Jumpstarting the American Century: USA 1936 AAR

anonymous4401 said:

It is not merely a 'great' read. It is an awesome, fabulous, unsurpassed read, such likes of which shall never again grace this earth! This wonderful AAR, a testament to the ultimate creativity and talents of man shall last the harsh and merciless tides of time itself! The distant day, when Paradox becomes unprofitable and closes down after poor sales of HOI 37, the legacy of these boards shall live on through this AAR, which shall be passed from hall to hall in the worlwide Web until all know of its name and the greatness it represents. Generations from now, when all of us have passed away and civlization has been destroyed in a nuclear inferno, our primitive descendants shall bow to the glories of this AAR, engraved in gold tablets and stored in some bunker in Sweden, as our last will and testament to the survivors that come after us. Yes, that is how great this AAR is.

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:rofl: HOI37? You mean this game can be 35 times better than it already is? wow! I can't wait! Wait. Will I be alive for #37? Aww, shucks! Well, hopefully I'll live long enough to see 25 or so.

Are you related to Winston Churchill? I detect a similar penchant for the melodramatic.

I take that back. Churchill may sound melodramatic today, but I think he had reason to be so then.

Update: The OOB is coming along nicely, but it's very time consuming. Still, I've got most of today to work on it, so figure it'll be up tomorrow if not today. It's also quite different from my previous posts, as I've decided to use this opportunity to "recap" what's already happened in the war. I'm doing this just to kind of wrap up the first part of the AAR, and to set the stage for the second part. So for those of you who like a little more history in your AARs, this post's for you! Well, it will be when I get it up (no, that's not a viagra joke).

PS

Therev, Machiavellian, Smuk, CV Mannerheim, Stnylan: Thanks!

Reveilled, Anonymous4401: I think I'll stick with "Operation Oasis." However, Operation Semi-Lobster has a pretty good ring to it...Is it copyrighted?

Templhaven, Evans: Monty is there, but he's not in charge of Oasis. He will play a part in the summer though. As for U.S. units being folded into the British Army...I had to find a way to reconcile the substitution of battle-hardened American troops with green British soldiers without alerting the Germans, who of course would periodically conduct patrols and probes into the American lines. If they found no one, the gig would've been up. I'll explain more in the OOB post about why it was acceptable to fold U.S. soldiers into British units. I knew that would be a sticking point, but don't worry, I have a perfectly good explanation. No, really, I do!

Jumpstarting the American Century, Part XX: The American Order of Battle, Parts 1-4

20.1

The United States Army in the Polish War

Part I: Inauspicious Beginnings

Building the Core

Despite Roosevelt’s determination, the rearmament of the United States did not progress as well as he would have hoped. Aside from his political obstacles (which were considerable, but are beyond the scope of this work), the Army itself was uncomfortable with such rapid expansion of strength. Training facilities were inadequate at best, and supplying the new troops proved difficult early on due to limited funding. Recruitment was not difficult, as unemployment remained high, but new soldiers often found themselves training with wooden guns and cardboard tanks. Nevertheless, the Army persevered, raising fifty-seven new infantry divisions and twenty-four specialized brigades. In later years, these original sixty divisions would form the famous “Core” of the United States Army, around which the even larger expansion of the mid-1940s would form.

The original organization of what would become the American Expeditionary Force was to be ten corps of six divisions each. Each corps carried with it specialized brigades of mechanized artillery, engineers, anti-aircraft, and anti-tank artillery. Although the corps were intended to operate independently of each other, the severe shortage of trained staff officers forced the Army to adopt a loose command structure in which the Core operated as five armies, infamously known as “tandems.” These tandems were commanded by the senior officer of the corps pair. For instance, 1st Army (or tandem) was comprised of the 1st U.S. Army Corps, commanded by General Thomas Richardson, and 1st Infantry Corps, commanded by General Malin Craig. Overall command of 1st Army rested with General Craig, while command of the expeditionary force as a whole rested with General George C. Marshall. Marshall himself commanded a tandem and a corps throughout the war.

As one could imagine, this system caused a great deal of stress, as generals were forced to make command decisions for other units as well as their own. In practice, the tandem was a horrendous failure, as commanders were forced to leave the day-to-day command of their original corps to particularly skilled subordinates while they struggled to coordinate their tandem with the rest of the Core. But while tandems caused a great deal confusion, and indeed several bloody mistakes, they were ultimately crucial to the future of the Army. The experience gained by these handpicked subordinates would be invaluable, and most if not all would eventually be given their own commands as the Army expanded.




