In an AAR (After Action Report) you can per se not decide what is going to happend, can you?Wilhelm VI said:
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Aldo said:In an AAR (After Action Report) you can per se not decide what is going to happend, can you?
Quite so. Besides, I have no intention of failing - do you not realise how easy it is in HOI to seize a province with a fleet?
Noooooo.Damnit let the Ottoman Empire survive for a little bit longer ! No not those poor Ottomans.Please let if fail !
Part XX – Fisher Counteracts
Lord Kitchener noticed before anyone else that Fisher was attempting to leave, and he stood up and guided the disgruntled admiral to a window to ask him where he was going. Whilst the others talked among themselves, Fisher told Kitchener quietly that he did not agree to the Dardanelles scheme and intended to resign. Kitchener told him that he would be the only person in the War Council opposed to the Dardanelles operation and that he should remain silent and accept the decision of the majority, especially as the Prime Minister had already made his mind up. Kitchener asked him to remain at his post and continue serving his country. Fisher thought for a moment whilst not saying anything, turned round briefly and uttered quickly to the War Council “I am opposed”. The room suddenly went quiet at the announcement, as members looked round at the admiral, standing by the window – Fisher, having thought about remaining quiet and going along with the flow of proceedings, had decided differently. Asquith and Churchill were stunned that Fisher, who had kept his doubts quiet for so long, should suddenly announce his thoughts on the Dardanelles at the meeting where the plan would be rubber stamped. Fisher, determined and confident, began to walk back to his chair when Asquith interjected, reminding Fisher that he only was a technical advisor, had no vote on the Council, and was the only person who had voiced their opposition. “I’m not the only one” Fisher replied, looking across to Admiral of the Fleet Sir Arthur Wilson. All eyes in the room were now trained on the War Council’s other great admiral, the former First Sea Lord who sat at the table, proudly wearing the Victoria Cross he had won in the Sudan in 1884. Unsure, Wilson responded with caution that he felt that forcing the Dardanelles by using ships alone was a forlorn hope and that the army would be needed to make it a success. Fisher then went on to say that most of the navy were opposed a to an attack by the navy alone, and even produced a letter from Sir Arthur Limpus, the head of Malta dockyard and the former head of the naval mission in Constantinople, also saying that the straits could not be forced without the army. Churchill’s plan was now in disarray – he had not expected his senior admirals to voice such vociferous opposition to the rest of the Council, and the outing of Limpus’ opinions also weighed massively against the plan. If anyone was likely to know whether the straits could be forced by ships alone or not, then Limpus, the man who had spent the last few years defending the straits for Turkey was bound to know. Who would seriously go against the combined wisdom of Fisher, Wilson and Limpus?
The interruption of Fisher had caused great embarrassment for Churchill, who was sure that his great scheme was about to be given the all clear. However, although Fisher had thrown a spanner into the works, he had not suggested a viable alternative. Or had he? Asquith asked whether Wilson and he had a better idea than Churchill’s Dardanelles scheme. Fisher replied that he felt that an amphibious landing on the German coast in the Baltic stood much better chance of success. At the utterance of the words ‘amphibious landing’ Kitchener weighed in and remarked in a monotone way that he had no troops to spare for such an operation. “Not even in May or June this year?” Fisher enquired, implying when he planned for his operation to take place. Kitchener acknowledged that some Territorial divisions would be available at that time but that they would probably be needed on the western front. Field Marshal French interjected and demanded that no extra troops be spared from the western front, insisting that the war would be won there, not with “some harebrained Baltic scheme”. But Kitchener was momentarily grasped by the concept of attacking Germany in the flank, brushed French aside and said that Fisher’s idea should not be discounted.
Asquith sensing that Fisher, the human embodiment of the navy and Kitchener, the human embodiment of the army, were coming together on the issue, asked Churchill whether he would object to a plan being drawn up for a Baltic campaign. Churchill, feeling to an extent that the constitutional nicety that admirals should be answerable to their civilian chief had been broken, replied that he felt that some effort against the Dardanelles should be attempted, even if Fisher, Wilson and Limpus were strongly sceptical. Others, amazed whilst they watched the Admiralty’s infighting burst out into the open, watched as Asquith tried to juggle the navy’s military and civilian chiefs. The debate continued for some time until a compromise was reached: Churchill would allow for the planning of a Baltic campaign, if Fisher would let Churchill launch a limited naval campaign against the Turks in the Dardanelles. The deal was accepted, and Asquith asked Churchill and Fisher to look into the practicality of an amphibious assault on the German Baltic coast, to be presented at the next War Council meeting, where it would be considered. After the meeting terminated, Churchill, sensing that his Dardanelles scheme was losing credibility, took Sir Edward Grey aside and asked him to increase pressure on the Greek government. If one thing could save his plan, Churchill said to the Foreign Secretary, it would be the intervention of Greece in the war on the Entente side.
