The Butterfly Effect: A British AAR

With the success of the initial phases of Operation Vulcan the attention of the IGS turned to the overarching objective; Tobruk. A regional strong point since the days when ruled by the Ottomans the landward defences of Tobruk where believed to be formidable, but as with many long established defences they had a weak point no amount of upgrading could overcome; attack from the sea. The well known systemic shortage of Italian artillery was believed to precluded any coastal batteries while the Royal Navy was confident that the Regia Marina was bottled up in Taranto. The reports from the Battle of Fort Capuso provided the final confirmation the IGS wanted, General Alanbrooke reported that the defensive lines around the Fort were far better armed and had greater depth than anticipated in the pre-war assessments. He added that had it not been for Wilson's flanking action he doubted II Corps could have taken the position from a direct assault. It seemed a reasonable assumption that Tobruk would be at least as well defended as Fort Capuso making a direct assault by Alexander's III and IV Corps risky. The only option for outflanking Tobruk however was an attack from the sea, an option which seemed to reminiscent of Gallipoli to many in the military. The choice came down to facing the memories of Flanders by asking troops to directly assault prepared position, or risking another Gallipoli and order troops barely trained in amphibious operations to make an opposed landing. The third option, doing nothing, was never entertained by the IGS, it was taken as axiomatic throughout the war that time, at least over the short to medium term before the Empire's industrial advantages started to tell, favoured Italy. Eventually the choice was made; the British Expeditionary Force's two divisions and supporting elements, assisted by Royal Marine landing parties, and with fire support from the Royal Navy was to capture Tobruk harbour and hold until Alexander's forces could drive through and relieve them.

Despite the residual misgivings of many in both the military and civilian hierarchies the first stage of the dawn landings went off far better than hoped. The heroic efforts of the advance parties of Marines and the miracles of the hard working engineer companies secured the docks before the Italian commander was even aware a landing was taking place. It was not until several brigades and their support units had got ashore that the first Italian resistance was encountered, the first Italian counter-attacks not encountering disorganised freshly landed troops but the dug in Vickers machine guns of the 4th Battalion the Cheshire Regiment. With the 1st (Guards) and 16th Brigades both pushing out from the landing site further into the city the landing appeared to be going according to plan.


The Italian SETT Command in Tobruk had taken the news of the landing surprisingly well, while it had come as a shock this situation had been assessed as a recoverable one, there had been no preceding bombardment from the Royal Navy and while the landing had local superiority it was heavily outnumbered by the total garrison. While it may take time to remove the dug in British forces Field Marshall Balbo's staff had been confident they could be removed, a confidence that was shattered upon reports of heavy incoming shelling and news of Fairey Seals of the Fleet Air Arm bombing Italian positions. It was clear the lack of bombardment had been part of the plan to achieve surprise, a subterfuge that a ruefully Balbo would later admit had worked perfectly. Despite this the SETT Command had still believed Tobruk could be held, albeit at the cost of far higher casualties than first estimated. It was the news from Bardia, that a large British force had smashed through the Italian positions and, with seemingly little regard for their flanks, was rushing north that pushed the command towards panic. The worst nightmares of Field Marshall Balbo appeared to be coming true before his eyes, Bardia formed part of the outer ring of Tobruk's defences, there could only be one target of the British advance, a link up with the landing. Faced with two threats but not the troops to deal with both Balbo made the best of a bad situation, he decided to try to crush the landing quickly and hope he had time to turn around his troops to face the onrushing Alexander. Before immersing himself in planning he sent, more in hope than expectation, a signal to the Commando Supremo in Rome outlining the precariousness of his position.

The Commando Supremo, faced with the prospect of losing control of Tobruk, the eastern lynch pin of Italy's North African empire, was prepared to take any steps necessary to prop up the faltering Italian forces. While the Regio Esercito had reinforcement division that could be sent, there was no way to transport them, and the Regia Aeronautica's few assets in theatre were grounded due to lack of fuel and spares. This left the Hobson's choice of the Regia Marina which, despite most of the fleet being bottled up in Taranto, still had one substantial force to call on; the Seconda Squadra at Spezia. Intended to provide a counter to the French Mediterranean presence it had become a symbol of the national naval rivalry and, unintentionally, a sign of how times had changed since the Great War. In previous generations the Franco-Italian naval rivalry would have expressed itself in a 'Dreadnought race', each side straining its industrial sinews to produce more and better battleships. Naval Treaties, and more relevantly the severe economic depression, had forced the rivalry to be expressed through heavy cruisers, culminating in the French Algerie and the Italian Zaras.


