1914-1924 'British interests; British honour; British obligations'

TheExecuter said:

Ah...I see the light. Thanks for your explanation, the idea that Britain and the US would be intended to SHARE power completely escaped me. Thanks!

Click to expand...

I suppose it rests on whether one regards the distribution of power as being strictly a zero-sum game.

Sir Humphrey said:

Right, that was so super cool.

Click to expand...

aussieboy said:

Heh, I'd be more for a lenient peace with Germany... you don't want to go into overkill, then you get the intervention of a tiny Oesterreichische corporal...

Click to expand...

After four years of wanton destruction I suspect that a lenient peace will be electorally unviable for the Allied governments.

El Pip said:

No overkill is precisely the way to go, several hundred small city state sized countries each with the military power of say, Monaco, would be safest. Then it doesn't matter who comes to power in one of the many Bavaria-lets because there's piss all they can do.

Click to expand...

I am sure that the advocates of returning Germany to the 14th century will have a hearing at the peace conference.

Vincent Julien said:

So what's Pershing doing at the moment? Sitting at home and masturbating? Or something else? Can't imagine he took the 'loss' of the western front command to Wood very well. Mabye the Demycrayts could run him in '20?

Click to expand...

Pershing will appear in the update after next. I am not sure if there is too much chance of him being a presidential candidate - he would be rather obscure as a candidate in this timeline and he historically owed his rapid promotion in the 1900s to Roosevelt.

Mettermrck said:

Right...now that I've seen Allenby appear and post, I want to add my desire for an update to the deluge in this thread.

Click to expand...

I am glad that you are still keeping an eye on this thread, Met. I guarantee you that I will finish it before I die.

Vincent Julien said:

Hmm, well, assuming TR dies at the same time he did in OTL, then Harding would automatically become President, unless something happened to him before then (God forbid!) or he resigned. (Eminently possible considering the people Harding hung out with.) If that was the case, then Charles Evans Hughes as Secretary of State would be first in line to succeed....

Click to expand...

So many possibilities. I may not make any rational choice grounded in reason at all but leave it to the toss of a coin.

Now imagine the fun that could be had if Harding didn't die and won a second term?

Jalex said:

No sharing of power long live the British Empire!

An invasion will teach those Yankees whose boss

Click to expand...

What a sensible idea!

CXIII – Curzon and the dismantling of the Sykes-Picot Agreement

The armistice reached between the Allies and the Ottoman Empire brought the question of a peace treaty into sharp focus. Having secured a share of the spoils of victory by the agreements of 1916 and 1917 without having contributed extensively to the campaigns against the Ottoman Empire, the French and Italian governments anticipated ending the state of war with the Turks and collecting their winnings. Uncomfortably for Curzon, the veteran French Ambassador in London, Paul Cambon raised the subject of peace with the Ottomans after a banquet in the first week of January 1918. With the Austro-Hungarians and Bulgarians at peace and the Turks insulated from German interference, Cambon speculated that it was an opportune time to settle with the Porte. Cambon proceeded to emphasise the benefit of a prompt peace treaty to the Allies by pointing out that numerous divisions would be freed for deployment against the Germans. This approach was part of a cleverly laid ambush, for Cambon had also met the Italian Ambassador, Marquis Imperiali, with a view of putting up a united front on the subject. Imperiali also pressed the Foreign Secretary on the matter during the course of the evening. In response to both, Curzon was predictably non-committal, maintaining a calm air of mystery but in fact in despair of the vexatious attitude of the French and Italians and utterly unwilling to countenance the implementation of the Sykes-Picot and Cairo agreements, which he regarded as obsolete in the new circumstances of British military hegemony in the Middle East. Curzon described them dismissively to Lloyd George as ‘a fancy sketch to suit a situation that had not yet arisen.’ Now that the Ottomans were defeated, he argued, a more realistic arrangement had to be found. Fortunately for Curzon, many in London were of a like-minded disposition. Lloyd George was equally adamant that Arabia should be British and the Eastern Committee of the Cabinet, which included the arch imperialists Lords Milner and Selborne, reported that it was crucial for British interests that France be excluded from the Middle East. Curzon endorsed these findings and summarised his thoughts on the subject in a memorandum that was distributed to members of the War Cabinet prior to their meeting on 14th January 1918.