One reason why Churchill was not too distressed that his Dardanelles plan had come across a rival in the shape of Fisher’s Baltic scheme was because he was quite an advocate of landing in Germany himself, as he demonstrated in his December 1914 letter to Asquith. It was perhaps an exhibition of their similar characters – ruthlessly determined, both self-styled philosophers of grand strategy and unwavering in their desire to ‘run the show’ – that they should compromise by attempting both of their respective plans, and not one or the other. Fisher was apologetic about his antics at the last War Council meeting, but was assured that he did the right thing:
“My dear Winston. So sorry for showing you up in the War Council. But I felt that it had to be done. I have said for weeks that old ships will not reach Constantinople on their own – BUT IT’S WORTH A TRY!, if only once or twice. I cannot for the life of me imagine old Carden on the Queen Elizabeth entering Constantinople. Duckworth tried in 1807 and failed and I do not see improvement where the navy faltered before. The Baltic is THE PLACE to settle the war – I hope you agree!!! Yours until the sun explodes, F.”
Churchill replied sympathetically:
“I am certainly of the opinion that this is an opportune time to strike decisively in the Baltic & that our chances of success would by vy great indeed…if the Dardanelles does not go as planned then a landing in Germany would keep the enemy off balance…”
There was an inherent difficulty in the Churchill-Fisher relationship in so far as they were much too strong for each other, all the while fascinated with one another. On the surface they appeared to be a perfect team: the old admiral with brilliant ideas and the young politician with brilliant flair. But while craving to work with one another, they both desired to not work with one another, to run the navy in the way that they saw fit. Churchill interfered with operational matters, even down to the movements of single ships, and Fisher was renowned as a thrusting and forceful administrator. It was bad luck for both of them that Fisher should return to be faced with working alongside the most operationally interventionist First Lord in the navy’s history. Fisher had always worked with civilian heads with little taste for dabbling in the navy’s day to day affairs, and Churchill had grown used to working with admirals who would agree with him. It was natural that one would have to back down and let the other take ascendancy, and with youth on his side, and extraordinary debating skills, this turned out to be Churchill, much to the chagrin of the Fisher, whose abilities at his age were fading. This began to manifest both at the Admiralty and the War Council as the Dardanelles was discussed, with Churchill somehow managing to bring Fisher round to his opinion, only for the First Sea Lord to reiterate his actual opinion and oppose Churchill’s. Fisher’s performance at the War Council was a reaction to this shift of power, and perhaps a reassertion of the authority that he held a decade before, but there was underlying unease in their compromise. Their agreement that both the Dardanelles and Baltic schemes should be attempted, illustrated quite well how they recognised the strengths in each others characters, and were unwilling, for now, to commit mutual suicide in the form of a personal fall out.
Lord Kitchener noticed before anyone else that Fisher was attempting to leave, and he stood up and guided the disgruntled admiral to a window to ask him where he was going. Whilst the others talked among themselves, Fisher told Kitchener quietly that he did not agree to the Dardanelles scheme and intended to resign. Kitchener told him that he would be the only person in the War Council opposed to the Dardanelles operation and that he should remain silent and accept the decision of the majority, especially as the Prime Minister had already made his mind up. Kitchener asked him to remain at his post and continue serving his country. Fisher thought for a moment whilst not saying anything, turned round briefly and uttered quickly to the War Council “I am opposed”. The room suddenly went quiet at the announcement, as members looked round at the admiral, standing by the window – Fisher, having thought about remaining quiet and going along with the flow of proceedings, had decided differently. Asquith and Churchill were stunned that Fisher, who had kept his doubts quiet for so long, should suddenly announce his thoughts on the Dardanelles at the meeting where the plan would be rubber stamped. Fisher, determined and confident, began to walk back to his chair when Asquith interjected, reminding Fisher that he only was a technical advisor, had no vote on the Council, and was the only person who had voiced their opposition. “I’m not the only one” Fisher replied, looking across to Admiral of the Fleet Sir Arthur Wilson. All eyes in the room were now trained on the War Council’s other great admiral, the former First Sea Lord who sat at the table, proudly wearing the Victoria Cross he had won in the Sudan in 1884. Unsure, Wilson responded with caution that he felt that forcing the Dardanelles by using ships alone was a forlorn hope and that the army would be needed to make it a success. Fisher then went on to say that most of the navy were opposed a to an attack by the navy alone, and even produced a letter from Sir Arthur Limpus, the head of Malta dockyard and the former head of the naval mission in Constantinople, also saying that the straits could not be forced without the army. Churchill’s plan was now in disarray – he had not expected his senior admirals to voice such vociferous opposition to the rest of the Council, and the outing of Limpus’ opinions also weighed massively against the plan. If anyone was likely to know whether the straits could be forced by ships alone or not, then Limpus, the man who had spent the last few years defending the straits for Turkey was bound to know. Who would seriously go against the combined wisdom of Fisher, Wilson and Limpus?
