The Butterfly Effect: A British AAR

Chapter LXXXII: A Third Way.​

When Sir Johns Simons announced his grand gesture of leaving the government he managed to carry his party with him, both the MPs and constituency associations agreeing they had been marginalised and couldn't tolerate being blackmailed or their leader unceremoniously demoted. However it soon became apparent this unity did not extend to any clear idea of the party's next move, a problem only exacerbated by the emergence of something of an existential crisis amongst the membership. To understand this problem we must first note that the original rift in the Liberal Party over trade had, if not healed, then certainly scabbed over well enough to be worked around. Therefore, as the remaining differences in political platform were considered scalable, there was a strong body of opinion in the National Liberal party that a merger with the Liberals was not only possible but desirable. In pursuit of this tentative talks had been attempted several times, however they always broke down over the question of support for the National Government. It is therefore easy to see why many wondered what the point of being a National Liberal was if they were not in government, with the single biggest barrier to merger removed it was hoped a reunification could be engineered and with it the dream of a Liberal majority government. The key problem for the party was the significant portion who did not think that way, those who drew the opposite conclusion and decided they should abandon the pretence of being a different party and just merge with the Conservatives they had supported for years. Had this problem occurred in isolation it is likely the party would have split along such lines and the body politic moved on with a rump National Liberal Party withering to extinction as it was squeezed between the Conservatives and Liberals. However it did not occur in isolation, as Simons was leaving Downing Street the Labour party was involved in a most almighty fight over it's own future, a fight that provided the impetus for a most unexpected development.

The Labour row had been brewing since the election of the TUC's (Trade Union Congress) candidate, Arthur Greenwood, as Labour leader at the 1936 spring party conference. In the months that followed Greenwood and the TUC had worked tirelessly behind the scenes to reshape the party, increasing trade union influence at the cost of the other pillars of the party. As one unchangeable Labour Party rule was that 'Party conference is the supreme authority of the party" the first real fruits of their efforts blossomed at a specially arranged autumn conference in early October. The tone was set when the union block vote pushed through the solid union man George Dallas as the new chair of the National Executive Committee (NEC), Dallas being selected for his vehement anti-communism and 'reliable' views on nationalisation. The following week would see the conference presented with several large changes to the party programme (the specific policy proposals and ideas which formed the basis of any manifesto and to which the whole party was theoretically committed). The changes began gently enough, dropping the commitments to collective security and disarmament in favour of re-armament and stronger Imperial Defence. While this riled the still somewhat pacifist Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) the rest of the conference fell into line, recognising that a continuation of their old policies, especially such extreme ideas as trying to abolish national air forces, had been unfortunate mistakes. However as the week progressed and the emphasis shifted to economic areas this limited sense of agreement vanished, divides opening up between the "worker" and the "intellectual" wings of the party. The first issue was trade policy, from the TUC the matter was clear; Empire Free Trade and Imperial Preference had worked and helped to keep their membership employed and safe from foreign competition. This was in stark contrast to much of the PLP and the socialist societies who believed full free trade was the correct path, in the event however they were outvoted by the unions and the constituency associations who recognised it's populist appeal. The problems only worsened as the arguments continued over the latest interpretation of Clause IV, the clause of the Labour constitution that committed the party to "Common ownership of the means of production". After two Labour governments had entirely failed to deliver meaningful progress towards this objective, the TUC was keen for a nailed down and unequivocal commitment to nationalisation of the 'commanding heights' of the economy as a top priority, complete with either worker control or significant worker representation. This was opposed by both the economic moderates of the right and the constituency associations; the former believed in 'public ownership' where industries were run for the good of the country not just the workers, while the latter feared it would undo all the work of MacDonald's government in making Labour seem 'safe' and electable. However with the TUC, socialist societies and the remainder of the PLP united this too was pushed through on the final day of the conference.


As the party digested the conference it appeared party unity would triumph over disagreements, the end of the Parliamentary recess certainly helped matters as it allowed the PLP to focus back onto Westminster and away from the bruising encounters of the conference. However hanging over the party remained the issue of the shadow cabinet elections, Labour having the unique practice of electing the membership of it's shadow cabinet, the party leader reduced to the role of assigning jobs from a selected 'pool' of MPs. With the election delayed first by the conference, then by overseas matters the date was finally set for the New Year and the PLP moved into full on electioneering move, 'going on manoeuvres' in Westminster speak, to push their own cause and get a shadow cabinet position. After the squeeze at conference the PLP hoped their acceptance of the TUCs programme would lead to a return to normal party politics and a few gestures of reconciliation, in both expectations they were to be sorely disappointed. As the rounds of voting and back room dealing progressed the key problem soon became apparent; the TUC's idea of compromise and a 'Shadow Cabinet reflective of the Labour Party' didn't match the visions the PLP and constituency parties had. For the union barons having the entirely non-union Clement Attlee as Deputy Party Leader was considered a major compromise, while letting the 'troublemaker' Aneurin Bevan in the shadow cabinet at all was their version of an olive branch (Bevan's 'crime' being to speak in favour of a British Popular Front of all left leaning parties, including the harder left parties so despised of the TUC). In the eyes of much of the PLP however it was the final straw, already marginalised on the NEC and with declining influence over party policy they now saw their career prospects reduced to hoping for favours from the Union barons. Strained too far the PLP moved to open revolt and the party splintered.