War and Politics: Why Roosevelt Waited.

At the outbreak of hostilities in September of 1939, the AEF was hardly combat ready. In fact, it was not yet even complete, comprised of only about 44 divisions, and chronically short of ammunition and fuel. Luckily for the Army, the President recognized the country was not yet ready for war, but they were severely dismayed to find their puny stockpiles of artillery and anti-tank shells would be “donated” to the Allied cause. Nevertheless, the outbreak of war and the rapid fall of Poland loosened the purse strings of Congress enough to enable the Army initiate a series of wargames throughout the autumn and winter of 1939-1940. This last minute training would prove vital, as President Roosevelt asked for a declaration of war on Germany on the 1st of March, 1940.

The Army had prepared itself for immediate deployment to Europe, but the President had other plans. U.S. intelligence had convinced the President that Hitler did not believe he had anything to fear from the United States for at least a year, and was planning a quick knock-out blow against the Allies for that summer. Roosevelt determined to let Hitler commence his attack, waiting until the German army had left its border defenses before ordering the AEF deployed.

His reasoning behind this was two-fold. First and foremost, the AEF was still incomplete. The last four divisions were still in training, and were unlikely to be ready before mid-summer. Given the Army’s reservations about sending the Core into combat without armor or air cover (the USAAF was also in the midst of its first phase of expansion), Roosevelt rationalized that deploying an incomplete force would only make matters worse.

Second, he felt deploying the force too early would deter Hitler from launching an offensive in which the German army could be drawn out of their border defenses. Both the President and the Army’s high command feared a scenario in which Hitler held back, allowing the “Sitzkrieg” to continue. Undoubtedly, political and public pressure would ultimately compel the President to attack, ordering the untried AEF to hurl itself across the Rhine into the teeth of German defenses. Roosevelt hoped to avoid this by goading Hitler into attacking first. He felt his best chance at this was to feed the Fuhrer’s delusion that the U.S. was utterly unprepared for war. Thus, the AEF was held back until the first week of May.

American Soldiers En Route to Europe



Part II: Bloody Prelude

The First Battle of Eindhoven

On May 5, 1940, Hitler launched his western offensive, declaring war on Luxembourg, Belgium and the Netherlands. German troops surged forward in a pair of waves, one pushing into the Netherlands, the other through southern Belgium and Luxembourg. Roosevelt immediately issued orders for the AEF to be deployed to Europe, regardless of the still incomplete 41st Infantry Corps. As the French Army moved to react, 1st Army was already boarding transports in New York. They arrived in the port of Calais on May 13th, and moved immediately to stem the German tide rolling over Holland.

As Grand Admiral Leahy’s 4th Transport Fleet steamed back toward the new world, 1st Army conducted what would be the AEF’s first combat action of the war. Advanced German units had rolled into the Dutch city of Eindhoven on May 18th, then pressed on to the west. On the 20th, General Craig ordered his tandem to retake Eindhoven, and halt the German drive across southern Holland. The 1st U.S. Army Corps would conduct a frontal assault on the city itself while 1st Infantry Corps confronted German units advancing on Tilburg. After Eindhoven had been secured, the plan was for 1st USAC to turn three of it’s divisions west while the remaining three held the city. This would threaten German units in the Tilburg area with encirclement, and hopefully force them to retreat.

The attack was initially successful, primarily because German intelligence had failed to detect the arrival of American units on the continent. Eindhoven was quickly taken on May 21st, and casualties were surprisingly light. German soldiers occupying the city were utterly shocked when six divisions of Americans suddenly pounced on them from the south. They’d had no idea an enemy force of that size was within 100 kilometers of them. Indeed, even Lieutenant General Wilhelm von Leeb believed his left flank to be clear, as the Belgian Army was struggling to hold back the avalanche of Army Group B in the Ardennes. Much to his surprise, American soldiers suddenly surged all along his exposed flank while more blocked his advance to the west. But von Leeb refused to panic, quickly consolidating his position around Tilburg, and wiring Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt for reinforcements on the 23rd.