Lord Kitchener walks to Downing Street, 28th January 1915
The interruption of Fisher had caused great embarrassment for Churchill, who was sure that his great scheme was about to be given the all clear. However, although Fisher had thrown a spanner into the works, he had not suggested a viable alternative. Or had he? Asquith asked whether Wilson and he had a better idea than Churchill’s Dardanelles scheme. Fisher replied that he felt that an amphibious landing on the German coast in the Baltic stood much better chance of success. At the utterance of the words ‘amphibious landing’ Kitchener weighed in and remarked in a monotone way that he had no troops to spare for such an operation. “Not even in May or June this year?” Fisher enquired, implying when he planned for his operation to take place. Kitchener acknowledged that some Territorial divisions would be available at that time but that they would probably be needed on the western front. Field Marshal French interjected and demanded that no extra troops be spared from the western front, insisting that the war would be won there, not with “some harebrained Baltic scheme”. But Kitchener was momentarily grasped by the concept of attacking Germany in the flank, brushed French aside and said that Fisher’s idea should not be discounted.
Asquith sensing that Fisher, the human embodiment of the navy and Kitchener, the human embodiment of the army, were coming together on the issue, asked Churchill whether he would object to a plan being drawn up for a Baltic campaign. Churchill, feeling to an extent that the constitutional nicety that admirals should be answerable to their civilian chief had been broken, replied that he felt that some effort against the Dardanelles should be attempted, even if Fisher, Wilson and Limpus were strongly sceptical. Others, amazed whilst they watched the Admiralty’s infighting burst out into the open, watched as Asquith tried to juggle the navy’s military and civilian chiefs. The debate continued for some time until a compromise was reached: Churchill would allow for the planning of a Baltic campaign, if Fisher would let Churchill launch a limited naval campaign against the Turks in the Dardanelles. The deal was accepted, and Asquith asked Churchill and Fisher to look into the practicality of an amphibious assault on the German Baltic coast, to be presented at the next War Council meeting, where it would be considered. After the meeting terminated, Churchill, sensing that his Dardanelles scheme was losing credibility, took Sir Edward Grey aside and asked him to increase pressure on the Greek government. If one thing could save his plan, Churchill said to the Foreign Secretary, it would be the intervention of Greece in the war on the Entente side.
One reason why Churchill was not too distressed that his Dardanelles plan had come across a rival in the shape of Fisher’s Baltic scheme was because he was quite an advocate of landing in Germany himself, as he demonstrated in his December 1914 letter to Asquith. It was perhaps an exhibition of their similar characters – ruthlessly determined, both self-styled philosophers of grand strategy and unwavering in their desire to ‘run the show’ – that they should compromise by attempting both of their respective plans, and not one or the other. Fisher was apologetic about his antics at the last War Council meeting, but was assured that he did the right thing:
“My dear Winston. So sorry for showing you up in the War Council. But I felt that it had to be done. I have said for weeks that old ships will not reach Constantinople on their own – BUT IT’S WORTH A TRY!, if only once or twice. I cannot for the life of me imagine old Carden on the Queen Elizabeth entering Constantinople. Duckworth tried in 1807 and failed and I do not see improvement where the navy faltered before. The Baltic is THE PLACE to settle the war – I hope you agree!!! Yours until the sun explodes, F.”
Churchill replied sympathetically:
“I am certainly of the opinion that this is an opportune time to strike decisively in the Baltic & that our chances of success would by vy great indeed…if the Dardanelles does not go as planned then a landing in Germany would keep the enemy off balance…”
Churchill and Fisher: unable to live with one other; unable to live without one other.
There was an inherent difficulty in the Churchill-Fisher relationship in so far as they were much too strong for each other, all the while fascinated with one another. On the surface they appeared to be a perfect team: the old admiral with brilliant ideas and the young politician with brilliant flair. But while craving to work with one another, they both desired to not work with one another, to run the navy in the way that they saw fit. Churchill interfered with operational matters, even down to the movements of single ships, and Fisher was renowned as a thrusting and forceful administrator. It was bad luck for both of them that Fisher should return to be faced with working alongside the most operationally interventionist First Lord in the navy’s history. Fisher had always worked with civilian heads with little taste for dabbling in the navy’s day to day affairs, and Churchill had grown used to working with admirals who would agree with him. It was natural that one would have to back down and let the other take ascendancy, and with youth on his side, and extraordinary debating skills, this turned out to be Churchill, much to the chagrin of the Fisher, whose abilities at his age were fading. This began to manifest both at the Admiralty and the War Council as the Dardanelles was discussed, with Churchill somehow managing to bring Fisher round to his opinion, only for the First Sea Lord to reiterate his actual opinion and oppose Churchill’s. Fisher’s performance at the War Council was a reaction to this shift of power, and perhaps a reassertion of the authority that he held a decade before, but there was underlying unease in their compromise. Their agreement that both the Dardanelles and Baltic schemes should be attempted, illustrated quite well how they recognised the strengths in each others characters, and were unwilling, for now, to commit mutual suicide in the form of a personal fall out.
