Rise of the Eurasian Alliance: 'Russian Democracy'
Though in comparison to all previous Russian governments, the new Russian Empire was indeed a democracy, by western standards it was still an imperfect one at best. An example of this can be found with the formation of the Orchrana Secret Police on October 9. Passed with 338 votes to 204 thanks to the support of the National Conservatives, the duty of the Orchrana was officially to combat terrorism and foreign agents on Russian soil. Unofficially, it’s duties also extended to the suppression of pro-secession nationalist movements throughout the empire.
This was further enforced with passing of the ‘censure law’ on October 16, which banned pro-Communist newspapers, articles and publications. Pro-Communist trade unions were banned as well, while non-Communist unions still must have the ascent of the government in St. Petersburg before they can be established. The censure also prohibits any newspapers, articles or publications that promote or encourage the secession of any part of the Russian Empire. Expressions of Nationalism and ethnic/cultural pride were allowed in the various non-Russian parts of the empire, so long as they did not promote breaking away from the greater Empire.
Individuals or groups could push for greater autonomy for their region within the Empire however, and some took this to the extreme to the point were they essentially were promoting de facto independence in the style of the Commonwealth realms of Australia and Canada. Those who did attempt to promote independence for their region were quickly rounded up by the Ochrana and handed over to the authorities to be trialed. The typical jail time for publicly expressing secessionist views was typically 1 – 5 years, depending on the severity of their words and actions.
Still, the Orchrana were a far cry in terms of brutality from the old NKVD, and did have to act within the boundaries of the law to some extent. The days of silent executions and shipment to the gulags were for the most part over, and the penalty for most non-fatal crimes was now jail time, rather than death. Despite it’s more even handed methods, the Orchrana were an efficient secret police, having been trained by ex-NKVD operatives who agreed to renounce Communism and serve the Empire. Several important posts within the Ochrana were even held by ex-NKVD, which raised controversy amongst some members of the duma who mistrusted them.
The background checks for ex-NKVD operatives was always very extensive however, and only those who had no deep connection with the Communist Party or its leadership were allowed to join the Ochrana. Their experience in the NKVD proved to be a great asset when it came to the suppression of nationalist dissent and ferreting out Bolshevik insurgents and foreign operatives. The head of the Ochrana during the 30s was Constantine Kromiade who became well known for his zealous suppression of Communist militants and sympathizers. On October 29, an official law prohibiting the Communist party is passed by the duma with an overwhelming 477 seats to 65, and all of its goods are confiscated by the state, which uses them to help fund the post-war reconstruction effort.
On November 11 the Russian government, in order to quickly begin rebuilding and reindustrializing Russia’s economy along capitalist lines, took out a substantial loan from France and Britain. The French government was somewhat reluctant due to the previous refusal of the Bolshevik government to repay the loans of the old Tsarist regime. The Russian government however offered to reimburse the earlier loan along with the new one by June of 1939, and both Britain and France agreed to the deal.
The government also passed a law that restored the right to hold land and private property to the people. This was generally well received by the populace, though some raised the question of whom the factories and the great fields would belong to. The recently emigrated nobility and clergy desired to have their estates and fields restored in full, while the Kulaks desired compensation for their losses under the old Bolshevik regime, especially as many of them were now veterans of the second civil war.
The Church had already been given tax exemption and had set up countrywide donations to help rebuild the many Churches and Cathedrals that had fallen into disrepair under the Bolsheviks. Most in the Kadet-Octobrist coalition thought that the restitution of the fields of the clergy would be a step too far however. Though National Conservatives demanded that the property of both the nobility and church be restored in full, the rest of the government felt that there was little need for the Church – the conscience and spiritual guide of Russia – to possess such vast temporal holdings.
The Constitution had already proclaimed Russian Orthodoxy as the official state religion of the Empire, and that, along with the tax exemption was seen as more than enough to compensate the Church for the persecution it endured under the Bolsheviks and for exile of many of it’s clergymen. The government had even given a generous donation to help with the reconstruction of the Church, and guaranteed representation for the clergy in the State Council. They also gave official support to the Church in their hunt for members of the Society of the Godless, which had gone underground following the collapse of Bolshevik authority. Considered, with some merit, a Communistic organization, its members were relentlessly hunted down and imprisoned for treason.
