Chapter 162
From “German-Soviet Relations during 1938 – 1943”, Dissertation of
Pranab Mukherjee, 1967, University of New Dehli, Faculty for History and Historical Research, British India.
“The period between the fall of France and the start of Operation Market Garden is often seen as high-point of the war for the Axis powers and the low point for the Allies. With France occupied and the United Kingdom under constant aerial assault with Fighter Command barely able to hold the line against two other Air Forces that together outnumbered the RAF at that point by a fair margin. It was a time when the two leading members of the Axis powers stepped back to reappraise their situations. In the Soviet Union this meant planning for various other military operations[1] went ahead, in Germany this meant that the rest of the year was to be spent on absorbing the conquered territories and begin the exploitation of resources especially in France. The fight against France and the British Empire had been exhaustive, and even though Yugoslavia was subdued quickly, the Wehrmacht, and to a lesser extent the Red Army, needed time to stand down and refit. The war had wound down for the moment and it was once again the time of the spymasters, with Operations like Fortitude, and as a part of it, Operation Mincemeeat being planned and carried out. The Battle of Kristiansand was the only other big military engagement fought during that time. It therefore pays off to take a closer look at the relations between the Germans and the Soviets in this second calm period ( for them ) of the Second World War. Post-war records and documents show clearly that both sides never fully trusted each other, even at this early stage of the war, at least in the higher Officer Corps and in the higher levels of the respective Governments. On the streets the feelings between the citizens of the Soviet Union and those of Germany were mostly cordial, owed to by the brutal discipline enforced by the NKVD and the Soviet Military police for those units stationed in Germany and in the Soviet Occupation zones in France, mostly the area around Brest and a minor Naval Base near Marseilles. So on the surface it seemed like a cozy relationship. Below the surface however the cracks that had never disappeared and never would for the duration of this partnership. One might expect that these were mainly ideological differences, but the totalitarian systems in Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union were too insignificant on the whole.[2] The problem was that the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany had different ambitions on the same territory.
The singular examples will be discussed later on in this work, but this introduction two particular examples will be highlighted in order to give the reader a basic idea on what to expect and over the diplomatic situation for most of 1941.
One is Moldavia. Romania was drifting into the Axis camp for years before the alliance between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, and by 1941 King Carol II had force the country into full alliance. Like the rest of the minor axis nations he found it difficult to swallow that one was supposed to be friends with the communists all of a sudden, but since Moscow had made noise about recovering Bessarabia ever since Stalin had begun to reassert the Soviet position in Europe, there wasn't much of a choice. The Romanians correctly believed that their oilfields would be a powerful bargaining chip with Berlin. They hoped to trade oil for territorial integrity, and in the end were rewarded by the fact that neither the Soviet Union nor Hungary and Bulgaria managed to make good on the various territorial claims they had.
Meanwhile the Germans wanted more influence over the as yet independent Baltic countries. Stalin had repeatedly stated over the years, privately at first and later publicly that Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were breakaway provinces of the old Russian Empire and therefore by law part of the Soviet Union. The Germans on the other hand had had good relations with the Baltic states even before the Nazis had come to power, and liked to see them as neutrals at the very least. Officially this was to underscore that this was a defensive war, but in reality Hitler simply wanted the Soviet Union not to get even stronger than it already was, and the would make an excellent shortcut to Leningrad if Operation Barbarossa ( Chapter XXV, App.1 ) was ever to be carried out. The original text of the agreement between Hitler and Stalin was lost and is therefore not able to give reference to this statement, but it is most likely that these two examples were taken care of when the official Alliance treaty was signed, because afterwards these two long-time foreign policy goals were never mentioned again.
This however was only one facet of this complicated partnership. The fact that the two dictators had a healthy dose of personal distrust and hatred for each other did not help. Both saw the other has means to an end and nothing more, and both suspected the other one as such.
