The Butterfly Effect: A British AAR

[Duritz]

Duritz - If your going to start bringing facts into this I will be most upset. What is life without the chance to slur the French?

Just doing my bit for Anglo-French relations. God knows your AAR could do with it...

And now that I'm sitting in my own study instead of at work, it's actually called "Paths of Glory" by Anthony Clayton.

Dury.

[KaiserMuffin]

KaiserMuffin - Britain's been struggling for decades with the regimental structure. For all it's many faults it is perfect for colonial policing, sending small detachments of great distances for long periods. It's also outstanding for morale and was (probably) the main reason the British Army didn't mutiny in WW1 while certain garlic munchers did. You don't muck around with such a system lightly.

Fair enough, but it's absurd when we don't own a colonial empire (uppity bastards) and are conducting operations on foreign terrain for the length of time we introduce new camo

[Sir Humphrey]

[QUOTE]the army 2pdr anti-tank,/QUOTE]
Yet it was amongst the best in its class and served well in many, often difficult conditions and areas.

[El Pip]

Nathan Madien - Quite.

DonnieBaseball - Hindsight is a wonderful thing and I try to avoid it, but the 1930s British Army does deserve quite a bit of criticism for developing new weapons then deliberately ignoring them. Then of course wasting time re-inventing the wheel after they discover such weapons are actually needed.

Duritz - I'm sure you'll be shocked that I think Anglo-French relations are over-rated.

Seriously though it does appear to be a one way street with Britain getting negligible to negative benefit from the arrangement, not even gratitude. Certainly next time Germany invades France and Belgium I'd be inclined to just let them stay.

KaiserMuffin - That's the reason isn't it? There's only so much disruptive and morale sapping re-organisation you can do while a (under-funded) war is on. Even the relatively modest 2005 re-org was fiercely resisted, I dread to thing what a fundamentals shift to a division based system would bring.

Sir Humphrey - Indeed, for the size you'd struggle to do much better than a 2pdr. Of course that does assume all the ammo you need has been issued to you, sadly not often the case.

[Kurt_Steiner]

After 101 failed attempts to read this whole AAR gone amiss because of a reason or another, here I state my new attempt for the world to know it, shall I be stoned to death if I fail this time.







Peti, I've said if I fail! I hardly have re-started, so stop stonning me, you damned dog!

Why wasting time?

[El Pip]

Best of luck Kurty, though just to make your job that little bit harder I will now post an update!

[El Pip]

Chapter LXXXVIII: Coordinating Communications

Having dealt with the dispiriting problems facing the Army let us move onto the proposed solutions, a far more encouraging area for the IGS, though not without its problems. The entire package has been dubbed the Chetwode Reforms, something of an unusual choice as such reforms are traditionally named after the Minister for War at the time (for example the Haldane or Cardwell Reforms). However given the relatively high turnover at the War Office, three ministers between the commissioning of the report and it's implementation, there was no convenient Minister to heap the praise, and blame, onto, thus Chetwode ended up as the remembered 'face' of the reforms. A more cynical interpretation holds that the government, aware that there were few votes to be gained but many to be lost in army reform, actively encouraged the phrase Chetwode Reforms to muddy the waters over any fallout. Whatever the reasoning the practical impact was minimal, the successive ministers all gave Chetwode their full backing and ensured that, politically at least, the War Office was on side. Just as the problems overlapped many areas so do their solutions, Chetwode's conclusion made clear the problems found would require several changes to fix and that as such none of the recommendations could not be considered in isolation. It is recommended that modern readers also bear this in mind, each recommendation was expected to partially fix many problems and should be assessed as such.

We begin with what was perceived to be the most straightforward problem and ostensibly the easiest to fix, improving communication. On the technical side the recommendations were simple enough, development in radios was to continue but with more input from front line units to try and avoid the teething problems encountered with the tank and man portable units. On the organisational front the Royal Corps of Signals was to be expanded and to have a greater presence both on the Imperial General Staff and at lower command levels, a move intended to promote a proper understanding of the possibilities and limitations of communications. Interestingly the primary concern cited, problems with reliability at range meaning forward units out-running command and control, was soon solved by advancing technology. Instead most of the new staff officers found themselves dealing with the previously un-encountered problem of capacity, struggling to ensure radio networks didn't break down under the shear volume of traffic as radios proliferated at all levels. This problem was not helped by the most controversial communication proposal; a formalised system for ground forces to communicate with both the air force and the navy at the tactical level.

While Army Co-operation squadrons were well established they tended to work at a fairly high level and were equipped more for reconnaissance and spotting work than what is now termed close air support. The inspiration appears to have come from Royal Air Force's (reluctant) decision to form Strike Command, linking together light bombers with the Army Co-operation squadrons into a single command dedicated to tactical targets as opposed to the strategic focus of Bomber Command. Chetwode's innovation was the realisation that forward units sending messages up the chain of command, across the services to the RAF's hierarchy and the back down to the squadrons was too slow and too unreliable. As we have seen the later would be mostly solved by technological developments, though the 'Chinese whispers' problem of message corruption after multiple transfers would remain, but the former was unquestionably correct.