Rundstedt responded rapidly. Luftwaffe reconnaissance indicated Craig’s left flank was as open as von Leeb’s had been. He ordered General Keitel to attack southward from Utrecht and Rotterdam, and convinced Field Marshall Georg von Kuchler to extend his attack through northern Belgium into Craig’s equally exposed right flank. Keitel reported he would need several days, as he was still fending off furious Dutch counterattacks north and south of the Hague, but von Kuchler committed eight infantry and two panzer divisions on the 25th. Craig was now forced to deploy five of six 1st USAC divisions to counter von Kuchler’s advance. With his tandem hopelessly split (a gap of nearly 30 kilometers separating them), and only the 1st Infantry Corps and 24th Infantry Division still facing von Leeb, Craig began making preparations for a retreat to Turnhout.

Although he knew he had no hope of breaking through the American lines, von Leeb nevertheless attacked on May 28th, hoping to pin down Craig’s corps while Keitel finished off the Dutch. He was only marginally successful. Craig’s numerical superiority over von Leeb allowed him to conduct a carefully planned and magnificently executed fighting retreat with 1st Infantry Corps before Keitel’s troops arrived on June 1st. Nevertheless, Keitel still brought twenty infantry and one armored division to bear on the American left flank, and 1st Army soon found itself in all out retreat by the 3rd.

The Luftwaffe, which had steadily pounded the Americans since the 22nd of May, now struck with a vengeance as the men trudged along open roads. Morale plummeted as Heinkels and Stukas bloodily underlined their defeat in Holland. A sense of panic permeated through the ranks as they marched sullenly back through the towns they had serenaded and saluted only a week or two before. On June 6th, General Craig revised his plans, extending the retreat all the way to Brussels and Ghent as Keitels’ troops assaulted Antwerp. He rescinded that order, however, when he received word on the 7th of the imminent arrival of Marhsall’s 2nd Army.

The German Attack on Holland, & The First Battle of Eindhoven, May 5 - June 3, 1940



Building Up & the Loss of Antwerp

The arrival of Marshall’s 2nd Army on June 15th brought an abrupt end to the rout of 1st Army. General Marshall assumed his position as commander of the American Expeditionary Force, and in conjunction with French divisions recently redeployed to Belgium, solidified the Allied line. Rundstedt’s Army Group A still outnumbered the Allies opposite him by about two to one, but with von Kuchler’s push in the Ardennes stalling in the face of fierce French and Belgian resistance, Hitler ordered significant redeployments from Holland to Belgium, weakening Rundstedt and likely saving the AEF from an ignominious fate.

Shorn of 30% of his infantry strength and all of his panzer divisions, Rundstedt nevertheless pressed the attack forward on June 20th. Without armor, the Germans were forced to rely on their numerical superiority to push the Allies back. Marshall was compelled to abandon Antwerp on the 29th, but this time, the retreat of one portion of the army did not unhinge the entire line. 4th Infantry Corps fell back to the south and west of the city while 2nd Infantry Corps, its right flank anchored on 1st Army, pulled away to the southeast. By the second day of July, Antwerp was firmly in German hands.

Convinced another successful attack would break the American lines, Rundstedt ordered a general offensive on July 4th, aimed at the seizure of Brussels and Ghent, and ultimately, the destruction of the fledgling American army. Although the soldiers of 1st and 2nd Armies fought bravely, it was undoubtedly the timely arrival of Haislip’s 3rd Army on July 6th that saved the Allied line in northern Belgium. Once again, German intelligence had failed to detect the arrival of American troops, and the price was surprise and bloody stalemate.

Rundstedt backed off on July 20th to lick his wounds, calling in the Luftwaffe to soften up American lines for another assault. Although he had gained some ground, his inability to break through to Brussels and beyond had earned him even more unwanted attention from the Fuhrer. Hitler admonished him, questioning his courage and even his loyalty to the Reich. Rundstedt nearly lost his command (and likely his head), but managed to convince Hitler that the Americans would soon buckle under the weight of concentrated attacks from both north and east. Relieved, Hitler offered to release three panzer divisions from army reserve for his offensive. Rundstedt readily agreed, but the delay would prove to be decisive. The panzers would not arrive until August 2nd, two days after the AEF launched its first counterattack.

The Fall of Antwerp, June - July, 1940



Part III: The Norwegian Campaign

Fighting in the Fjords

Often considered the irrelevant sideshow of the Polish War, the Norwegian campaign was nevertheless fiercely fought, and contributed greatly to the Allied cause. It siphoned food, fuel, ammunition, and manpower away from German units in the west, and ultimately deprived the Wehrmacht of eight highly trained, battle-hardened divisions, two of them elite paratrooper units. Given the precarious nature of the Allied lines in the early summer of 1940, these eight divisions may very well have been enough to turn the tide.