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This time, the plan works.
You aren't actually going to land 20 divisions in Pomerania now, are you?
You aren't actually going to land 20 divisions in Pomerania now, are you?
Why strike in the Baltics ?DO you want to end the war quickly ? Just wait for the Americans.Besides it MUST fail.Otherwise ill stop reading your AAR.And the enemy will just throw you in sea quick.
You should put more trust in Allenby, or rather the Generals of the Central Powers... and I think Allenby got your point.Wilhelm VI said:
ptan54 said:
Though woefully ignorant of HoI Grand Strategy, the idea of cutting off the German east front, forcing the withdrawal of west front German divisions sounds quite feasible.
Then again, it might be a stupid madman's scheme.
Actually I would like to see an ahistorical, if you haven't been paying attention the emtire Naval Campaign has been alot more exciting with many naval battles as opposed to the handful of actual naval engagements of WWI. I'd love to see Allenby write about something that never happened in his analytical and historical style!
Part XXI – Genesis of the Baltic campaign
This was not the first time that a campaign in the Baltic had been planned. Indeed, it was not the first time that Sir Arthur Wilson, in particular, had been involved in planning a Baltic campaign. For during his time as First Sea Lord from 1910 to 1911, it was one of his main occupations, and his time as the navy’s military head culminated in a meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence of 1911 where his proposed landing in Pomerania was damned. But that was then. The situation had changed by now, and with many prominent members of the War Council aghast at the thought of protracted campaigning on the western front, the Baltic scheme looked a favourable alternative. It had powerful advocates too – not just Fisher, Wilson and Churchill, but also Hankey, the War Council’s secretary, Sir Charles Callwell, the Director of Military Operations at the War Office, and Sir Julian Corbett, the great naval historian and strategist. “The army is a projectile fired by the navy” Fisher announced in his last spell as First Sea Lord, and many agreed with him. Up until 1905, when the army began to look towards continentalism, of sending the army to France, the War Office had envisaged that the army would be sent to some part of the world by courtesy of the navy. Callwell used the examples of the Peninsula War and the campaign in Crimea as suitable examples that the army should follow, and Corbett was one of the country’s chief advocates of a limited involvement in the continental war, and of striking decisively elsewhere. As a Royal Marine, Maurice Hankey’s thinking was naturally orientated around amphibious landings and argued that this strategy would best go hand in hand with the traditional British policy of waging economic warfare. However, during the previous decade, the Royal Navy had kept plans for a Baltic campaign without consultation with the army – plans for a joint operation committee were spurned as the army began to look towards a possible deployment to France. Furthermore, there were a number of notable difficulties that afflicted both the army and navy in the 1900s which rendered a Baltic campaign impractical.
Otto von Bismarck once remarked that if the British Army landed in Germany, it would “be rounded up by a few Prussian policemen”. Indeed, the British Army’s size was a problem for Britain’s imperial war planners, who knew that maintaining a large conscript army of the type Lord Roberts had campaigned for would be financially inexpedient. Thus, because of the numerical inferiority of the British Army in comparison to its continental rivals, the planners were compelled to ponder upon the question of where the army would have the greatest impact in the event of war. In France, it was believed, the British Army might tip the balance in favour of the Entente, whereas in northern Germany, it would be swallowed up. This was highlighted, not only by the directorate of military operations in 1907 and 1908, but by the Committee of Imperial Defence in 1908 and 1909, and in the well known meeting of 1911. However, it now appeared that the war would last longer than the planners had suspected, and the size of the British Army was beginning to grow, not only with the organisation of Territorials into divisions, but with the great rush of Britons to recruiting stations. With several Territorial divisions ready for deployment, a window of opportunity had appeared in which to use them in a place other than the western front that would at least partially answer the problem of landing a force of a suitable size. Most importantly, however, were Britain’s allies. Although Fisher still envisaged the navy launching the army onto the continent, the circumstances of the war ensured that which army was used in the plan was kept open – it did not necessarily have to be the British Army, for if the Russians and French were willing to provide a force large enough, then the British Army would conceivably not have to take part at all.
