I thought the line:Vincent Julien said:
"Maude became one of the hundreds of general officers in the British Army killed on the western front."
Was fairly unambiguous, but perhaps I'm just jumping to conclusions on that one.
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"Maude became one of the hundreds of general officers in the British Army killed on the western front."
Was fairly unambiguous, but perhaps I'm just jumping to conclusions on that one.
Vincent Julien said:
Not at all far-fetched... the Portuguese lost loads on the Western Front IRL...
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_La_Lys
Earl Uhtred said:
Lawks. What compelled them to get involved in that deathtrap in the first place?
EitherVincent Julien said:
1. von Lettow-Vorbeck raiding into Portuguese Mozamibque while trying to avoid being captured/having to fight the British
2. Noticing that Germany was on the ropes and deciding to try and nick bits of German colonial Africa in the peace with a contribution to the Western Front.
Or, my favourite,
3. Which is 1. as an excuse to disguise 2.
And so 4 years of blood, sweat and tears draws to an end.
It's been an interesting ride
It's been an interesting ride
At the very least, Elsass-Lothringen will be ceded to France, though perhaps reparations are definitely in order. No cession of Westpreussen und Posen to the Poles, though - we don't want to completely humiliate the Germans, just weaken them like the French post-Vienna.
Allenby said:The project is bequeathed to you!
I humbly and with great reverence accept
The TGW 1.1 mini-mod v.3 will be released soon and lots of new TGW sprites!!!
Dr Rare
P.P.P.S, I love the fact that the Serbs are now defending a whole stretch of Austro-Hungarian territory.
Great update Allenby
A very fine attack by the Allies and especially by the British army. I see that the British sure has learnt a lot from their latest advances and now they sure are doing very well when they attack. Interesting to see that the Germans are interested in peace, but I fear that if the politicians try too much they will have to face the army staging a coup.
Shall be interesting to see how all this turns out…
A very fine attack by the Allies and especially by the British army. I see that the British sure has learnt a lot from their latest advances and now they sure are doing very well when they attack. Interesting to see that the Germans are interested in peace, but I fear that if the politicians try too much they will have to face the army staging a coup.
Shall be interesting to see how all this turns out…
Great update there, really great stuff. A terrific advance, although the American's seem to have gotten a bloody nose in the process, but then again in time.
El Pip said:
To be fair, the units comprising the AEF were attached to British units before being grouped into independent forces.
The reaction to Bülow's plea is in the next update!
Vann the Red said:
Thank you ever so much!
SirCliveWolfe said:
Don't think I am going to stop just as soon as the war is over.
There is far too much to tidy up afterwards to allow that.Kurt_Steiner said:
Like any good man, the Allies will ensure that the recipient swallows instead of spits.
TheExecuter said:
Well now, Germany has not surrendered yet! If these terms are turned down by the Allies, then get ready for a last ditch defence of the Vaterland and the continuation of the war through the summer!
TheExecuter said:
1914 has barely progressed at all in the past month and a half - I have not really worked on it at all.
The Russian revolution problem was fixed some time ago - the biggest difficulties now are AI-orientated and I see no solution.
Vincent Julien said:
Part fix, part stunt could be one interpretation. Although it could also be a basis for negotiation if one sees that Bülow is attempting to put the subject of peace on the agenda whilst hard bargaining at the same time.
Prufrock451 said:
Yes! Assuming that the Germans are able to summon the numbers, the firepower and the morale to mount an effective counterattack. But I suppose that anything is possible if there are weakpoints in the Allied line.
Lord_Robertus said:
You're expecting the Allies to accept the German terms and call it quits already?
...or do you see it as the beginning of the end?There is still a lot that could happen.
aussieboy said:
It would depend, to a great extent, on how strong the Poles are - and, of course, what kind of truce is agreed to in the first place. Compromise over Eastern Europe?
Dr Rare said:
Hurrah!
Vincent Julien said:
Yes, it is rather an irony! Although it would be pointed out to the most Austrophobic Serb that it is simply a form of forward defence.
Lord E said:
Thank you, E-man!
Yes, don't discount the possibility of a split between civil and military authority and the latter choosing to lock the former out of governance entirely. Ludendorff still has a great deal of power.
Sir Humphrey said:
Thanks! Quite right, the AEF is bound to improve the more it fights. It is fortunate to be taking on an enemy that is much weaker than in 1914 or 1915.
Just spotted it, Allenby, another fine update! I'm tempted to wonder how dangerous that German attack is in Central Europe...36 divisions against 60+?! Or is it a quality difference...
Mettermrck said:
Thank you! The German divisions are of exceptional quality. As a force, it is probably on a par with the Austro-Hungarian army despite the inferiority of its size.