However, on the military side the co-operation worked better than anyone could have expected. Before the war had started the OKW and STAVKA had carved up Europe, with each side of the line under German or Soviet area commanders, no matter which country the forces belonged to.
Pic.1: Grey: German Command Area, Red: Soviet Command Area
On the technological side the two nations worked even better together. Chapters XXI through XXIV give a better and detailed look into this matter, but once again this introduction is meant to give the reader a general overview. The Campaigns in the low countries and France had shown the troubles and deficiencies with various arms and weapons systems in use at the time, on both sides. However, the Germans and Soviets started an extensive arms co-operation programme that built on similar ones that had existed in the late 1920s and early 1930s when the Germans had laid the basis for their modern Armoured Force during the Versailles treaty by carrying out secret experiments in partnership with the Red Army. Why these efforts not led to the Germans adopting a vehicle similar to the BT series in time for World War 2 is has not been fully explained as of time of writing, but most likely the Germans, after cutting the programs in the early 1930s simply did not have the technical and industrial power to go from nothing to several Division's worth of the Panzer III and IV models within less than five years. However, in the aftermath of the Battle of France the Germans started a crash programme and by the time the attack on Yugoslavia rolled around, the Panzer III had replaced all other models in service. The Germans knew that producing anything that had the same capabilities and rugged durability as the Soviet T-34 series would take some years even though they had received plans for it as early as 1939. As an interrim the Germans decided to mass-produce an improved version of the Panzer IV with a 75mm gun that entered service just in time for Market Garden. The notion that the Panzer IV/J was an answer to the British Cromwell Tank is therefore clearly false. Another area where the Germans and the Soviets worked together well was aviation. The Me-109 and the LaGG3 and Yak 3 were roughly on par in terms of raw capabilities, but the Germans clearly had the edge in manufacturing processes and technology. Despite this the Germans were initially reluctant to share such sensitive technologies with the Soviets, but during the first annual conference between Hitler and Stalin in Berlin the two dictators decided that defeating Britain had to come first. So the Germans did transfer such technologies as reflective visors for Aircraft and several examples of the newest version of the DB-601 engine, derivatives of which would power several last-generation piston-engined aircraft in the Red Air Force. Another area where the Germans sent massive aid to the Soviet Union were general industrial processes. The Soviets received everything from actual advisers from Albert Speers Ministry; who had taken the post after Todt was killed by a strafing Mosquito Infiltrator in May 194; to technologies that allowed the Soviets to streamline their factories, something that would have a sever impact later in the war.
The Germans however also received technologies from the Soviet Union. Among the most hotly awaited ones were five or six T-34 that arrived in Germany sometime between March 1941, after the Soviets had finally put it into mass production and the Battle of Kristiansand. The vehicles were rigerously tested under a shroud of secrecy and it is rumoured that the Germans tested them with a variety of weapons, from a German-built 75mm gun similar to the 17pdr on the Cromwell and their famed 88mm Flak/Anti-Tank gun. Little is else is known of this programme, but the author has devoted a chapter to this peculiar part of the war. Whatever conclusions the Germans drew from these tests, it is clear that the ( in )famous Panzer V Panther is clearly based on the T-34, or at least shares several design characteristics that echoed even after the war.
Pic 2-6: The vehicles in various stages of testing
[3]
German/Soviet relations during this time were at their height. During the further course of the war they would deteriorate, but at this time even several high-ranking political leaders on both sides would let themselves believe that this was made to last.”
[Notes: Stating this once and for all: Officially the constituent parts of the Empire are the Imperial Dominions of such and such, but public parlance in the Empire and overseas, and of course myself will use British such and such for convenience. Also, this is not exactly how I wanted this to turn out...Hope you still like.]
[1]
[2] In the AAO-verse totalitarian ideologies from the left and right are seen as two sides of the same medal.
[3] These are of course T-34s captured by German forces after Operation Barbarossa. Cudos to achtungpanzer.com from whose site I pinched these pictures.