Previous planning for a Baltic campaign had envisaged the securing of Heligoland, Borkum or some other island off the north-west coast of Germany, to serve as an advance base for operations in connection with a close blockade. But the inauguration of a distant blockade rendered this objective redundant, and in this renewed Baltic effort, Heligoland and Borkum would be ignored and direct concentration would be placed on the Baltic. Yet if no bases were to be seized in the Heligoland Bight, then how would the German fleet be bottled up in its base? To this, Fisher had a simple answer: it wouldn’t. For Fisher’s Baltic strategy had another purpose – the seeking of a decisive battle with the German fleet. With an army landing in northern Germany, potentially threatening the German navy’s bases, the main battle fleet would be compelled to come out to sea to face the guns of the British dreadnoughts. The battle of the Waddenzee, far from satiating Fisher, had whetted his appetite for a further great sea victory. Although not First Sea Lord at the time, hearing about his dreadnoughts inflicting punishment on the German fleet without visiting total destruction disappointed Fisher. He had built his dreadnoughts for the purpose of sinking the German fleet and was determined to see this come about, even if it involved landing the army in Germany in order to do so. Thus, the Grand Fleet would not only mask the invasion fleet, but would also sail in close to Germany in preparation for a great sea battle. Previously, the idea of pushing the main British battle fleet adjacent to German territory had been debunked on the basis that even losing a single dreadnought to a mine or torpedo would not be worth the risk. However, the victory at the Waddenzee had seen five German dreadnoughts sent to the bottom of the sea, and given the Grand Fleet a crushing preponderance in numbers. By virtue of the victory achieved in August 1914, the British dreadnought had lost value, as the loss of even a handful would not imperil Britain’s control of the sea. To Churchill in particular, and Fisher to an extent, the loss of some dreadnoughts was a price worth paying if it meant that the German fleet could be destroyed – or even the war won.
Fisher and Churchill recognised that the Baltic scheme would be doomed without French or Russian support, and on 1st February, a conference was held at Chantilly, Joffre’s headquarters to discuss what contribution, if any, could be made to the Baltic campaign from France and Russia. Joffre was not enthusiastic, and insisted that every division available should be concentrated on the western front. Churchill, representing the Royal Navy, having just visited Field Marshal French’s chateaux, reminded Joffre in his broken French that an attack on northern Germany would benefit the Entente armies’ position on the western front too, for if the former was a success, then operations in France would be made easier due to the number of German divisions being diverted to deal with the threat from the north. The French prime minister expressed his favour for the plan, and asked Joffre to lend a handful of divisions for the enterprise, whilst demanding from the British that they handle the French divisions’ supply arrangements. To this, Churchill and Kitchener accepted. The Russians were represented by their ambassador to Paris and the Russian attaché to the French Army who gave their provisional support to Russian participation in the scheme, pending confirmation from Stavka. Joffre then announced that he was planning an offensive in the Champagne in March and asked the BEF for its support, but Kitchener intervened and made a case for launching an offensive on the western front in conjunction with the Baltic operations. Joffre would not be moved and insisted upon an offensive in March and asked bluntly whether the British would participate or not. Kitchener declined and said that he would insist that the BEF go onto the offensive in April or May, when the Baltic operations would commence. Joffre went some way to come round to Kitchener’s position when he declared that if the offensive in Champagne succeeded, which he suspected it would, then the French Army would follow this up with further operations to coincide with the landings in Germany. Field Marshal French, unusually taking Kitchener’s side, remarked to Joffre that the BEF required time to recuperate after the operations of 1914, and that if it were to make an offensive, to do so at the same time as an amphibious assault in Germany, would be for the best.
When the Russians confirmed that they would be able to lend support to the Baltic scheme, Fisher and Churchill began to work assiduously on the plan, in conjunction with the War Office. Kitchener confirmed that upward of five Territorial divisions would be ready for operations in early May – this was a far cry from Kitchener’s dogged insistence in the past that not a single man could be spared from service on the western front. A number of factors combined to make British troops available for the enterprise. Unlike the Dardanelles, which demanded immediate action, Fisher was willing to bide his time and wait until May for the execution of the Baltic scheme. Field Marshal French also had a sudden burst of optimism that troubled Kitchener. French, having insisted to Joffre that he would not participate with the French offensives at the Champagne, then announced that he probably would attack in March after all and would make renewed efforts in May to support the Baltic landings. Having met with Joffre, French was now sure that the next offensive on the western front would be a winning one and that the German army was a spent force. Kitchener had no such illusions, and having questioned French’s leadership qualities the previous December, now found himself doing the same in February. Thus, Kitchener was partly motivated by a desire not to put too much trust in French, and by giving some other commander the opportunity to strike at the Germans. For the very fact that the operation would be an attempt against the Entente’s main enemy was what assuaged French, who still insisted that any divisions raised should be sent to France. Essentially, French wanted the divisions to attack the Germans; that they would do the same job but in a different location was enough to moderate French’s opinion.