The government also did not wish to turn over control of the great fields to the nobility, which they felt would actually encourage collectivization, and hinder the development of a prosperous free market economy. Russian agriculture had been completely disorganized by collectivization, and famine now threatened to engulf Russia if drastic changes were not implemented. The government thus decided to divide and distribute the great estates to the Kulaks, whom they hoped would come to form a strong Middle Class that would be supportive of democracy and the Kadet/Octobrist parties. The goal of the initiative was to see the replacement of the inefficient collective exploitation of the village communities with an individual exploitation dominated by the Kulaks.
Thus, the process of partitioning the great estates to the Kulaks began, with individual families once again owning large tracts of farmland and employing workers to help maintain and run them. The government was determined to not repeat the mistakes of the past however. Laws were soon passed in the Duma to limit weekly work hours for both farmhands and for industrial workers. Minimum wage laws and retirement benefits were also passed, which was quite revolutionary (as in innovative) at that time, even for a ‘civilized’ country. Ironically, the staunchly anti-Communist Russian Empire now had some of the most progressive social policies in the world in regards to the working class.
Though the Kadet-Octobrist coalition had wished to make life as easy on the working class as it could while still moving towards capitalism, their efforts were somewhat hindered by the gradual emergence of the Oligarchs. Having been denied the restitution of their confiscated land, a large percentage of the nobility instead turned to the industrial sector. In order to raise funds for rebuilding the economy and to encourage private enterprise, the government had sold the various conglomerates that had been set up by the Soviet regime. Wealthy noblemen who were seeking a new source of revenue following the loss of their great fields to the Kulaks most often bought these.
Known as the ‘Oligarchs’ to the general populace, these industrial-aristocrats would often use their newly acquired businesses to build substantial monopolies. They quickly formed a substantially wealthy upper class, and typically voted for the Octobrists in Duma elections. Even the ‘poorest’ Oligarch still typically had dozens of factories within his company, while the most wealthy and powerful could easily have several hundred throughout Russia. The Oligarchs heavily opposed the pro-workers reforms made by the Duma, claiming that they harmed their production and would weaken the Russian Empire’s growing industrial economy overall.
Supporters of the reforms in turn argued that having healthy, well-paid and well-rested workers would increase, not decrease production efficiency. They believed that men who were forced to work in unpleasant conditions until their bodies were worn out and exhausted made for inefficient workmen, while those who were properly motivated and in good physical condition would more than make up for the lost weekly hours. Despite their general opposition to government, the Socialist-Revolutionary Party acknowledged that the reforms were a step in the right direction, though they demanded that they take them a step further by enforcing a harsher income tax upon the Oligarchs and using the money to build better housing for the workers.
Since the official end of the civil war in July, the government had set about purging the old bureaucracy and administration of its Bolshevik elements. The nobility once again occupied the majority of the high positions within the government, but the recently emigrated urban middle class also held many positions as well. Overall, it was a far more open administration than that of the old empire, which in turn made it seem less distant and out of touch with the general populace.
The most notable purges however took place in the army. Following the collapse of Soviet authority in June, over a million soldiers from the former Red Army had rounded up and placed in POW camps throughout the country. By October, most of the regular conscripts had been released, and allowed to return to their homes. The officers however were given extensive background checks by the Ochrana to determine the threat they posed to the security of the Russian Empire. Those who had significant involvement with the Communist Party were expelled from Russia, usually to Western Europe. Those that had only nominal associations with the Bolshevik government were allowed to return to their homes, but were banned from joining the army for the next four years.
The Imperial Army was in turn reorganized and strengthened with the recruitment of thousands of Kulaks into its ranks to form a new core of officers. This was met with opposition from the nobility who wished to return to the old system, but was seen as necessary by the government in order to form a more efficient modern army, where promotion was based on skill and merit, rather than noble birth. The Imperial Military Academy was reopened in late September, where the new officers would be sent to study the art of war.
Tsar Kyrill I Romanov in October asked for a review of the current state of the army, and after a week of observing their tactics and organization remarked with some dismay that Russia would be in dire straits if it were to be attacked by a foreign power. The Tsar, still seeing himself as the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Armed Forces, decreed that the Imperial Army should work towards becoming more of a professional force, rather than a force of conscript infantry and outdated cavalry. He had seen reels taken from the second civil war, and was impressed by the performance of the Soviet tank divisions, which had inflicted heavy losses on the White Army despite being vastly outnumbered and low on fuel.