The campaign began on April 30, 1941, with the surprise landing of six infantry divisions near the Norwegian port of Bergen. Despite the city’s heavy fortifications, the tiny number of Norwegian defenders were quickly overrun, and German infantry under the command of General Walther Model began a rapid advance inland towards Gudvagen and Hermansverk. At first, the Germans were more or less unopposed, brushing aside a smattering of militia units before running into more serious resistance along the Bergen-Gudvagen rail line.

Though small, the Norwegian Army proved itself adept at exploiting the rugged terrain, using the forested fjords to ambush German supply columns, and to establish effective, if ultimately only temporary, defensive lines. Unfortunately, they had nothing with which to counter the Luftwaffe. Constant and heavy air attack dogged the Norwegian Army as it struggled to delay the German advance and bring reinforcements up from Oslo, Kristiansand, and Namsos. Model nearly broke through Norwegian lines north of Hermansverk in mid-May, but the difficult terrain conspired with aircraft-grounding weather. By the time the rain cleared, Hitler had diverted most of the Luftwaffe’s strength to the offensive in the west. To make matters worse, the Royal Air Force arrived on May 15th.

Unable to bring his full strength to bear on the Norwegians, unable to convince the Fuhrer of the need for a second landing, and facing a sudden shortage of supplies thanks to the U.S. Navy, Model was forced to reconsider his strategy. The optimal choice would have been a drive on Oslo. Seizing the capital would be a symbolic blow to Norwegian resistance, but more importantly, it would open a second, shorter, more easily defended supply route. But the main roads to Oslo were blocked, leaving the tortuous track over the fjords as his only apparent option.

The Norwegians had planned for such an expedition, mining the forested ridges and preparing carefully camouflaged ambushes and choke-points. They felt a German attack to the southeast was the only logical option. But much to their surprise and chagrin, Model turned instead to the northeast, attacking on May 22nd, advancing up the narrow valleys, aiming for the Alesund-Lillehammer road. His hope was to cut the road, then split his force, sending two divisions north to secure Alesund and Trondheim while his remaining four advanced on Lillehammer and Oslo. If it worked, he would cut off the Norwegian forces in the northwest, and open up a second port for much needed supplies.

It did not work. The Norwegians reacted quickly, shifting reserves and scraping together enough troops to form a ragged but rigid defense line. The Germans surged forward again and again, the fighting often degenerating into vicious hand to hand combat. The Norwegian line bent and bent, but never broke. By June 20th, Model was still 50 kilometers from the road, and found himself facing utter defeat. His men were hungry and exhausted. Ammunition was running low, and rations were down to half the standard daily allotment. The Fuhrer was still refusing to send reinforcements, and indeed was furious at Model’s lack of progress. Even if reinforcements were forthcoming, it is doubtful they ever would have made it through the American blockade. Nevertheless, Hitler refused to accept defeat in Norway, and ordered Model to hold his ground while he devised a plan. On June 24th, Model ordered his men to dig in, and await the Fuhrer’s orders.

Hitler’s response to Model’s predicament is perhaps one of the greatest military mysteries in history. As historians have argued for sixty years, Hitler should have recognized that Model needed rescuing. He could have utilized his newly acquired bases in Denmark to seize Oslo, and push a column northward to relieve Model. Instead, Hitler was somehow convinced that Model was still his primary offensive force in Norway. He ordered Goering to organize an airborne assault on Trondheim, more than 200 kilometers north of Model’s advanced positions. Two divisions of fallschirmjagers would secure the city and its port while Model drove northward to link up with them. This would fulfill Model’s objective of isolating the Norwegians in the northwest while opening up a secondary port for supplies.

Upon receiving his orders, Model was utterly perplexed. Although he believed he could push through the Norwegians opposing him, his supply situation had grown far too serious to sustain such an ambitious drive. When he voiced his concerns to Hitler on June 29th, the response was brief, terse, and ambitious to say the least:

“The Luftwaffe will fulfill any reported shortages until supply by sea is reestablished. The commanding general will see to it that troop positions are properly marked at all times to ensure accurate drops. The attack is to commence as scheduled.”

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Regardless of his misgivings, Model now had no choice. The jump-off date was set for July 5th. He sent the orders down the line, amended with the simple phrase “the Fuhrer will deliver us.” Whether that was a sarcastic remark or a statement of Model’s belief in the Fuhrerprinzip, we will never know.

