The Butterfly Effect: A British AAR

Chapter LXXVIII: A Way with Words Part I - The Rhineland Question.​

For connoisseurs of the darker arts of international diplomacy the Amsterdam Conference has much to recommend it, the full range of deceptions and misdirections being employed by participants on both sides. The prevalence of such techniques was undoubtedly helped by the somewhat confused agenda, the stated intent of 'A re-negotiation of the Versailles Treaty' covered such a multitude of topics that days of low level talks would be needed merely to agree on what could even be discussed. This problem was complicated by the unintentionally 'global' nature of the conference; despite the key topics being essentially European in nature (the Rhineland Question and the war in Spain topping the list) the presence of both Japan and the United States prompted the other, smaller, Versailles victors to send a delegation to Amsterdam. Thus protocol and national pride turned focused negotiations into a full blown diplomatic conference with delegates from everywhere from Siam to Ecuador present.

We begin with the Rhineland Question, the most urgent of the two key issues at the Conference and for many the more important; failure to reach agreement would have been seen by many delegates as a possible precursor to open conflict. In reality this was never a likely outcome, neither Germany nor France was ready for war and, somewhat ironically, both sides agreed that French troops should leave the area. For France the matter was essentially financial, even if the political will had been there to maintain an occupation in the face of growing domestic and international opposition the economy was buckling under the strain. Though the relief in the money markets at the defeat of the Popular Front had brought the economy time, it had not fixed the underlying problems. The cost of maintaing the force in the Rhineland (and the attendant 'High Alert' status of much of the armed forces on the border and in reserve) was contributing to a ballooning budget deficit. With a strong Franc policy one of the few things uniting the fragmented parliament devaluation was out of the question, thus the country was burning through it's hard currency and gold reserves trying to prop up an ever weakening currency. With the budget spiralling out of control and reserves running low France quite simply had to do a deal before the country ran out of money, putting the French delegation in a decidedly weak position to bargain from, the only glimmer of comfort being that the problems were still mostly private.

If the French position was bad then that of the Germans was scarcely much better. On the positive side despite being technically at fault by making the first move in the Rhineland Germany enjoyed considerable international sympathy and, as we have seen above, was in the stronger long term situation; Merely agreeing to the status quo for a few months would see France forced to pull out or risk a full blown economic catastrophe. However as the assembled delegates would all agree (in private at least) international goodwill was rarely worth anything in high stakes diplomacy while a long term advantage was of precious use to a government under short term pressure. The French reaction had been a political disaster for the Nazi party in general and Hitler in particular, the stark clash between the rhetoric of a strong resurgent Germany and French boots marching though the Rhineland had stirred up discontent bordering on anger across Germany. Combined with economic policies that were causing effective wage drops for most workers it was taking the best efforts of the Ministry for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda, liberally helped by the Gestapo for truly 'un-patriotic cases', to keep a lid on public unease. Hitler therefore needed a deal and, as a measure of how important the matter was and the pressure he was beginning to feel, it was the experienced Foreign Minister Konstantin von Neurath who was sent, not the politically favoured but less successful Joachim von Ribbentrop.


Unfortunately for Germany Neurath's presence ensured his opposite number, the French Foreign Minister Pierre Flandin, would lead the French delegation; diplomatic protocol demanded equality of rank in such talks. With both sides needing a deal the negotiations came down to who could convince the other they were actually in a position of strength, a task that favoured the flashier style of Flandin over the respectable realism of Neurath. In a display of bluster and bravado Flandin was able to convince the German delegation that France would only accept a return to the status quo, any alteration would have to be purely cosmetic and only for domestic consumption. The final agreement left the Rhineland in effect de-militarised, while Germany was permitted to keep paramilitary troops in the area no heavy weapons, artillery, tanks or fortifications were allowed. On the thorny question of compliance the German delegation was left in no doubt that France would swiftly re-occupy the area if Germany attempted to even bend the agreement, another Flandin bluff but an effective one. While Hitler correctly suspected Germany could have got a better deal, his own foreign policy failures and the disaster of Ribbentrops charm offensive ("Light on charm, heavy on offence" was one British diplomat's damning assessment) pushed him into accepting the deal and instructing Goebbels to publicise the "heroic" SA paramilitaries marching back to the Rhineland.