The Foreign Office sought to overturn the Sykes-Picot Agreement​

Curzon’s case for reneging on the Sykes-Picot Agreement was helped by apposite timing. In the aftermath of the Russian Revolution, Lenin had revealed the terms of the Sykes-Picot Agreement which the former Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Sazonov had signed, for propaganda purposes. Suspicion was aroused in Britain and the Middle East that Britain and France had indulged in a cynical carve-up of the Ottoman Empire, resonant of the 1885 Berlin Conference and the Scramble for Africa. Accusations that the Allies were fighting a war of imperial conquest surfaced. In Constantinople, Admiral Beatty reported to the Admiralty in a document to be circulated to the Foreign Office that the revelation of the terms of the deal had caused considerable disquiet in the city and elsewhere in Anatolia and that a number of members of the Ottoman government were greatly disturbed at the implications of the agreement. Curzon exploited the embarrassment to the Allies caused by the actions of the Bolshevik government by advocating a complete revision of the Middle East settlement. It was no longer practical, Curzon insisted to his Cabinet colleagues, to implement an agreement that had been revealed to the public by a regime seeking to amass political capital from the discomfiture of the Allies. The Foreign Secretary was confidently aware that British opinion, both in government and publicly, supported his outlook. In Cairo, the Arab Bureau remained trenchantly anti-French, cherishing its ambition for a united Arabia under British tutelage. It worked constantly to strengthen bonds between Britain and the Arab nationalist movement whilst trying to distance King Hussein and Prince Feisal from the French. Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Townshend, temporarily commanding British forces in the Near East, reported in October 1916 from Palestine that Arab public opinion was uniformly anti-French. Curzon, with a polite nod to Sykes’ arguments in favour of self-determination, interpreted this as an Arab plea for British governance and made reference to Townshend’s report in his memorandum. Departmental figures at the War Office, the Admiralty and Churchill’s flourishing Air Department unanimously agreed that the French should be marginalised in the Middle East. Of the major figures at the Foreign Office, only the worldly-minded Lord Robert Cecil, the Under-Secretary of State remained an enthusiast for the Sykes-Picot Agreement. Even Sykes himself had come to the opinion since the Bolshevik Revolution that the Agreement was an embarrassment that ought to be modified to take account of current circumstances.

Sir Mark Sykes had come to admit that the Sykes-Picot Agreement was an anachronism​