German Troops Advancing Along the Gudvegen-Hermansverd Road, May 13, 1940



Yankees in the Fjords

As the fallschirmjagers climbed aboard their Ju-52s, German intelligence reported a huge fleet of transports in the Norwegian port of Alesund, escorted by a large number of capital ships. Hitler ignored the warning, brushing it off as the exaggerated claim of an overzealous and inexperienced U-Boot commander. He couldn’t have been more wrong. By the time parachutes fluttered over Trondheim on July 3rd, six American divisions had unloaded in Alesund, and were marching southward to help their Norwegian comrades contain Model’s army.

Originally, the 7th Infantry Corps, commanded by General John DeWitt, was intended to be paired with 11th Infantry Corps as the 3rd Army. However, Roosevelt ordered the 7th deployed to Norway in mid-June over the loud protests of the Army. The decision was controversial, as the AEF was in the midst of its humiliating retreat from Holland. General Marshal felt the best strategy for victory in Norway was containment and blockade, and that any deployment of troops would be a useless drain of the Army’s strength. Nevertheless, Roosevelt persisted, citing the need for Allies to assist each other, “else what’s an alliance for?” Clearly, Roosevelt was trying to send a signal to the British, who were already releasing statements on why committing troops to the continent would be “a difficult and unwise endeavor.”

As American troops rushed into position, the defenders of Trondheim found themselves suddenly attacked not from the sea, as they expected, but from inland. Under the command of Lieutenant General Kurt Student, German paratroopers quickly overwhelmed the surprised Norwegians, seizing the port facilities before they could be blown, and setting up a solid defense perimeter around the city. Late on the afternoon of July 4th, as advanced units of 7th Infantry Corps began bumping into Model’s line, Student signaled that Trondheim was secure, and the port facilities intact.

Even before the American landings, Model was clearly unconvinced the attack would succeed. Now with “Yankees in the fjords,” he sank into deep despair. As the long night of July 4th stretched on, and his men made their final preparations for attack, Model sat alone and smoked, staring blankly at his maps, hardly moving, and never speaking. The attack commenced precisely at 0330, July 5th, 1940, at the nod of his tired head.

Although expecting an assault, the American units in his way were in no way prepared to repel an all out offensive. They had only been in position for a day, and most of their heavy equipment was still moving up. Only the T30 halftrack-mounted howitzers were in position, and most of those were without large stocks of ammunition (which still sat in small mountains in Alesund). To make matters worse, the experienced Norwegian troops, which had previously held the line into which the Americans now poured, were redeployed to the southeast in order to keep their army together. Although hardly considered strange at the time, the result of this shift – the replacement of experienced troops with green soldiers – would have a lasting effect on the Army’s high command.

Model quickly tore into their first lines, inflicting heavy casualties and pushing the Americans back nearly 20 kilometers in the first three days alone. By July 14th, he had reached the Lillehammer-Alesund road, splitting 7th Infantry Corps in half, and trapping the 34th, 28th, and 25th infantry divisions south of the German salient. Model paused for twenty-four hours on the 15th, ostensibly to rest and resupply his men, but one wonders how longingly he looked to the south, toward Lillehammer and Oslo. Whatever was on his mind, he resumed the offensive the next day, pushing on to the northeast.

As the politicians panicked, General DeWitt calmly reorganized his defeated and demoralized corps. The 40th and 43rd infantry divisions would continue to bear the brunt of the German advance, conducting a bloody fighting retreat that gradually slowed Model’s advance. The 79th Infantry Division was left to cover DeWitt’s right flank, guarding the road to Alesund and pecking away at Model’s left while the 34th, 28th, and 25th divisions were reorganized under the temporary command of Lieutenant General William H. Simpson. Simpson’s task was to coordinate with Norwegian troops around Lillehammer, and on DeWitt’s command, assault Model’s right flank along the Lillehammer-Alesund road. DeWitt waited until Model’s attack had expended itself, grinding to a halt on July 24th, then signaled Simpson. With the ferocity and confidence that would come to symbolize this famous commander, Simpson struck Model’s exposed flanks on July 26th, smashing through the 44th Infanterie Division, and surging forward nearly 40 kilometers in two days.

Despite the apparent success of his drive on Trondheim, Model was still mired in depression. The severe shortage of supplies, increasing casualties exacerbated by (and perhaps even due to) hunger, and Hitler’s insistence that he continue an offensive he considered doomed to failure all conspired to produce and overwhelming sense of dread in the man. According to his surviving subordinates, his command of the situation and of the army did not waver as his men pressed on, but he never regained the confidence and joviality he’d displayed in the early days of the campaign. His malaise worsened as his the Allied lines stiffened in late July, but Simpson’s attack on his exposed right flank was the last straw.