The Russians confirmed to the Admiralty that they could commit six divisions to the Baltic enterprise and more if the operation met initial success. The French offered three divisions, to go alongside their promise that some sort of effort would be made by the French Army on the western front in May. The French contingent would go to Britain in preparation for the campaign, but the initial landings would be made by the British Army. The Grand Fleet would shield the transportation of four British divisions around the Jutland Peninsula, where an assortment of dreadnoughts, pre-dreadnoughts older cruisers and destroyers would escort the landing craft through the Kattegat, the Great Belt and to the Kieler Bucht, where the divisions would land. The presence of four dreadnoughts with the landing would not only provide adequate protection for the landing, but would be enough to counter any German naval units in the Baltic – it was known by the Admiralty that the Germans had scrapped many of their older coastal defence vessels after the Waddenzee, and that the ones that remained would not match the British dreadnoughts. The next part of the plan would be crucial, as the possibility of the German fleet moving through the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal to counter the invasion could not be discounted. The chances of this were seen as slim – Churchill and Fisher felt that if the German fleet began to sail up the Canal, that it would be vulnerable, not only to the British Army on either side of the Canal, but to the British ships in the Kieler Bucht. Even so, upon landing, the British Army were to work with Royal Marines, Engineers and Pioneer companies to ensure that a number of block ships be sunk in the Canal to prevent the German fleet from making an immediate intervention, as Fisher elaborated:
“…with the Canal bottled up, the German fleet will have to attempt to go round Denmark – but it will not get that far because they shall sally forth into the Heligoland Bight, looking for protection, only to face ANNIHILATION!!!!”
Whilst the remainder of the landing force, including the French, is ferried across the North Sea by components of the Royal Navy, the Grand Fleet would fight – and win – a decisive sea battle in the Heligoland Bight. Any remnants of the German fleet would return to Wilhelsmhaven to face capture by the British Army, for it was hoped that after the landings and the blocking of the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal, that Cuxhaven, Bremerhaven and Wilhelmshaven would be captured before the German Army could arrive in force. Meanwhile, the Russians would land in Pomerania between Stralsund and Kolberg, either side of the Oder, and march on Berlin, which could arguably end the war, as Fisher explained in a letter to Churchill:
“…with 125,000 Russians in Berlin, and Kaiser Bill being able to do NOTHING about it without his flanks collapsing, the war shall be won!! It will only require swift and decisive action!”
This is how Fisher proposed to win the war. He was sure that his plan was sound, but already knew that there was one commander, at least, who would have great misgivings.
This was not the first time that a campaign in the Baltic had been planned. Indeed, it was not the first time that Sir Arthur Wilson, in particular, had been involved in planning a Baltic campaign. For during his time as First Sea Lord from 1910 to 1911, it was one of his main occupations, and his time as the navy’s military head culminated in a meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence of 1911 where his proposed landing in Pomerania was damned. But that was then. The situation had changed by now, and with many prominent members of the War Council aghast at the thought of protracted campaigning on the western front, the Baltic scheme looked a favourable alternative. It had powerful advocates too – not just Fisher, Wilson and Churchill, but also Hankey, the War Council’s secretary, Sir Charles Callwell, the Director of Military Operations at the War Office, and Sir Julian Corbett, the great naval historian and strategist. “The army is a projectile fired by the navy” Fisher announced in his last spell as First Sea Lord, and many agreed with him. Up until 1905, when the army began to look towards continentalism, of sending the army to France, the War Office had envisaged that the army would be sent to some part of the world by courtesy of the navy. Callwell used the examples of the Peninsula War and the campaign in Crimea as suitable examples that the army should follow, and Corbett was one of the country’s chief advocates of a limited involvement in the continental war, and of striking decisively elsewhere. As a Royal Marine, Maurice Hankey’s thinking was naturally orientated around amphibious landings and argued that this strategy would best go hand in hand with the traditional British policy of waging economic warfare. However, during the previous decade, the Royal Navy had kept plans for a Baltic campaign without consultation with the army – plans for a joint operation committee were spurned as the army began to look towards a possible deployment to France. Furthermore, there were a number of notable difficulties that afflicted both the army and navy in the 1900s which rendered a Baltic campaign impractical.
Fisher (left) and Wilson (right) were the chief advocates of a Baltic strategy
Otto von Bismarck once remarked that if the British Army landed in Germany, it would “be rounded up by a few Prussian policemen”. Indeed, the British Army’s size was a problem for Britain’s imperial war planners, who knew that maintaining a large conscript army of the type Lord Roberts had campaigned for would be financially inexpedient. Thus, because of the numerical inferiority of the British Army in comparison to its continental rivals, the planners were compelled to ponder upon the question of where the army would have the greatest impact in the event of war. In France, it was believed, the British Army might tip the balance in favour of the Entente, whereas in northern Germany, it would be swallowed up. This was highlighted, not only by the directorate of military operations in 1907 and 1908, but by the Committee of Imperial Defence in 1908 and 1909, and in the well known meeting of 1911. However, it now appeared that the war would last longer than the planners had suspected, and the size of the British Army was beginning to grow, not only with the organisation of Territorials into divisions, but with the great rush of Britons to recruiting stations. With several Territorial divisions ready for deployment, a window of opportunity had appeared in which to use them in a place other than the western front that would at least partially answer the problem of landing a force of a suitable size. Most importantly, however, were Britain’s allies. Although Fisher still envisaged the navy launching the army onto the continent, the circumstances of the war ensured that which army was used in the plan was kept open – it did not necessarily have to be the British Army, for if the Russians and French were willing to provide a force large enough, then the British Army would conceivably not have to take part at all.