With respect to Arabia, Curzon encountered little argument against the contention that the Sykes-Picot and Cairo agreements were ill-suited to form the basis of a peace treaty with the Ottoman Empire. Bonar Law, Carson, Smuts and Barnes all agreed with Lloyd George who remarked that the agreements were “altogether most undesirable from the British point of view”. Balfour, having listened to the deliberations in complete silence, suddenly pointed out that the Allies had agreed that conquered territories were to be grouped for later distribution and not annexed by those who occupied them. The august former Prime Minister then argued, customarily without conviction, that given the Sykes-Picot and Cairo agreements bore the signatures of representatives of the British government, to dishonour them could wreck Allied trust in Britain’s word. Relations with France, he insisted, could be damaged unnecessarily. Although Bonar Law confirmed that the idea of pooling territories had been agreed upon, he did not alter his opinion that the agreements ran counter to British interests. Curzon found Balfour’s reminder awkward but cleverly retorted that prematurely allotting territorial claims irrespective of military effort in the same manner of the agreements contradicted the concept of pooling territory to the same degree that selfishly keeping conquered territory did. Although the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary were agreed upon the desirability of achieving a British Arabia, they differed strongly on Anatolia. In part, this reflected the different attitudes to the Ottoman Empire that had long been held by Liberals and Conservatives. Disdain of Turkey and the championing of Greek nationalism had become a liberal tradition in the Victorian era. Meanwhile, Conservatives had often identified the support of Turkey with the defence of the British Empire. Neither Lloyd George nor Curzon departed from these conceptions. The Prime Minister despised Turkey and was imbued with classicism. He was enthusiastic at the prospect of expanding Greek and Italian domains in Anatolia at the expense of the Ottomans. For the Greeks, he was particular fond. Lloyd George envisaged a Hellenised Anatolia and the revival of the Greece of antiquity in the twentieth century, a new fount of civilisation and progress in a land previously governed by despotism. Curzon could only regard a partition of Turkey as a danger. He had initially toyed with the idea of dismembering Turkey to draw rival powers away from Arabia, but had now decided conclusively in favour of a united Turkey instead. Curzon told the War Cabinet that partitioning the ethnically homogenous Turkish heartland would be unacceptable to its inhabitants and inspire the mistrust of Muslims throughout the world. Strategically, it would be sensible to support a united Turkey to counter the nefarious influence of Bolshevism emanating from Russia. In detail, Curzon’s memorandum outlined how Anatolia should be settled in future. The Foreign Secretary sought to rescind the Greek claim to Smyrna and compensate them with Thrace and numerous Aegean Islands instead. He believed that Italian claims to Anatolia were ill-founded and unworthy of consideration. France, he wrote, should be encouraged to undertake a protectorate in Armenia whilst removing her claims to Cilicia and Syria. Constantinople, where the Turks were an ethnic minority, should be internationalised and governed by representatives of the Allied powers.

Admiral Beatty reported that the revelation of Allied agreements on the
Ottoman Empire had caused considerable concern throughout Anatolia​

The summary placed before the War Cabinet provoked considerable interest and Curzon obliged his colleagues by talking about the projected arrangements in greater detail, mentioning his personal experience of Anatolia with tiresome regularity. The War Cabinet was treated to an informed lecture by the Foreign Secretary who was soon in his element addressing the meeting lengthily about the various peoples of the Ottoman Empire and their distinctive traits and preferences. Nevertheless, the War Cabinet could not agree upon their desiderata for Anatolia, for Lloyd George, still somewhat dazzled by the idea of a sprawling Greek empire, was keen to reward the Greeks for their military efforts. They were, however, agreed that negotiations for a peace treaty with the Turks should be delayed until the conclusion of war with Germany, reasoning that squabbles over the future of the Ottoman Empire could only cause Allied disharmony. Curzon felt that he had made considerable progress and was content to delay the French and Italians, confiding to his ally Selborne that it enabled him to buy time with which to both undermine the French in the Levant and to wean Lloyd George from his Hellenophilia. When Cambon and Imperiali pressed the Foreign Secretary again on the subject of an Ottoman peace treaty, Curzon informed them that the revelation of the Sykes-Picot Agreement by the Bolsheviks rendered it a dead letter and that a vindictive peace with the Turks would undermine the Allies in her dealings with Austria-Hungary, which had placed her trust in a generous peace. The Germans, Curzon insisted, could not be allowed to score a propaganda coup by the Allies dismembering the Ottoman Empire whilst Germany bestowed ‘self-determination’, however dubious, upon the people of Eastern Europe. When they met at the Foreign Office, Cambon informed Curzon how painful it would be for France to be denied of her historic rights in Syria, especially when Britain had recognised them under the terms of the agreements. Irritated, Curzon replied that the entire matter would have to be postponed until after the war. In advocating delay, Curzon had recruited a surprise ally in the form of the Greeks. Encouraged by the exit of Russia from the war, Prime Minister Venizelos believed that an adjournment of peace negotiations would allow time for Greece to increase their demands. Now that Russia had forfeited its claim to Constantinople, Venizelos could eye up the Ottoman capital. Thus, in handling the French, Curzon utilised two distinct weapons. Whilst he made insincere use of self-determination, believing that British-guided Arab nationalism could thwart French intentions in Syria, he used Greek ambition to justify delay without having any sympathy for the reasons that lay behind the Greek government’s motive. The Foreign Secretary had worked to undermine the French in Syria since assuming the post and had made explicit to successive British military commanders in the region to cooperate with Prince Feisal and the Arabs in establishing a civil administration for routine administration irrespective of French protests. Although a French officer, Colonel Brémond was present at the side of Feisal in Damascus to give advice and represent the interests of France, Colonel Lawrence worked hard to brief against the French. Consequently, to the despair of Brémond, Feisal ignored his advice and leant upon the British for support. Whilst the Quay d'Orsay fumed, Curzon looked on approvingly as the French position in Syria weakened.

