The Butterfly Effect: A British AAR

While the latest bout of Franco-German posturing dominated northern and central Europe during the summer in the south of the continent everything revolved around Italy. The Italian defeat in the Abyssinian War had changed the strategic situation throughout the Balkans and the Mediterranean, from being a potential aggressor looking to expand her sphere of influence Italy had been transformed into a defeated nation with a shattered fleet and an economy in tatters. Yet it was not all bad, she remained a key trading partner in the region and it was acknowledged that the root of Italy's defeat was at sea; without the Royal Navy's dominance it was believed Italy could have triumphed, a not unreasonable conclusion given the vast numerical superiority of the Regio Esercito. Thus Italy's army retained some respect, if only for its still considerable size, and her diplomatic and economic influence did not completely vanish. It is no surprise then that May and June saw Il Duce launch a mass of diplomatic endeavours to try and rebuild the country's standing. In Albania a new series of 'economic' agreements were forced through under threat of bankrupting the Albanian government, these deals greatly increased Italy's effective control of the country. More significantly the Rome Protocols with Austria and Hungary were extended, the group signed the Three Powers Pact, forming a fascist counter-weight to the Little and New Ententes. The pact committed Italy to guaranteeing Austrian and Hungarian independence as well as containing ominous statements about establishing an even larger 'Danubian Bloc' as the dominant power in the region.

The news was welcomed in Hungary, a strong alliance with Italy and Austria had been one of the major foreign policy objectives of Prime Minister Gyula Gömbös for years, the deal brought Hungary the advantages of Italian support without the threat of being dragged into war by Il Duce not to mention very beneficial trade agreements. Austria was equally pleased, Italian support was seen as the main bulwark against German designs on the country, moreover Italy could be guaranteed to support Chancellor Kurt Schuschnigg's desire to re-introduce conscription and rebuild the Austrian army, both clear breaches of the treaty of St. Germain. In Germany however the news was seen as yet another diplomatic failure, one that cut Germany away from her neighbours and the few other fascist states in Europe. Moreover the problem was explicitly Hitler's fault, specifically his mishandling of German-Hungarian relations. Barely two years earlier Hungary had attempt to align herself with Germany, Prime Minister Gömbös trying to engineer a 'Robbed by the Entente' alliance, both states supporting each others re-armament programmes and claims over lost territory. However Hitler had been unwilling to support Hungarian re-armament and demanded Hungary limit its claims to Czechoslovakia, even then the claims should in no way overlap with German demands for the Sudetendland. Obviously this was utterly unacceptable to Gömbös who was a supporter of the Greater Hungary movement, turned down by Germany he had turned to the more sympathetic Mussolini. For Konstantin von Neurath and his colleagues in the Reich Foreign Ministry this was yet another of Hitler's mistakes, alienating Hungary and failing to forge strong relations with either Austria or Italy. This would lead Hitler to give von Neurath a free hand in the region, an area he had decided to ignore in order to concentrate fully on efforts in Spain, the fruits of this decision would soon become apparent.

If the rebuilding and strengthening of Italy's position with Austria and Hungary was due to reasoned and profitable negotiation then relations with Yugoslavia were defined by Mussolini's bombastic speeches, the work of the Italian foreign ministry being to lay the ground work for their leader to pronounce from. In a series of grand addresses he re-iterated Italian claims to the Dalmatian coast, listing many alleged crimes against the Italian minority in those regions and decrying the allied betrayal that had prevented Italy reclaiming her rightful territory along the Adriatic. While Il Duce, or more likely his speech writers, were careful not to make direct claims or threats the speeches were very well received, the Italian public accepting the vision as an Imperialism they could believe in. The Libyan colonies had not been popular, even pre-war, the public associated them with the decade long insurgency that Marshal Rodolfo Graziani had so violently crushed and a heavy financial burden, first on the army then on public works to 'Italianise' the Arab population. With so few Italians living in Libya there were many who were secretly glad the colonies were gone, hoping for lower taxes or more money to be spent on Italy proper. The Adriatic provinces were a different matter, a populist rallying call to liberate fellow Italians, right the injustices of the past and confirm the Adriatic as an Italian lake, as a sop to Imperialists bitter at losing Libya and a distraction for the masses it was undoubtedly a success.


Naturally the speech was not welcome in Belgrade but neither was it a shock, almost all of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia's neighbours claimed some part of her territory, for decades the kingdom had been assailed by irredentist of all types, demanding repatriation of this or liberation of that. Italy's position had been clear since 1927, when Mussolini allowed the Croatian revolutionary nationalist Ante Pavelic to set up training camps in Italy. So Il Duce's claims were merely a more bombastic statement of what Yugoslavia had long suspected, the shock came from a follow up speech in Hungary in which Prime Minister Gömbös re-affirmed his vision of a Greater Hungary, for the first time explicitly included large areas of Yugoslavia in this expanded nation. This was interpreted as a co-ordinated effort by the two fascist nations, prompting much speculation as to exactly what else was agreed in the Three Powers Pact. Yugoslav paranoia was not unfounded, there were indeed 'secret protocols' in the Pact, committing Italy and Hungary to come to the aid of the other should a territorial war break out with Hungary. The protocols also outlined areas of control and guaranteed Hungary port facilities and basing rights on the Dalmatian coast. However suspecting the correct motives did not help the Yugoslavian government with how to react, because it was rapidly decided this latest threat could not be ignored and new, strong, allies were needed if Yugoslavia was to survive intact.

The stark option was France or Germany, the historic ally verses the more recent economic partner. Those who hoped for both, or at least keeping both on side, soon discovered that allying with one would drive the other away, thus a choice had to be made. France was the obvious choice, Frano-Yugoslav friendship had a long history and the resurgence of France in Central and Eastern Europe made her a most worthwhile ally. Yet that very resurgence was the biggest downside, what Yugoslavia wanted was solid support from the other Little Entente nations and protection from Italy, what France was offering was membership of a complex web of relations, pacts and ententes which could get Yugoslavia involved in territorial disputes across the continent. There was no simple, limited commitment on offer, only a maze of commitments and obligations. The advantages of Germany were clear, the previous years had seen a string of trade pacts and economic deals that had greatly enhanced the Yugoslav economy, so much so that the German trade links had become a pillar of the economy and the driving force pulling the country out of the depression. Moreover there was common ground, German designs on Austria were well known and Mussolini was the single biggest obstacle to the much lusted after Anschluss, a unpalatable prospect the government was prepared to support in exchange for German protection. Against was the lack of a common border and the lingering fear that the Nazis would support their fellow fascists when push came to shove, not inconsiderable concern. Yet in the end it was the fear of France's web of alliances that won out, Yugoslavia was indifferent to the status of Danzig, yet by joining the New Entente it could drag the country to war. The German offer was at least a simple and limited, allowing Yugoslavia to focus on her borders not the other side of the continent, moreover German desperation for success in the endeavour lead von Neurath to offer even more generous trade terms, sweetening the deal still further. While some way short of a full alliance it was at last a success for German foreign policy, even if it was one born of an earlier defeat. Significantly however, it was von Neurath's success and Hitler's earlier failure, a point few in the German government failed to notice.