The world wide reaction to the issue was decided much as one would suspect, the rights and wrong of the matter almost a distraction from the guiding principle of politics and the complex web of alliances and pacts. The New Entente naturally supported France, anything that kept German attention in the West and on France's border not theirs was popular in the capitals of Eastern Europe. Germany's closest partner, Yugoslavia, kept quiet; while the nation was drifting towards the German orbit the French lobby still had considerable influence. With no direct threat to Yugoslavia and divided domestic opinion silence seemed the best option for politicians with more immediate issues to face. In their silence they were joined by their fellow European neutrals Greece, Romania and significantly Belgium, their own preference for neutrality prompting those nations to keep their own counsel. It was the Italian led Three Powers Pact who's support was most sought, Germany naturally hoping her fellow fascists would act as a counter-weight to the New Entente while France hoped to resurrect the Franco-Italian Agreement and surround Germany on all sides. For Mussolini the choice was tough, diplomatic silence was obviously out of the question for such a bombastic man so he had to back one side over the other. Without the distractions of Africa the European situation became much more important, in particular territorial ambitions over Yugoslavia and the Italian 'sphere of influence'. This tipped the balance towards France, German ambitions over Austria were well known and incompatible with Italian influence while with Yugoslavia drifting towards Germany, and away from France, the best chance to reclaim the Dalmatian coast came through backing France not Germany. Thus, in exchange for France guaranteeing the independence of Austria, Italy backed the French solution to the Rhineland Question. For France this was an excellent deal, in exchange for Italian support against Germany they were only required to support something they already agreed with; No forced Anschluss between Germany and Austria. For Italy French support for Austria both re-assured fellow Pact members and helped to ensure their sphere of influence remained intact, not unimportant aims for a country so recently shaken by military defeat.

Outside of the continent the issue was not considered especially important, the countless delegations from the Americas and Asia following the lead of Japan and the United States in dismissing the issue as a 'European matter'. For many it was not the formal conference but the informal receptions that attracted them, for instance the Siamese delegation's prime concern was gauging the relative strength and weaknesses of Japan, France and Britain to help the nation pick a side as tension in the region grew. At the other end of the spectrum came the Uruguayan diplomats, sent by their authoritarian President Gabriel Terra to seek out the best foreign investment partners and to open negotiations on debt forgiveness. To these gentlemen it appeared Germany had been humbled while France was in the ascendency, an impression heightened by the ineffectual blustering of Ribbentrop as he blundered from mistake to faux par around the conference. Thus we finally come to the British delegation which, to the discomfort of the Foreign Office, had been marginalised during the talks due to the ambiguous position of the British government. With the Entente Cordial long buried the Foreign Office was coming round to the more traditional 'balance of power' view of the continent that worried France was too strong and Germany too weak. France's humbling of Germany, her growing Eastern European alliances and the ominous Franco-Italian rapprochement did little to calm those concerned by the balance of power. However the logical balance of power option, support for Germany, was not an option; lingering sympathies with France in the Foreign Office, distaste at the German regime and the somewhat ham fisted German demands for the return of 'their' colonies (not least the conspicuous exclusion of those territories that had been transferred to Japan) mitigated against diplomatically supporting Germany.

Thus it was the more Imperially minded diplomats that prevailed, promoting the option of leaving Europe well alone and concentrating on the Empire and the trade opportunities in South America and elsewhere. While this went against the personal preference of both Chamberlain and his Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, the lack of any better alternative tied their hands. Quite simply the failure of France to support Britain during the Abyssinian War had left 'Continental' faction with an up-hill fight, continental connections were seen as costing Britain plenty for precious advantage. The cabinet therefore agreed on a return to something closer to 'Splendid Isolation' in preference to cultivating new continental attachments. While popular amongst the public the flaw in the scheme soon became apparent when the drafts of the post-Versailles Treaties were circulated; Britain had no support for continued ship building limits against Germany. For France giving Germany a fleet was considered an acceptable price for keeping a stranglehold over the Rhineland, without the distractions of Italy (courtesy of the Royal Navy) they could concentrate their fleet in the North Sea/Atlantic while trade and supply links to the colonial Empire went through the secure Mediterranean. Italy went along with the deal as a gesture to Germany, Mussolini hoping to keep the German option open should his French gambit not work out. Amongst the other Great Powers the United States was indifferent and Japan positively supported anything that would distract the Royal Navy from the Pacific. Isolated and with little leverage Britain had little choice but to agree, the cabinet reacting to public disquiet over the revelation by boosting naval spending for the 1937 programme.


Notes
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Well that didn't go well for Britain did it? No allies in Europe, growing Franco-Italian relations and facing an unwanted naval distraction from Germany. And they haven't even reached the SCW portion of the conference yet.

On the Rhineland deal I pondered that one for quite some time. I found Pierre Flandin a decidedly complex character to pin down, though I'm sure Atlantic Friend will point the flaws in my portrayal of him here. However while he would never have gone to war over the Rhineland he was not above bluffing about it (Admittedly it was Britain who he bluffed, but the point still stands). Conversely Neurath was something of a pessimist, his response was usually 'Not possible' as he kept under-rating the power of bluff and the lack of resolve in the West. Thus I think Flandin would chance his arm and, discovering that Neurath wouldn't challenge him over it, keep going until he ended up with the result we see.

At sea, I think France would probably allow Germany a fleet as a concession, no-one is going to want to push Germany too far in case their bluff is discovered. And with the Regia Marina sunk they can concentrate in the North Sea with their soon to commission Dunkerques while the Med remains safe. Not a good result for Britain, but then Anglo-French relations are far from cordial and getting worse.

Game Effects;
The forts Germany starts the 1936 scenario with have been deleted, and they get some garrisons in those provinces. The AI probably wont keep that deployment, but I'll deal with that come wartime.

Build wise Germany gets a few ships in the queue as does France. Britain gets some new BCs as well when the current builds clear the system. And yes there will be a naval porn update to discuss these new ships.