The British government moved quickly in early 1918 to counter the source of danger emanating from the Caucasus, where the collapse of Russian authority had permitted the establishment of republics in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Power struggles between Bolsheviks and anti-Bolsheviks in each of these countries had ensued, causing considerable confusion to outside observers. The situation in Persia was also uncertain, with a nationalist government in power in Tehran and the Bolsheviks having exposed the 1907 Anglo-Russian Convention that detailed the nature of the duopoly exercised in the country. Always mindful of British security in Asia, Curzon was eager to take measures to protect British interests from the Bolsheviks and the encroachments of the Germans, who possessed troops on Russian soil. Suspicious that the Bolsheviks and the Germans were acting in concert, Curzon sought to pre-empt the possibility of the Caucasus being transformed into a German outpost. These fears were well founded, for the German government was in urgent requirement of the agricultural produce and oil resources of the Caucasus to fuel the German war effort, now facing a stern test with the defeat of Austria-Hungary. Yet the German move to establish dominance over the Caucasus was not driven by resource considerations alone. The German government recognised the opportunity to threaten the British in Asia in the same way that the Allies threatened Germany in Central Europe. Even as Germany stood alone, Hindenburg and Ludendorff were positive about the prospects of reaching a favourable negotiated settlement with the Allies in 1918 that would permit her to use the Caucasus as a future staging post for enhancing her influence in the Middle East. As Curzon correctly realised, the more ambitious policymakers in Berlin aspired to use the propaganda value of the Allied occupation of Constantinople, seat of the Caliphate and a military presence in the Caucasus to direct pan-Islamism against the British in India. With the threat of German interference and the prominence of Bolshevik forces in the Caucasus, the Cabinet required little prompting to sanction a British military expedition to the area to bolster elements hostile to Germany and the Bolsheviks. Chamberlain at the Admiralty reminded his colleagues of the importance of oil for the navy; the necessity of denying resources to the Germans was apparent to all. Consequently, Major-General Dunsterville was appointed to lead a small expedition of a thousand troops and forty armoured vehicles to Tiflis in order to safeguard British interests. Furthermore, British units in occupation of western Anatolia were notified to make preparations for redeployment to the Caucasus at a moment’s notice. Lloyd George and Curzon were making every precaution to ensure British dominance of the region for the foreseeable future. Stéphen Pichon, the Foreign Minister of France, commented with interest that the British decision to act in the Caucasus, combined with the demise of Russia and the Ottoman Empire, ‘heralds the growth of England’s position in status as a Black Sea power in addition to her long-standing commitment as a Mediterranean power.’

Vincent Julien said:

Nice work. It'll be interesting to see what happens next.

As you've already kept a few noticeable figures going past their historical times of death - von Spee, Kitchener - you could play around with a few others as well. (Although those so far have generally been war casualties rather than natural deaths.)

I'd personally like to see a Hughes Presidency purely for the simple reason that I don't believe I've ever seen one before, and it would certainly be of interest to see how it played out in such a detailed and exceptional timeline as yours.

Click to expand...

Kitchener probably has a few miles in him, undoubtedly. Lomax is another who has lived beyond his historic death date (1915).

Regarding a Hughes Presidency, you might be interested in a work alternate history called "Mr. Hughes Goes to War" It can be found with a bit of Googling.

Vann the Red said:

Fascinating, Allenby. I suspect there are at the very, very least some harsh words coming between France and Great Britain over Syria.

Click to expand...

Any harsh words will be reserved for the peace conferences, I should think.

