Lecture Eighteen: North of the Border (1861-62)
"Ah, the blueprint that historians will draft of this! The angles they will plot to lend shape to the mess! They will take the word of a cabinet minister, the decision of a general, the discussion of a committee, and out of that parade of ghosts they will build historic conversations in which they will discern far-sighted views and weighty responsibilities"
A. de Saint-Exupery
On moving north in late November 1860 to assume the Governorship of Texas, Santa Anna was not only revisiting the scene of past glories but already plotting future conquests. His memoirs are uncharacteristically silent on this issue but it is likely that by this stage that Don Antonio had already decided that a Confederate victory would be desirable and was actively working to involve Mexico in this conflict. Perhaps he hoped that another war against the US would restore his reputation and allow him to regain the Presidency or perhaps he genuinely believed that such a conflict to break the power of Washington was in the best interests of Mexico. What is clear is that by the end of 1860 his emissaries had made contact with Confederate leaders (perhaps even Davies himself) with an offer of assistance in the struggle against Washington. We know from Confederate sources that Josefina Zoraida Vázquez, Santa Anna's negotiator in-chief, promised nothing short of a full military alliance (on the behalf of Mexico City!) against the 'Yankee menace'. This was, lest we forget, an act far in excess of Santa Anna's legal powers as Governor and almost certainly crossed the line into treason. If Vázquez was truly acting with the approval of Don Antonio then the latter is guilty of conspiring to take his country to war against the wishes of the legal government. Certainly such a move contrasted sharply with the studied and public neutrality of Diaz's government. Whatever his motivations, this was an incredibly bold step… but then such risky gambits were not uncommon in Santa Anna's long career
If there was indeed a firm offer of alliance made then it was only the hesitation of the Confederate leadership that scuppered any deal. Santa Anna had long been vilified by Southern politicians – the result of dashed expansionist dreams, numerous military defeats, a certain base racism, and, lest we forget, Mexican war crimes – and the two camps were not natural allies. To this must be added a degree of understandable incredulity on the behalf of Confederate politicians that Santa Anna could actually deliver substantial assistance in the face of Mexico City's very public refusal to be drawn into the war. It is believed that Vázquez returned to Texas empty handed in early February 1861 but contacts had been made and the changing military situation would soon bring these seeds to fruition
In late 1860 the Confederate leadership could afford to dismiss offers of assistance due to the expectation of a rapid military victory over Washington. What they really craved was diplomatic recognition from an established government – something that Santa Anna was in no position to provide. Five months later and things were different. The Southern states had entered the war with a large pool of trained and experienced soldiers, a product of the Mexican wars, but a series of exceedingly bloody stalemates around the Shenandoah Valley (known collectively as Valley Campaign) had dashed any hopes of a rapid military settlement and begun to place severe strain on Confederate reserves. These were losses that the South could ill afford and, together with the North's significantly larger population and industrial base, looked to be tilting the balance away from Richmond. Matters came to a head in August 1861 when the Confederate generals delivered a blunt assessment to the political leadership in which it was made clear that they could no longer afford to reject any foreign offers of aid. For Santa Anna, who had spent the summer months quietly marshalling his reserves in Texas, this presented one last opportunity to make his mark on history
It was in the small Texan border settlement of Joaquin that an accord between Robert Hunter, representing Richmond, and Santa Anna, representing only himself, was finally arrived at. No physical record survives of what was a strictly informal arrangement but we know, from sources published many decades after the event, that the
caudillo promised the immediate despatch of two Mexican armies (close to fifty thousand men and arms) to fight under Confederate colours. Because Mexico was technically not at war with the United States these soldiers were to be classified as 'volunteers' and sent to bolster General Lee's forces in the east rather than opening a new front on the Mexican border. In exchange the Confederacy undertook to pay and provide for these new recruits (no doubt Santa Anna's himself also benefitted finically from these arrangements) as well as making some vague promises as to future cooperation. Ominously, a reserve force of ten thousand would be retained in Texas under Santa Anna's personal command to prepare for the inevitable confrontation with the government whose authority he had so subverted
Over 60,000 men perished or were invalided during the the three month Valley Campaign, making it the bloodiest set of engagements of the conflict
Intrigues at home were not a concern of those Mexican formations being marshalled across the Southern states. They must surely have made for an odd sight – Mexican soldiers under Confederate colours, passing through lands that they had laid waste to only a few years previously. Understandably their reception in the various communities passed through was mixed and conditions on the route were hard; nonetheless by late October they had successfully traversed North America and the advance elements were immediately deployed to support the faltering left flank of General Beauregard's Army of the Potomac as it faced the US Virginia Offensive. Necessity had overridden Confederate doubts as to the value of these 'volunteer' formations but victory at the Battle of Fredericksburg proved that the reputation of the Mexican fighting soldier – the product of decades of conflict, both at home and abroad – was well deserved. Further victories followed with Mexican units featuring heavily in a number of further battles that drove back the US offensive and had advanced into Maryland by the turn of 1862
It was inevitable however that these very successes would draw attention to the presence of Mexican soldiers and cause shock and alarm in both Washington and Mexico City. The journey across America had been successfully conducted in relative secrecy, to a degree unimaginable in an era of camera phones and the internet, but now both capitals had to react to this unexpected development. In the United States the obvious assumption was that Mexico had thrown her lot in with the Confederacy and emergency preparations were made for another war in the west. Santa Anna may have counted on this reaction as a means for drawing Mexico into the conflict proper. There is evidence that Generals Zaragoza and Ortega, stationed along the tense northern borders with two large armies, were actively preparing for such a war on the advice of the
caudillo. That the slide to war was halted is largely attributable to another former president. Benito Juarez, who was aware of the Mexican government's reluctance to intervene, personally urged caution on President Seward during an audience on 12 December and it was this intervention that lent credence to Diaz's pleas of ignorance
The Mexican President himself must be paid credit for resisting the calls for war. Whether fearing the reaction of Congress or a resurgent Santa Anna, Diaz did not take long to decide against throwing in his lot with the Confederacy. After a brief period of hesitation he rejected Santa Anna's belated demands that the remainder of the army be mobilised for war, and then privately confessed to Washington that the soldiers fighting in Virginia were not under his authority. This was an extraordinary confession from a head of state but it proved enough to cool talk of war. With President Seward soothed, Diaz turned his attention to Santa Anna and demanded his immediate resignation and the recall of the 'volunteers'. Such an unexpectedly firm stance left the Governor of Texas with only two options – revolt or submit, and the latter was no option at all. Nonetheless Santa Anna must have been confident; this was not the first time that he found himself in opposition to the government and there remained a formula for occasions like this. Just as he had first done as a young officer in 1822 the
caudillo issued a
pronunciamiento against the government on 17 January 1862, effectively placing himself in a position of armed opposition. A manifesto was hastily proclaimed, full of the stock phrases about liberty and the fatherland, and emissaries despatched to other armies and towns seeking their support against the government. As spring approached Santa Anna was once again prepared to march on the capital to overthrow the government
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