On the left of the party the pacifist grouping around Stafford Cirpps and George Strauss, still cowed after Cripps' disastrous leadership election run, saw the writing on the wall and decamped to the more left leaning Independent Labour Party to continue their dreams of disarmament, a Popular Front and 'true socialism'. Those on the right however faced a somewhat more complex problem, not only did they lack an existing party to jin but they were a less cohesive group to begin with. Indeed on purely policy grounds the differences were not insurmountable; disagreements over the exact definition of "Common Ownership" were not serious enough to cause a split in normal circumstances while the differences between 'fair trade' as opposed to 'free trade' were fairly academic when Labour was already committed to state control of prices and all imports and exports. The problem was therefore partly personality but mostly one of trust, men such as Herbert Morrison and Hugh Dalton were just not trusted to implement the new party platform as they were both on the right of the party and had been a part of MacDonald's 'failed' governments. The latter was particularly serious and, though a select few MacDonald men were let in as a gesture, many were not as the leadership pinned it's hopes on the new generation of candidates standing at the next election. Unsurprisingly the rejected MPs did not relish the prospect of a life on the backbenches as 'penance' for something many were actually proud of and began looking for alternatives. They soon realised that the only sensible options were acceptance of their fate and hoping for a change in the leaderships thinking or the radical option of leaving the party. While staying and hoping was unpalatable, especially to the ambitious, without the 'grass roots' support of volunteers and constituency associations leaving the party would mean all but certain defeat at the next election, and for much the group it was thought better to be a back bencher than a no-bencher. It was at this stage that Labour right's search for a better option overlapped with the ongoing Liberal reunification talks, a long and liquid meeting between the parties at the House of Common's bar prompting a most radical solution; a new party of the left.


The new grouping was inevitably based on the Liberals, the local Liberal Associations were the only organisation that could form the basis of the vital constituency machinery and they initially had more MPs, though as notional National Liberals returned to the Conservative Party and wavering Labour members defected as the party gained momentum that advantage became slenderer. The knotty question of Leadership threatened to derail the entire project; after tense negotiations the Labour contingent agreed to settle for a Liberal leader provided they could propose one of their own as an influential deputy leader, a vital concession but one that merely highlighted Liberal divisions. This should have been a simple problem, the National Liberal leader John Simons indicated he had no intention of joining the new 'leftist' party and indeed was trying to turn his fellow party members against it, thus the Liberal leader Archibald Sinclair should have been the only choice. However Sinclair was not an impressive character, having been selected as Liberal leader almost by default he had failed to tackle the large hole where a vision for the country should have been while his main leadership idea (opposition to continental dictatorships) had been thoroughly hijacked by the other parties with his party gaining almost none of the credit. Worse still he had a personal manner to rival that of the thoroughly dislikeable John Simons, hardly an ideal qualification for a man who had to weld several disparate groups into a cohesive party. The choice therefore fell to the National Liberal deputy leader Ernest Brown, his key qualifications being the cabinet experience deemed vital for the party to be taken seriously and a broad base of support, quite aside from the remaining National Liberals he was well thought of in Labour circles for his efforts assisting distribution workers to form trade unions and his work on wage control and compulsory labour arbitration. That just left the question of a name, while many favoured keeping a 'Liberal' based name that was a double edged sword, while the tag of 'Liberal' still carried both cachet and votes it was a confused label; it was not uncommon for pure Conservative candidates to claim to be 'National Liberals' to boost their vote, worse the previous election had seen some constituencies producing ballots containing the options Liberal, Liberal National, National Liberal and Independent Liberal and thoroughly confusing the voters. The decisive requirement though was the need to reflect the permanent leftward shift of the party, a vital condition of the Labour contingent and recognised as a necessary step to end the Liberal confusion. In stark contrast to the earlier wrangling the naming debate was mercifully brief, the new leadership rapidly settling on the somewhat unwieldy choice of Liberal Social Democrats or LSD.


Notes:
Another beast of an update but what can I say? How often do you get to start a new party named LSD? Should be fun if they survive till the 1960s!

Was this likely? Well the TUC never had much faith in it's MPs, McDonald's two governments weren't particularly effective or indeed very socialist so the strains were already present. The reason given by McDonald's apologists was such timidity was needed for the party to 'become respectable', an argument that only works if the party does indeed make progress. Now TTL the TUC isn't seeing that progress, the 1935 election didn't go well (OTL they gained 100 seats, TTL barely 50) and they blame the MPs for being too pacifist and not being bold enough enough and they're probably right on both, certainly the PLP was pacifist and wasn't very bold on anything till after the war was well under way. Therefore I can see the TUC saying going for a clear out, what's the point in compromising your beliefs for 'electability' if you're not even getting elected?

The new party, now that is less clear. Cripps and Co. heading off for the far left is easy enough, he was thrown out OTL for wanting a popular front and was an avowed Marxist so would never get on with the anti-communist TUC. The Liberal-Nat Liberal merger was apparently regularly on the cards but kept stumbling over the 'support the national government' blocker, presumably there was some fudge on trade policy and the rest of the Liberal platform was so vague no-one noticed the huge policy chasms elsewhere. So I can see it happening, but with a great deal of Nat Lib MPs jumping ship and formally joining the Tories as they don't like the new leftward lean of the new party.

The big question though is would the Labour right join? Morrison was not popular with the unions and was massively ambitious so he would certainly do something, while Dalton was on the right of the party (look at his protégés Gaitskell and Crosland) and was not above scheming or madcap ideas. So not impossible or indeed even that unlikely I'd say. For those who charge me with another convenient event I say two things; 1. Wait and see and 2. If I was doing convenient change I'd have a proper classical liberal party come back espousing economic liberalism and personal freedoms and then install them for 50 years of constant rule ala the LDP in Japan.

Anyway for those bored of politics and such you will be relieved to hear I have abandoned plans for making welding interesting and will go straight to the boat porn in the next update.