The Kremlin
May 16, 1942
Vasilevskij stood in front of Stalin, for all intents and purposes on trial for his conduct of the war. Stalin had given him remarkable freedom in prosecuting it how he saw fit, but there was still civilian oversight of the process, embodied by Stalin himself. Following the events on the front with some concern, Stalin had decided to exercise that right of oversight and question Vasilevskij on his strategy and its prospect of success. If he was being honest with himself, Vasilevskij knew that his strategy had been a hard sell to Stalin in the first place. The man had been deeply impressed by Imperial Russia’s strategy during 1812, when they had essentially traded space for time. Studies of that campaign showed that, though the Russians had originally planned to fight on the border, it was eventually decided that such a course of action would be disastrous and instead they opted for an army-in-being strategy that saw the Russian army constantly harrying and harassing the French until Borodino, and then again afterwards once the French had begun withdrawing. In 1942, guided by Vasilevskij, STAVKA had opted for the exact opposite decision.
Stalin coughed, drawing Vasilevskij’s attention away from his ruminations of the past and back to the present. Indicating that he was ready to hear Vasilevskij’s presentation, Stalin sat back in his chair with a pen ready to take notes if necessary. Vasilevskij cleared his throat and begun. “As you are already appraised of events up to the 15th of May, I shall detail only yesterday’s occurrences before offering my assessment of the strategic situation. Early in the morning, the Germans attacked the two mobile corps of the 1st Belarussian Front at Baranowicze and two other unidentified corps, to where they had withdrew after heavy fighting around Suwalki in a very roundabout manner. Their parent Front was to the north, at Vilnius, and in no position to aid them. The German assault was even more ferocious than expected, comprising an entire eight panzer corps, or twenty-four armored and motorized infantry divisions. These were fresh units, as opposed to the battered divisions they were attacking. Our provincial defenses were breached within hours.”
The battle for Baranowicze, which saw Soviet defenses crumble terrifyingly quickly.
“As we were being defeated at Baranowicze, Timoshenko went on the offensive around Grodno, throwing his Front, minus the two mobile corps, southward. He faced only a single German panzer corps, making his odds of success even better than the German odds at Baranowicze. Retaking his old positions around Grodno would allow him to flank any German push toward Baranowicze and effectively force them to divert units to attempt to counter any potential threat he may be.”
Timoshenko’s assault on Grodno.
“At the same time, Antonov brought the rest of his Front to bear around Lomza, sealing the fate of the Anglo-German defenders. It was soon clear that the Germans were also withdrawing from Grodno for it was deemed a lost cause by the local commander. Lomza is a flexible position if supplies can be consistently kept flowing to it. From there, it would be possible to strike toward Torun, Warsaw, Lublin and Bielsk. A strong thrust in any of these directions would spell considerable grief for the Germans if they could not counter it, and to counter it would require a massive weakening of their spearhead units.”
The battle of Lomza, with the rest of Antonov’s Front taking part.
“Finally, yesterday evening Zhukov began his renewed offensive. He had been driven out of Tarnopol by the Germans but upon reaching Vinnitsa he had gathered additional forces and counterattacked. Tarnopol was only defended by two panzer corps at the time, six divisions. Against this, Zhukov massed 45 divisions, attacking along three axes. Though the Germans seem to be rushing reinforcements toward Tarnopol from Lvov, they will likely arrive too late to make much difference.”
The massively biased battle of Tarnopol.
“This is important as Zhukov’s plan is as ambitious as Timoshenko’s offensive in the north. He plans to drive onward toward Kowel once Tarnopol is recaptured. This would fulfill various ambitions. It would isolate the Germans at Rowne once again, for one. Secondly, it would directly threaten Zamosc and Lublin.”
The first phase of Zhukov’s operational plan.
“As can be seen, our prospects are actually quite promising. Lomza has fallen to our forces, and Zhukov does not expect much difficulty in rushing to Kowel. We are in the process of placing the bulk of German forces into an enormous encirclement, one that stretches nearly the entirety of Belarus and a quarter of the Ukraine. We have twenty-four divisions in danger of being encircled at Brest-Litovsk. Around it, the Germans have perhaps up to 60 divisions in danger of being encircled. If they are successful, they will open up a major gap in our frontline. If we are successful, their army will be all but annihilated as a coherent fighting force. The risks are high, and the stakes are higher.”
Vasilevskij had finished his presentation and dared to look away from the map and actually study Stalin’s reaction. He saw the dictator smiling in a subtle sort of way and stroking his moustache. Vasilevskij felt weak inside, with relief and joy. He had passed Stalin’s trial.