Remember that Clemenceau is PM - he has no interest in Syria whatsoever.

Sir Humphrey said:

Looks like the tendrils of empire are spreading ever further, and it will be interesting to see the Arab response to it all, after the war that is.

Click to expand...

The Arab nationalist wind has been sewn and now we shall have to reap the whirlwind.

Kurt_Steiner said:

The Dunsterforce is on the way.... those little details are the one which makes this AAR so great.

And now... something different.

I guess that Turkey is going to have hard times with the Allies, who, in their turn, are going to have a lot of internal dissension. Ah, the greedy empires...

Click to expand...

Thank you for your compliment.

Well the Allies would not regard it as greed. They would treat it as just rewards for their efforts.

Lord E said:

Very interesting and fascination to read how England reacts to the end of war and peace. I see a much more offensive world player, and I am glad to see that the deal with the French was scrapped. The French has not done any of the work and therefore they should not be given any of the winnings either. Shall be interesting to see if you can keep all the British interests in the Middle East satisfied while at the same time making sure not to force any Allies and neutrals away from you and into the German camp.
But I am sure of one thing, when this war is over we shall see a British Empire that will continue to rule the waves

Click to expand...

There will certainly be an empire the size and status of which will have never been higher, but whether it will be inclined to get extensively involved in foreign matters remain to be seen. Retrenchment usually follows massive military exertions.

Lord_Robertus said:

I think the words we are looking for here are Imperial Overstretch

Click to expand...

I'm sure HM Treasury can find some money for long-standing commitments in the Caucasus. It's rich in oil, after all!

comac said:

Having lurked around here since the very beginning, as the War winds down it is now time to chime in and say that if there was a Pulitzer Prize for AAR's, then Allenby should be the undisputed front-runner. British interests; British honour; British obligations has morphed from an incredibly detailed original narritive to what has become an outstanding stand-alone alternate history novella. Good Shooting Allenby, I'm honoured that you continue to share your creativity with us.

Still love TGW too...

Click to expand...

Thank you! I am very much honoured by your kind words - I am most glad that you continue to find this to be a source of interest and enjoyment. I assure that I shall persist with this until I am finished.

As for TGW, I am surprised that anyone still plays it! I am uninstalling my version as soon as I have finished my game.

Funkatronica said:

yup another great update allenby, have a drink on all of us!

Click to expand...

With pleasure!

Funkatronica said:

curzon seems like an amazing figure here, just how can he be rewarded properly after the war i wonder?

Click to expand...

Curzon's stature within the Unionist Party would be sky high at this juncture. Perhaps he is considering how post-war politics will be arranged?

aussieboy said:

I'd say offer British protection and economic agreements with Armenia and Azerbaijan in exchange for protection against the damned Bolsheviki...

Click to expand...

...and if the Bolsheviks threaten Armenia and Azerbaijan, Britain will be at war with the Soviets! Will Britain ever be at peace?

Iron_Skull said:

France should definitly get Syria, the war on the Western front earns them that prize...

Click to expand...

France certainly deserves reward for her efforts in the western theatre! But where? If not Syria, the French colonial lobby will go bezerk...

SirCliveWolfe said:

I would say that the British deserve everything they've faught for, especially asfter holding so much of the line in flanders... no BEF = no France

Seriously though I think that the arab's should have a large and unified state under the protection of someone... and the Brits look to be the most favored.

Click to expand...

Equally, it might be the case that no France = no British reinforcements available to fight the Turks.

There are still enemies of the 'big Arabia' concept - most of them lurking in the corridors of the India Office who will work night and day to undermine the scheme. They might be among those who would like to see the French in Syria.

Vincent Julien said:

(France will almost certainly get Syria, and, as I suggested earlier, it's much more likely that Italy will get the Dalmatian Coast here and a possible Croatian state under their protection.)

Click to expand...

Interestingly, that would probably conflict with what others, TR most notably, want to achieve in Central Europe with respect to Austria-Hungary.

Square pegs, round holes. There are going to be some disappointed countries.