Here's some ideas generaly speaking on the german and french doctrines and the background on what lead to their development...I hope I am not stepping on Sarmatia's feet when making up the stuff.
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Combined Wave - The French Military Doctrine
The french military thinkers had barely time at all to think about the lessons of the bloody Great War when the revolution came. The loyalist forces were beaten and driven off by revolutionary 'hordes', led with people who had little experience in military leadership. Still, reckless human wave attacks, massed artillery and political indoctrination were enough to win the civil war.
The post-civil war forces were largely built on methods which seemed almost napoleonic to outside spectators and the new military leadership tried to feverishly improve the quality of the armed forces, their efforts distrupted by the chaos reigning in the country.
The first major military decision was taken in 1922 when the decision to create a new french army - before that the country was guarded by unassorted worker's and peasant's militias. While the "dove lobby" wanted to force to be entirely made out of regional militias many argued against this and it was finally decided that roughly fifty percent of the new army would be regional militias and another fifty percent would be "mobile troops", grouped into relatively normal division-corp-army structure.
However, the quality of the army remained dismal and the military leaders knew that France could not afford a rematch of the Great War as the war had damaged the country's population structure greatly. Some argued that if the war came the german workers would surely revolt against their overlords. The majority was more or less sceptic.
During the 'Turbulent Twenties' many noted that the German army was getting spread thing and the military thinkers came up with an idea of a 'Wide Front', a doctrine relying on massive attack that would force a catastrophic military failure on the overstretched german defenses. After initial attack the army would focus on the weakest spots of the defence. The weak spots would fall after human wave attacks and massed artillery bombardment and soon the forces could break through.
France also started to show ever-growing intrest towards new weapons of war, namely tanks and aircraft. The Entente had postive experience on the two new weapons, even if they had failed to win the war. Investing in new weapons would be risky but the french military thinkers were trying to come up with a way to make up for the lack of manpower.
The decision that finally made France start producing mechanized forces was the capture of a german manual on defence. The manual showed the lack of antitank defences as germans had focused on fighting colonial unrest and what they perceived as 'communard hordes'.
In 1928 France started to rearm for real. A new system of modern volunteer corps was establish and these forces were given the newest weapons and finest mechanized equipment - trucks, halftracks, artillery carriers and tanks. France also started to put attention into it's navy and airforce. The airforce was largely put under the supervision of land forces and designated to act as 'close support' for the advancing troops. Doctrines were changed to adapt combined arms attacks from infantry, tanks and aircraft into the idea of a wide front.
Now, in 1936, the French army is no doubt the finest mechanized force on earth, but the wide masses of the people's militias that make up most of the army are badly outdated, and the ideas of furious attack to dispel any possibility of trench warfare have left the french with outdated, Great War era densive doctrines. And mechanized warfare has yet to prove itself and many point out that it might be ground to halt in the rivers, forests and hills of Germany...
Infantry Firepower - The German Military Doctrine
After the Great War the german military inherited a vast new world order to look after. And this new world order came with it's own political tension, intrigue and restrictions.
The germans had gained a perception that the traditional land arms - infantry, artillery, even cavalry, with some adaptions were the way to win wars. Afterall, the Entente tanks had, for germans, proved little else than 'annoyance'. The perception of supeority of traditional arms was only reinforced by the succesfull intervention the Russian civil war.
In the immediate postwar years the german army was moulded by two inventions of the great war, elastic defence and attacks on 'schwerpunkts', points of maxium effort where the infantry, or rather the Stormtrooper units of the division, would make a breakthrough. Emphasis was also placed in night fighting as it gave an element of suprise.
During the Tirpitz chanchellorship the germans got more and more occupied by naval buildup, colonial intervention and 'housekeeping' of their new world order which limited the possibilites for new ways of warfare to develop as infantry was needed to occupy and control the vast territories.
As german became more and more involved in naval buildup the whole military industry seemed to adapt to support it in ever growing amount: scout blimps for the fleets were adapted for land and airforce use, infantry divisions specialized on amphibious attacks were planned and infiltration tactics were further adapted for them, corps were given units with heavy artillery adapted from ship guns and monstrous "land battleships" were built, although in small numbers. Every time somebody suggested mechanization of land forces the answer was largely "the steel is needed for battleships".
While germans read about the planned Wotan-class battleships with humongous propotions and military plans calling for amphibious invasions of France and Britain the land forces stagnated to an extent, becoming slower and more stuck in the ideas of fortress warfare because it suited the needs of the 'Old Guard', colonial lobby and naval industry.
And in many cases the conclusions taken by the leaders seemed logical, afterall, Germany was faced with colonial dissent, a weak russia and syndicalist powers whose armies were made out of militia. None of them would pose much of a danger to germany.
But this situation wasn't to stay. While Russia remained weak France remilitarised furiously, focusing on the two things germans didn't expect to face in warfare against enemies with poor forces: tanks and aircraft. Some commanders told that the french efforts are a waste. Meanwhile many started to worry greatly as the french plans were aimed to exploit the german lack of anti-tank weapons. Appeals for doctrinal reconsiderations started to move around and soon the intrests of land forces and navy were crossed: the army needed anti-tank artillery while the navy wanted big guns.
It was not untill the end of Tirpitz chancellorship that the land forces started to get moder modern arms. Germany established her own motorized units and even built a 'panzer' division. Still, the intrests of the various lobby groubs and the new and old guard remain crossed.
Now, in 1936, the German armed forces are still burdened by a huge world empire to guard but they are they also bogged down by the heavy weapons. Factionism is making the mechanization of the armed forces slow and any general wishing to express new ideas has to be carefull not to step on the toes of industrial intrests. Only time will tell of Germany can create armed forces suitable for both colonial defence and continental warfare.