Chapter CXXII: Per aspera ad mare?
With national pride ruling out both ocean travel and booking passage on a German Zeppelin, the air ministries of the western powers turned their thoughts to the difficulties of trans-Atlantic aerial crossings. We begin with the Italian solution which had the distinct advantage of being relatively straightforward and, in as much as was possible for any of the plans discussed, well proven. The Italian team would be arriving in South America in a squadron of Savoia-Marchetti S.55Xs, the latest version of what was probably the most famous flying boat in the world at that time. While not the first aircraft to cross either the North or South Atlantic, those honours falling to the Vickers Vimy and Fairey Fox respectively, the original S.55’s claim to fame was built on the famous flights of the Italian Air Marshall Italo Balbo. While others flew higher, faster or further no-one in civil aviation flew on the same scale of Balbo, his master stroke being in 1933 when he organised a squadron of 24 S.55Xs flying from Rome to Chicago, a spectacle that brought him, and the aircraft, well deserved international recognition. There was, almost inevitably in Mussolini’s Italy, a degree of politics involved, as governor of Libya and de facto commander of Italian forces in North Africa Balbo had attracted a great deal of blame over the disastrous course of the Abyssinian War. While this wasn’t a killer blow to his career, almost the entire government from Mussolini downwards was in some way culpable, Balbo was still keen to regain his reputation and saw another large scale crossing, this time of the South Atlantic, as the way to achieve a degree of rehabilitation. For his part Mussolini was happy to see one of his rivals distracted away from domestic matters in Italy and moreover had a weakness for grandiose gestures that could enhance Italian ‘prestige’, so gave the scheme his backing. Unmentioned, but undoubtedly an important factor, was that using an existing aircraft left Italy's engineering firms free to concentrate on re-arming the nation, the air force determined to make a major step forward in both the quality and quantity of their aircraft before the end of the decade. With the loss of the country's African Empire there was, to be brutal, no pressing need for Italy to develop or deploy long ranged transport aircraft, or indeed long ranged anything aircraft, so the diversion of engineering effort onto a dedicated trans-Atlantic aircraft would have been a luxury that post-Abyssinia Italy neither needed nor could afford.
A pair of S.55s in formation showing the unique features of the design; the inclined push-pull engine configuration, the central bubble for the pilot and crew and the two deep floats where the passenger accommodation was located. The entire effort would be on a grand scale, in addition to the eight S.55Xs for the Italian squad and support staff to travel in, Balbo would end up committing two submarines and three auxiliaries from the Regia Marina, half a dozen hired in trawlers to serve as radio relays and the same number serving as weather boats. Such was the price of prestige.
While Italy was re-using a proven idea France intended to show off something new, or at least newer than the Italian effort. As is the case in so many fields the French believed they had invented the flying boat, though unusually they actually had a solid reason for such a belief; Henri Fabre’s ‘Hydravion’ of 1910 wasn’t the first powered seaplane to be built, but it was the first to actually manage to take off and fly under it's own power. His pioneering efforts had not been wasted and the French had embraced the seaplane, but the 1930s there were half a dozen active manufacturers specialising in sea planes, with other firms chipping on the odd design for especially lucrative contracts. Whether such a broad range of relatively small manufacturers was actually in the best interests of the French state is a different question, one we will be looking at in later chapters, but it does demonstrate the enthusiasm for the seaplane. It is therefore unsurprising that in looking to cross the Atlantic the French had naturally looked to the flying boat, what is surprising is that, despite the vast choice of firms and experts to chose from, the French effort would end up revolving around one man, the visionary engineer, and terrible businessman, Pierre-Goerges Latécoère. As the founder of Compagnie Générale Aéropostale (General Airmail Company) he had, along with Lufthansa, Pan Am and Imperial Airways, pioneered long range airmail. Equally importantly by selling out in 1927 he had avoided the scandals with accompanied that companies long drawn out collapse and eventual nationalisation in the early 1930s. Despite this less than promising start the French government had been quick to recognise the value of the vast air-mail network that the new Air France had inherited from Aéropostale, not only did it help to tie together the more far flung parts of their Empire but it was also felt to add to the countries honour and glory, concepts just as important in Paris as Rome. Looking to modernise the disparate Air France fleet, the government found itself turning to Latécoère again who, after being forced to sell Aéropostale, had returned to his family engineering firm to work on seaplanes, with admittedly mixed success. It is with one of his definite successes that we are interested, the vast Latécoère 521 that the French government ‘suggested’ the French Football Federation use to get to Argentina. Designed specifically for trans-Atlantic passenger travel it had started life as merely a very large four engined craft, however problems with the original engines forced a switch to a lower power unit, resulting in a impressively huge six engined monster. For an ideal of scale the Italian S.55X had a maximum take off weight, including fuel and passengers, of less than 9tonnes; a drained and empty 521 tipped the scales at almost 19 tonnes and fully loaded almost hit 40 tonnes.
Thanks to it’s vast size and power the 521 could transport 30 passengers in luxury across the Atlantic or up to 72 passengers in slightly less luxury on shorter routes. This luxury was no extravagance but considered a necessity; with a cruising speed of only 125mph a total flight time of 24hrs or more on trans-Atlantic runs was typical. There was but one issue with the 521; after successfully completing it’s first trans-Atlantic trial flight at the end of 1935 it had been caught in the aftermath of a hurricane of Florida, been flipped over and then wrecked. However by the middle of 1937 it had been salvaged and re-built and Latécoère was confident (correctly as it turned out) that it would prove itself a reliable aircraft in good time for the French team’s crossing. The other slight problem was not strictly a problem with the design; there was only one 521 in existence and, like so much of the French aviation industry at the time, Latécoère was in no way prepared for large scale production, so it would take multiple trips to transport the entire French squad and supporting officials. The seemingly obvious possibility of farming out the work to other manufacturers, or working with Latécoère to scale the company up so it was ready for volume production, was not an option the French Aviation Ministry would even consider, such moves would strike at one of the pillars of French industrial policy; no one manufacturer was to become too large or too powerful.