The Bristol Blenheim, one of the Strike Command aircraft at the centre of the debate. Whether the pilots should be at the beck and call of the ground commanders or if instead the commanders should be mere 'waiters', providing the pilots with a menu of targets to chose from, was the issue at the heart of the debate. Until it was resolved all other issues, including some fairly fundamental questions (Should co-ordination be at Division, Company or Battalion level? What should the make up of the team be? Dedicated aircraft for each unit or free for all?) would be left unanswered.

While Chetwode sketched out the basic idea for what would become the modern MSC by accident or design he did not address the key issue of primacy, that is to say whether the acronym should stand for Mobile Strike Controllers or Mobile Strike Communicator. Of course such phrases, indeed the acronym itself, are anachronisms but they do neatly sum up the two opposing views, the Army favouring the latter while the Air Force argued for the latter. Before dissecting the two view points it is worth highlighting the level of agreement that existed, while the implementation was argued over both services had (mostly) accepted that better co-operation was not just advantageous but a necessity in modern warfare, proof positive that at least some lessons had been learnt from North Africa. The Army's view was simple, the Air Force should be considered a form of aerial artillery to be deployed as and when the ground commander saw fit onto targets of his choosing. While a not unreasonable position it did somewhat overlook the realities of aerial operations, unless aircraft permanently circled over the battlefield (a dangerous proposition even if fuel capacity allowed, which it usually didn't in aircraft of the time) strike aircraft could expect to find that all but the most stationary of targets had moved on by the time they arrived at the indicated location. The Royal Air Force view was equally service-centric, they believed the Army should use the new liaison officers to provide the local squadrons with a list of targets that they could pick and choose from. While Strike Command may have been able to look beyond the heavy bomber they were still Lord Trenchard's children and so believed air power could win wars (almost) alone, provided of course it was deployed by experts such as themselves. As we shall see when we look at the doctrinal changes in the Army the process of reconciling these two views would be somewhat complicated by the lack of a coherent Army view on the subject, a situation the RAF would eagerly exploit.

Before we move onto the real meat of Chetwode's reforms, the regimental recommendations, the contrast with the Royal Navy's reaction to closer co-ordination of support should be noted. Where the RAF argued and fought and schemed the Admiralty agreed it was sensible and detailed the job to the recently expanded Royal Marines Corps, the Corps responding with Forward Observation parties, groups of marines trained in naval gunnery, equipped with plethora of radios and with enough extra manpower to defend themselves on a hostile beachhead. While the idea still needed evolution, note the focus on naval gunnery and the reluctant to include any Fleet Air Arm expertise, it was at least progress and something that could be put on a more formal footing compared to the ad-hoc arrangements used in North Africa.

Of course the Army was less than happy at the proposal, a party of Marines and Naval Officers running the show was not their idea of co-operation, however there was little they could do to argue with it; it met the requirements and solved the obvious problems. Moreover naval gunnery was only applicable during amphibious assaults or operations near major ports, outside those area it was assumed no sensible enemy would leave any major units within range of the Royal Navy's devastating firepower, it was therefore a fairly specialised activity which would probably be a Royal Navy show in any event. Typically this is seen as the Navy flexing it's muscles by forcing it's solution onto the Army, which it undoubtedly was to a certain extent, more interesting is the fact that the Admiralty even engaged with the problem, they could have instead have applied their political clout to closing the subject down. While the self confidence of the Royal Navy doubtless played a part, as Senior Service they had none of the RAFs fears over disbandment so lacked the reflective fear of co-operation, credit must go to First Sea Lord Keyes who had thoroughly shaken up a somewhat complacent Admiralty and re-introduced some of the professionalism that had been lost since the days of Fisher. As we shall see it was striving for an equivalent Army professionalism, the aim that officers would talk planning and tactics not polo and tiffin, that formed a key part of Chetwode's regimental reforms.

--
Still dragging out this regimental reform, it's not deliberate I swear. I just thought I really ought to get an update out before it got too long (both in terms of length of update and in terms of gap from the last one)

Notes;
Game Effects, first CAS doctrine researched which I'm taking as meaning the idea is accepted but it's not working very well. The first fruits of Strike Command are becoming apparent and I imagine various people are wondering just what they've created.

Signalling was one of the areas Britain got the hang of, technically at least (they may not have been used properly, but that wasn't the fault of the kit). Main change is a slightly enlarged Royal Corps of Signals with a few radios entering service a bit earlier, so probably better able to cope with the flurry of radio messages.