CXV – Peace Overture; Mons Again
The revelation of Bülow’s terms for peace provoked considerable interest in Allied countries. The 13th March proposal would form not the basis of further negotiation in the aftermath of an armistice but the settlement of harmony in Europe itself. By offering to withdraw from Austria-Hungary, Belgium and France, the German government had issued their most magnanimous terms for peace since the outbreak of war. Like others, Lloyd George had interpreted the reappointment of Bülow to the Chancellorship as a steadying act rather than an attempt to end the war. Common assumption had it that Bülow would complement the ascendancy of Hindenburg and Ludendorff, not detract from it. Thus, the communication of peace terms came as a surprise despite the recent advance made by Haig in France. The Prime Minister recognised the potential for mischief, admitting that the German terms, by conceding Belgium, gave Britain what she had officially entered the war for in August 1914. Those most vocal in favour of immediate peace, the Union of Democratic Control among them, were expected to escalate their campaign now that Germany was preparing to retreat to its western and southern borders. A spectator from the sidelines, Lord Kitchener opined that ‘Prince Bülow’s overture is the first step towards a settlement in Europe that will bring lasting peace between Great Britain and Germany.’ The unprecedented generosity of the terms had not escaped notice, but it was widely recognised by most as a German bid to obtain Allied recognition of her dominance in Eastern Europe. Focusing on imperial defence and playing upon the notion expounded since the Russian Revolution that the Bolsheviks were German pawns, the Assistant Secretary to the War Cabinet Leo Amery warned Lloyd George that acceptance of the terms set out by Bülow would allow Germany and Russia to menace the British Empire in the future. Curzon commented that allowing Germany to control the hinterlands of Eastern Europe would render Austria-Hungary strategically vulnerable. The Foreign Secretary doubted that the empire could retain effective independence from Germany under such circumstances and that Britain would be confronted with the same dilemma as had existed in the days of the Dreikaiserbund. These considerations guaranteed that Bülow’s gesture was given short shrift in London.
Clemenceau flatly turned down the German peace terms
The reaction to the German peace drive in other Allied capitals was similar. Lacking any mention of Alsace-Lorraine, Clemenceau gave it his immediate rejection, whilst acknowledging the ammunition it would give to followers of the former Prime Minister, Joseph Caillaux, who were calling for peace. The Tiger was committed to a peace settlement that guaranteed the destruction of Germany’s war-making potential and having fought for his entire career for the return of the lost provinces, could not accept a return to the borders of 1914 under any circumstances. He also detected the attempt by Germany to obtain from the Allies a free hand in Russia and warned of its perils, insisting to his colleagues that if Germany were able to harness the vast resources of Eastern Europe that France could never be safe from attack. In Washington D.C., President Roosevelt brushed aside the German approach, branding Bülow’s proposal ‘impertinence’ for implying that German troops in the east should be authorised to remain at their posts to exert Berlin’s control. The ‘three points’ outlined by the President before Congress in January had been disdainfully ignored by the German Chancellor. Like Clemenceau, Roosevelt could not tolerate an agreement with Germany that left her in a position to threaten Europe in the future and regarded the imposition of a democratic constitution – his second ‘point’ – as a vital necessity for taming German power, commenting to Secretary of War Elihu Root that the ‘acceptance of Prince Bülow’s terms will strengthen the tendency in Germany towards Prussian militarism.’ The recipients of the German offer could not help but notice that Bülow was proposing a peace without reparations. Although this was equally unpalatable to all Allied leaders, it particularly disgusted Clemenceau, whose country had undergone pillage and to a lesser extent, Lloyd George, who was committed to retrieving compensation for the sinking of merchant vessels. Coming shortly after the advance of the BEF in France, the peace bid was ill-timed and Allied leaders recognised it as a manifestation of German weakness. ‘Prince Bülow’s démarche’ Carson wrote, was ‘an opportunistic ploy to transform a military reverse into a diplomatic victory.’ The Allies comprehensively rejected the German offer just days after receiving it. By doing so, they had committed themselves to demanding German withdrawal to her 1914 borders at the very least before peace negotiations could even begin. Scolded by the brusque Allied rejection, Bülow confided his intention to reduce the generosity of his next offer, gambling that Allied public opinion would agitate their governments to accept the comparably munificent terms of 13th March when confronted by Germany’s strengthened resolve.
