encouraged at the expense of Lithuania - much to the approval of the large Polish communities at home. Copying much of Bukharin's model, the Polish government of Wanda Wasilewska had deftly wedded Polish Syndicalism with Polish nationalism to such a degree that democratic proponents could make little headway as election day neared. Squabbling amongst the syndicalists, which nearly saw Boleslaw Bierut and the hardliners break with Wasilewska, was smoothed over in the nick of time, allowing the Polish syndicalist to emerge from election day on March 12 the victors, defeating Archbishop Kakowski by a wide margin.

The victory of the Syndicalist faction in the Polish elections appeared undermine Truman's confidence that democracy might yet take hold in Europe, but in many respects the case of Poland was unique, divorced as it was from the ravages of the World War and the responsibility of the Syndicalists in bringing about first the war, then catastrophic defeat. Indeed, in Germany, syndicalism was in such a state of disarray that it would be many, many years before it might recover from the stigma of collaboration with the French occupiers. On the opposite side of the ideological spectrum, the Kaiser's popularity continued to erode with each passing day, such that the question was whether or not the monarchy might even survive. Of all Wilhelm's supporters, only Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck seemed capable of eliciting positive reactions from the masses. Despite an initial hesitancy, the talented general threw himself enthusiastically into the political storm, roaming the country at a pace that seemed to defy physics and delight crowds, even if he lacked much in the way of a coherent political program for recovery. Moreover, the legacy of defeat cast a long shadow over the Kaiser, who von Lettow-Vorbeck supported loyally, and Theodor Heuss, armed with the backing of Germany's Social Democrats, capitalized on this extensively.

The German election of March 21 was a peculiar combination of election and referendum. Technically, the German state did not even exist, as the United States had occupied the four Syndicalist states the French invaders had established in 1942. Though there was absolutely no doubt that Germany would be reunited again, albeit in somewhat reduced form and without Austria, the Germans still had yet to choose a form of government; in essence, the victor would be granted absolute power to craft the new government. von Lettow-Vorbeck argued for a constitutional monarchy while Heuss sought the creation of a true republic. Thus, the political campaign underway was as much a contest between two forms of government as it was between two candidates. Voter turnout was enormous, with polling stations kept open from the pre-dawn hours until well beyond midnight. The results reflected the uncertainty of the German people: von Lettow-Vorbeck achieved a plurality of forty-seven percent to Heuss' forty-two percent - the remaining eleven percent was split roughly evenly between Syndicalist Ludwig Renn and the rather dim Oskar von Hindenburg, son of the late Field Marshal. Handed such a slim electoral victory, von Lettow-Vorbeck faced a monumental challenge for the future: to rebuild a new and democratic Germany while maintaining her traditional institutions.

In France, violence was never far beneath the surface of the ongoing political struggle. After Jack Reed quietly withdrew his name from consideration, Pivert enjoyed a large base of support from the French people. In contrast, Chautemps struggled to organize a coherent political party from the anarchy of the liberalization of French politics. For the millions who had lived through the glories of the Revolution and the World War, it was tempting to believe the myth that France had been 'stabbed in the back' by Thorez's Jacobins and their Sorelian cohorts. Indeed, under the Travailleur regime, the common man had enjoyed economic security in the form of employment and generous social welfare, a state of being Pivert gave no indication of altering, and Chautemps, left-leaning of his own right, could find little to disagree with. What, then, could liberal democracy give to France that Syndicalism could not?

As election day, March 25, drew near, it seemed little could stop a renewed Syndicalist victory. Despite his vocal distaste for the orders of non-interference coming from Washington, MacArthur remained idle in Paris, and Chautemps continued to struggle to offer the French voter an attractive alternative to Pivert's agenda. Yet fate intervened in the form of Pierre Villon, Director of the sinister Information Directory. Overstretched in policing the Continent and forced to rely heavily on the pre-existing governing apparatus, the Americans had made little headway in dismantling the pervasive institution. Convinced that the Americans would rig the election, Villon connived to eliminate Chautemps. On the night of March 22, a half dozen Directory agents burst into Chautemps' Parisian residence, opening fire and lobbing grenades. The French politician was shot several times and four of his bodyguards were killed before American soldiers intervened, killing three of the assassins and capturing the rest. Acting swiftly upon the remaining assassins' testimony, MacArthur ordered Villon arrested immediately. Though seriously injured as a result of a shoulder wound, Chautemps survived, and the Directory's involvement was rapidly made public knowledge. This act of political brutality horrified the nation, bringing back memories of the worst excesses of the revolutionary days and rekindling fears Jacobin and Sorelian extremism, the very same extremism Pivert had failed to prevent from seizing control of the nation.

Within days, the effects of the failed attempt on Chautemps' life became readily apparent. In spite of his large early lead, Pivert's election bid failed, managing to gain only thrity-eight percent of the vote. Chautemps, in contrast, despite lingering questions of his physical fitness to take office won an impressive fifty-six percent of the votes cast. It was just the sort of triumph of democracy over syndicalism that Truman hoped might materialize in Europe. Though leadership would be assumed by Chautemps' running mates, Feliz Gouin and Vincent Auriol, his precarious condition raised grave doubts as to the longevity of this new government. In a noble gesture, Pivert accepted the outcome of the election and offered his support for the new government and his heartfelt sympathies for the injured 'Acting-President.' But the roots of democracy in France were still shallow; there were still many obstacles for the fledgling government to overcome.