Previous planning for a Baltic campaign had envisaged the securing of Heligoland, Borkum or some other island off the north-west coast of Germany, to serve as an advance base for operations in connection with a close blockade. But the inauguration of a distant blockade rendered this objective redundant, and in this renewed Baltic effort, Heligoland and Borkum would be ignored and direct concentration would be placed on the Baltic. Yet if no bases were to be seized in the Heligoland Bight, then how would the German fleet be bottled up in its base? To this, Fisher had a simple answer: it wouldn’t. For Fisher’s Baltic strategy had another purpose – the seeking of a decisive battle with the German fleet. With an army landing in northern Germany, potentially threatening the German navy’s bases, the main battle fleet would be compelled to come out to sea to face the guns of the British dreadnoughts. The battle of the Waddenzee, far from satiating Fisher, had whetted his appetite for a further great sea victory. Although not First Sea Lord at the time, hearing about his dreadnoughts inflicting punishment on the German fleet without visiting total destruction disappointed Fisher. He had built his dreadnoughts for the purpose of sinking the German fleet and was determined to see this come about, even if it involved landing the army in Germany in order to do so. Thus, the Grand Fleet would not only mask the invasion fleet, but would also sail in close to Germany in preparation for a great sea battle. Previously, the idea of pushing the main British battle fleet adjacent to German territory had been debunked on the basis that even losing a single dreadnought to a mine or torpedo would not be worth the risk. However, the victory at the Waddenzee had seen five German dreadnoughts sent to the bottom of the sea, and given the Grand Fleet a crushing preponderance in numbers. By virtue of the victory achieved in August 1914, the British dreadnought had lost value, as the loss of even a handful would not imperil Britain’s control of the sea. To Churchill in particular, and Fisher to an extent, the loss of some dreadnoughts was a price worth paying if it meant that the German fleet could be destroyed – or even the war won.
Fisher and Churchill recognised that the Baltic scheme would be doomed without French or Russian support, and on 1st February, a conference was held at Chantilly, Joffre’s headquarters to discuss what contribution, if any, could be made to the Baltic campaign from France and Russia. Joffre was not enthusiastic, and insisted that every division available should be concentrated on the western front. Churchill, representing the Royal Navy, having just visited Field Marshal French’s chateaux, reminded Joffre in his broken French that an attack on northern Germany would benefit the Entente armies’ position on the western front too, for if the former was a success, then operations in France would be made easier due to the number of German divisions being diverted to deal with the threat from the north. The French prime minister expressed his favour for the plan, and asked Joffre to lend a handful of divisions for the enterprise, whilst demanding from the British that they handle the French divisions’ supply arrangements. To this, Churchill and Kitchener accepted. The Russians were represented by their ambassador to Paris and the Russian attaché to the French Army who gave their provisional support to Russian participation in the scheme, pending confirmation from Stavka. Joffre then announced that he was planning an offensive in the Champagne in March and asked the BEF for its support, but Kitchener intervened and made a case for launching an offensive on the western front in conjunction with the Baltic operations. Joffre would not be moved and insisted upon an offensive in March and asked bluntly whether the British would participate or not. Kitchener declined and said that he would insist that the BEF go onto the offensive in April or May, when the Baltic operations would commence. Joffre went some way to come round to Kitchener’s position when he declared that if the offensive in Champagne succeeded, which he suspected it would, then the French Army would follow this up with further operations to coincide with the landings in Germany. Field Marshal French, unusually taking Kitchener’s side, remarked to Joffre that the BEF required time to recuperate after the operations of 1914, and that if it were to make an offensive, to do so at the same time as an amphibious assault in Germany, would be for the best.
When the Russians confirmed that they would be able to lend support to the Baltic scheme, Fisher and Churchill began to work assiduously on the plan, in conjunction with the War Office. Kitchener confirmed that upward of five Territorial divisions would be ready for operations in early May – this was a far cry from Kitchener’s dogged insistence in the past that not a single man could be spared from service on the western front. A number of factors combined to make British troops available for the enterprise. Unlike the Dardanelles, which demanded immediate action, Fisher was willing to bide his time and wait until May for the execution of the Baltic scheme. Field Marshal French also had a sudden burst of optimism that troubled Kitchener. French, having insisted to Joffre that he would not participate with the French offensives at the Champagne, then announced that he probably would attack in March after all and would make renewed efforts in May to support the Baltic landings. Having met with Joffre, French was now sure that the next offensive on the western front would be a winning one and that the German army was a spent force. Kitchener had no such illusions, and having questioned French’s leadership qualities the previous December, now found himself doing the same in February. Thus, Kitchener was partly motivated by a desire not to put too much trust in French, and by giving some other commander the opportunity to strike at the Germans. For the very fact that the operation would be an attempt against the Entente’s main enemy was what assuaged French, who still insisted that any divisions raised should be sent to France. Essentially, French wanted the divisions to attack the Germans; that they would do the same job but in a different location was enough to moderate French’s opinion.
