Chapter XXI: Nili Nomen Roboris Omen.
For the initial stages of the North African Campaign only two of the British Empire's armed services were in action, namely the Army and the Royal Navy. Royal Air Force activity had been limited to defensive fighter patrols over metropolitan Egypt and maintaining the Trans-African and other Empire spanning communication routes. The RAF's initial inactivity was not due to a shortage of assets in theatre or sloth and indolence in the senior ranks but for far more deep seated reasons. These problems, both strategic and inherently structural, dogged all the services throughout the war but affected the RAF most deeply.
Of the problems outlined above the first is by far the easiest, Italy had achieved strategic surprise with its declaration of war and so the British would spend the opening phase of the war playing catchup. The structural issues were the more complex and the more serious; in essence the pre-war priority for the Royal Air Force prior, to the extent of all other considerations in the region, was Palestine, Iraq and the Trans-Jordan. The most westerly RAF bases, or depots as they were called, were in suburbs of Cairo to protect the canal and provide close reinforcements for the Trans-Jordan region. This left the RAF perfectly prepared to re-fight the Great War, or indeed the many small wars and counter-insurgency operations fought since, but not ready for the new threats the Empire faced. While there would be many more obvious outcomes of the war the recognition, by both the Government and the Imperial General Staff, of these institutional problems would be one of the most far reaching for the British Empire.
Air Vice Marshall Peirse, Air Officer Command RAF Western Desert Command
To return to the Abyssinian conflict, it was soon realised that the pre-war RAF Middle East hierarchy was eminently unsuitable to the current war and that an additional station was needed nearer the front line. The obvious choice for the commander was Air Vice Marshall Peirse, the Air Officer Commanding the Palestine Trans-Jordan Command, one of the major sub-commands of RAF Middle East. An experienced flyer who had been based in the Middle East since the late 1920s Peirse had combat experience from both the Great War and the many small conflicts Britain had been involved in since as well as command experience from his time as Air Officer Commanding.
Peirse's new unit, the grandly titled 'RAF Western Desert Command', more commonly called 'The Desert Air Force', was mainly formed from units based at RAF Heliopolis, outside of Cairo, and at least in the early stages of the war was a fairly rag tag unit. While all the squadrons that formed Western Desert Command operated biplanes there was considerable variation between units which would cause no end of problems for ground crews throughout the campaign. The most common airframe in use were the Hawker Hart variants, such as the Hawker Hardy's of No.6 Squadron, the ubiquitous two seat light bombers that formed the backbone of RAF Middle East and many other non-Home Isle squadrons. The first unit into action however would No.216 Squadron, a communication and transport unit most famous for pioneering the trans-African mail route with Vickers Vincents and Valentias. While hardly the obvious unit to spearhead an attack it was the trans-African experience and accompanying long range tanks that made No.216 the only squadron capable of hitting the Italian lines from the Cairo bases.
The crest of No.216 Squadron RAF. The squadrons motto: '216 Bearing Gifts' would be adapted as a catchphrase, not only by the RAF other squadrons (with their own squadron number substituted in, naturally) but would also feature in the copious media reporting on the conflict, including several famous BBC radio reports.
The fact that the unit was able to contribute to the attack so early highlighted the two main advantages Peirse had over his Italian adversaries; first all RAF units were expected and trained to fight, there were no 'non-combat' units or airframes, everything he could muster could fight in some capacity. Secondly RAF Middle East had been the most active command in the Royal Air Force during the 1920s and early 30s, gaining valuable experience for aircrews in operating in desert conditions.
To this could be added a third, more long term advantage; the Cairo airbases, RAF Abu Sueir in particular, were home to No.4 Flying Training School one of the main training depots for teaching desert operations and army co-operation to new pilots. This school could rapidly acclimatise the reinforcements pouring in from the UK and get his aircrews up to speed meaning Peirse could count on trained replacement pilots for any losses while new Italian pilots would have to gain their experience the hard way, in combat. On whether these advantages could overcome the Italians numerical superiority hung the fate of the air war in the desert.
Up Next:
Well there's still about half an Operation Vulcan update in the tank, the bits before and after the teaser. With a bit of luck, and no interesting diversions like the one above, that will be up next.