British troops continue their advance into Belgium
As the German peace proposal was being considered and rejected, the Allies continued to press the German Army in the west. King Albert’s Army Group, consisting of the British Second Army of General Maxse and his own Belgian Army, attacked the River Lys on 15th March. After a two day engagement, the Belgians broke down the German defences and entered Ghent before pushing along the north bank of the Scheldt. Maxse undertook the responsibility of crossing the Lys itself, with Albert asking General Horne to provide support with his First Army. Lieutenant-General Pulteney’s III Corps was in the forefront of the offensive, with heavy guns being concentrated under his command. After a surprise bombardment, 4th Division undertook an infantry assault across the river along a short frontage whilst covered by accurate artillery fire. Reaching the south bank, the men of 4th Division forced back the German defenders and established a bridgehead. Later, bridges across the Lys were seized to prevent their destruction by the Germans, permitting the rapid transport of the remainder of III Corps to the south of the river. Facing pressure from Pulteney’s III Corps in the north and Horne’s First Army in the west, the Germans retreated, settling on the River Escaut on 18th March. The British pursued them to Oudenarde, where Marlborough had famously defeated the French in 1708. At a conference convened quickly after the victory at Courtrai, Generals Maxse, Horne and Rawlinson agreed to attack the Germans again before their positions on the Escaut could be strengthened. Maxse hurriedly planned an operation almost identical to that carried out at the Lys, again working with Lieutenant-General Pulteney and allotting his III Corps with the responsibility of leading the attack. 4th Division launched its attempt to cross the Escaut on 20th March, facing tougher opposition from the Germans than it had confronted on the Lys. Despite the unexpectedly stern German resistance, the British were established across the Escaut by 22nd March and the Germans had withdrawn yet again. Further south, General Lomax’s Third Army resumed its advance, having paused for nearly a fortnight. His target was the symbolic town of Mons, where he had commanded 1st Division in the BEF’s first battle in 1914. After a series of brief engagements with the German Army along the Mons-Condé Canal to the west of Mons, the Germans withdrew from the town, abandoning it to the British. A squadron of cavalry swept into the town centre followed by British infantry, the streets decked with Union and Belgian flags and thronging with delirious civilians. Later, Lomax entered the town in a staff car to oversee a ceremony after Mons was secured. Following a parade of British troops, the Mayor of Mons addressed Lomax, announcing exultantly that “we witnessed the wonderful retreat of the British Army from here. We knew it would return.” Lomax paused only briefly before planning further operations, for Haig had ordered him to advance on the tenuously held German line north of the town.
Lieutenant-General Pulteney, commander of III Corps
British troops enter Mons
Surveying the recent battles, Haig wrote in his diary that ‘the discipline of the German Army is quickly going, and the German officer is no longer what he was. It seems to me to be the beginning of the end…If we act with energy now, a decision can be obtained in the very near future.’ Later he commented optimistically that ‘the Enemy is in such a state that we can run all kinds of risks without any chance of [the] Enemy hitting back in any force.’ Haig opted not to hold back, hoping to test the spirit and fighting capabilities of the German Army by aiming to capture Brussels. The BEF commander-in-chief devised orders that envisaged four British armies converging on the Belgian capital. Maxse’s Second Army was to approach from the northwest, Horne’s First and Rawlinson’s Fourth were to advance in the centre and Monash’s Seventh was ordered by Haig to advance from the southeast. Although Albert had hoped to advance on Brussels with his own army, Haig persuaded the Belgian King to continue his push towards Antwerp and support the British left flank. With the German Army holding hastily organised defensive positions, the British generals were optimistic at the prospects of success. Their offensive plans materialised quickly, not requiring the weeks of meticulous preparation that had characterised operational planning in circumstances of trench warfare. Aspiring to make good progress, Maxse placed 3rd Division, commanded by the ultra-aggressive Major-General Cyril Deverell in the vanguard of his advance on Brussels. This formation, untested in combat in 1918, was raring to fight. Supported by heavy artillery, bombers and cooperating with tanks, Deverell’s troops smashed a hole through the thin German defences, inflicted heavy casualties, captured thousands of prisoners and seized Aalst on 25th March. Concerting their offensive with Maxse, Horne and Rawlinson pushed against the shallow defences of the German Army east of the recently forded River Escaut. At Ninove, ten miles from Brussels, Rawlinson engaged the enemy on 26th March and inflicted a stinging defeat in a one day battle, causing the Germans to retreat to Roosdaal. Rawlinson attacked them here the next day, forcing the Germans to undertake another withdrawal, this time to the outskirts of the Belgian capital itself. The quickest advance was achieved by Monash’s Seventh Army, which advanced through Leuze-en-Hainaut and Ath. Most prominently, 1st Australian Division, having fought in several engagements with the Germans in successive days, reached Waterloo on 28th March, threatening Brussels from the south. Shocked by the swift British advance, Ludendorff defiantly ordered that Brussels be defended at all costs. To the concern of Hindenburg, Ludendorff recommended that the German Army fight in the streets of Brussels if necessary. With Maxse threatening the supply routes into the city from the north, Monash doing the same in the south and Horne and Rawlinson approaching from the west, the German Army was at risk of losing tens of thousands of troops. Under such circumstances, General von Xylander saw little wisdom in keeping his force in the Belgian capital and countermanded the orders of Ludendorff, withdrawing on 30th March and falling back to Louvain.