Of the six divisions at Model’s disposal, two (the 143rd and 160th Infanterie divisions) were concentrated at the eastern tip of his advance. The 28th Infanterie Division was stretched out along his long right flank from Bergen to the Lillehammer-Alesund road, where 44th Infanterie had been deployed, and the 98th was similarly stretched along his left. Only the 71st Infanterie was left in reserve. Model immediately ordered his men to turn around, abandoning his drive on Trondheim in a desperate attempt to avoid encirclement.

Hitler was furious, issuing several directives to continue the attack, no matter the cost. Model ignored them all, ordering 71st Infanterie and the remains of the 44th to hold off Simpson while the two spearhead divisions fell back. DeWitt smelled blood, ordering the 40th and 43rd divisions into hot pursuit. 79th Infantry assaulted Model’s left on July 30, but the attacks were poorly coordinated and gained little ground. Model held the entire division off with little more than a regiment and some artillery.

As DeWitt ratcheted up the pressure on the retreating Germans, Model’s depression seems to have lifted. His mood improved as he strove to rescue his army, and indeed, he did manage to keep his retreat from turning into a route. His subordinates believed he was relieved to have a clear objective which did not include the deliberate destruction of his force. Whatever the cause, he led his army courageously, even recklessly, past the Lillehammer-Alesund road, and through the same narrow valleys he’d driven through weeks before. He established a strong defense line west of Gudvagen by August 16th, and set up his headquarters once again in Bergen. Nevertheless, the situation in Norway had shifted fundamentally in favor of the Allies.

General Walther Model



"A Sad and Sorry End"

The dramatic success of DeWitt’s counterattack was a godsend for American morale, which had sunk after the loss of Holland and Antwerp. Suddenly, after ignoring the fighting for more than three months, the American press was enamored with the struggle for Norway, and Lieutenant General Simpson in particular. Reporters flocked to the general wherever he was, glorifying his gruff demeanor and touting his every achievement, no matter how insignificant. The attention miffed General DeWitt, who had actually masterminded the operation, but he refrained from pointing this out to the press for fear they would accuse him of trying to steal Simpson’s glory.

Throughout the rest of August, 7th Infantry Corps consolidated its positions, bringing in replacements and building huge stockpiles of ammunition and fuel. Their Norwegian compatriots did the same, forging an iron ring around Model’s now trapped army as well as the two divisions of fallschirmjagers in Trondheim. Combat died down as the weather cooled, and both sides settled into a siege.

Despite pressure from above, DeWitt resisted the temptation to press the attack, feeling his men needed rest, and that in any case, he should wait until the Norwegians had secured Trondheim before attacking Model. The surrender of the fallschirmjagers was not forthcoming, however, until a concentrated Norwegian assault on the city virtually annihilated them. Student finally gave up only when Norwegian soldiers burst into his command center on September 9th.

With the battle still raging on the continent, Roosevelt grew impatient with DeWitt. He needed 7th Infantry Corps for the fighting in Belgium and Holland, but couldn’t afford to risk Model running loose in Norway again. The President determined the best way to free up 7th Infantry was to reinforce it with 41st Infantry Corps, which was just finishing its combat training in Georgia. Roosevelt hoped that DeWitt would finally feel he had enough troops, and quickly assault “Festung Bergen,” forcing the Germans to surrender. The 41st was ordered to Norway on September 5th, and arrived in Alesund on the 14th. The two corps would form the last tandem in the AEF: 5th Army.

Roosevelt proved correct. Within a few days, DeWitt launched a well-coordinated assault all along the German lines, driving Model back into a ring around the city of Bergen. However, DeWitt was anxious to avoid street-fighting, hoping Model would choose honorable surrender over annihilation. On September 25th, he halted the attack, and sent messengers under a white flag into the German lines with instructions to negotiate terms of surrender. They returned with grim news. Model had committed suicide, and his successor, a staff officer named Paulus, refused to violate Hitler’s order to fight to the last.

