The Kremlin
May 18, 1942
Vasilevskij paced back and forth behind his desk at the STAVKA headquarters set up within the Kremlin. Stalin had ordered him to stay in Moscow for, to his eyes, it seemed like Vasilevskij’s 1st Tank Army would never actually get into combat; it was still in transit somewhere behind the Dnepr River, Vasilevskij was unsure quite where it was at the moment though he knew his chief of staff would notify him as soon as it neared the frontline. Stalin had given him permission to rejoin it once it reached the front, but until then he had to stay back and direct the war from a strategist’s holistic point of view. Vasilevskij felt somewhat cheated; Zhukov was out making a name for himself, as was Timoshenko and many of the other Front and Army commanders. However, they were still only Front commanders, excepting Timoshenko who was also a theater commander. Vasilevskij had the chance to be the director of the entire war for what seemed to be its climax. It was a unique opportunity for him, his career and how history judged him.
And, to be honest to himself, he had to admit that he seemed to be presiding over an increasingly favorable turn of events. Of course, the actions being taken were generally quite risky and thus had much potential for disaster, but that potential had yet to be realized whereas the auspicious dividends seemed just out of his reach but moving closer. Among the first reports concerning the 17th that Vasilevskij received were of the battle around Torun. The two mobile corps of Malinovskij’s 3rd Baltic Front had reached Konigsberg a day or two earlier and after a brief period of reorganization had continued their drive by pushing toward Torun, in Poland. There they ran into four corps, twelve divisions, of German troops. These troops, however, were heavily engaged in pushing toward Suwalki and had been badly battered in previous fights as well. Their combat value was relatively little and it seemed likely from what Vasilevskij was reading that that a penetration might be made at Torun that could allow the Baltic Fronts to exploit into the interior of Poland.
The battle for Torun.
The picture at Suwalki was less clear cut. Antonov’s 2nd Baltic Front had been defeated and was in full retreat, minus its mobile units at Lomza, toward Alytus. At the same time, however, nearly the entirey of Berzarin’s 1st Baltic Front had entered the fray there and was holding the gap, despite the very heavy pressure the Germans were placing on it. Nevertheless, it seemed inevitable that Berzarin would be overrun as well, and then Antonov’s mobile corps would likely be pocketed and broken by concentric German assaults unless Bielsk fell quickly.
Yet another battle for Suwalki, the count was probably in double digits by this point in time.
Further east, the German thrust toward Baranowicze seemed to be on its way to failure. The Soviet units recently mauled at Pinsk, belonging to the nomadic 2nd Belarusian Front under the command of Field Marshal Fedorenko, were making yet another stand in the face of the enemy, at Baranowicze. Their history during the war had not been a glamorous one; they had been pushed from Bielsk to Brest-Litovsk, then to Pinsk, and finally to Baranowicze. There, however, they seemed to be finally making a stand that could end victoriously. Von Manstein’s six divisions were grinding to a halt against the resistance being posed by the twelve divisions of the 2nd Belarusian that were at Baranowicze. Vasilevskij was unsure where the other half of the Front was.
Another battle for Baranowicze.
In another piece of bad news, which might actually be good news in disguise, it seemed that the push by one of Antonov’s mobile corps on Warsaw was petering out against resistance in the fatal urban landscape. Though this meant not being able to make Warsaw an urban anchor around which battle could safely cavort, it also meant that the Soviets were that much less overstretched. Vasilevskij did honestly believe that they were overstretched as it was; there were still gaps in the front and no way to plug them without weakening the front elsewhere. Thus, a failed gamble for Warsaw would turn into a stronger position at Lomza.
The battle for Warsaw.
Thus, Vasilevskij looked upon the map that was tacked up quite handsomely to his wall. The frontline was contorting savagely, and Vasilevskij had markers on nearly ten locations that indicated that battles were or had been going on, on the 17th. He shook his head. Usually wars were punctuated by intense periods of violence interspersed by periods of rest and reorganization. This war, however, seemed as close to Clausewitz’s archetype of absolute war as was possible: there was not yet any real drop in the sheer level of carnage yet, and particularly not in the north.
The northern theater of operations with its contorted front and its many battles.
Vasilevskij shook his head again and continued pacing behind his desk. As an apparently successful strategist thus far, he had no major crises to manage as he would in defeat. He simply had the crisis of creating a victory to attempt, but that was already in the works.