British troops entering Brussels were welcomed with the same enthusiasm as had greeted the liberators of Mons. Belgian flags, Union flags, Tricolours and Stars and Stripes were hung from windows as British infantry marched into the city centre behind a battle-scarred tank to tumultuous cheering and the throwing of flowers from Belgian civilians. As General Maxse’s direct superior, King Albert had played a significant part in the recapture of Brussels and took centre stage when he entered the city on 31st March, having visited his official residence at Laeken the day before. A guard of honour was arranged for the entering King, who arrived wearing a drab Belgian Army uniform to loud cheers from the assembled crowd. Having remained at the head of his truncated army and lived in the tiny slither of unoccupied Belgium since 1914, the credit of King Albert among the public had never stood so high. There was more cause for joy when General Sixt von Armin, recognising the danger presented by the capture of Brussels and not wanting his army to be pinned against the Dutch frontier, chose to surrender the port of Antwerp to the advancing Belgian Army. Supported by British artillery and aircraft, the Belgians had pressed the Germans hard along the north bank of the Scheldt for several days and had reached the outskirts of Antwerp when the German Army relinquished control. On the French sector of the line, General Lyautey had concentrated on eliminating German salients as a precursor to a general thrust into enemy held territory. General Debeney’s Seventh Army and General Mangin’s Sixth Army launched a colossal attack against German positions south of the Aisne, overwhelming the fixed defences and reaching their objective within three days on 26th March. Another attack was undertaken by General Fayolle’s Fourth Army against the protruding German salient between the rivers Meuse and Moselle. Here, German resistance was stronger than exhibited anywhere else in March, with the French Army taking eleven days of bloody fighting to force the Germans back. With the AEF having suffered heavily during the operations to capture La Fère and Laon, General Wood demanded more discipline from his inexperienced forces. Yet it was paradoxical that whilst he hoped for improved planning and performance, more armies were being introduced to the front line to expand the numerical presence of the AEF. Observing that the war was reaching a crucial stage, Wood believed that American manpower could prove decisive in the coming months. The commander-in-chief of the AEF was undeterred by the minimal training undergone by many American recruits, activating Third Army under General Liggett and placing it between Pershing’s Second Army and Duchêne’s French Ninth Army. Wood hoped to square the circle of his force’s inexperience and his heightened demands by burdening the AEF’s most experienced units and giving his armies a narrow frontage on which to fight. On 20th March, the AEF attacked the German front line with gusto after a mighty bombardment which saw the firing of more ammunition than had been expended by the Union in the American Civil War. The units which had served at the front since mid-1917 led the assault, with the more inexperienced formations undertaking either holding or supporting roles. Fighting was intense as the Americans pressed the Germans along the length of the front. Casualties were high, but the Americans fought with much greater skill than they had a month previously. By 27th March, the AEF had forced its dispirited enemy back to new positions twenty miles west of Charleville-Mézières, compelling OHL to relocate its headquarters to the Belgian town of Spa. For Wood, this outcome had made the operation worthwhile – the hasty movement of the German high command served as visible expression of the worsening state of the German Army.
General Wood addressing American troops in France
Field Marshal Conrad, having played such an important role in advocating war before 1914, now played a key role in events that would directly compel Germany to consider ending it in 1918. As the German Army withdrew in the west, the offensive in Central Europe ground to a complete halt on 24th March. Prague and Kuttenberg were still in possession of the Allies. Conrad had become the indomitable defender of a vulnerable empire under assault. With the German Army bogged down on the Elbe, hopes of a swift destruction of Austria-Hungary evaporated. Austrian agitation within the empire against fighting Germany became muted as the fortunes of the German Army fluctuated from early success to immobility. Supported by the Allies and bolstered by military success, the Austro-Hungarian Empire would not fold imminently. Whilst Hindenburg coolly weighed up the options before Germany with Bülow, Ludendorff despaired. The news that General von Xylander had surrendered Brussels on 30th March enraged Ludendorff, his hopes of exhausting the enemy in defensive operations dashed, lamenting the declining spirit of the German Army. These developments forced Ludendorff to declare that the war was lost and to recommend that Germany focused on self-preservation amidst revolutionary spirit at home. Believing that an armistice was necessary to save Germany, he suggested that the German government accede to President Roosevelt’s second ‘point’ – granting a democratic constitution – with the aim of inviting the socialists to assume a share of the responsibility for governing the country. The spectre of revolution would be exorcised by adopting parliamentary government and the socialist critics of the war would be tainted by any humiliation that would ensue. Saved from destruction by the Allies, the Army would be the sword to protect the German state from Bolshevism. The Kaiser believed that a truce on this basis would be a capitulation and harboured hopes that a French Revolutionary levée en masse could be adopted in a last ditch defence of the Second Reich. Although supported by the prominent industrialist Walther Rathenau in this proposal, his principal prop, Bülow, was not entirely unsympathetic to what Ludendorff had proposed, regarding it as a temporary expedient to save Germany in extraordinary circumstances. Although reluctant to accept full democratisation of the country, Bülow recognised the potential of burdening the left with the weight of the war effort and the opprobrium of defeat if it occurred. The Chancellor toyed with the idea of resigning instead of working with the socialists, but was dissuaded from doing so by Count Schulenburg. Bülow realised that Ludendorff would be infinitely empowered by his departure and that as Chancellor, he would be in a position to obstruct the excesses of the socialists and temper their demands in the future. Thus, Bülow remained, determined to act as a guardian of the monarchy and in particular, the reign of Wilhelm II.