Unfortunately for Paulus, his men were beginning to succumb to starvation. It had been months since the last supply ship had arrived in Bergen, and with the bulk of their fighter force engaged over the continent, the Luftwaffe had no hope of protecting it’s vulnerable transports. As September stretched into October, starvation was exacerbated with disease. Groups of Germans began surrendering in early October, often under fire from their own officers. Hoping to force Paulus’ hand, DeWitt authorized a series of probing attacks on October 10th in preparation for one final assault. Paulus preempted him, however, by sending messengers on the 16th to ask for terms of surrender, requesting leniency in the face of his army’s “sad and sorry end.” Relieved, DeWitt quickly scribbled them out (they were indeed lenient), then immediately wired General Marshall.

The Norwegian Campaign, April 30 - October 16, 1940



Part IV. The Great War Revisited

The French Adventure

The soldiers of the AEF, no matter where they were, all had one thing in coming in late July, 1940. They were exhausted. 1st Army was in the worst shape, having been brutally defeated at Eindhoven, then driven bloodily backward as Rundstedt strove to seize Brussels. 2nd and 3rd Armies were in poor shape as well, as they had borne the brunt of the fighting for Antwerp. As 4th Army marched into line on July 24th, they were exhausted as well, but from marching, rather than fighting.

As both sides prepared for the next round of fighting, President Roosevelt met with French Prime Minister Eduoard Daladier. Although details of the meeting will never be known, one thing is clear: Roosevelt, in his eagerness to deliver victories to the American people, ordered 4th Army, under the command of General Thomas T. Handy, to cooperate with the local French commander, General Gamelin, covering his left flank as the Allies attempted to push back into Holland. His objectives would be the cities of Rotterdam and Hertogenbosch, while the French would strike first toward Hasselt, then northward to Eindhoven.

Handy was skeptical, to say the least. His men were not only tired, but disorganized by the march. They were also experiencing a severe test of their morale as they marched by rear area hospitals and aid stations. There were no cheering crowds along the roadside, as they had expected. Only the cries of the wounded and the stink of blood and filth welcomed them to the war. As they settled into their jumping off points, cleaning rifles and girding themselves for battle, many men simply slipped off into the night. The AEF experienced its first serious cases of desertion in those late July days.

On July 31st, 1940, the Franco-American offensive began. Although only 4th Army was to participate in the advance, the rest of the AEF was not idle that morning. Artillery rumbled all down the line, pounding German positions at dawn. The barrage was devastatingly effective. German units were utterly unprepared for a counterattack. They were as exhausted as the Allied units facing them, and hadn’t thought the Americans capable of more than probing attacks, let alone a full-blown offensive. Many men, complacent and confident of victory, were caught out of their holes in the bombardment.

At 0630, the infantry surged forward, tearing a gaping hole in the German line south of Antwerp. American soldiers were stunned at the havoc wrought on their unsuspecting enemy, but pressed on. As the day wore on, many soldiers who the night before had felt such despair now cheered and whooped as they swiftly advanced into the German rear. That mood would darken the next day in the outskirts of Antwerp.

General Keitel was as surprised as anybody at the sudden Allied offensive, but he did not panic. Reserves were quickly and efficiently brought forward, slamming into the 66th Infantry Division just north of Antwerp on August 1st. With the majority of 4th Army advancing to the west of the Antwerp, the 66th was driven back into the city. However, the counter-attack was short lived, as the 1st U.S. Army Corps suddenly jumped into the fray without orders. With Americans swarming through the streets, Antwerp fell after a few days of brutal street-fighting. Ostensibly, General Richardson had mistakenly received orders intended for the 23rd Infantry Corps, which demanded an immediate relief force be sent to Antwerp. Although he would deny it in later years, it now seems certain that General Richardson himself ordered his corps forward, and that he received no orders from Marshall or anybody else. Regardless of the circumstances, Richardson’s intervention undoubtedly saved the 66th Infantry Division.

While Antwerp fell relatively quickly, the offensive nevertheless degenerated into a series of Great War style infantry battles. In the east, the French slogged forward toward Hasselt while the Americans pushed the Germans back into Holland, taking Roosendaal on August 13th. In the center, Richardson continued his unauthorized advance, meeting up with a French column in Turnhout the next day. While Marshall was furious with Richardson’s insubordination, he chose not to pull 1st USAC out of the fight, particularly since he believed they were so badly needed. He would prove correct in the coming days.