A shot of the re-built 521 on a test flight in the countryside near Toulouse, an aerial shot being necessary to highlight its distinctive hull form. The six Hispano-Suiza 12Ydrs engines are also clearly visible, the inboard four being in the tractor push/pull arrangement so popular in seaplanes. The switch from four engines to six was forced upon Latécoère after Hispano-Suiza abandoned development of the planned engine, the 18Sbr. With it’s unusual three block ‘W’ cylinder layout the 18Sbr was originally intended as a racing engine to challenge for the 1929 Schneider Trophy, however ongoing problems during development meant the first engine didn’t enter testing till after the Schneider race for that year had been run and won by Britain with the Rolls Royce 'R' powered Supermarine S.6. This disappointment, along with ongoing reliability problems and the failure of the test engines to meet the hoped for power outputs, led to the engine’s cancellation. The ongoing problems at Hispano-Suiza with engine development, and the affect this had on otherwise promising designs, would be a recurring theme in French aviation throughout the decade.
It was something of an article of faith in the French Aviation Ministry that a South American based World Cup should have been delayed until 1942, and not just because of the feeling that France had been robbed of her chance to host the 1938 tournament. The ministry had issued a series of demanding specifications for trans-Atlantic flying boats after the nationalisation of the four leading airlines at the start of the 1930s, a process that had only accelerated after the formation of Air France as the national flag carrier. While the early efforts had proved to be something of a disappointment (the Lioré et Olivier LeO H-47, which had been designed specifically for South Atlantic passenger service, ruled itself out of contention in mid-1937 after the prototype crashed during testing when it’s wing collapsed) there were high hopes for the second generation of large six engined designs on the drawing board that aimed to improve on the 521 and enter mass production. However such designs were still on the drawing board in 1937 and it was unlikely any of them would be in any fit state for testing by 1938, let alone the rigours of a trans-Atlantic crossing, hence the selection of the 521.
In stark contrast in the United States Pan America very much approved of the ordering, while the Sikorsky S-38 and S-40 flying boats had established an excellent ‘Clipper’ service all across the Caribbean and South America the Atlantic was proving a tougher challenge. Co-operation with Imperial Airways had seen survey runs made and a tentative in-direct service via Bermuda tested, Pan Am had decided to wait for the far more capable Boeing 314 to enter service at the end of the decade before establishing a direct, scheduled trans-Atlantic service, making a 1942 contest in Europe almost ideally scheduled. That is not to say Pan Am was disinterested, sounding out some of the liner companies about hybrid routes – across the Atlantic by liner, across the Americas by Pan Am. Quite aside from the revenue it was hoped exposing more European travellers to Pan Am would raise the companies profile and help the ongoing effort to break the European stranglehold on Air Mail in all points south of Mexico.
We come finally to the British Air Ministry which, not unusually for Whitehall, had been distracted completely from the practical objective by arguments about side issues, though the fact that no-one could agree which was the side issue and which the main objective didn't help. In general however the majority saw trans-Atlantic passenger flight as something of a distraction from the real issue of the Empire Air Mail Scheme, though sensitive to Canadian views on the Atlantic crossing such views were not expressed too loudly. However the entire EAM scheme was at something of a crossroads and many of the interested parties recognised a good stalking horse when they saw one, thus the issue of how to get the Home Nations to Argentina received far more interest than anyone in the Air Ministry really thought it deserved.
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Notes: I thought I was safe when someone posted at the top of the page, then they deleted their post so now I have to update. Response to comments and totalling up the votes later, I just wanted to get this up.
On the actual update, while I accept it was a long diversion hopefully it had some relevance to the plot. If not just look at the pretty planes. All aircraft are historic of course.
One minor detail, which I fully accept will be of interest to the few, is the Pan Am airmail service which is new, historically the US airlines all but abandoned air mail after the Air Mail scandal of the early 1930s which has been mostly butterflied away TTL. Broadly speaking the US government established a massive subsidy for air mail in the mid 1920s, sadly the scheme had massive loopholes (it was per mail bag, but there were no limits on junk mail or airlines sending mail to themselves or just putting stamps on bricks) and the airlines took full advantage to grab what they could. This was found out and Hoover got a new Post Master in 1930 to sort it all out, which was mostly done by changing to a subsidy per plane so extra mail cost the firms money. Alas post-election politics intervened in 1933 and a Democrat Senate committee made all sorts of wild accusations about fraud and corruption (all lies as it turned out) until FDR sacked many people and said the US Army Air Corps would carry all air mail. This didn’t work well as the early 1930s USAAC lacked planes, training, equipment, and funds, with predictably fatal results for an alarmingly large number of pilots. Eventually FDR backed down and allowed commercial firms to bid for a new round of mail contracts, but under such harsh conditions that few bothered, deciding instead to concentrate on passengers.
But in TTL there's no FDR and no Senate witch hunt so the US airlines are still doing air mail and many USAAC pilots don’t crash, which is a plus. But that fiasco did show that the USAAC desperately needed funds and equipment, without that they are still fighting the general view that, as there is no threat of aerial attack on the continental US, they aren’t that important a service. So swings and roundabouts.
It was researching such irrelevant bits as this that, in part, is why this update was so late. I really need to get some self control over this sort of thing.