Canadian troops rest during their advance
The deteriorating position of Germany, both in the field against the enemy and at home where the public yearned for peace, had forced its senior politicians and soldiers to agree upon a strategy of democratising and disengaging from the war. Having hoarded power in Germany since his accession to prominence as Quartermaster-General in 1916 and having brought his country to the edge of ruin through his single-minded determination to assert German supremacy in Europe, Ludendorff prepared to encumber civilian government with the burdensome task of tidying the mess. Yet although the German Army had been convincingly outfought and had stumbled from setback after setback, it had not sustained a decisive, catastrophic defeat at the hands of the Allies. On the occasion of every Allied advance, the German Army had withdrawn without collapsing and had often fought tenaciously. The British had sustained another 50,000 casualties since 15th March. As General Wilson wrote, ‘the Boche army is shaken and tired…but it is not beaten.’ Lloyd George, whilst surprised and delighted at the continuing success of the British Army, remained concerned by the situation in Central Europe and believed that Germany was still determined to fight. The Prime Minister wrote that although he could expect ‘another mischievous pronouncement from Bülow’ on the subject of peace, he speculated that the bargaining position of the Allies might only improve dramatically if the German Army was utterly routed in battle.
The revelation of Bülow’s terms for peace provoked considerable interest in Allied countries. The 13th March proposal would form not the basis of further negotiation in the aftermath of an armistice but the settlement of harmony in Europe itself. By offering to withdraw from Austria-Hungary, Belgium and France, the German government had issued their most magnanimous terms for peace since the outbreak of war. Like others, Lloyd George had interpreted the reappointment of Bülow to the Chancellorship as a steadying act rather than an attempt to end the war. Common assumption had it that Bülow would complement the ascendancy of Hindenburg and Ludendorff, not detract from it. Thus, the communication of peace terms came as a surprise despite the recent advance made by Haig in France. The Prime Minister recognised the potential for mischief, admitting that the German terms, by conceding Belgium, gave Britain what she had officially entered the war for in August 1914. Those most vocal in favour of immediate peace, the Union of Democratic Control among them, were expected to escalate their campaign now that Germany was preparing to retreat to its western and southern borders. A spectator from the sidelines, Lord Kitchener opined that ‘Prince Bülow’s overture is the first step towards a settlement in Europe that will bring lasting peace between Great Britain and Germany.’ The unprecedented generosity of the terms had not escaped notice, but it was widely recognised by most as a German bid to obtain Allied recognition of her dominance in Eastern Europe. Focusing on imperial defence and playing upon the notion expounded since the Russian Revolution that the Bolsheviks were German pawns, the Assistant Secretary to the War Cabinet Leo Amery warned Lloyd George that acceptance of the terms set out by Bülow would allow Germany and Russia to menace the British Empire in the future. Curzon commented that allowing Germany to control the hinterlands of Eastern Europe would render Austria-Hungary strategically vulnerable. The Foreign Secretary doubted that the empire could retain effective independence from Germany under such circumstances and that Britain would be confronted with the same dilemma as had existed in the days of the Dreikaiserbund. These considerations guaranteed that Bülow’s gesture was given short shrift in London.