Kyrill expressed his desire to see a more mechanized Russian army, which would be able to surprise and quickly defeat it’s opponent with minimal losses. The Tsar had lived through WWI, and saw the horrible devastation that had been wrought upon his country and on the army, which had proven to be no match for Germany. The horrible casualties Russia suffered as a result of its army’s lack of professionalism and training during the war still left a very bitter taste in the newly crowned Emperor’s mouth.
Though the Old Guard of the Imperial Army disliked the thought of abandoning so many of their military traditions to a very uncertain and untested doctrine of mobile warfare, the fact that it was the Tsar himself who decreed the change in doctrine rather than the elected government somewhat softened their opposition. The Duma was somewhat unnerved by the strong personal initiative the Tsar had taken in promoting reforms in military doctrine, especially considering that he had no consulted them first. They did not speak out against him however; for fear of further undermining their standing with the leadership of the Imperial Army, and for the fact that the Constitution did indeed state that the Tsar was the commander-in-chief of the Russian military.
The second initiative the Tsar took was to promote the formation of the Imperial Air Force, based roughly on their British counterparts. During the second civil war, Soviet air superiority had resulted in some of the heaviest casualties of the war. In particular their relentless bombing runs on advancing White infantry had cost them several whole divisions. Most of these aircraft had been captured at the end of the war, and were soon repaired and refitted to serve the Empire. Over the next several years, the Imperial Air Force would be greatly expanded, becoming the largest airfleet in the world by 1940.
The Tsar also expressed his desire to see the navy reformed, though he understood that only so much could be accomplished at once. Building ships was a lengthy process, and he understood that it would likely take many years for the dilapidated Imperial Navy to become competitive on the world stage. Nevertheless, he gave his support for updating and maintaining their current navy, to the point where they could at least defend Russia’s home waters against any potential attacker.
Thanks in part to the Tsar’s initiative; the Russian Armed Forces would undergo a great period of expansion throughout the 30s. Much of the growing industry of Russia would go towards the production of new tanks and aircraft, of artillery and of small arms. One reason the Duma embraced the Tsar’s remilitarization initiative so whole-heartedly was because of the apparent success of Germany’s remilitarization, which had revived it’s struggling economy at an astonishing rate. The difference between the two however was that Russia had far more room for industrial expansion, and the agricultural economy to support it in the long run.
In order to further accelerate economic and industrial growth, Prime Minister Sergei Baidalakov promoted investment from foreign capitalists in Russia’s mining, oil and metallurgical sectors. Baidalakov’s economic policies were actually based on those of Prime Minister Sergei Witte, the first PM of Russia and the man responsible for the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway. Baidalakov felt that only strong foreign investment in Russia’s growing industry could lead to a prosperous and powerful capitalist market economy.
In order further investment in Russia’s oil sector in particular, Baidalakov invited Edouard Alphonse de Rothschild to once again invest in the Baku oil fields of Azerbaijan. Rothschild eagerly accepted and paid the Russian government handsomely to reestablish his Oil Company there. Baidalakov assured Edouard that the “ethnic situation” was under control in the region, and that oil production was running smoothly. In the next few years Russia’s oil exports would skyrocket, allowing for extremely rapid economic growth to take place. Foreign investment in the mining and metallurgical sectors also greatly aided in this rapid expansion.
Baidalakov’s actions were not without their detractors however. Both the Nationalist Conservatives and the Mensheviks angrily opposed the inviting of foreign investors “to ravage and exploit the motherland” and “steal the resources that rightfully belong to the Russian people.” The SRs also held wide protests and attempted to organize strikes to dissuade Baidalakov from his initiative. Opposition from the Oligarchs was also fairly strong, as they feared that the foreign investors would encroach on their profits. The Prime Minister was determined to revitalize the Russian economy however, and would allow little to stand in the way of that personal mission.
On December 30, the first regional elections were held. By January 7 1935 the results were in and on the 1st of February the military tribunals officially handed over authority to the elected local governments. As the New Year began, the people of Russia wondered what the future would hold for the motherland. So much had been lost because of the Bolsheviks, because of Germany. Even if it’s economy should grow powerful, the existence of the independent Baltic states, Finland and Poland all symbolized their humiliating defeat in the Great War, which inevitably lead to the Bolshevik Revolution. So long as they remained outside the motherland, the people’s rage at the Russia’s humiliation would not subside…
Russia on February 1 1935