Prior to the Abyssinian war, however, the arms race had been threatening to escalate severely, the French 'fast battleship' Dunkerque being the catalyst. Although officially ordered to counter the threat of the high speed German 'pocket battleships' they caused considerable panic throughout the ranks of the Regina Marina, Italy had nothing comparable even under construction. The Regia Marina's war planning was thrown into disarray, it had been assumed that in any conflict with France large amounts of the French battlefleet would remain in or around the English Channel to guard against a threat from Germany. Facing a reduced enemy the Regia Marina could concentrate its forces and defeat the French Mediterranean presence in detail and still, hopefully, have the strength to face the French Atlantic fleet later on. The Dunkerques changed that equation by giving the French a qualitative and quantitative advantage, the reasoning went that even if Dunkerques were sent to the Atlantic fleet, a fact much doubted in Italian naval circles, that would release the slower battleships there to join the Mediterranean fleet. This new threat could only be matched by additional, stronger and more modern, battleships so the whole weight of the navy was thrown behind the construction of the Vittorio Vento class, initially planned to face the long term enemy, the British Mediterranean Fleet, but now given extra importance due to the growing French threat. Sadly for Italy these ships were ordered too late for the Abyssinian War and would be forced to sit the conflict out on the slipways of Trieste and Genoa.

At this point it is worth noticing the optimism, or grim pessimism depending on one's view point, of Italian naval war planning. The one common thread of all the planning was the assumption that Italy would face only ever one major sea power, never more, and Italy would be the aggressor or at least significantly forewarned of the impending conflict. It was also assumed the rival powers, never named but clearly Britain or France, would have commitments elsewhere making them unable to send reinforcements, enabling the Regia Marina to concentrate it's whole strength on a part of the enemy fleet. While this may seem naive optimism the other view contends that the admirals of Italy knew that they had no chance, with the fleet they had in the early 1930s at least, against the full fleets of any of their potential naval rivals and so didn't even bother to predict the details of their potential defeats. The most charitable viewpoint of course is that the Italian planners were in fact mostly correct, France had not joined Britain in declaring war on Italy and the globe spanning commitments of the British Empire had severely limited the reinforcements the Royal Navy could send.

Regardless of which view is correct the pre-war plans stated Britain would not commit significant additional forces so the Commando Supremo, knowing that Admiral Cunningham had committed entirety of the Mediterranean Fleet, bar a convoy raiding force and the carriers, at Taranto assumed that was the full Royal Navy force in theatre. With an institutionally low opinion of aircraft carriers and the belief that the latest Zara heavy cruiser were more than a match for any of the Royal Navy's cruisers the Seconda Squadra was committed to disrupt the British landing and relieve Taranto. The Battle of the coast of Tobruk would see the Royal Navy correct the Regia Marina's on both of those points.


Up Next: Land and Sea battles at Tobruk.

Chapter XXIV: Part One - The Leader and The Technocrat.​

The Battle of the Coast of Tobruk was a meeting between the rising stars of both sides, Admiral Bergamini for the Regia Marina and Admiral Tovey of the Royal Navy. Admiral Carlo Bergamini was probably the finest technical officer in the Italian navy, an expert in naval artillery the ships he commanded were always well drilled in gunnery. Before commanding the Seconda Squadra he had headed the efforts to upgrade and replace the Italian navy's fire control systems with great success. The new systems he had developed were amongst the fastest and most accurate in the world and, more importantly, were the first effective anti-air fire control to enter service with the Regia Marina. Serving with the Seconda Squadra since late 1934 he had insisted on the entire force being re-fitted with the new systems before training the squadron into the finest in the fleet.

Admiral Tovey's background was less technical and more practical. A sailor since 14 Tovey's career had been wide and varied from commanding destroyers at Jutland to restoring morale and discipline as Captain of HMS Rodney after the Invergordon mutiny. It was his actions at Jutland that had provided the impetus to his career, commanding the 18th destroyer flotilla he had sunk the German cruiser Wiesbaden and earnt himself a DSO as well as the attention of the Admiralty Board. He would later claim his promotion was due to Navy tradition not talent; 'The frigate captains of one war are the admirals of the next' had been an axiom since before Nelson. For all his modesty Tovey was an excellent motivator and leader of men, a fine seaman and contentious planner who tried to consider all contingencies.


While the commanders of both forces were at least comparable, the same could not be said of the vessels they commanded. The Italian force was based around three Zara heavy cruiser with four Condottieri light cruisers and three modern destroyer flotillas as escort. None of the ships was more than five years old and all the ships had been designed for speed and fire-power, indeed such was the obsession with speed that several of the Condettieris had the same power plant as the Zaras, giving them a top speed in excess of 36 knots. All this speed came at a cost and that price was armoured protection, range and, in the case of the Zaras torpedo tubes.

The Royal Navy forces in comparison were in the main over 15 years old and designed to operate anywhere, not just in the Mediterranean. The requirements of range and long term crew habitation were space, and tonnage, intensive and more importantly problems Italian designers didn't have to deal with. The only modern vessels in the two Royal Navy forces were the Leander class light cruisers, all built since 1930 but unfortunately designed for commerce protection duties not as escorts for naval battles. Tovey also faced a far more challenging mission not only did he have to keep the Italian force away from the vulnerable transports bringing in new troops and supplies, he also had to provide fire and air support to the hard pressed troops already landed. Against all this gloom there were significant positives, his capital ships although old were formidable; the battlecruisers HMS Hood, HMS Renown and HMS Repulse and the carriers HMS Eagle, Glorious and Courageous. Tovey could also count on land based air support from Malta and the superior morale and experience of a Royal Navy sailor versus his Italian counterpart.

