Chapter LVIII: Fallout and Aftershocks Part IX - The United States of America.
Leaving the intrigues of the East behind us we come to the Americas, two continents that contain the full spectrum of reactions and consequence to the summer's events. From the indifference of Uruguay to the vast changes in Newfoundland the events of the summer provide an insight into the links, or in many cases the lack of links, between the continents. We start in North America with the United States a nation that fell somewhere between the two extremes. The biggest impacts were the first implementations of the Neutrality Act and the formal abandonment of US interests in the Treaty of Versailles. The former revealed significant holes in the Act while the latter was further proof that the concerns of Europe were not those of the United States. Considering the 1934 Neutrality Act first, it is unsurprising that such a hasty piece of legislation should contain so many flaws. Rushed through to meet the 1934 mid-term elections, it was framed in terms of political advantage rather than practical application, legislation that gave congressmen something to boast off on the campaign trail rather than giving the President a useful foreign policy tool. The flaws rapidly became apparent after President Alfred Smith invoked the Act during the first stages of the Abyssinian War, applying sanctions to both Italy and Abyssinia and preventing the sale of 'all types of arms and ammunition to both belligerents'. This embargo, combined with a very public re-statement of the 'Lusitania clause' (which warned all US citizens that they travelled on liners of combatants or vessels entering war zones at their own risk), was expected to prompt a massive fall in vessels departing for Italy, as liners stopped running and merchantmen sought out new ports.
In fact, much to the consternation of isolationist politicians, shipping boomed. Abyssinian didn't even have a coast, let alone a navy, so the ocean liner passengers continued to travel while many a savy US merchant pitched wares that, though neither weapons nor ammunition, were most certainly useful to a nation at war; oil, 'mining' explosives and industrial equipment of all types. Indeed attempts were even made to sell production rights to everything from rifles to fighters, the sale of plans and blueprints having not been mentioned in either the Act or the embargo. Given the poor state of certain areas of the Italian military it is quite possible that only Mussolini's belief in national self-sufficiency and Autarky prevented the Italian's from purchasing at least some of those manufacturing licences. Fortunately for the President and Congress the Italian declaration of war on Britain prevented further embarrassing breaches of the embargo, Britain declared a blockade and the Royal Navy promptly sealed the Suez Canal and the Straits of Gibraltar to Italian bound shipping.
The British naval base at Gibraltar once again proved it's inestimable value during the Abyssinian War. Serving as base for the western end of the British blockade the vessels based there were at the centre of the usual controversy over neutral trading rights during a blockade.
There was, of course, a formal US complaint about the British blockade, issued to protect the general principle of unfettered US trade rather than any problems with the specific actions, but this masked the considerable confusion in both the White House and Congress. While all believed the US should be able to trade with who it wished it was also recognised that only British actions had actually enforced the intent, rather than the technical wording, of the Neutrality Act. Thus complaints were muted and limited to the exceptionally small anti-British interventionist groups, those who believed the US should intervene more on the world stage and do so against Britain and/or in favour of fascist Italy. That said the Abyssinian War embargo was extended to cover the British Empire and the Dominions, although as the British Ambassador to Washington commented 'Given what the Royal Navy blockade is seizing at Gibraltar, it is hard to believe the United States has embargoed anything at all.'
The obvious solution for the isolationists was a revised Act, one that included not just arms and ammunition but all war making equipment and material in all forms. The new Act drew on the lessons of the Abyssinian embargo and banned a great many items specifically along with the more general embargo on 'war making material'. Despite the obvious disruption caused by the assassination of President Smith in March the Act was approved, passed and signed into by the newly promoted President Garner in late June, almost two months after the Abyssinian War had ended. It was however passed in time for the escalating Spanish Civil War, or would have been if the Act covered civil wars, which it did not. Despite this revelation of yet another loop hole there was little outcry, the country was deep into convention season and politicians of all parties were more concerned with who the Presidential candidates would be than 'Another European war'. This disinterest was helped by the two factions in Spain being beholden to their backers, the Republicans to France and the Soviet Union and the Monarchists to Britain and Germany, all of whom made sure it was their factories that got the war orders, not American ones. This meant there was very little trade to actually embargo, making a revised Act a symbolic gesture that neither party had the time or interest to make.
John Jakob Raskob, Secretary of State under President Al Smith. Owing his position to his support of Smith's run for office and his former role as Chairman of the Democratic National Committee Raskob was not a foreign policy expert and had focused the efforts of the State Department on the Americas at the expense of the rest of the world. Given such a view it is understandable that after President's Smiths assassination and the side lining of former Vice-President Garner by the party's souther hierarchy Raskob was more concerned with domestic politics and survival than events in Europe and beyond.
Taking the second point, the lack of reaction to the stand off over the Rhineland, this was perhaps more symbolic than practical. As a signatory the United States was notionally committed to enforcing Versailles and thus had made token diplomatic responses to the various breaches in previous years, however the Rhineland Crisis marked the point where even that effort was stopped. It was, perhaps, the most honest approach, main stream public and political opinion could see no realistic circumstances under which the US should involve herself in the affairs of Europe, thus continued diplomatic protests with no conviction or interest behind them merely undermined the status of a State Department statement. On that point it is interesting to contrast that approach with that of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, which continued to issue statements and notes on affairs in Europe on the flimsiest of pretexts, persevering in the belief that such pronouncements were a vital part of being seen and treated as a 'Great Power'. From that viewpoint the US silence was interpreted as a disinterest in being seen as a Great Power, a view with a not inconsiderable measure of truth. Americans being more than happy to forgo the 'prestige' of foreign adventures if it meant avoiding the other, less desirable, side effects of such actions. The candidates for both President and Congress therefore focused themselves on the many domestic issues the country faced, foreign policy fading to little more than a sideshow to the economic and social issues of the day.