The Russians confirmed to the Admiralty that they could commit six divisions to the Baltic enterprise and more if the operation met initial success. The French offered three divisions, to go alongside their promise that some sort of effort would be made by the French Army on the western front in May. The French contingent would go to Britain in preparation for the campaign, but the initial landings would be made by the British Army. The Grand Fleet would shield the transportation of four British divisions around the Jutland Peninsula, where an assortment of dreadnoughts, pre-dreadnoughts older cruisers and destroyers would escort the landing craft through the Kattegat, the Great Belt and to the Kieler Bucht, where the divisions would land. The presence of four dreadnoughts with the landing would not only provide adequate protection for the landing, but would be enough to counter any German naval units in the Baltic – it was known by the Admiralty that the Germans had scrapped many of their older coastal defence vessels after the Waddenzee, and that the ones that remained would not match the British dreadnoughts. The next part of the plan would be crucial, as the possibility of the German fleet moving through the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal to counter the invasion could not be discounted. The chances of this were seen as slim – Churchill and Fisher felt that if the German fleet began to sail up the Canal, that it would be vulnerable, not only to the British Army on either side of the Canal, but to the British ships in the Kieler Bucht. Even so, upon landing, the British Army were to work with Royal Marines, Engineers and Pioneer companies to ensure that a number of block ships be sunk in the Canal to prevent the German fleet from making an immediate intervention, as Fisher elaborated:
“…with the Canal bottled up, the German fleet will have to attempt to go round Denmark – but it will not get that far because they shall sally forth into the Heligoland Bight, looking for protection, only to face ANNIHILATION!!!!”
Whilst the remainder of the landing force, including the French, is ferried across the North Sea by components of the Royal Navy, the Grand Fleet would fight – and win – a decisive sea battle in the Heligoland Bight. Any remnants of the German fleet would return to Wilhelsmhaven to face capture by the British Army, for it was hoped that after the landings and the blocking of the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal, that Cuxhaven, Bremerhaven and Wilhelmshaven would be captured before the German Army could arrive in force. Meanwhile, the Russians would land in Pomerania between Stralsund and Kolberg, either side of the Oder, and march on Berlin, which could arguably end the war, as Fisher explained in a letter to Churchill:
“…with 125,000 Russians in Berlin, and Kaiser Bill being able to do NOTHING about it without his flanks collapsing, the war shall be won!! It will only require swift and decisive action!”
This is how Fisher proposed to win the war. He was sure that his plan was sound, but already knew that there was one commander, at least, who would have great misgivings.
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So, you plan to spend a whole year besieging a single enemy fortress, let half your army die of typhoid, and send your cavalry units on a headlong charge into a valley surrounded on three sides by enemy artillery?Allenby said:
Ohhhh i actually dont mind .If only the Russians would fail.I hope you will meet heavy rssistance.But still the AI always invades on Northern Germany.Couldnt you be a little bit original,like a invasion of Dardanelles ? Or maybe help the Serbs in their invasion of A-H ?
StephenT said:So, you plan to spend a whole year besieging a single enemy fortress, let half your army die of typhoid, and send your cavalry units on a headlong charge into a valley surrounded on three sides by enemy artillery?
Surely not! Mr. Asquith and Lord Kitchener are much more capable than Lord Aberdeen and Lord Raglan.
Wilhelm VI said:
How more original can one get?
It's not as if Northern Germany was ravaged by war between 1914-18 Wilhelm VI said:
I refer you to Chapter XX
Wilhelm VI said:
Honestly. Who'd listen to thing that David Lloyd George has to say?
Lol why doesnt the Russian colapse already ? Will the operation succeed and then making an end the the war leaving an strong and powerful Austria-Hungary and Ottoman Empire behind.
Allenby said:
I know next to nothing about Fisher, but was the chap really as unstable as you portray him?
TheBee said:I know next to nothing about Fisher, but was the chap really as unstable as you portray him?
Many historians, including Eric Grove, agree that he was slightly mad, judging from how he used to act. For example, when he was C-in-C of the Mediterranean Fleet in 1900, he used to stand about on the decks of his flagship Renown wearing an advertising board with the words "Give me something to do" written on it. He seems a touch bonkers just looking at his letter writing - important words and phrases laced with four or five underlines, written in italics and so on.
You know... Bonkers... rhymes with... conkers... so everyonr that plays... conkers are... bonkers!