Clemenceau flatly turned down the German peace terms
The reaction to the German peace drive in other Allied capitals was similar. Lacking any mention of Alsace-Lorraine, Clemenceau gave it his immediate rejection, whilst acknowledging the ammunition it would give to followers of the former Prime Minister, Joseph Caillaux, who were calling for peace. The Tiger was committed to a peace settlement that guaranteed the destruction of Germany’s war-making potential and having fought for his entire career for the return of the lost provinces, could not accept a return to the borders of 1914 under any circumstances. He also detected the attempt by Germany to obtain from the Allies a free hand in Russia and warned of its perils, insisting to his colleagues that if Germany were able to harness the vast resources of Eastern Europe that France could never be safe from attack. In Washington D.C., President Roosevelt brushed aside the German approach, branding Bülow’s proposal ‘impertinence’ for implying that German troops in the east should be authorised to remain at their posts to exert Berlin’s control. The ‘three points’ outlined by the President before Congress in January had been disdainfully ignored by the German Chancellor. Like Clemenceau, Roosevelt could not tolerate an agreement with Germany that left her in a position to threaten Europe in the future and regarded the imposition of a democratic constitution – his second ‘point’ – as a vital necessity for taming German power, commenting to Secretary of War Elihu Root that the ‘acceptance of Prince Bülow’s terms will strengthen the tendency in Germany towards Prussian militarism.’ The recipients of the German offer could not help but notice that Bülow was proposing a peace without reparations. Although this was equally unpalatable to all Allied leaders, it particularly disgusted Clemenceau, whose country had undergone pillage and to a lesser extent, Lloyd George, who was committed to retrieving compensation for the sinking of merchant vessels. Coming shortly after the advance of the BEF in France, the peace bid was ill-timed and Allied leaders recognised it as a manifestation of German weakness. ‘Prince Bülow’s démarche’ Carson wrote, was ‘an opportunistic ploy to transform a military reverse into a diplomatic victory.’ The Allies comprehensively rejected the German offer just days after receiving it. By doing so, they had committed themselves to demanding German withdrawal to her 1914 borders at the very least before peace negotiations could even begin. Scolded by the brusque Allied rejection, Bülow confided his intention to reduce the generosity of his next offer, gambling that Allied public opinion would agitate their governments to accept the comparably munificent terms of 13th March when confronted by Germany’s strengthened resolve.
British troops continue their advance into Belgium
As the German peace proposal was being considered and rejected, the Allies continued to press the German Army in the west. King Albert’s Army Group, consisting of the British Second Army of General Maxse and his own Belgian Army, attacked the River Lys on 15th March. After a two day engagement, the Belgians broke down the German defences and entered Ghent before pushing along the north bank of the Scheldt. Maxse undertook the responsibility of crossing the Lys itself, with Albert asking General Horne to provide support with his First Army. Lieutenant-General Pulteney’s III Corps was in the forefront of the offensive, with heavy guns being concentrated under his command. After a surprise bombardment, 4th Division undertook an infantry assault across the river along a short frontage whilst covered by accurate artillery fire. Reaching the south bank, the men of 4th Division forced back the German defenders and established a bridgehead. Later, bridges across the Lys were seized to prevent their destruction by the Germans, permitting the rapid transport of the remainder of III Corps to the south of the river. Facing pressure from Pulteney’s III Corps in the north and Horne’s First Army in the west, the Germans retreated, settling on the River Escaut on 18th March. The British pursued them to Oudenarde, where Marlborough had famously defeated the French in 1708. At a conference convened quickly after the victory at Courtrai, Generals Maxse, Horne and Rawlinson agreed to attack the Germans again before their positions on the Escaut could be strengthened. Maxse hurriedly planned an operation almost identical to that carried out at the Lys, again working with Lieutenant-General Pulteney and allotting his III Corps with the responsibility of leading the attack. 4th Division launched its attempt to cross the Escaut on 20th March, facing tougher opposition from the Germans than it had confronted on the Lys. Despite the unexpectedly stern German resistance, the British were established across the Escaut by 22nd March and the Germans had withdrawn yet again. Further south, General Lomax’s Third Army resumed its advance, having paused for nearly a fortnight. His target was the symbolic town of Mons, where he had commanded 1st Division in the BEF’s first battle in 1914. After a series of brief engagements with the German Army along the Mons-Condé Canal to the west of Mons, the Germans withdrew from the town, abandoning it to the British. A squadron of cavalry swept into the town centre followed by British infantry, the streets decked with Union and Belgian flags and thronging with delirious civilians. Later, Lomax entered the town in a staff car to oversee a ceremony after Mons was secured. Following a parade of British troops, the Mayor of Mons addressed Lomax, announcing exultantly that “we witnessed the wonderful retreat of the British Army from here. We knew it would return.” Lomax paused only briefly before planning further operations, for Haig had ordered him to advance on the tenuously held German line north of the town.