Rundstedt reacted to the Allied attack with his usual coolness, ordering reserves forward and preparing several lines of defense along with a few potential counterattacks. Unfortunately, Hitler also reacted to the attack in his usual manner. The Fuhrer ordered Rundstedt to attack immediately, and drive the Allies out of Belgium. Foreshadowing events to come, Rundstedt resisted Hitler’s foolish directives, either subverting them or avoiding them completely, while he steadily bled the Franco-American armies in a fighting retreat. As 4th Army pushed past Breda and towards its objectives during the third week of August, Rundstedt prepared to spring a trap on the French and American columns closing in on Hergotenbosch.

An Exhausted French Soldier, Holland, August 1940



Return to Holland: The Battle of Hertogenbosch

German resistance intensified as the Allies pushed back into Holland, but the sudden arrival of the United States Army Air Force kept the troops moving. Morale soared as P-40s and Brewster Buffalos roared over their heads rather than the usual Messerschmitts, Heinkels, and Stukas. A-20 Havocs and A-24 Dauntless dive bombers quickly set to pounding German defenses, while giving Allied commanders their first look into the German rear via aerial reconnaissance.

That reconnaissance clued French General Gamelin in to the trap laid by Rundstedt. On August 18th, A Martin A-22 Maryland on loan to the French snapped several crucial images of the three panzer divisions Hitler had given Rundstedt at the beginning of the month. They were deployed to the north and east of Hergotenbosch, clearly waiting for the American column advancing from the southwest to push into the city, exposing its flanks. Gamelin warned his American comrades, but Marshall uncharacteristically brushed him off (he was one of only a few American generals who did not look down on his French counterparts). Unaware of the danger, the 63rd and 42nd Infantry divisions pressed on, reaching the outskirts of Hertogenbosch on August 23rd. Rundstedt unleashed his panzers the same day.

Without adequate anti-tank weapons (the 37mm anti-tank guns of the 63rd division were utterly useless against the thick armor of the Panzerkampfwagen III), the Americans had no hope of holding the panzers back, but quick action on the part of division and battalion commanders saved the day, preventing panic from sweeping the two divisions away and coordinating crucial air strikes. With his flanks threatening to cave in, 23rd Infantry Corps commander Fredendall reacted quickly himself, ordering the 47th and 108th Infantry divisions forward to reinforce his right flank, then wired General Handy for assistance. By the afternoon of the 24th, as the 63rd division began to crumble under the panzers’ onslaught, two divisions from Handy’s 33rd Infantry Corps (the 167th and 164th) had arrived, blunting the German drive and saving Fredendall’s corps.

Under direct orders from Marshall, the drive on Hergotenbosch was called off on August 26th. Two days later, Rundstedt counterattacked again, this time to the west and east of Rotterdam. Although German infantry blunted the Dutch-American drive on Amsterdam, they were unable to inflict the kind of damage as the panzers had in the east. Like the battle for Antwerp a few weeks before, the Americans were driven back into Rotterdam, the fighting degenerating into brutal house-to-house combat. This time, however, there would be no sudden intervention. The front stabilized with the city still divided between the armies.

By now, with the fighting in Eindhoven similarly degenerating into costly urban warfare, Marshall was fed up with what he contemptuously called “the French Adventure.” He ordered all offensive operations halted on September 1st while the rest of the AEF was brought forward. Rotterdam had become the front, and Hertogenbosch remained in German hands. 4th Army had been soundly defeated.

The Franco-American Summer Offensive, July 31 - September 1, 1940

Adaml83 said:

Nice re-update. At least we'll be able to remember what went on previously...I hope.

Click to expand...

I'm going to continue this style right up to Drake and Hatchet, then return to the storyline. Figure one, maybe 2 more posts like this.

Oops! I edited the post, I think I caught all of them. Thanks for the heads-up, Smuk!

Hey folks, just wanted to let everyone know the next post will be up either tomorrow or saturday. All I have left to do before I graduate is write a few papers and take a few exams next week, so I should have some time this weekend to finish the OOB and get one with the story. Thanks for all your patience, and fear not, by this time next week, I'll have more than enough time to devote to more posts.

Also, just as a note to all you readers out there, as this AAR progresses, pay attention for more updates like these, as they'll mark major points in the story. I'll rely on the characters to tell the story for the most part, but I'll insert posts like these at specific points to update you on the state of the army and give a more historical overview of what's happening. I hope it will balance the AAR.

Regards.

InVert

Once again, I have the misfortune to announce that the next post will be delayed, probably for another week. This weekend has been busier than I expected, and with it now being Sunday, I have finals to study for, and little time to write until Thursday at least. My apologies for the delay, but rest assured this AAR is alive and kicking...just on hiatus for the moment.

InVert