In the hours before the battle began as the two forces approached, both commanders thought their side possessed the vital edge needed to overcome the enemy; Bergamini believed the technology of his ships would be decisive while Tovey placed his faith in his men. Both men would be correct, but not in the way either of them expected.

The battle opened not with the roar of heavy guns or the near silent bubbles of torpedoes but with the mechanical chatter of light anti-air weapons. The Italian force had spotted, and was trying to drive off, a Coastal Command Avro Anson. The Anson, and indeed the rest of No.48 Squadron, had been rushed into service and hurriedly transferred to Valetta airbase via Gibralta. Such had been the rush that the Ansons had arrived with only their 0.303 Vickers machine guns installed, the mounts and aims for their 360lb bombs having been left with 17 Group. Brought into theatre only for their reconnaissance role the crews had to content themselves with shadowing the Italian squadron before lack of fuel forced their return to base. This opening spar was a double blow for the Italians, the obvious blow was they had been spotted and could no longer count on the element of surprise. More seriously, and entirely unintentionally, it exploited flaws in Admiral Bergamini's personality; an arrogant optimism about technology. Bergamini had expected his new anti-aircraft fire control systems to be effective in combat and drive off any aircraft that tried to attack. The lack of attack by the Anson was taken as proof of this so, following the logic, it was believed the sheer volume and accuracy of fire would deter the British carrier aircraft or destroy them if they dared approached. Confident in his ability to fend off any air attack until he closed in to kill the carriers Bergamini drove his force onwards. In this confidence in anti-aircraft fire Bergamini was far from alone, Admirals across the world's navies were far from convinced of the merits of aircraft carriers in anything other than scouting. One of these unconvinced commanders was none other than Bergamini's opponent Admiral Tovey.

On receiving news of the approaching Italian force Tovey had to balance his two objectives, fire support and protecting the landings. If he moved to intercept the approaching forces the landings, deprived of support, could be repulsed. If he waited the Italians could get too close, or slip past him, and go on to wreak havoc on the unarmed transports supplying the landing. Tovey made his choice; try to stall for time and hope the beachhead made enough progress to survive un-supported for a few hours. Tovey, after consulting with his Air Operations Officers, ordered Glorious and Courageous to launch No.808 and No.813 Squadrons to attack the incoming Italian ships. Although far from convinced about the merit of the attack, and fearful of heavy losses among the pilots carrying it out, it is a mark of Tovey's character that he trusted his AirOp officers despite personal misgivings. Tovey had no experience of air operations beyond reconnaissance float planes and had never served on a carrier before the war, it was only the superior communication and control equipment on HMS Eagle that convinced him to raise his flag there. Where many commanders would have vacillated or allowed personal prejudice to guide their decisions Tovey held true to his principles, he hated 'back seat drivers' and would allow himself to interfere with experts doing their job.


The strike was, however, far smaller than the Fleet Air Arm officers had wanted. At only two squadrons, one of which would be Gloster Sea Gladiators to guard against enemy fighters, there would be less than twenty actual strike aircraft. Worse the single squadron in Force B equipped with the new Swordfishes, No.825, had only just returned from a ground-support mission over Tobruk so could not be used. Attempts to argue for more aircraft or more time however met with flat refusal, while Tovey was prepared to let the Air Operation Officers do their jobs without interference he would not let them do his; the landing needed support and the Italian squadron needed delaying. Two squadrons was all that could be spared from from army co-operation so those two squadrons would have to suffice.

The pessimism of the FAA officers appeared born out by the bombing run, several of the attacking Fairey Seals were damaged before they could drop their bombs with most who made it through hitting nothing but sea. Of the three hits that were scored the 500lb bombs only managed to damage the superstructure of their targets without penetrating the deck armour or causing any serious damage. What the pilots or their commanders could not see was the impact the attack had on Admiral Bergamini. His much vaunted systems and training had failed to down a single aircraft, the light damage to the cruisers Alberto di Giussano and Armando Diaz was a massive blow to the Admiral's confidence because it had been so unexpected. Convincing himself it had been a failure of his captains to position their ships according to plan and not his technology Bergamini slowed his squadron to a virtual crawl as he personally re-positioned every ship into it's 'correct' location. Over an hour later, with the Seconda Squadra re-organised to it's commanders liking, the Italian force set sail on a course parallel to the direction the Fleet Air Arm planes had come from. Bergamini officially searching for the BEF's supply transports, but actually hoping to find the British carriers and extract revenge for the humiliation of the strike.


Up Next; Part Two of course.