Finally the Mobile Strike Controller term, something of a twist on the OTL British term Mobile Fighter Controller which became the more familiar Forward Air Controller (then a flurry of other acronyms post Cold War as bored staff officers broke out the dictionaries). I'm always in two minds over new terms for innovations/inventions/units. On the one hand it helps emphasise the newness and is probably more plausible; different invention, different name. On the other I wonder if it's just unnecessarily confusing on the reader. I suspect as always I'm worrying about something no-one else has noticed or cares about. :shrug:

[Carlstadt Boy]

To be honest I didn`t understand most of the last paragraph. So you dont have to worry much over that mobile something name.

[trekaddict]

Oh dear. I fear the end of Fighter Command is inevitable once Tactical Bombers and Fighters become one and the same.

[El Pip]

To be honest I didn`t understand most of the last paragraph. So you dont have to worry much over that mobile something name.

I suspected that would be the response.

It's not something that keeps me awake at night, just something I wondered about while proof reading the update and thinking about new tanks for the next one. I've got the tanks, they just need names.

[trekaddict]

I suspected that would be the response.

It's not something that keeps me awake at night, just something I wondered about while proof reading the update and thinking about new tanks for the next one. I've got the tanks, they just need names.

Copy the Yanks and go with Generals.

Imagine a Cavalry tank called Haig, it would probably move ten inches in a week and kill most of it's crew whilst doing so.

[El Pip]

You worry too much tk, even the most zealous bureaucrat would never call an EE Lightning a tactical bomber. Or a Buccaneer a fighter come to that.

[trekaddict]

You worry too much tk, even the most zealous bureaucrat would never call an EE Lightning a tactical bomber. Or a Buccaneer a fighter come to that.

I wouldn't put it past the people who decided that planes would be obsolete by 1960.

[Carlstadt Boy]

Copy the Yanks and go with Generals.

Imagine a Cavalry tank called Haig, it would probably move ten inches in a week and kill most of it's crew whilst doing so.

Please dont go into that direction. Its not a big thing at start, but copying Americans can one day lead to the HMS Clement Atlee, pride of the Royal Navy, or some similar crap.

[trekaddict]

Please dont go into that direction. Its not a big thing at start, but copying Americans can one day lead to the HMS Clement Atlee, pride of the Royal Navy, or some similar rubbish.

*shudders*

[El Pip]

Copy the Yanks and go with Generals.

Imagine a Cavalry tank called Haig, it would probably move ten inches in a week and kill most of it's crew whilst doing so.

A tad unfair on Haig, while I love Blackadder it should never be used as a source of historical information.

But Carlstadt Boy has the point perfectly, once you have a tank called Wellington you'll get politicians think it was named for his time as Prime Minister not as a general and before you know it they'll get ideas above their station.

[trekaddict]

A tad unfair on Haig, while I love Blackadder it should never be used as a source of historical information.

But Carlstadt Boy has the point perfectly, once you have a tank called Wellington you'll get politicians think it was named for his time as Prime Minister not as a general and before you know it they'll get ideas above their station.

Agreed. I also see now that my post lacked a .

[DonnieBaseball]

I would think the controller/communicator question solves itself eventually--when the front is static/quiet, the RAF can choose from a menu; when things are hot, the Army calls the shots. Granted the RAF will need to get a handle on logistics of base mobility to be close enough to the front to do "cab rank" type stuff, but there were probably the seeds of that in the Italian war.

[RAFspeak]

...of any update which has a Blenheim as the only image!

Did you know that these aircraft were in RAF squadron service as fighters at the beginning of the war? Just shows how rushed and 'dodgy' Britain's OTL preparations for WW2 were. TTL, of course, with Winston backing Dowding and the boys all the way, there will be a much improved situation, I'm sure!

As for the update itself, and the implications for a CAS-centric approach rather than a TAC-oriented one, this is all to the good. I heartily approve, as it is one of the ways in which Britain can gain air power in the period '36-'39 : I always find that building extra TACs (a good idea in itself) is actually impossible on cost grounds. But the CAS aircraft can be made to fit in between the cracks, just barely...

Good work Pippy - now let those patient tank boys have what they have been waiting for! How about a (medium) Matilda-II with improved turret space for the commander and radio? ...Who knows, might even be able to fit a bigger gun in something like that, some day...

[Davout]

I had to run this through babelfish to translate from Pipspeak:

Pipspeak: It is recommended that modern readers also bear this in mind, each recommendation was expected to partially fix many problems and should be assessed as such.

English: I haven't been bothered to get off my arse to finish the tank update and I am easily distracted into discussing esoteria which have no relevance to what preceded or will proceed from this update, and oh, look at the shiny new update.

Having said that, I loved the update. Very shiny. (I'm easily distracted, too)

It seems to me that the level of the liaison link predetermines who is the tail and who is the dog. The lower down the chain of command the communication link is set, the more likely it is the army in control, although as you observed, the aircraft at the time did not have the air time capacity to really do a cab rank role.