Lieutenant-General Pulteney, commander of III Corps
British troops enter Mons
Surveying the recent battles, Haig wrote in his diary that ‘the discipline of the German Army is quickly going, and the German officer is no longer what he was. It seems to me to be the beginning of the end…If we act with energy now, a decision can be obtained in the very near future.’ Later he commented optimistically that ‘the Enemy is in such a state that we can run all kinds of risks without any chance of [the] Enemy hitting back in any force.’ Haig opted not to hold back, hoping to test the spirit and fighting capabilities of the German Army by aiming to capture Brussels. The BEF commander-in-chief devised orders that envisaged four British armies converging on the Belgian capital. Maxse’s Second Army was to approach from the northwest, Horne’s First and Rawlinson’s Fourth were to advance in the centre and Monash’s Seventh was ordered by Haig to advance from the southeast. Although Albert had hoped to advance on Brussels with his own army, Haig persuaded the Belgian King to continue his push towards Antwerp and support the British left flank. With the German Army holding hastily organised defensive positions, the British generals were optimistic at the prospects of success. Their offensive plans materialised quickly, not requiring the weeks of meticulous preparation that had characterised operational planning in circumstances of trench warfare. Aspiring to make good progress, Maxse placed 3rd Division, commanded by the ultra-aggressive Major-General Cyril Deverell in the vanguard of his advance on Brussels. This formation, untested in combat in 1918, was raring to fight. Supported by heavy artillery, bombers and cooperating with tanks, Deverell’s troops smashed a hole through the thin German defences, inflicted heavy casualties, captured thousands of prisoners and seized Aalst on 25th March. Concerting their offensive with Maxse, Horne and Rawlinson pushed against the shallow defences of the German Army east of the recently forded River Escaut. At Ninove, ten miles from Brussels, Rawlinson engaged the enemy on 26th March and inflicted a stinging defeat in a one day battle, causing the Germans to retreat to Roosdaal. Rawlinson attacked them here the next day, forcing the Germans to undertake another withdrawal, this time to the outskirts of the Belgian capital itself. The quickest advance was achieved by Monash’s Seventh Army, which advanced through Leuze-en-Hainaut and Ath. Most prominently, 1st Australian Division, having fought in several engagements with the Germans in successive days, reached Waterloo on 28th March, threatening Brussels from the south. Shocked by the swift British advance, Ludendorff defiantly ordered that Brussels be defended at all costs. To the concern of Hindenburg, Ludendorff recommended that the German Army fight in the streets of Brussels if necessary. With Maxse threatening the supply routes into the city from the north, Monash doing the same in the south and Horne and Rawlinson approaching from the west, the German Army was at risk of losing tens of thousands of troops. Under such circumstances, General von Xylander saw little wisdom in keeping his force in the Belgian capital and countermanded the orders of Ludendorff, withdrawing on 30th March and falling back to Louvain.
British troops entering Brussels were welcomed with the same enthusiasm as had greeted the liberators of Mons. Belgian flags, Union flags, Tricolours and Stars and Stripes were hung from windows as British infantry marched into the city centre behind a battle-scarred tank to tumultuous cheering and the throwing of flowers from Belgian civilians. As General Maxse’s direct superior, King Albert had played a significant part in the recapture of Brussels and took centre stage when he entered the city on 31st March, having visited his official residence at Laeken the day before. A guard of honour was arranged for the entering King, who arrived wearing a drab Belgian Army uniform to loud cheers from the assembled crowd. Having remained at the head of his truncated army and lived in the tiny slither of unoccupied Belgium since 1914, the credit of King Albert among the public had never stood so high. There was more cause for joy when General Sixt von Armin, recognising the danger presented by the capture of Brussels and not wanting his army to be pinned against the Dutch frontier, chose to surrender the port of Antwerp to the advancing Belgian Army. Supported by British artillery and aircraft, the Belgians had pressed the Germans hard along the north bank of the Scheldt for several days and had reached the outskirts of Antwerp when the German Army relinquished control. On the French sector of the line, General Lyautey had concentrated on eliminating German salients as a precursor to a general thrust into enemy held territory. General Debeney’s Seventh Army and General Mangin’s Sixth Army launched a colossal attack against German positions south of the Aisne, overwhelming the fixed defences and reaching their objective within three days on 26th March. Another attack was undertaken by General Fayolle’s Fourth Army against the protruding German salient between the rivers Meuse and Moselle. Here, German resistance was stronger than exhibited anywhere else in March, with the French Army taking eleven days of bloody fighting to force the Germans back. With the AEF having suffered heavily during the operations to capture La Fère and Laon, General Wood demanded more discipline from his inexperienced forces. Yet it was paradoxical that whilst he hoped for improved planning and performance, more armies were being introduced to the front line to expand the numerical presence of the AEF. Observing that the war was reaching a crucial stage, Wood believed that American manpower could prove decisive in the coming months. The commander-in-chief of the AEF was undeterred by the minimal training undergone by many American recruits, activating Third Army under General Liggett and placing it between Pershing’s Second Army and Duchêne’s French Ninth Army. Wood hoped to square the circle of his force’s inexperience and his heightened demands by burdening the AEF’s most experienced units and giving his armies a narrow frontage on which to fight. On 20th March, the AEF attacked the German front line with gusto after a mighty bombardment which saw the firing of more ammunition than had been expended by the Union in the American Civil War. The units which had served at the front since mid-1917 led the assault, with the more inexperienced formations undertaking either holding or supporting roles. Fighting was intense as the Americans pressed the Germans along the length of the front. Casualties were high, but the Americans fought with much greater skill than they had a month previously. By 27th March, the AEF had forced its dispirited enemy back to new positions twenty miles west of Charleville-Mézières, compelling OHL to relocate its headquarters to the Belgian town of Spa. For Wood, this outcome had made the operation worthwhile – the hasty movement of the German high command served as visible expression of the worsening state of the German Army.
