CHAPTER FOUR - OFFICE 2 REPORTS.
security level RESTRICTED
report as requested by the General Staff (ref 152/1080)
date - 10 V 1934
Office 2 to General's Staff Section II.
As requested in order 152/1080 Office 2 our organisation prepared this analisis of etnical composition in Central-Eastern Europe and the opportunities it presents to our organisation.
Currently still large Polish communities live beyond the borders of our state.
It is the very purpose of Office 2 to infiltrate such communitis and recruit operatives amongst them.
As requested by Office 'B' and with the approval of the General Staff we concentrated our efforts in clandestine operations beyond the eastern border in Ukraine, Belorus, Caucasus and other promising regions.
Recent developments however demanded expansion of our activities in other, previously neglected areas.
We managed to define most promising directions for new actions demanded by the General Staff.
Lithuania (nr 1) remains the easiest to infiltrate. Large Polish and Polish-speaking community exists in Lithuania proper as well as in all other areas of the state. Which makes it the most promising direction of our new actions is large number of Poles in its capital Kowno ( lit. Kaunas).
Since Zeligowski's 'rebellion a state of virtual 'cold war' and lack of proper contacts with that state somehow limited our actions in this Lithuania, but given the importance of the latest orders and additional resources left to our disposal we firmly belive it is the easiest area to explore and promises greatest success with limited risk.
The Soviet Union (nr 2) thanks to presence of large Polish communities (circa 1 million) including around 500 000 and support gained among other ethnic groups ( Georgians, Azeri, Tartars, Armenians, Ukrainians) remains the area where our organisation has the most extensive network of operatives and greatest experience.
Latest events (ref: Great Hunger/Holodomor ) caused considerable losses, still the ruthless actions of the Soviet government mean we can count on support amongst previously neutral, even moderately hostile organisations with the right approach.
Czechoslovakia (nr 3) is in interest of Office 'A' for some time already and as demanded by the General Staff we are promised to use extensive network of contacts they created in that region.
Presence of large Polish majority in Zaolzie/Olza region means that it is in theory our most promising territory, hovewer activities of Czechosloval counter-intelligence makes it considerably more difficult than expected.
Still recently we managed to establish out agents in several critical areas (ref 144/1080).
Office 'B' made greatest progress in Slovakia and Transcarpathian Ruthenia (3a). Since Slovakian separatist are already supported by our organisation and Office 'B' we deem sufficiently prepared if required by the General Staff.
Ruthenia is still a 'new' area to us, but one of most promising ones too.
Pur operatives already infiltrated structures of local forces ( 2nd Infantry Corps).
Germany ( 4) since the end of the Third Silesian Uprising is seen as rather easy penetrate. Sizable Polish and Polish-speaking live in Oppeln/Opole area as well as in northern Masuria (southern part of Eastern Prussia. Also virtually all larger German cities offer good opportunities to use, especially industrial Ruhr where most of 'german Poles' live or work.
Our orders are to ease the pressure in Germany so many operatives are kept in hiatus, but if necessary it will not be difficult to activite them, though after commitment of considerable resources.
Latvia (5) for a long time was rather not in our interest. Despite sizable Polish minority in Dyneburg (lat. Daugavpils) friendly relations with that state and their unwillingness to commit themselves to any larger international projects means it is unlikely we will need to act in this country.
However as a precaution first steps have been made to create a network of agents. Still it remains the only region where clandestine operations are not possible yet and will require additional resources.
ANNEX 1 - 'Office 2 network in other continents - phase one of the operation
As requested by the General Staff (ref 1048/1080) Office 2 started infiltration of Polish communities in other continents.
Currently the most promising and easiest to use community lives in Northern America, especially the USA. Either Polish, of Polish ancestry, or pro-Polish the number of already selected individuals is considerable.
Exceptionally useful proved to be early 'recruitment' in charity organisations such as American Friends Service Commitee.
USA proves to be suprisingly easy to infiltrate given the size and importance of the country. Most likely it is due to very limited experience of their counter-intelligence and lack of funding.
Second most promising are to explore exists in Southern America, especially in Brasil and Argentina with their large Polish communities. Because the General Staff believes it will have small importance to our cause we will limit our activities to establishing an usual network of agents closely cooperating with Section 'B' of the intelligence.
Australia is considered promising future direction of the operations, for now, however our limited resources will mean we cannot commit to much attention to this region.
Asia. Very small Polish communities and decades long contacts with Japanese Kempetai mean it is currently not in our interest to create sizable networks in this region.
Africa. Except Northern Africa and Southern African Republic where our intelligence created small but active networks the rest still remains terra incognita to our organisation. If deemed necessary by the General Staff we will create sufficiently powerful organisation in this area, but not without additional and considerable resources.
COMMMENT - you might find it suprising, but all the organisations described in this chapter DID exist and in fact according to some recent discoveries I REALLY didn't have to use my imagination - it was enough to present activities which REALLY happened.
So you really had good cooperation with Kempetai, sizable network in the USA and the SU, clandestine actions in Czechoslovakia and Germany etc.