Chapter XXXIV: Patriots and Plotters.
Churchill had been the right person at the right time for the Conservative party to win the election and was fortunate that the immediacy of the Italian threat had kept quiet his critics. The Abyssinian war had played to his strengths, his insistence of holding the line at Sidi Barrani not El Alamein had paid stunning dividends and his determination to involve himself as much as possible ensured the public associated him with the victories. The evolving crisis however would showcase a different side of him: a focus on the long term to the detriment of the short, a disinterest in domestic matters and, most fatefully, a complete disregard for the realities of cabinet government.
The situation on the 23rd of April was far from severe, although difficulties over both the succession and Hertzog's actions in South Africa loomed they were far from insoluble and, with careful handling, would not necessarily evolve into full blown crises. Unfortunately that was not to be. The inevitable path towards the seismic events of May began with a report from North Africa reaching the cabinet, the army intelligence units investigating the former Italian Army HQ had discovered a series of explosive communications between the Comando Supermo in Rome and North Africa. The signals ordered various airbases to prepare for the arrival of a large number of transport aircraft that were to be rapidly refuelled before sent on their way. Although no final destination was specified the location was obvious; The signals also requested that Spanish speaking aircrew and support staff were preferred. Combined with intelligence from both the Secret Intelligence Service and the unofficial diplomatic intelligence gathering of Robert Vansittart's unit at the Foreign Office the conclusion was clear: Elements of the Spanish army were planning a coup, starting in Morocco, but needed foreign aid to ferry them to the mainland.
Robert Vansittart, Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office during the 1930s, ran a parallel intelligence service to the formal SIS utilising the network of diplomats and attaches across Britain's many Embassies and Consulates.
While the intelligence services frantically checked their conclusions and sought confirmation from sources in Spain the cabinet was facing up to the question of what to do next. The obvious pre-war solution would have been to do nothing. React like any other nation when the events unfolded and make a decision when it became clear how well supported the rebellion was. While tempting to many in the cabinet, particularly the anti-war isolationist elements around Lord Halifax, such a plan conflicted with Churchill's desire to be at the heart of the action at all times. Fortunately for the Prime Minister he had facts on his side, Spain was far too important economically and strategically to Britain to be allowed to suffer a long war or to be controlled by an unfriendly government. British investments in Spain were broad and deep rooted, concentrated in the mining and heavy industrial sectors they were proving vital in the re-armament and economic plans of the cabinet. From the Bilbao iron works in the north through the Almaden mercury mines around Madrid to the copper and sulphate mines of Huevla in the south it was British firms that owned the mines, who built and ran the railways linking them to the British owned docks and then hired British registered shipping to carry the ores back to the UK. The industrial sector was much the same; the Sociedad Española de Construcción Naval, the Spanish Naval Construction Company, was majority owned by John Brown and Vickers-Armstrong and British interests were present everywhere from aluminium to paint. Given the scale and importance of British interests the cabinet felt obliged to intervene.
The next alternative was to inform the Spanish government, suitably forewarned they could arrest the leading conspirators and hopefully crush the coup before it even started, yet there was great reluctance to do this. Partly this sprung from a distaste for the Popular Front government, there is little doubt the dominance of communists, Marxists and revolutionary socialists in the leadership of the government did not endear them to the mainly Conservative cabinet. There is however another more powerful reason; practicality. The Spanish Army of Africa was believed to be solidly behind the coup and was more than capable of overpowering the civilian government of Spanish Morocco. At 30,000 strong the Army of Africa comprised almost a third of the total Spanish Army and moreover contained the two most formidable units; The Legión Española and the Regulares both of which had built an impressive, if violent reputation, during both the Riff War and in putting down the Asturian miners strike of 1934. Moreover the Popular Front's victory had been far from emphatic, although winning 263 out of the 478 sear in the Cortes they had won less than 50% of the popular vote and had made many enemies throughout the army and the Spanish establishment. In short it was feared that even if the cabinet held its nose and informed the Republican government there was no guarantee they would be able to do anything about it.
Regulares of the Spanish Army of Africa. Recruited from local Moroccans and in the main officered by colonial Spaniards the unit was one of the elite of the Spanish Army.
This left the final option; side with the rebels and support them to ensure a quick and decisive victory. This too however was far from ideal, as mentioned the Spanish Army of Africa had gained a reputation for brutality during the Asturian miner's strike and were far from savoury allies. More worrying was the fact the plotters had been seeking Italian aid to transport themselves to the main land, apart from showing that the coup planners distrusted the Spanish Navy it also cast doubt on the politics of the plotters. Having just fought a war against fascist aggression in the Mediterranean it would be most unwise to establish another similar regime in the same region. The cabinet therefore faced quandary; they could not sit by and do nothing with the knowledge they had gained, yet they could not in good conscience support either side.
The cabinet would chase it's own tail long into the night before retiring, the issue still unresolved but drifting towards inaction through lack of a better option. They were, however, not the only groups burning the midnight oil that night. In Buckingham Palace, where King George V had been working to protect his son from the influence of Mrs Simpson, the strain of plotting against his heir had been too much on the King and Lord Dawson had been called in to treat the gravely ill monarch. The third group that met that night in London did not have the lofty concerns of international affairs or national stability at heart, but the ambitious desires of self interest. In an anonymous office in the heart of the palace of Westminster Stanley Baldwin and Samuel Hoare were putting a proposal to Sir Hugh O'Neill, chairman of the Conservative 1922 Committee.
Up Next: The morning after the night before