General Wood addressing American troops in France
Field Marshal Conrad, having played such an important role in advocating war before 1914, now played a key role in events that would directly compel Germany to consider ending it in 1918. As the German Army withdrew in the west, the offensive in Central Europe ground to a complete halt on 24th March. Prague and Kuttenberg were still in possession of the Allies. Conrad had become the indomitable defender of a vulnerable empire under assault. With the German Army bogged down on the Elbe, hopes of a swift destruction of Austria-Hungary evaporated. Austrian agitation within the empire against fighting Germany became muted as the fortunes of the German Army fluctuated from early success to immobility. Supported by the Allies and bolstered by military success, the Austro-Hungarian Empire would not fold imminently. Whilst Hindenburg coolly weighed up the options before Germany with Bülow, Ludendorff despaired. The news that General von Xylander had surrendered Brussels on 30th March enraged Ludendorff, his hopes of exhausting the enemy in defensive operations dashed, lamenting the declining spirit of the German Army. These developments forced Ludendorff to declare that the war was lost and to recommend that Germany focused on self-preservation amidst revolutionary spirit at home. Believing that an armistice was necessary to save Germany, he suggested that the German government accede to President Roosevelt’s second ‘point’ – granting a democratic constitution – with the aim of inviting the socialists to assume a share of the responsibility for governing the country. The spectre of revolution would be exorcised by adopting parliamentary government and the socialist critics of the war would be tainted by any humiliation that would ensue. Saved from destruction by the Allies, the Army would be the sword to protect the German state from Bolshevism. The Kaiser believed that a truce on this basis would be a capitulation and harboured hopes that a French Revolutionary levée en masse could be adopted in a last ditch defence of the Second Reich. Although supported by the prominent industrialist Walther Rathenau in this proposal, his principal prop, Bülow, was not entirely unsympathetic to what Ludendorff had proposed, regarding it as a temporary expedient to save Germany in extraordinary circumstances. Although reluctant to accept full democratisation of the country, Bülow recognised the potential of burdening the left with the weight of the war effort and the opprobrium of defeat if it occurred. The Chancellor toyed with the idea of resigning instead of working with the socialists, but was dissuaded from doing so by Count Schulenburg. Bülow realised that Ludendorff would be infinitely empowered by his departure and that as Chancellor, he would be in a position to obstruct the excesses of the socialists and temper their demands in the future. Thus, Bülow remained, determined to act as a guardian of the monarchy and in particular, the reign of Wilhelm II.
Canadian troops rest during their advance
The deteriorating position of Germany, both in the field against the enemy and at home where the public yearned for peace, had forced its senior politicians and soldiers to agree upon a strategy of democratising and disengaging from the war. Having hoarded power in Germany since his accession to prominence as Quartermaster-General in 1916 and having brought his country to the edge of ruin through his single-minded determination to assert German supremacy in Europe, Ludendorff prepared to encumber civilian government with the burdensome task of tidying the mess. Yet although the German Army had been convincingly outfought and had stumbled from setback after setback, it had not sustained a decisive, catastrophic defeat at the hands of the Allies. On the occasion of every Allied advance, the German Army had withdrawn without collapsing and had often fought tenaciously. The British had sustained another 50,000 casualties since 15th March. As General Wilson wrote, ‘the Boche army is shaken and tired…but it is not beaten.’ Lloyd George, whilst surprised and delighted at the continuing success of the British Army, remained concerned by the situation in Central Europe and believed that Germany was still determined to fight. The Prime Minister wrote that although he could expect ‘another mischievous pronouncement from Bülow’ on the subject of peace, he speculated that the bargaining position of the Allies might only improve dramatically if the German Army was utterly routed in battle.
!!! Brussels and Antwerp have fallen...is this a sign of the end? Will the German Army be...*cough*...'stabbed in the back'? I can't wait until your next update, Allenby.
I can't wait until your next update, Allenby.
Ah...the opening of the 'mobile phase' of combat in the west. Congratulations on cracking into Brussels...one can only hope that Ludendorff can continue to make such mistakes as ordering the troops to defend something 'to the last man' or some such foolishness. You've also made some rumbling about an upcoming French offensive? If so, the Germans may be in for a nasty surprise!
Hoping for the best...Get the boys home by Christmas!
TheExecuter
Hoping for the best...Get the boys home by Christmas!
TheExecuter
I have to say, the fall of Brussles and Antwerp, but its still a long way to Berlin, at any distance. A cunning plan indeed on behalf of the German leadership, whether it works or not is another factor.
A sterling success, but I suspect that there's quite a way to go yet before peace can finally descend. I wonder if there will be a Kaiserschlacht in this TL?